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Introduction
Secret Histories
My first contact with the American war in Vietnam was Michael Herr’s Dispatches.
I was in my final year studying toward a B.A. in Ancient W orld Studies when I took a seminar 
in ancient Greek warfare, which spurred a general, if light, interest in the history o f war. 
Following a friend’s recommendation, I then watched the HBO miniseries Band of Brothers, 
about American paratroopers in W orld War II, which hooked me completely—I think I watched 
episode 6 daily for about two weeks. Gorging on Tumblr posts and forum entries about the show 
and the real-life soldiers whose story it followed, I also began looking at more and more combat 
photography, which soon became a hobby in the form of a small private blog where I collected 
pictures from all the major twentieth-century conflicts. Around the same time, I also happened 
to read the memoir from Afghanistan and Iraq by a British ex-soldier (and Oxford English 
graduate) Patrick Hennessey, The Junior Officers’ Reading Club, in which he briefly mentions 
Dispatches (1977) as “the best writing on war, ever, period.” It wasn’t long before I bought and 
read the book. I loved it.
Prior to Dispatches, I had no real knowledge about the war in Vietnam, only a vague awareness 
o f it. Born and educated in Poland, I never learnt about it at school. I had seen Apocalypse Now 
and Full M etal Jacket—although my father, a great lover o f war films, always said that he didn’t 
like Vietnam movies much. The iconic Vietnam photographs were of course lodged somewhere
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in my consciousness along with a sense o f what they depicted, as they probably are in the minds 
o f most Westerners. But Dispatches was the first real contact. Trudging through the dense 
paragraphs and the monsters o f sentences, I was as enthralled with Herr’s language, so unlike 
any other writer’s, as I was with the Vietnam W ar he described: dazzling, mysterious, ironic, 
brimming with enigmatic meanings, terrible and beautiful, sexy, almost mythical. W ith my blog 
growing and the prospect o f choosing a topic for my M.A., which I would write in an English 
department, I decided to focus on the photography from Vietnam. As this thesis proves, I have 
stayed with that war for some years.
I’m writing all this because I want to use my own story of gaining a knowledge of Vietnam to 
make a point. In Dispatches, Herr wrote about what he called the “secret history” o f the war. 
W hat he meant was the very senselessness o f the death and suffering o f American soldiers, on 
insignificant battlefields o f a bad war fought incorrectly and for wrong reasons, buried, the way 
Herr saw it, under the official languages o f military and government propaganda, and left largely 
uncovered by much of the wartime press.
But what Herr probably couldn’t have foreseen was that in the decades since the publication 
of Dispatches at the end o f the 1970s, a different secret history of the war would come into being.
Beginning from nothing and proceeding from Dispatches, the research I conducted for my 
M.A. consisted of studies o f the Vietnam-era media, and included also some brief, mostly fact- 
based histories o f the war, and volumes and articles dedicated to its presence in American pop 
culture and literature. For a long time, the image of Vietnam that Herr’s book had planted in 
my mind continued to grow and clarify. It was only when, starting to think about my PhD 
dissertation, I began reading other novels and memoirs o f the war that I began noticing certain 
patterns that troubled me. Perhaps because I’m not American, or perhaps because my own 
politics were evolving, I could not always easily sympathize with the protagonists o f these texts 
or see them as the victims the authors portrayed them to be, and my curiosity turned to the 
representations o f the Vietnamese civilians, which I thought to be formulaic and instrumental. 
M ost directly, however, the idea for this thesis comes from an old Time article, titled “An 
American Tragedy,” which described the massacre o f several hundred Vietnamese civilians by 
an American infantry company. The title perplexed me, and the question irked me: just how, 
and why, does one brand an event like My Lai an American tragedy?
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Meanwhile, when I had familiarized myself with some of the “canon” of Vietnam literature 
scholarship, I made my way to other studies, like Jim Neilson’s Vietnam and American Cultural 
Narrative, Katherine Kinney’s Friendly Fire, and the recent volumes edited by Brenda Boyle, which 
offered more critical, sometimes radical, readings o f that literature. From there, my research led 
me finally to cultural and political studies that traced the mainstream American discourses of 
the 1980s that effectively rewrote the very history of the Vietnam W ar in the United States. 
These were especially those related specifically to that war, like H. Bruce Franklin’s MIA, Edwin 
M artini’s Invisible Enemies, Jerry Lembcke’s Spitting Image, Patrick Hagopian’s The Vietnam War 
in American Memory, or Kendrick Oliver’s The My Lai Massacre, but also works that concerned 
Ronald Reagan’s presidency, the rise o f neoconservatism, the recent history of U .S. foreign 
policy, and so forth. The single most important transformation of the Vietnam cultural narrative 
that all these studies recorded was the primacy of the American veteran as the victim of Vietnam, 
at the cost o f purging much of the progressive legacy of the 1960s and the war—and of the history 
that accounts fully for the destruction of Vietnam and the suffering o f the Vietnamese people at 
the hands o f Americans. This is now the secret history of the war in Vietnam, and the time it 
took me—quite literally working backwards—to discover it, testifies, I hope, to its burial in the 
mainstream knowledge of the war. Going back to the histories and other accounts o f the war by 
Noam  Chomsky and Edward Herman, James William Gibson, Frances FitzGerald, Gloria 
Emerson, or Philip Jones Griffiths jump-starts the process o f uncovering this secret history.
I have since read Dispatches several times, and, frankly, if I were to take five books with me to 
a desert island, it would very probably still be among them. But, as I imagine, a certain 
disillusionment is usually the price one pays for picking something dear as a subject o f a doctoral 
dissertation. I don’t think Michael Herr should be held entirely responsible for his book’s 
complicity in the rewriting of the war; his was, after all, only one voice, and a particularly self­
conscious one at that—just one that proved particularly popular and influential. Rather, the 
canonical American Vietnam literature, though problematic in itself, was inscribed into the 
modified cultural narrative o f the war emerging in the 1980s largely through its validation in 
literary criticism and scholarship, an ideologically-motivated process which Jim Neilson traced 
in his 1998 study Warring Fictions.
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Neilson looked at the ways in which reviewers and scholars had discussed the literature about 
the Vietnam War, authored by American writers and published between 1975 and 1990. His 
overarching argument was that what those critics wrote about the books was rooted in an 
ideological system of judging artistic merit, compliant with the discourses o f talking about 
Vietnam—and about the United States—which were “permissible” at the time. The upshot of 
those “safe” readings was to turn the newly-emerged canon of American Vietnam W ar literature 
politically impotent. O n the one hand, Neilson argued, this was because those privileged 
interpretations disregarded any politicized content in the books as well as ignored the problems 
with the narratives themselves: their solipsism, their racism, their metaphysical rendering of 
recent, unfinished history. O n  the other hand, however, the books that were published, 
positively reviewed, and then analyzed academically—the books that entered the canon, in other 
words—themselves conformed to the dominant discourses, eschewing the potential for radical 
criticism that the war in Indochina had once offered. Instead, the books turned obsessively 
inward, their torments and concerns mostly limited to American soul-searching, as well as 
American casualties, real and symbolic.
The present thesis returns to the canonical texts o f American Vietnam W ar literature and 
cinema to assess them as narratives engaging in establishing victimhood. The books discussed 
include Michael Herr’s Dispatches, the works o f Tim O ’Brien and Larry Heinemann, Philip 
C aputo’s A  Rumor of War, James W ebb’s Fields of Fire, John Del Vecchio’s The 13th Valley, Gustav 
Hasford’s The Short-Timers, and Ron Kovic’s Born on the Fourth of July; among the films considered 
are Apocalypse Now, Platoon, Full-Metal Jacket, Casualties of War, and Good Morning, Vietnam. W hat 
these narratives share, apart from the praise and attention they have received, is chronology. 
Even those o f the Vietnam-related American-perspective books that were published in the 1990s 
and have received some recognition, like Stewart O ’N an ’s novel The Names of the Dead (1996), 
have not been canonized as the literature o f the war. In fact, all the Vietnam books, both fiction 
and non-fiction, that would enter the war’s American canon were published by the mid-1980s, 
with the exception of Tim O ’Brien’s The Things They Carried which in 1990 seemed to 
symbolically close the decade o f vital creative rendering of the war. The contemporaneous 
commercial and academic critical response to these texts helped, in accordance with the 
mechanisms described by Neilson, to not only cement their significance as illuminating with
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regards to the war, but also to direct the readership toward specific interpretations o f the conflict 
and its “symbolism.”
N ot all academic literary criticism dealing with the Vietnam W ar has been along the lines 
disapproved of by Neilson, o f course.1 In the meantime, other well-received literatures o f the war 
have also emerged and entered the Vietnam W ar literary scholarship, their position evinced by 
recent edited volumes dedicated in equal measure to narratives o f American, Vietnamese, and 
American-Vietnamese authorship (Boyle 2015c; Boyle and Lim 2016; Heberle 2009). The 1990s 
and 2000s saw the publication in the U .S . o f important Vietnamese accounts o f the war, 
including Le Ly Hayslip’s When Heaven and Earth Changed Places (1989); Bao N inh ’s The Sorrow 
of War (1990, English trans. 1994); Duong Thu Huong’s Novel without a Name (1991, English 
trans. 1995); and Dang Thuy Tram ’s Last Night I Dreamed of Peace (2005, English trans. 2007). 
A t the same time, several popular and bestselling post-war Vietnamese and American- 
Vietnamese memoirs and novels have also been released, dealing with the war’s aftermath in 
Asia and the experiences o f the Vietnamese refugees and diaspora in the United States. Viet 
Thanh Nguyen’s The Sympathizer (2015)—a novel whose narrator, a North Vietnamese spy in the 
South and an immigrant to the U .S., bridges several Vietnamese viewpoints and identities—is a 
recent example, and one received particularly enthusiastically, winning several awards including 
the Pulitzer.
The Sympathizer assumes an interesting perspective: against the established canon. O ne critic 
notes, for example, that it “reads like the absolute opposite o f Tim O ’Brien’s The Things They 
Carried, the clipped, cool fragmentary narrative that has long served as the canonical U .S. literary 
account” o f the war, and calls Nguyen’s novel a “globally minded reimagining” o f it (Boyagoda 
2016). Philip Caputo, reviewing the book for the New York Times, observes that the Americans 
have tended to consider the war in Vietnam as a “solely American dram a,” and adds that the 
literature and especially cinema have “reflected” it by largely excluding the perspectives o f the 
Vietnamese (the admonition encompasses, I presume, his own canonical memoir). Caputo 
concludes that Nguyen has managed to “de-Americanize the portrayal o f the war” (2015). In an 
interview with NPR, Nguyen himself speaks about his ambivalence, as a man born in Vietnam 
and raised in the U .S. as a child o f refugees, towards the American portrayals o f the war he saw 
as a teenager in films like Rambo, Platoon and Apocalypse Now: “W ait a minute, I’m also the gook
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on the screen being killed” (2015a). In the novel, the narrator actually works as a consultant on 
the set o f an epic American Vietnam film, the subplot helping Nguyen to deconstruct the 
Americanized image of the conflict while simultaneously delivering a criticism of it.
While the popularity o f The Sympathizer proves a breath of fresh air to audiences and critics 
alike, the very fact o f its determined de-Americanization speaks to the influence the literary and 
cinematic canons have had in weaving the conflict’s cultural narrative. In fact, the past decade 
or so in the United States has seen something of a resurgence in literary interest in the American 
experience in the war, the long years o f slumber ending with the publication of a number of 
award-winners and bestsellers: Denis Johnson’s Tree of Smoke (2007), Karl Marlantes’ Matterhorn 
(2009), and Tatjana Soli’s The Lotus Eaters (2010). Unlike Nguyen, these authors remain securely 
within the bounds o f the American perspective, but they are also unable to transcend the 
established canon and the requirements it answers to. Brenda Boyle writes that they “replicate 
themes in previous works o f fiction about the War; after all, American readers and writers are 
tutored—both by novels and films—to expect certain events and characterizations in 
representations o f the Vietnam W ar era. These elements o f [Vietnam] W ar fiction (...) focus on 
the victimization of, trauma to, and redemption of the individual (usually male) American” 
(2015b).
Matterhorn is the most popular o f the three books, and yet it is also the one most in line with 
the familiar paradigms, following rather closely, in terms of form, content, and outlook, in the 
footsteps o f predecessors like John Del Vecchio’s The 13th Valley and James W ebb’s Fields of Fire. 
It does not tell its readers anything new about the Vietnam War, or the American soldiers who 
fought there—not anything they would not have encountered in the canon before. The reception 
of the novel suggests that the vision of the Vietnam W ar generated by these older narratives, and 
recreated once more by Marlantes, remains current, adequate to the expectations o f the U .S. 
audiences, and influential, the assessment further validated by the way the conflict is portrayed 
and talked about in the recent, well-received PBS documentary series, The Vietnam War (2017), 
directed by Ken Burns and Lynn Novick. For that reason, it is worthwhile to go back to the 
narratives in the American canon of the war in Vietnam, to examine their shared narrative 
strategies, themes, imageries, tropes, and interpretive suggestions; there, as in the scholarship 
analyzed by Neilson, we shall find certain ideological unity, overlapping across the titles to
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produce a specific American literary vision of “Vietnam ,” which will turn out to have fallen in 
line with other unfailingly, and to a large extent consistently, ideologically-informed strands of 
the war’s interpretation in American culture.
O ne context within which this canon inscribes itself is a historiographic discourse o f the so- 
called “different war.” It belongs among a number of narrative and interpretive strategies that 
feed into the larger discourses on the Vietnam W ar in the United States. A nd while this 
particular way of contextualization has a history going back to the times o f the war (one might 
even wonder whether it originated in the crisis years o f 1968 and 1969 particularly, when the 
conflict’s turning bad began necessitating explanation and framework), it is really in the post­
war period, especially the ever-important 1980s, that it gains currency—more often than not to 
explain the experience of an individual U .S. soldier, and sometimes with the implication that 
the perceived oddities o f service in Vietnam justified lapses in good conduct, also towards 
civilians.
One finds accounts o f the “different war” in historiographical writings and other types of 
commentaries on the conflict, including literary studies. Indeed, Tobey Herzog, who in his study 
of American Vietnam W ar literature noted several important ways in which it continued the 
traditions and conventions o f the literary output from previous conflicts, nevertheless pointed 
out that it is important to keep in mind that
each war also has its own character—images, political ideology, battlefield strategy, 
geography, participants, and technology influencing soldiers’, civilians’, and artists’ 
reactions to the war. (...) [One of the contexts in which to read the literature about Vietnam 
is that] several special characteristics, real or perceived, of the Vietnam War affect how 
American foot soldiers responded to this war and how soldier-authors created themes, 
images, and psychological conflicts within their stories. (Herzog 2005, 45)
The elements most usually enumerated as the factors that made “Vietnam ” different include:
(1) the relatively short length of an infantryman’s tour o f duty (thirteen months in the Marine 
Corps, twelve in the Army), which meant that troops worried more about surviving their “time” 
than about overall victory, and which supposedly undermined the typical soldierly bonding 
among men in units;
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(2) the controversial and unjust selective service practice which sent large numbers of 
reluctant draftees into combat, to fight, be wounded, and die in an ultimately meaningless war;
(3) the limited war policy that had real consequences for strategy and maddeningly ineffective 
tactics;
(4) relatedly, the lack of distinct battle lines, no front, the prevalence of small-unit 
engagements, such as during patrols or search-and-destroy missions, over battalion-size and larger 
battles, which were exceptionally rare;
(5) relatedly, the lack of visible progress as “strategic” positions would be fought for and 
abandoned soon after, to be reclaimed by the ever-replenished enemy;
(6) the ineradicable presence of the National Liberation Front (NLF, or the “Viet Cong”) 
throughout South Vietnam, as well as the hidden presence of massive North Vietnamese Army 
(NVA) units in the jungles, and the continuous threat o f falling victim to their ambushes, sniper 
fire, and booby-traps, all o f which translated into a near-constant state o f paranoia while in the 
field;
(7) the passive hostility o f the civilian population, the inability to distinguish innocents from 
the enemy, and the resultant indelible belief among the U .S. rank and file that “they were all 
V .C .” (“Viet Cong”);
(8) the oppressiveness o f the climate and the difficulty o f the terrain;
(9) the unprecedented antiwar opposition to the war at home, the perceived hostility of 
“hippies” toward veterans, and the lukewarm or antagonistic societal reception of returning 
soldiers, all o f which were said to have exacerbated the trauma of homecoming, the feeling of 
alienation, the sense o f shame at having served (and lost) in an unpopular and polarizing war, 
the pain caused by the people’s betrayal and their denial o f recognition, and so forth (for 
examples o f comments or discussions about Vietnam as a “different war,” see: Carpenter, 2003, 
32-35; Herzog 2005, 45-57 ; Knightley 1975, 381-382; MacPherson 1984, 54-74; W iest 2002, 
29-58).
M ost entries in this list deserve a nuanced dissection, since, while not really myths, they are 
still products o f oversimplification, exaggeration, bias, or misunderstanding. But my point here 
is not to tackle the historicity o f the circumstances proposed in these statements. Rather, it is to 
highlight the fact that they have come to be favored as the framework for imagining the Vietnam
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W ar in the American and other popular cultures, to the exclusion of different, but no less 
pertinent, ways o f looking at the conflict, for example as a “counterrevolutionary intervention” 
(Chomsky and Herman 1979b, 1) or as “a struggle between the legitimate leaders o f an 
independent Vietnam and the usurpers protected by a foreign power” (Young 2014, ch. 4).
In this thesis, my overall aim is to demonstrate the process by which the dominant American 
cultural narrative o f the war in Vietnam has been discursively constructed, as well as to consider 
certain crucial elements o f that narrative. I will argue that the war has been mythologized, or, in 
other words, removed from history, in order to restore and protect the mainstream American 
sense o f identity and ideology in the wake of the 1960s. The fundamental element o f this 
mythologization—and restoration—has been to shift the optics o f looking at the conflict so as to 
emphasize the scope o f American victimization in Vietnam until, eventually, Americans would 
become the war’s primary victims. Various forces were at work toward that conclusion 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s, and although claiming that literature had a decisive impact on 
the discourse o f American victimization would be to endow it with too much influence, the 
canonized books may nevertheless be considered symptomatic o f the larger processes occurring 
in culture and historical memory. In the case o f cinema, its impact is more direct and less 
contentious: while the bulk of the movies provided their audiences with the imagery of the war, 
and particular titles like Rambo have long been recognized to have had observable input into the 
cultural narrative, it is also true that cinematic narratives employed strategies o f representing 
Americans as victims, and that those strategies are found in literature, too. Moreover, by putting 
emphasis on the particular facets o f the “different war” trope through narrative strategies and 
favoring them over other issues raised by the war’s circumstances, these books and films 
transmitted a specific interpretation and imagery o f the war to the wider public as well as critics 
and scholars in literary and film studies, who throughout the early period o f the academic and 
cultural reception of the war’s artistic output happily accepted the authors’ largely similar visions 
o f Vietnam as truthful, often even decisive, profound, and illuminative as to the war’s “nature.” 
Thus, not only through their contents but also their obvious influence on literary and film 
studies—not to mention on the readers and the viewers themselves—did the narratives o f the 
Vietnam W ar contribute to the mainstream cultural knowledge and memory of the conflict 
(Neilson 1998, 7).
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I begin with the assumption that the canonical American narratives should be read against 
the backdrop of their release and publication: what they say about the Vietnam W ar and its 
participants—the image of the war they construct—should be contextualized by the shifts in the 
American politics and society in the late 1970s and 1980s, since this was the setting in which 
the books and movies became popular and eventually canonized. And if they alone cannot have 
been decisive in cementing the particular notions o f American victimization, by endorsing a 
mythologized and solipsistic view of the conflict, they did become complicit in the limited 
permissible discourse that more easily accommodated the idea o f American suffering than that 
o f American-perpetrated oppression and mass death. Therefore, in Chapter 1 I explore the 
permissible discourse and its limits within the American mainstream in the relevant period. First, 
I discuss, after Neilson, the mechanics o f cultural narratives, before moving on to the subject of 
the rise o f neoconservatism and Ronald Reagan’s presidency, as well as their use o f the Vietnam 
War. I then turn to the liberal center and the war’s cultural presence in the 1980s, especially in 
regard to the figure o f the veteran. I will argue that the deliberate depoliticization of the conflict, 
and the shifting of attention almost entirely to veterans and their problems, not only allowed 
Americans to disregard the matter o f what their country had done in Vietnam (and for which it 
was refusing to compensate in the form of reparations or aid), but—because the harmful capitalist 
ideologies behind the invasion o f Indochina were carefully obscured—also enabled a resurgence 
of American militarism and nationalism married to both neoconservative and neoliberal visions 
o f the world.
In Chapter 2, my aim is to demonstrate how the canonical American narratives o f the war in 
Vietnam fell largely in line with the permissible public discourse, supporting its view of the 
conflict as a primarily American affair and primarily a cause o f profound American suffering and 
trauma, a polarizing wound inflicted on the American nation in need of mending. In light of 
the transformations o f the Vietnam historical memory in the 1980s discussed in Chapter 1, I 
return to the very beginnings o f the war to recount its history with an emphasis on the 
relationship between ideology and material interests o f the United States. Next, I move on to 
what repressed that history: myth. I devote some space to its definition and application to the 
American war in Vietnam. I then begin my discussion of the American canon by recognizing the 
fact that in the narratives, “Vietnam ” was first o f all reconstructed as a place (an American place),
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and that the strategies American authors employed to achieve that had fundamental significance 
to the process o f turning the war into myth. Michael Herr’s notion of “Landing Zone Loon” 
serves as a framework to analyze the reconstructions and reimaginings o f “Vietnam ” in other 
texts. I pay particular attention to the strategies o f representation that bolster the notion of 
American victimization in Vietnam, symbolized in the ways in which the U .S . soldiers are 
harassed and killed by the Vietnamese “homicidal” landscape.
Having established the mythological setting of the American war, in Chapter 3 I move on to 
the inhabitants o f the “Vietnam ” of American imagination: the soldiers and the civilians. The 
chapter begins with an in-depth analysis o f the aforementioned editorial in Times, “A n American 
Tragedy.” In the subchapter, I show that the article already attempted to contextualize the 
ongoing conflict in the terms of the “different war” trope, and that it employed several strategies 
regarding the U .S. conduct in Indochina which would come to dominate the war’s American 
canon, amongst which the focus on the American soldier and his suffering was foremost. The 
subsequent investigation into the representations and strategies in post-war texts will establish a 
continuum in interpretive and contextualizing practices running from the moment during the 
still ongoing war in which My Lai could already be branded an American tragedy, to the working- 
through the war in memoirs, novels and films, and to the emergence of the American cultural 
narrative o f the war by the end of the 1980s. W ithin the bounds o f this continuum, it becomes 
clear how the view of the war’s atrocity as an American tragedy transitions eventually into the 
complex discourse o f American victimization at the hands o f the Vietnamese. In this way, my 
discussion will have completed a full circle: in the Conclusion, I will discuss the rhetorical, 
ideological, and political uses o f the notion o f American suffering in Vietnam, beginning with 
the G ulf W ar and the “Support the Troops” campaign.
Considering that an ideological dimension o f victimization is the central interest o f this 
thesis, and that it is approached from a specific political point o f view, certain qualifications are 
in order. This thesis should, in fact, be read as a rhetorical stance against the anodyne ideology 
which dictates the “traditional, ‘liberal’ empathy for everyone involved in a war as its inevitable 
victim” (Ritchin 1989, 437), and against the common readings o f American Vietnam W ar 
literature and film that, focusing on American traumas, leave unproblematized various issues 
these narratives generate and perpetuate. W hat I wish to offer is a look at these texts from a
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perspective that, even if it seems rigid, is meant as an exercise in different—but, I believe, no less 
legitimate—“outsider” optics o f reading the American Vietnam canon. In other words, a 
particular problem with this canon, as treated here, arises from its complicity in the notion that 
Americans had been the victims in and of Vietnam, an idea that by the 1980s had transmuted 
into a coherent, persistent myth of the war. This is the context against which this thesis should 
be read—not as an absolute statement o f American non-victimization, or a denial o f American 
suffering endured in Vietnam, but as an alternative perspective where the attention is neither 
shifted wholly to the American soldier and veteran, nor diluted between the American people 
and the Vietnamese equally.
O n  the contrary, I balk at such relativistic tendencies o f liberal discourses, and I would 
certainly disagree that the United States, the American people, or “America” were victims of the 
war. But it does not mean, o f course, that certain segments o f American society were not. 
Draftees are an obvious case in point. They should undoubtedly be seen as victims on the basis 
o f class (and race, as the two so often go inextricably together in the American context). In a 
specific example, Robert M cNamara’s Project 100,000, a low-standard recruitment scheme 
promoted in alignment with Lyndon Johnson’s W ar on Poverty and Pentagon’s preferable 
alternative to abolishing college deferments or calling up the reserves, gave the armed forces 
“M cNamara’s M oron C orps,” over 350,000 men who would not previously have been allowed 
in due to low IQ, physical defects, and similar detriments. These men were sent to Vietnam, and 
not to be assigned duties requiring any advanced training: as Seymour Hersh points out, many 
infantrymen, hailing from the Project, were the runt o f the military, as much “cannon fodder” 
as anyone could so be called (1970, 17-18; see also Jeffords 1989, 122-123; MacPherson 2002). 
Another example o f a group of Americans victimized by the circumstances o f the conflict are 
those who resisted the draft: not those who did so via deferments enabled by positions o f 
privilege, but rather protesters who chose prison or exile. But, to put it bluntly, these American 
men, soldiers, and veterans, are not the victims I am interested in here. My interest lies not so 
much in the “Vietnam W ar” and what it “did” to the United States, as it does in the violence, 
destruction and suffering the U nited States brought to Indochina—in the American war in 
Vietnam, that is—and in how the U .S. cultural narrative o f the conflict has dealt with them in 
the aftermath.
Chapter 1
Vietnam Syndromes: 
Symptoms & Contexts
The war in Vietnam was a war nobody won—a struggle between victims.
Stanley Karnow
What rules the world is ideas, because ideas define the way reality is perceived.
Irving Kristol
1.1. The American cultural narrative of Vietnam
In order to understand the American cultural narrative o f the war in Vietnam one must look 
not only, and perhaps not even primarily, to the wartime experience itself, but rather to the 
decades following the U .S. withdrawal from Indochina. It was then, roughly speaking from the 
late 1970s and throughout the 1980s, that the war was being reinterpreted and rewritten, its 
political and cultural significance reshaped to foster a particular perspective, not on what the 
events o f the conflict had been, but rather on why they happened, what they meant, and how 
they reverberated. In other words, what is meant by a cultural narrative here is the residue of 
notions, images, beliefs and mental inclinations, or o f ways o f thinking and understanding, that 
attaches itself to the historical narrative o f facts and events. A  cultural narrative is not identical 
with a historical analysis and interpretation of causes and effects, though it may color them;
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rather, the term, as it is employed here, refers to a popular mode of explanation that operates 
on a level different to that o f historiography or history, one nourished by the mythological and 
ideological—or cultural—sediments o f a society. The history of the U .S. involvement in Vietnam 
may be extended all the way back to 1945, and a chain of political decisions may be established 
that through the policies o f four U .S. administrations led to the repressions o f the native Diem 
regime, the eventual American military invasion, the bombing campaigns in Laos and 
Cambodia, and the long-lasting devastation of North and South Vietnam. The American 
cultural narrative o f the war in Vietnam, on the other hand, is what has seeped into this historical 
narrative and “flavored” the memory and understanding o f it: the conflict thus came to be seen 
as a “symbolic war” (Hellmann 1986, 4) or a “mythic enterprise” (Myers 1988, 144).
Millions o f Indochinese died in the war, and more bombs were dropped on the relatively 
small area encompassing North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos, and Cam bodia than ever before 
or since—at least twice as many as in the entire W orld W ar II, both in Europe and the Pacific. 
The United States pursued a near-genocidal policy during the conflict, which eventually 
influenced how the Americans treated the Vietnamese all the way down the U .S. chain of 
command—and yet W illiam Calley remains the sole American war criminal o f the conflict 
acknowledged by a court sentence. In the decades since the American war ended, the long-term 
effects o f the conflict in the region have been manifold and disastrous. A  consideration of why— 
and especially how-such a war should come to be described as “symbolic” or “mythic” is the 
purpose o f this thesis.
The answers to these questions should be sought in the American cultural narrative o f the 
war as it emerged in the aftermath of the conflict. If the word culture is understood here fairly 
broadly, literature, and especially as narrow a genre as the Vietnam W ar literature, should be 
taken as its poignant but ultimately fairly peripheral sphere; I think it is safe to assume that 
Oliver Stone, or Ronald Reagan for that matter (Bacevich 2005, 117), have done more to shape 
the collective American image of Vietnam than Tim O ’Brien or Philip Caputo have. 
Nevertheless, because o f its poignancy and often greater exploratory depth in both creative and 
critical activity, literature is an interesting case o f focalization, especially as certain prevalent 
themes and narrative tendencies are given ample space for development and complexity, and 
may therefore offer particularly useful insights into what is bubbling below the surface o f (pop)
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culture. Secondly, when the aim is a critique of a culture and its attendant ideologies, literature 
matters in so far as it reflects, criticizes, or subverts that culture and those ideologies, and as it is 
received. Investigating how it does either o f these things may prove very enlightening.
Canons are a particular case in point here because they are the result o f a dynamic that 
contributes to the process o f weaving cultural narratives; deconstructing this dynamic translates 
into a fuller appreciation of how a cultural narrative operates. In 1998—and in the context o f a 
publishing industry that has since changed much, but which was the milieu at the time when 
the Vietnam canon was constituted—Jim Neilson discussed precisely these mechanisms in 
relation to the conflict’s literature. He perceived its significance in the fact that “as part o f a 
struggle over the representation of [the war], a struggle over what the war meant, over how and 
why it was fought, this literature has both reflected and contributed to the construction of recent 
historical memory” (1998, 2). In tracing how the Vietnam canon had come to be, and which 
representations o f the war it had promoted, Neilson’s overriding aim was to examine the 
ideological foundations not necessarily o f the texts themselves, but rather o f the very culture that 
had received and interpreted them, and on the basis o f its judgements had deemed these books 
particularly representative o f the American experience of Vietnam. For that end, Neilson 
discussed in detail the system of institutions with vested interest in the production and reception 
of literary texts, whose preferences and judgements are decisive in the constitution of canons: a 
two-pronged structure consisting o f what he called commercial literary culture (publishing 
houses, book review magazines) and academic literary culture (academic journals, college course 
syllabi).
W ith regards to commercial literary culture, Neilson observed two processes that had 
occurred since the 1970s, firstly the increasing corporatization of the publishing industry, 
accompanied by an increasing concentration of the ownership of publishing houses by major 
corporate players. In acting as the initial gatekeeper for books, Neilson argued, the ever- 
consolidating publishing industry was responsible for “a marginalization of views that dissent 
too loudly or depart too radically from the status quo. (...) Such marginalization occurs not 
through overt censorship but through institutional sympathy between a publishing house and 
its corporate owner” (1998, 21). This was because “large commercial publishing firms with ties 
to multiple corporate enterprises do not feverishly pursue books critical o f capitalism, let alone
20 Vietnam Syndromes
those that advocate its dismantling” (Neilson 1998, 23-24). Moreover, as corporations, 
publishers are driven primarily by profit—and not just any old profit, but maximized profit, which 
puts pressure on the houses “to anticipate and reflect broad public sentiment (...). 
Commercialism itself, then, is a significant filter, marginalizing and even excluding books 
thought insufficiently reflective o f popular interest (...)” (Neilson 1998, 24). This trend was 
compounded by the diminishing buyers’ market, with consolidation of corporate bookstore 
chains and elimination of independent competition resulting in the preference to purchase titles 
with broader appeal and greater chance of profit. Effectively, the limits o f “acceptable discourse” 
were established through the “persistent affirmation of dominant ideology” (Neilson 1998, 28) 
which became internalized—through, for example, institutional pressure, imitation of industry 
trends, experience with rejection of manuscripts or exposure to general cultural currents—by 
agents, editors, and buyers. In these conditions, Neilson contented, and in the face o f the “public 
sentiment” in general shifting toward the political right, the chance o f a leftist text getting 
published and widely distributed in the period in question was perhaps not impossible, but 
limited.
In the case o f magazines, Neilson observed that reviewers in general are “likely to share, in 
broad outline, the ideology of the periodicals for which they write, and these periodicals are 
likely to fit within the spectrum of acceptable public discourse” (1998, 31). Moreover, the 
American press was also influenced by the shifts toward the right occurring at the time, reflective 
not only of the institutional and corporate pressures, but also the public culture at large.2 
Additionally, Neilson found that the most influential book review magazines, such as the New 
York Times Book Review, had tended to promote big (corporate) publishing houses by choosing 
their products for review disproportionately more often than smaller and independent 
publishers, a correlation, he argued, due to “the shared class and cultural backgrounds of 
reviewers, editors, authors, and agents” (1998, 31), but also to the fact that these big firms paid 
for a lot o f advertisement on which the magazines depended for survival.
But Neilson found the aesthetic tastes o f reviewers to be ideologically informed, too, even if 
the ideology consisted in ignoring a book’s political dimension entirely; to favor an ostensibly 
non-ideological reading of a text is not in itself an act beyond politics, but rather an act o f de­
politicization that ends up promoting a certain ideological interpretation nevertheless. This is a
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problem of various liberal approaches to the conflict that will be returned to later in this chapter. 
In an assessment o f reviewers’ practices, Neilson argued that
Reviewers and critics (...) likewise function as an ideological barrier. By privileging imagery 
and language, experts can downplay a text’s social dynamics (...). A book’s political import 
can be hindered obliquely, by downplaying its social commentary and praising its formal 
qualities, or overtly, by repudiating its ideology. In other words, reviewers by and large 
reinforce modernist assumptions of critical value, championing complex and sophisticated 
narratives (...) and valuing the individual and timeless human struggle over social struggles 
against specific injustices (1998, 32).
Moving on to the academic literary culture—the final gatekeeper to the canon—Neilson discussed 
the various ways in which radical discourse was curbed at universities: specialization and 
disciplinarity, hierarchical structures and career design, demands o f proficiency in “professional” 
discourses, the economic precariousness o f academic workforce, and so forth. O ne might add 
that many scholars would also come from the same “class and cultural backgrounds” as the 
aforementioned reviewers and editors, or aspire to the professional-managerial stratum of 
society, which had traditionally served as a hotbed of capitalist and often liberal ideologies. 
Finally, at universities the institutional interest was overriding:
Society needs help from the schools to justify its present divisions, including much 
inequality. (...) The ruling classes want a culture, including a literature and a criticism, that 
supports the social order and discourages rebellion, while it sanctions all kinds of 
nonthreatening nonconformity (Richard Ochmann, quoted in Neilson 1998, 40).
Therefore, “for the canon to be sanctioned by the academic literary establishment (...) neither its 
content nor its dominant interpretations should challenge liberal-pluralist belief’ (Neilson 1998, 
40).
Neilson went on to criticize two dominant schools o f criticism in the U .S. during the time of 
the Vietnam W ar and afterwards, the formalist New Criticism and poststructuralism, and their 
“implicit ideologies” (1998, 47), charging both with latent promotion of liberalism, either in the 
more obvious New Critical guise or in the disguise o f contemporary theory—crucially, responsible 
for determining much of the Vietnam canon—with its emphasis on politics o f identity and
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representation, its foregrounding of linguistic play, and its primary attention to discourse. 
Contemporary theory was thus guilty o f superficiality o f its purported political edge (again: 
“nonthreatening nonconformity”), and o f reducing the concept o f freedom to matters of 
individual expression and a subjective sense o f lack of oppression:
[t]he result of this [poststructuralist] attempt to revise American literary culture without 
overturning its economic configurations or structures of power (...) has been the application 
of a representative gloss to an unrepresentative and exploitative system. (...) Ultimately, the 
social critique made by contemporary literary studies fails to address the systemic causes of 
social injustice and economic exploitation and thus reproduces (...) an individualist (or 
identity group) ethos and nationalist ideology (Neilson 1998, 51-52).
Together with the literary Vietnam “classics,” the cinematic canon of the war, though created 
via different cultural and institutional mechanisms, was being formed as well, and—given that 
back then millions o f people in the United States would have watched a popular film upon its 
cinematic release—undoubtedly with more success. Titles such as The Deer Hunter (1978), 
Apocalypse Now (1979), Platoon (1986), Full Metal Jacket (1987), and Born on the Fourth of July 
(1989) were being released at the same time as the novels and memoirs were being published, 
and for all the formal differences between each film and between the films and the books, 
ultimately they reiterated much of the same imagery, narrative strategies, and conclusions; they 
also seem to have locked the American imagination of the Vietnam W ar—how it looked and felt, 
what happened there and what it meant—for perpetuity. The blockbuster B-class movie canon 
that included Missing in Action (1984) and the wonderfully titled Rambo: First Blood Part II (1985) 
was in the meantime, and no less memorably, wreaking its own, greater havoc in the Vietnam 
historical and cultural narrative.
Departing from Neilson’s analysis o f how cultural and dominant ideological conditions 
impact on the constitution of canons, it is then necessary to consider in some depth specifically 
these cultural and ideological conditions in which the Vietnam literary canon was constituted 
in the United States during the late 1970s and the 1980s. The canonical American books about 
Vietnam should be considered primarily in the context o f the responses and ideological 
formulations o f the period, precisely because they achieved their popularity and status since they 
were deemed—by publishers, reviewers, scholars, and perhaps ultimately the American public
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itself, receptive o f these top-down influences—as presenting a take on the war, and most 
importantly on the “American experience” in it, that was unthreatening, appropriate, desired, 
or reflective o f the specifically American needs to understand and explain the conflict.
1.2. Repudiating the 1960s
Imagine a room full of Communists who are furiously debating the meaning of Marxist 
ideas. Shouting and screaming, the Communists would see themselves as deeply divided.
But to an outsider, things might look very different: This is a room full of ideologues who 
all share the same basic view of the world.
In the same vein, people in the United States are struck by what divides Americans. But 
foreign observers often see, instead, what unites Americans. (...)
Are we really saying that Americans are ideological in the sense that the Soviet and 
Chinese Communists were ideological? Of course not—that would be ridiculous. Americans 
are far more ideological. In other words, liberalism is deeper-rooted and more universally 
accepted in the United States than communism was across the seas (Tierney 2011).
Thus writes Dominic Tierney about liberalism in the United States. “Americans have a 
national ideology,” he explains, “and it’s called liberalism. (...) To be American is not to claim a 
particular ethnicity, but to profess the liberal creed” (2011). Crucially, “remarkably few 
Americans question the basic [liberal] assumptions. W e are indoctrinated so profoundly that we 
don ’t even realize we are ideologues. Liberalism just seems like the natural order o f things” 
(Tierney 2011). Moreover, the presumed polarization of political options between conservatives 
and segments o f influential liberals, especially centrists, liberal internationalists or neoliberals, 
in fact precludes the possibility o f politics and solutions outside o f this quite narrow range. This 
center-to-right polarity thus effectively establishes the “limits o f acceptable public discourse” of 
which Jim Neilson wrote, and which Noam  Chomsky called “the narrowing of the ideological 
spectrum” (1997, 154; see also Thom pson 2007a, on the liberal roots o f neoconservatism and 
the capitalist, anti-social character o f neoliberalism).
The process o f rewriting the war in Vietnam in the 1980s neatly illustrates those limits, with 
everyone in the mainstream political range in the U .S. at the time agonizing in the contest to 
establish the conflict’s “meanings,” vindicate its veterans, and use it—and them—for various 
ideologically motivated ends. This circumstance creates the perfect environment in which to 
study the responses to the war from various political perspectives o f the 1980s milieu.
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During the 1970s and 1980s, the larger objective in American culture, o f which the rewriting 
of Vietnam was part, was to repudiate the legacy of the 1960s, with their movements and 
demonstrations, because the period was considered dangerous by various influential parties. In 
his discussion of the rightward turn following that decade, Chomsky argued that the ascendant 
ideologies gained momentum in response to the upheavals o f the 1960s and the rapid 
democratization and activization in U .S. political life, which threatened entrenched political 
authority and capitalist power: “ [e]rosion of discipline under the impact o f the popular ferment 
o f the 1960s elicited renewed hysteria and (...) dedicated efforts to establish doctrinal controls” 
(1997, 162). O n the conservative right, wrote Bernhard von Bothmer,
Republicans [had] been campaigning against the “sixties” ever since the 1960s themselves.
(...) Reagan invented “the sixties” during the 1960s and was against “the sixties” before the 
decade ended. (...) Republicans wielded painful memories of the 1960s as a political weapon 
to attack Johnson’s Great Society, the antiwar movement, and the loosening of social 
restraints (2010, 2-3; on Reagan and “the sixties” see 28-44).
In relation to big business, “the 20th century has been characterized by three developments of 
great political importance: the growth of democracy, the growth of corporate power, and the 
growth of corporate propaganda as a means o f protecting corporate power against democracy” 
(Alex Carey, quoted in: Chomsky 1997, 156). This “protection” against the legacy of the 1960s 
is linked to both the anti-welfare and free-enterprise concerns o f neoconservatives, many of 
whom would become funded by corporations, and the ascent o f economic neoliberalism:
[t]he inhabitants of ‘enemy territory’ at home [the ‘60s popular movements] had to be 
controlled and suppressed, so as to restore the ability of U.S. corporations to compete in 
the more diverse world market by reducing real wages and welfare benefits and weakening 
working-class organization (Chomsky 1989, 56).
[B]y 1978, American business was spending $1 billion a year on grassroots propaganda.
These efforts were supplemented by (...) “tree-tops propaganda,” targeting educated sectors 
and seeking to eliminate any articulate threat to business domination. Methods ranged from 
endowed Professorships of Free Enterprise in universities to huge propaganda campaigns 
against the usual run of targets: taxes, regulation of business, welfare (for the poor), pointy- 
headed “bureaucrats” interfering with the creative entrepreneur, union corruption and 
violence, evil apologists for our enemies, and so on (Chomsky 1997, 162; “[j]ust as
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corporations sought partisan influence by pouring millions of dollars into New Right 
political action committees, they also financed the growth of ‘free enterprise’ think tanks, 
university programs, and journals” [Diamond 1995, 198; see also 109-139]).
Conservative historian Andrew Bacevich in his 2005 book on the “new American militarism” 
stated outright that its rise had been “the handiwork of several disparate groups that shared little 
in common apart from being intent on undoing the purportedly nefarious 1960s” (2005, 6; see 
also 70-72  on the neoconservative intellectual “counterrevolution” against the 1960s; see also 
Aronowitz 2007; D iam ond 1995; Dorrien 2004). Bacevich also documented the origins o f one 
of these groups, the nationalistic and interventionist neoconservatives, eventually influential as 
ideologues and pundits,3 in their adverse reaction to the decade.
Neoconservatives, many of their leaders emerging from Jewish intelligentsia and New York 
literary circles, were evolved Cold W ar liberals, united by shared anticommunism and opposition 
to the New Left; they would eventually come to endorse Ronald Reagan and cohere under the 
mantle o f his foreign policy (Aronowitz 2007, 58-59 ; D iam ond 1995, 178-180; Dorrien 2004, 
7 -10). But the rise o f neoconservatism was only the most evident symptom of the rightward shift 
o f the median of U .S. politics. Liberalism itself was moving further away from the left; during 
the 1960s and in relation to Vietnam, the New Left had “launched a sustained assault against 
allegedly repressive institutions, beginning with the university but ultimately including the 
federal government and the armed services, and by extension the premises underlying a liberal 
internationalist foreign policy” (Bacevich 2005, 69-70). Therefore, after the war and the fateful 
decade, liberals reacted with recoil:
the social movements of the 1960s were very threatening to certain occupational groups in 
the middle class, many of whom were also the social base for liberal politics. The middle 
class generally feared the loss of privilege it saw coming as a result of the rising tide of 
entitlement movements (...). The strategies of the left, focusing as they did on group rather 
than individual rights, added to the estrangement of liberals from the Left (Lembcke 1998, 
96-97; see also Bothmer 2010, 82: by the 1980s, “white liberals [...] had regarded the 
working class with suspicion, if not outright hostility, since the sixties”).
Resistance to the war in Vietnam, as well as acute criticism of the U .S. intervention, belonged 
of course among the decade’s most iconic and dangerous heritage. To rewrite the war meant,
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therefore, to remove some of its subversive potential. O n the right, to begin tracing the 
permutations o f Vietnam history and myth as they were being driven by various Republican and 
(neo)conservative agents and forces, starting with Richard Nixon in 1969, is to plunge into a 
rabbit hole o f perversions o f fact, astounding malformations o f history, and outright lies.
N ixon’s contribution to the mythologizing of the war was significant. His fabrications were 
the result o f the administration’s wish to divert the public’s attention away from the secret 
campaigns, incursions and bombings, which it had conducted illegally in Laos and Cambodia, 
and which—once exposed—elicited a powerful wave of protest in the U .S., leading to the 
infamous Kent State shooting at a college campus in Ohio in 1970, where four students were 
killed by National Guard. Considering that N ixon had won the presidential election two years 
before with promises o f ending the war—and that by the time he was finally done, over 21,000 
more U .S. soldiers would die in Vietnam4—he needed an effective propaganda campaign to 
soften and counter the harsh criticism and opposition to his policies.
It was Nixon and Henry Kissinger, for example, who concocted the so-called “M IA /PO W  
issue,” as leverage with which to exert political pressure on the Vietnamese during the peace 
negotiations in Paris. The issue would be exploited in U.S.-Vietnamese relations, to the 
detriment o f Vietnam, for another two decades. Secondly, N ixon and his Vice-President Spiro 
Agnew engaged in a rhetoric campaign of distortion in order to discredit and even demonize the 
antiwar movement, the “dovish” liberals and “pinkos,” to the extent that they came to be seen 
as practically directly responsible for the defeat in Indochina. The myth of the peace protester 
spitting on veterans was thus born (Lembcke 1998, 49-70).5 Jerry Lembcke studied this myth in 
detail, and came to the conclusion that no such occurrences had taken place, or that if a protester 
had ever spat on a veteran, these were isolated and unreported events, far from the widespread 
phenomenon it had been made out to be.6 The spitting myth was part o f a larger Nixon-Agnew 
campaign to disengage the antiwar protester from the veteran: to drive a wedge between the two 
groups, and, even more importantly, to create the public image o f the two as fundamentally 
opposed. The peace movement could in this way be portrayed as unpatriotic—defiling the 
quintessential American nationalist symbol, the soldier—and responsible for the failure to win 
the war by undermining the morale o f the troops in Vietnam, as well as by weakening the 
national resolve to win the war. As Lembcke writes, “the corollary (...) was that anyone who
Vietnam Syndromes 27
opposed the war was, in the eyes o f Nixon-Agnew followers, also disloyal to the soldiers and, by 
extension, disloyal to the country” (1998, 51; on the ties between American nationalism and 
militarism, see Ehrenreich 1997, 216-223).
The effects o f this P.R. stunt were exacerbated by the infamous radio broadcast from the 
communist government in Hanoi in support o f antiwar activities in the U .S. that aided N ixon’s 
portrayal o f the movement as communist agents and traitors. As a consequence, the antiwar 
organizations began losing support o f some Democrat politicians and liberal supporters. A  
fissure appeared in the movement itself, too, between its liberal and radical wings. Thus 
generated, condemnation of the antiwar movement, an element o f the general repudiation of 
the 1960s, gained traction in the 1980s and became related to the efforts o f reviving U.S. 
militarism and interventionism. M ost importantly, Lembcke argued that by locating protesters 
and veterans in opposition to each other, the antiwar sentiment and activism of the latter were 
put into doubt, and the veterans effectively deprived of political voice and depoliticized. The 
potential o f the veteran as a powerful voice against the U .S. policy and practices in Vietnam 
could be silenced if he was removed from the political context, the sometimes radical criticism 
now relegated to “anti-American” and easily maligned (and marginalized) peace movement. A  
veteran active in the antiwar movement could be portrayed as anomalous and “bad,” in contrast 
to the “good” patriotic one.
But in fact, as Lembcke was determined to show in his study, Vietnam veterans were largely 
supportive o f the antiwar movement and vice versa (1998, 27 —48).7 Obviously there were 
veterans who were not against the war and those who supported it: the group was certainly too 
large and diverse to be ideologically unified. Am ong veteran authors, for example, few show 
particular concern for the political causes and imperialist foundations o f the conflict, or see past 
the indoctrinated anticommunism. In fact, the two most conservative canonical novels to be 
investigated in this thesis were authored by veterans convinced that the war had, indeed, been a 
noble cause: James W ebb, author o f Fields of Fire, was in the 1980s outspoken about this belief 
(Hagopian 2009, 85), while John M. Del Vecchio, author o f The 13th Valley, wrote in the preface 
to his book that Vietnam had been “the most moral war this nation [had] ever engaged” (1982, 
xi). This stance was reported among groups o f right wing veterans in the 1970s and 1980s 
(Hagopian 2009, 11, 49; Lembcke 1998, 67; MacPherson 1988, 69). Nevertheless, Lembcke’s
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study provides compelling evidence that the soldiers’ and veterans’ opposition to the war and 
active dissent were more widespread than it is remembered—and other dedicated studies support 
the thesis that G .I. resistance was, if not universal, then still on a massive scale, consisting in all 
manner o f action ranging from publication and distribution of underground antiwar press 
among servicemen in Vietnam, to mutinies (see Cortright 2005; Moser 1996).8 Lembcke’s book 
also shows that the antiwar movement was supportive, organizing, for example, legal aid for draft 
resisters and troops protesting the war while in service as early as 1966, and actively working for 
soldiers’ rights.9 For one thing, while the conflict lasted, no veteran group came together to 
publicly support the war and Nixon was unable to find ex-soldiers who had served in Vietnam 
to promote his policies (Lembcke 1998, 53, 67).
O n  the contrary, among the best known organizations in the antiwar movement was the 
Vietnam Veterans Against the W ar (VVAW), founded in 1967, which went on to organize the 
notorious medal-throwing event at the Capitol in 1971. A nd although in the 1980s the veterans’ 
cause would be reduced to grievances concerning their treatment and reception in the U .S., the 
VVAW  was unequivocal in its political awareness and radical criticism of the U .S. policy in 
Vietnam—and the Vietnamese and their suffering were always at the center o f the organization’s 
ideological stance and impetus for activism, a veteran concern that would all but disappear from 
common memory by the 1980s. For example, a video clip available on YouTube from the 1972 
Republican National Convention in Miami Beach, where the VVAW  and other groups 
protested the war, shows veterans, among them young Ron Kovic (author o f Born on the Fourth 
of July) in his wheelchair, shouting for N ixon to “stop the bom bing” (MediaBurnArchive 2009). 
Lembcke cites another veteran remarking on that same occasion, in response to N ixon’s 
“Vietnamization” policy that would shift the burden of the fight to South Vietnam forces, that 
the veterans wanted “an end of the Vietnam war, not a changing of the color o f the skins of 
those who are dying” (1998, 66).
In another particularly famous instance, in a statement before the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee on April 22, 1971, VVAW  spokesman John Kerry began by addressing the war 
crimes perpetrated by U .S. servicemen in Vietnam and the ravage caused by U .S. bombing, also 
pointing out that the Vietnamese “had for years been seeking their liberation from any colonial 
influence whatsoever,” and that they simply wanted the Americans “to leave them alone in
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peace.” He identified the U.S.-backed and financed South Vietnam government as a “corrupt 
dictatorial regime” and stated that “America placed a cheapness on the lives o f orientals,” adding 
that he did not believe the Americans would “dream o f ’ using against Europeans the kinds of 
weapons used to kill people in Vietnam. Kerry also said that the United States was “more guilty 
than any other body of [violating] the Geneva Conventions” (Kerry 1971).
A  few months before, in January and February 1971 in Detroit, the VVAW  had organized 
the so-called W inter Soldier Investigation (WSI), a public hearing in which over a hundred 
veterans revealed the sometimes hair-raising war crimes—including murder, mutilation, rape, and 
torture—against Vietnamese civilians and prisoners perpetrated by American soldiers, which they 
had witnessed or participated in. The stated purpose o f the investigation was to draw a direct 
link between U .S. policy and the crimes. There was no response to the veterans’ accounts: the 
testimonies were entered into Congressional Record and discussed at the Foreign Relations 
Committee hearings, but no investigations into specific crimes were pursued, and, a mere two 
years after the My Lai scandal, there was virtually no mention of the W SI in the media. Video 
footage of the Detroit hearings was later made by the VVAW into a documentary film titled 
Winter Soldier (1972), but television stations declined to broadcast it, and the press hardly 
acknowledged it, the very few papers that picked it up doing so only to cast doubt on the veracity 
o f the testimonies (“About the Film” 2006; Hunt 2001, 60-76; Huston 2005; Lembcke 1998, 
57-66; Stacewicz 2008; Winter Soldier was rereleased in 2005 to universal acclaim; the W SI 
hearings may, o f course, be watched in the film; otherwise, a full transcript is available in “W inter 
Soldier Investigation” 1999). All o f this was part o f the legacy—of the 1960s, o f the antiwar 
movement, and of the veterans’ political engagement—that would be distorted ten years later, 
even as the veterans’ activism was depoliticized. Similarly, the specific complaints centered 
around the plight o f the Vietnamese, and the immorality and criminality o f the war, would soon 
be squeezed outside o f the “acceptable public discourse” by liberal and right-wing narratives.
Perhaps N ixon’s failure to garner public support from soldiers and veterans should be 
ascribed to the ideological pull generated by the VVAW  and likeminded activists, together with 
the simple fact o f chronology and thus the immediacy, also emotional, o f the matter: the war 
had not yet ended. In effect, although Nixon was guilty o f inventing enemies for calculated ends 
demanded by the still ongoing war—the antiwar protesters spitting on veterans and evil
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Vietnamese keeping American soldiers in cages—it was R onald Reagan who undertook to 
completely rewrite it. During his presidential campaign and in the White House, Reagan pushed 
an interpretation o f the conflict that had for some time been constructed by a group of 
intellectuals defined as neoconservatives, clustered around a number of publications among 
which Commentary, edited by Norm an Podhoretz, was the most influential (Aronowitz 2007, 59; 
Bacevich 2005, 71).10 The proponents o f this interpretation insisted that the failure in Southeast 
Asia was attributable to wimpy leadership and liberal opposition, and that the military had not 
been “allowed” to win. This neoconservative view had been consistent and politically useful from 
the beginning: in the N ixon administration, Vice-President Agnew had actually used quotations 
from the movement’s prominent writers, such as Irving Kristol, in speeches that denounced and 
demonized the antiwar activists (Lembcke 1998, 96). In the 1980s, Podhoretz, in defending 
N ixon’s policies in Indochina, considered those opposed to them to be allies to communists and 
“almost impossible to forgive” (Hagopian 2009, 33). The way out o f the postwar funk, 
neoconservatives believed, was for the United States to forget the destructive 1960s, reassert its 
position as a superpower and to flex its military muscle abroad. The ideology was 
unapologetically nationalist: the belief in the exceptional status o f the U nited States translated 
into the conviction that there were no alternatives to American power globally, and that it 
should, therefore, be the natural order o f the world (Bacevich 2005, 73-79; Dorrien 2004, 9 ­
11; Isaacs 1997, 67; Roper 2007a, 5-8).
Reagan subscribed to a similar line o f thinking, staffed his high-level administration with 
many neoconservatives, and would spend his two terms squirming for military action (Diamond 
1995, 179; see 200-227 on the merging o f neoconservatism and Reaganism; cf. Bacevich 2005, 
78-79; Dorrien 2004, 9-12). W hat checked his interventionist ambitions was what he himself 
termed the “Vietnam syndrome,” and what Chomsky described sarcastically as “a disease with 
such ominous symptoms as opposition to aggression, terror, and violence, and even sympathy 
for [United States’] victims” (1997, 164; see also Bothmer 2010, 86-90). In the neoconservative 
definition, the syndrome was an undesirable residue of the fiasco in Southeast Asia: the 
unwillingness o f the American people to engage their forces anywhere in the world, out o f fear 
that any intervention would become “another Vietnam ,” and the refusal “to accept any but the 
most nominal U .S. casualties in any military operation” (Isaacs 1997, 66; the neoconservative
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and Reaganite take on the “Vietnam syndrome” has been discussed extensively; apart from Isaacs 
1997, who devotes an entire chapter to it, see, for example, Bacevich 2005, 73-80; Bothmer 
2010, 70-92; Hagopian 2009, 23-49; Young 2014, ch. 15). It was a sign o f weakness, and it had 
to be eradicated in order for the U nited States to resume its role as the hegemon of the free 
world. The international situation seemed to confirm that the U .S. was losing its footing: the 
popular revolutions in Central America and Africa, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, 
and above all the so-called Iran Hostage Crisis that same year, were for the neocons signals of 
American decline in the international arena. But the syndrome would stick around for a while. 
Reagan was able to significantly raise military spending (a head-spinning $2.7 trillion over his 
two terms [Bacevich 2005, 108]) and upgrade the country’s military hardware. He got his field 
day in Grenada in 1983, when U .S. forces invaded the island following a coup; 19 Americans 
were killed in the few weeks o f fighting, and afterwards Reagan awarded over 8,000 medals to 
the 6,000 troops who had participated in the operation. But the president was not able to do 
much elsewhere, except resort to covert support and financing for governments, regimes, and 
right-wing rebels; the “syndrome” still thwarted the public opinion’s support for military 
interventions. This popular anti-militarism intensified in 1983 when, following Reagan’s 
decision to send American soldiers on a peacekeeping mission to Lebanon, 241 U .S. servicemen 
died in a suicide bombing of a barracks in Beirut (Isaacs 1997, 73).
However, symptoms of the Vietnam syndrome from which the American public suffered 
could subside: in its aftermath the Grenada invasion was received positively, and soon, the G ulf 
W ar would throw masses o f people into pro-military frenzy; such is the power o f skillful 
nationalist propaganda (Ehrenreich 1997, 221-223; sixty-three percent o f Americans supported 
the invasion of Grenada after it ended [Bothmer 2010, 76]; see also Chomsky 1997, 164; 
Hagopian 2009, 39). The syndrome was far more interesting in how it affected the American 
military: it is evident that the 15-year break in American warring around the world between 1973 
and 1990 (with the relatively minor exceptions) was ascribable in the largest measure to the 
armed forces themselves. The military leadership’s “lessons o f Vietnam ” were clear, and on their 
basis a new set o f principles was devised that held American interventionism in check, especially 
against politicians who might be too trigger-happy. Nam ed after Reagan’s own Secretary of 
Defense Caspar Weinberger, who was its topmost proponent, the new doctrine, as the most
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concrete realization of the Vietnam syndrome, was passionately hated by the neoconservative 
commentariat and the militarist/interventionist opposition in the administration itself. The 
Weinberger Doctrine stipulated that the U .S. military power could be deployed only if the 
following conditions, each a clear echo of Vietnam, were met: the goals are vital to American 
national interest; political and military objectives are “clearly defined”; there is a “clear intention 
of winning”; the intervention is supported by the public opinion and approved by Congress; war 
is the absolute last resort after all other means have failed; and in case o f deployment, the policy 
is constantly “reassessed and adjusted” (for discussions o f the “Vietnam syndrome” in the 
military during the Reagan years and the Weinberger Doctrine, see the accounts in Bacevich 
2005, 39-48; Isaacs 1997, 68-75).
Nevertheless, in the neoconservative and Reaganite opinion, even if the syndrome could not 
immediately be cured, it had to be at least treated: hence the idea that “it is time we recognized 
that ours was, in truth, a noble cause,” the somewhat infamous revisionist line delivered by 
Reagan in a speech in 1980 (Reagan 1980). The phrase was an element o f a broader effort to 
repackage the war as an admirable instance of American crusading for freedom, which the 
yellowbellied political leadership had made unwinnable. Yet another related element o f the 
repackaging was the newfound admiration for Vietnam veterans, who—according to Reaganite 
logic—had for a decade been deprived of their well-deserved status as heroes, and thus needed to 
be fervently rehabilitated, even if in words rather than actions (on Reagan’s use o f the Vietnam 
veterans, see: Bacevich 2005, 105-111; Bothmer 2010, 70ff). Here is a typical sample o f Reagan’s 
teary-eyed, revisionist rhetoric concerning the veterans and the nobility o f the war, taken from a 
1984 Memorial Day speech: “[t]he veterans o f Vietnam were never welcomed home with 
speeches and bands, but were never defeated in battle and were heroes as surely as any who ever 
fought in a noble cause” (quoted in Bothmer 2010, 70).11
This insistence on the “noble cause,” and the complete whitewashing of the United States’ 
interests and policy in Indochina, rested on an astonishing act o f falsification of history. It made 
the notion o f a “noble cause” possible by painting the U .S. intervention as uncontroversial 
protection of the Vietnamese people against communist aggression, rather than an invasion to 
support a semi-legal and oppressive regime in order to thwart Vietnamese independence. In a 
press conference in 1982, Reagan claimed that “when France gave up Indochina as a colony,” it
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was decided in Geneva that, “since North and South Vietnam had been, previous to 
colonization, two separate countries,” elections would be held there to let people decide whether 
to remain one country or two; Ho Chi Minh, however, “refused to participate in such an 
election” (Reagan 1982; see also Bothmer 2010, 70-71; Hagopian 2009, 47-48 ; Young 2015, 
ch. 15). The U .S. had no choice but to send in military advisers, who were then attacked and 
killed by insurgents from the North and so needed further military protection, and the rest was 
history.
Only, o f course, it was not. For a start, France had not “given up” Indochina, but following 
the disruptions o f W orld W ar II, waged a war in Vietnam to regain control over the colony, 
until it was defeated by V o Nguyen G iap’s Viet M inh at Dien Bien Phu in 1954. That North 
and South Vietnam remained at war for twenty more years was largely due to the U nited States’ 
ideological and economic motivations, and the power it had to first meddle in the internal affairs 
o f the small country, and then to wage an illegal war against it. Nevertheless, to Reagan, 
maneuvering in the cultural memory of the war had clear ideological advantages. Most 
importantly, it discredited not only the 1960s and the antiwar movement, but also the very idea 
that there was anything wrong about the U .S. presence in Vietnam. It also aided the renewed 
and refreshed anticommunist agenda of the Reagan administration (Bacevich 2005, 105; 
Bothmer 2010, 70-72; Hagopian 2009, 17). Furthermore, the American neoconservative 
attitude was by nature nationalist and interventionist, thriving on the idea o f American greatness 
and the underlying belief, even if not made explicit, that the country had the right to expand 
and protect its power and capitalist interests, even through war, worldwide. If the war in Vietnam 
could be turned into a moral and heroic enterprise, then the threat o f “another” one would be 
gone and with it the poignant point o f comparison that could be used to scrutinize W ashington’s 
actions abroad (Bothmer 2010, 79)—by claiming Vietnam for themselves, the warmongers were 
trying to disable its political legacy. Vindication o f the war and its soldiers—but also the spectacle 
o f Grenada, in its aftermath a modest prelude to Desert Storm —aided and promoted it all, and 
so the need to dispel the evil aura around the Vietnam W ar as a symbol o f possible American 
wrongdoing was thus a natural extension of the inherent neoconservative and nationalist 
outlook: soldiers and veterans, according to Reagan’s rhetoric, “made possible the rebirth of
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American patriotism. [They] refurbished the nation’s ideals and embodied its renewed sense of 
purpose” (Bacevich 2005, 109).
1.3. Squandering Vietnam’s subversive potential
In themselves, the Weinberger Doctrine and the “Vietnam syndrome” would not end American 
imperialism or interventionism, o f course. W hen needed, the G ulf W ar was made to meet all 
the stipulations o f the doctrine, after all, and still several hundred thousands o f Iraqis died as a 
result o f U .S. actions.12 Even with the syndrome gnawing at American hearts and minds, the 
post-Vietnam administrations continued to meddle abroad covertly, often supporting 
murderous, sometimes genocidal, regimes and parties on the wrong side o f history: from Ford 
to Clinton, for example, between 1975 and 1999, U .S. administrations continued to give 
political blessing to and supply the Indonesian government with weapons for its occupation of 
East Timor, during which the local population was destroyed through killings, starvation, and 
terror (Chomsky 1997, 47). Carter’s White House supported Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge, 
pushing for their recognition as the official representative o f Cam bodia in the United Nations, 
even when their crimes began coming to light, after Vietnam had invaded the country and ousted 
the brutal regime in 1978. The Carter administration also supported the punitive war waged on 
Vietnam by China a year later (the Khmer Rouge had been backed by the Chinese, with whom 
the U .S. was flirting at the time), in which as many as 137,000 Vietnamese people, mostly 
soldiers and militiamen, died over the four weeks o f conflict (Chomsky 1989, 173—174; Chomsky 
1999, 10.5.8; Young 2014, ch. 15). Reagan famously funded and publicly promoted the Nicaraguan 
right-wing and antirevolutionary Contras, guilty o f various crimes against civilians, including 
executions, rapes, torture, kidnappings, and terrorist attacks; in El Salvador, he supported 
ultraright death squads, in Guatemala—a government guilty o f the worst genocide in modern 
Latin America, and there were more places worldwide where the Reaganite blessing and money 
flowed. That is why, Sara Diam ond wrote,
[t]he collaboration of [anticommunist, interventionist, and militaristic] right-wing 
movements with Reagan’s policymaking apparatus was no mere academic question. During 
the 1980s, the U.S. government used proxy armies to wage the East-West struggle on Third 
World battlefields, particularly in Central America and southern Africa. In Guatemala, El
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Salvador, Nicaragua, Angola, Mozambique, and South Africa, hundreds of thousands of 
people were killed. The scope of atrocities committed by forces allied with the United States 
defies calculation. In all of these countries, U.S. right-wing movement activists enlisted on 
the side of the anticommunist military and paramilitary forces, and therefore share the 
responsibility for the death and destruction perpetrated by their fellow “freedom fighters”
(1995, 207; see also Grandin 2007, 197-224).
But if the neoconservative attempts to rewrite the Vietnam W ar were more sinister and 
calculated in their objective o f reinstating American imperial ambition and upholding the 
balance of power through military intervention, the more diffuse liberal cultural narrative o f the 
war, as it crystallized throughout the late 1970s and 1980s, was perhaps more effective in 
colonizing people’s minds as to what the war had “meant”—mostly because it proved so anodyne, 
its critique a form of “nonthreatening nonconformity.” Therefore, what the following account 
should make clear is the limitation o f the centrist-liberal discourse as a mode of criticism: its 
failure to identify and verbalize the real issues the war highlighted and the problems it posed, 
and its inadvertent complicity in restoring the nationalist and militarist tendencies in the U .S. 
in response to the conflict, and all that they entailed.
The process by which this mainstream narrative emerged from the smoke and dust o f the 
“long 1960s” (ending in 1973) was multifaceted, and indeed has been described from various 
perspectives: o f the constitution of the Vietnam literary canon (Neilson), leftist criticism of 
political and corporate propaganda (Chomsky), the right-wing rewriting of the 1960s (Bothmer), 
the politics o f commemoration and memorials (Hagopian), U .S. foreign policy (Bacevich, Isaacs), 
cultural studies (Beattie), the myths associated with veterans (Franklin, Lembcke), the treatment 
o f the My Lai massacre (Oliver), and so on. Several shared conclusions may be drawn from those 
studies. The propaganda of Nixon especially, but also o f neoconservative intellectuals and 
Reagan, certainly contributed to the eventual narrative. More significantly, the narrative is 
likewise grounded in two particular concerns: foreign policy, in its more abstract dimensions, 
and the veterans. It is characterized, above all, by its deceptively non-ideological politics o f 
victimhood: the forgetting of U .S. culpability in Indochina, “Vietnamnesia” and the notion of 
“mutual destruction,” depoliticization and psychologization o f the Vietnam W ar discourse, and 
promotion of the discourses o f healing and of reconciliation. Above all, the narrative claims the
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absolute centrality o f the Vietnam veteran as the worthiest victim o f the conflict and the amplest 
symbol o f its meaning and impact on America itself. As Patrick Hagopian puts it,
[t]he cultural construction of Vietnam veterans played a central role in shaping the 
remembrance of the war. The veterans were living embodiments of the war and their 
difficult readjustment to civilian society became a metaphor for the nation’s problems in 
integrating the Vietnam experience into the pattern of national life (Hagopian 2009, 49).
The conservative version of the Vietnam syndrome extended to encompass the attempts to 
rewrite the conflict as heroic and noble, and the 1960s as destructive and unpatriotic. But the 
broader take on the syndrome had its extensions, too. For example, what was left out o f that 
central narrative, were the other victims: the Vietnamese people themselves.
O ne of the paradoxes o f the war was that, even as it was happening, for a decade occupying a 
central spot in the public agenda in the U .S., the country’s press and media showed relatively 
little interest in the people o f South Vietnam—whose government was the United States’ ally, 
and whose liberty and welfare were ostensibly the very reasons why the Americans went to war.13 
Civilian matters, which were crucial for understanding the conflict and the roots o f the eventual 
American failure, received little coverage, beyond conventionalized and simplifying press and 
television reports. These ignored matters included not only the historical circumstances o f the 
war and its (post)colonial context, or the reasons behind support for the National Liberation 
Front (NLF) in South Vietnamese countryside, but also issues such as economic problems and 
corruption brought about by the influx of U .S. money to Saigon, or the destruction of traditional 
social structures, fundamental to Vietnamese life for millennia, that the American strategies were 
causing. The early years o f the war were reported in the States much as the previous wars had 
been: the media were overwhelmingly supportive o f the war, and by convention portrayed the 
American soldiers as bringers o f freedom and modernity, and as protectors o f the civilians. The 
other side o f the war, the one in which it was clear that the GIs were racist and capable of 
extraordinary brutality against Vietnamese noncombatants, went largely unreported until the 
My Lai massacre scandal in 1969 broke out and more stories surfaced briefly; the almost 
complete lack of interest with which VVAW ’s W inter Soldier Investigation was met in 1970 
seems to suggest that the capacity o f the American public to listen about their soldiers
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perpetrating atrocities had quickly run out. Nevertheless, the image of a Vietnamese person, a 
peasant, solidified eventually into the image o f a brutalized passive victim, physically violated 
and destroyed. This image was enforced particularly powerfully in war photography, such as Nick 
U t’s picture o f napalm-covered running children with the naked girl in the middle, and in film, 
such as Platoon. It was also dominant in literature.
However, at the same time as the Vietnamese peasants were seen as brutalized victims, they 
were also considered treacherous and deceitful: “they’re all V C ” was the slogan of the war’s trope 
that was emerging and feeding the larger American cultural narrative, seen in reports from 
Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s, but, as we shall see in further chapters, given most attention 
in literature and film. As I will argue, these images converged into a particular strategy of 
representation which enabled the unspoken, half-conscious suggestion that because they were 
ungrateful about the American assistance, all seemed to “look the sam e,” and often harbored 
pro-guerilla political sentiments against the U.S.-backed and cripplingly corrupted government, 
the civilians o f South Vietnam were in some ways responsible for their mistreatment at the hands 
o f American soldiers.
More openly, however, it fell to Democrat President Jimmy Carter to engage, before Reagan, 
in a rewriting of the war’s narrative in which the Vietnamese were simultaneously at the center 
and pushed out beyond the margins. First o f all, there was Carter’s rhetoric itself, reflecting and 
supporting the U .S. policy toward Vietnam in the aftermath of the conflict. In a news conference 
in 1977, two years after the fall o f South Vietnam, when asked whether the U .S. had “any moral 
obligation to help rebuild” the reunified country, Carter answered that,
[w]ell, the destruction was mutual. (...) We went there to defend the freedom of the South 
Vietnamese. And I don’t feel that we ought to apologize or to castigate ourselves or to 
assume the status of culpability. (...) I don’t feel that we owe a debt, nor that we should be 
forced to pay reparations at all (Carter 1977).
The meaning of the proclamation—which, as Chomsky observes, was “so uncontroversial as to 
pass with no reaction” (1999, 10.5.7)—was of course that whatever the havoc the U .S. strategy 
had wreaked in Vietnam, and whatever the scale o f suffering it had caused the native population, 
they were matched by the havoc and the suffering the Vietnamese had wreaked and caused the
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American people. Discussing these words in the context o f Carter administration’s negotiations 
with postwar Vietnam which urged reparations, Young interpreted the idea that lay behind this 
statement thus:
[The United States would not agree to any precondition or advance assurances] that in any 
way implied a debt, moral or otherwise. One does not pay reparations for mistakes, even 
tragic ones. The United States considered that it had intervened in Vietnam with excellent 
motives which had then gone bad. This did not make America a wrongdoer like Germany 
or Japan, who not only paid for the damage each had done but were forced to accept 
international constraints against recidivism (2014, ch. 15; on comparisons with Japan and 
Germany, see also Chomsky 1999, ch. 10; Hagopian 2009, 406).
This turn of phrase, and the revisionist image of the war that lay behind it, were part of the 
general anti-Vietnam stance of U .S. administrations in the 1970s and ‘80s. For Carter, there 
were realpolitik concerns at stake; his administration was, for one thing, eager for good relations 
with China which would strengthen its position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, and China’s relations 
with Vietnam were very bad indeed, culminating in the 1979 war. But the roots o f the claim of 
“mutual destruction” went further. The notion was part o f a rhetoric necessary to substantiate 
the systematic refusal o f the U nited States to fulfil any obligations to Vietnam after the war. 
While reparations were not negotiated in the Paris Peace Accords that ended the American 
phase o f the conflict in 1973, the treaty did stipulate that the U .S. would “contribute to healing 
the wounds of war and to postwar reconstruction” o f the country. Hence, in private 
correspondence to Hanoi, Richard Nixon promised to pay out $3.25 billion to the reunited 
Vietnam in aid (Franklin 2002, 322; Lawrence 2008, 168-169; Young 2014, ch. 15; corrected 
for inflation, the value of this amount comes to about $18 billion). The money never came. O n 
the contrary, 1975 marked the beginning of the United States’ lowkey campaign to oppose 
Vietnamese attempts at development after the war—a campaign whose aim was, in short, to 
“bleed Vietnam” (Martini 2004). A  number o f American history books have discussed this 
subject in depth, including Marilyn Young’s seminal The Vietnam Wars (2014, ch. 15), and a 
dedicated study by Edwin Martini, titled Invisible Enemies: The American War on Vietnam, 1975­
2000; it will suffice here to list the major points in U .S. post-war Vietnam policy. First o f all, 
twice, in 1975 and 1976, the United States vetoed Vietnam’s admission to the United Nations.
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Moreover, not only did Congress, during President Ford’s term, expressly forbid all forms of 
formal and informal aid to Vietnam, Cam bodia or Laos, the U .S. also put an embargo on all 
trade with Vietnam (and Cambodia), which stunted its economic development and contributed 
massively to the country’s decades-long plunge into deep and devastating poverty, as it closed it 
to other foreign markets and made aid from development organizations, as well as international 
loans, unavailable. The troubles were made worse by the widespread wartime destruction 
(Chomsky 1999, 10.5.9; Young 2014, ch. 15).14 Both Young and Martini agree that “although 
the brutal American embargo did not determine the fate o f a Socialist Vietnam, it did limit the 
range of possibilities available to the state and its people” (Martini 2004, 49; emphasis in original) 
and “greatly exacerbated the economic crisis in Vietnam ” (Young 2014, ch. 15).
As far as the symbolism of these acts went, much like Carter’s notion of “mutual destruction,” 
they signified to the rest o f the world and to the American people at home that the war in 
Vietnam was a definitively finished chapter with which the U nited States wanted nothing more 
to do. These actions and statements were, in other words, a declaration of political and historical 
closure.
But this closure concerned the war as an event in which the United States and Vietnam were 
both entangled, and it did not necessarily apply to “Vietnam” as something that had happened 
to the United States. A  particularly bizarre, but very powerful, real-life instance of a “mutual 
destruction”-like concept emerged in the form of the so-called “M IA /PO W  issue.”15 Again, the 
issue is by now well-known in Vietnam W ar scholarship, as it was the focus o f historian H. Bruce 
Franklin’s M.I.A., Or, Mythmaking in America (1994), and has been discussed in other studies 
since then. The gist o f the issue is the widespread belief that following the U .S. withdrawal and 
the release o f American prisoners o f war (POWs) from North Vietnamese prisons, a number of 
captured U .S. soldiers remained in Indochina, secretly held captive by the communists. 
According to the proponents o f this theory, these men were to be found on the list o f soldiers 
missing in action (MIA) in Indochina. Franklin’s book concluded decisively that no American 
POWs had been left behind in Vietnam. It traced in great detail the development o f the 
M IA /PO W  myth, which since Ford’s presidency had been used as a block to normalization of 
relations with Vietnam and as justification to pressure the United Nations and other 
international organizations and institutions to abstain from helping the country. By the 1980s,
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the myth had grown into an astonishingly strong conspiracy theory and a particularly lasting 
legacy of the Vietnam W ar (the political uses o f the M IA /PO W  issue are discussed throughout 
Martini 2004).
Though largely accepted in academia, Franklin’s findings never made it into the American 
mainstream, where the conviction that soldiers had been left behind in Indochina remained 
widespread. The largest government investigation into the possibility o f live American prisoners 
in Southeast Asia was the Senate Select Committee on PO W /M IA  affairs in 1991-1993, chaired 
by Vietnam veterans Bob Sm ith and John Kerry, and including others such as John M cCain. 
The issue, given the public sentiment about it, proved so inflammatory, however, that 
participation in the committee was considered politically dangerous. In fact, another Vietnam 
vet senator, Al Gore, refused to be a member, while a participant, Senator Bob Kerrey, is reported 
to have said that, “[n]obody wanted to be on that damn committee. It was an absolute loser. 
Everyone knew that the P.O.W. stories were fabrications, but no one wanted to offend the vet 
community” (quoted in Kline 2002). Political caution may indeed explain the vagueness o f the 
committee’s findings, the conclusion being that there were no surviving American POWs in Asia 
at the present time, and thus allowing the possibility that these soldiers may conceivably have been 
there before. Senator Smith, in any case, soon publicly rejected the unanimous decision of the 
committee he had vice-chaired. The conspiracy theory thus continued to be fanned. By the mid- 
1990s, the myth
had evolved to baroque intricacy. By 1992, there were thousands of zealots—who believed 
with cultlike fervor that hundreds of American POWs had been deliberately and callously 
abandoned in Indochina after the war, that there was a vast conspiracy within the armed 
forces and the executive branch—spanning five administrations—to cover up all evidence of 
this betrayal, and that the governments of Communist Vietnam and Laos continued to hold 
an unspecified number of living American POWs, despite their adamant denials of this 
charge (Malcolm McConnell and Theodore Schweitzer III, quoted in Wikipedia 2016b; the 
quotation comes from the two authors’ book titled Inside Hanoi’s Secret Archives: Solving the 
MIA M ystery [1995]).
In Reagan’s America the issue was validated through its political presence, the actions o f the 
M IA /PO W  movement, occasional publicized rescue missions, and above all Hollywood and 
films such as Rambo: First Blood Part II and the Missing in Action series, whose implication in the
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president’s rhetoric has received much academic attention. Where the first Rambo film, First 
Blood (1982), promoted the image of the traumatized, unstable, dangerous, and misunderstood 
veteran, the second installment—departing from its predecessor in virtually all aspects but the 
film ’s title and its star—somehow managed to pack many strands o f American cultural narrative 
o f Vietnam in the 1980s. As for the Reagan connection, the film combines anti-big-government 
sentiment with unabashed militarism characteristic o f the president, interventionist elements in 
his administration, and the neoconservative foreign-policy ideology. In the first instance the film 
pushes forward the later offshoot o f the M IA /PO W  conspiracy according to which the United 
States government had knowingly abandoned the soldiers to their Vietnamese tormentors and, 
through the post-war administrations, continued to cover it up and to deny the prisoners’ 
existence. In the second instance, First Blood Part II is perhaps the most notorious for its title 
character’s question, upon accepting his mission to rescue the POWs: “Do we get to win this 
time?” Thus the film reverts its condemnation of a secretive and treacherous government into a 
rehashing o f the familiar 1980s conservative insistence that Vietnam could have been won were 
it not for the liberals (politicians, the media, activists) who “didn’t let” the military do their job. 
It thus joined the rhetorical stream of Reagan’s calls for an invigorated, assertive foreign policy 
(Bacevich 2005, 111 — 113; Kern 1988, 37—54; Lembcke 1998, 174—179; Martini 2004, 265—281; 
a polemic with the view that John Rambo indorsed Reaganism is offered in Hellmann 1991, 
140—152). A nd the Rambo movie series did resonate and leave a mark: as Andrew Bacevich 
observes, “[a]s measured by the response [the] film evoked, it seems fair to say that Stallone, like 
Reagan, had a far more accurate feel for what made ordinary Americans tick than did elite 
observers who dismissed Rambo, as they did Reagan himself, as either menace or a buffoon” 
(2005, 113; see also Lembcke 1998, 180; Martini 2004, 258).
But First Blood Part II veered toward the center, too, playing up to the emerging dominant 
imagery and narrative tendencies o f the war. In his second incarnation, the buffed-up and 
bandana-wearing John Ram bo is still a disturbed Vietnam veteran broken by his wartime 
experience and reception at home. Although he exerts his revenge, he remains a victim of 
ineffective American leaders as much as o f the bad war itself. Furthermore, the film, like the 
1980s POW  genre in general, marries this form of victimization to another one by following The 
Deer Hunter in emphasizing the image of the incontestably evil North Vietnamese communist
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torturing Americans. U .S. POWs did, o f course, suffer abuse in captivity; the point here 
concerns rather the volume and amount o f cultural airtime these matters received, even as they 
turned into tropes in the American cultural narrative o f the war, to the exclusion of other 
problems the war continued to pose. In the early 1970s, the POW  issue—the administration’s 
insistence on the missing soldiers as much as the widely publicized PR stunt that was the return 
of the 591 prisoners actually freed from Vietnam—served to divert the public attention away 
from the American dead and from the disgruntled veterans, who sometimes voiced their 
dissatisfaction with the disproportionate publicity o f the event. Now the filmic Vietnamese Red 
and his American victim served to strengthen the imagery of American victimization and 
suffering in the war at the hands o f the Vietnamese.
Outside o f Hollywood, the nonexistent prisoners continued to be exploited in American- 
Vietnamese relations. The PO W /M IA  lobby steadfastly opposed any suggestions o f improving 
them, and the issue was used as justification for the aforementioned attempts to deny Vietnam 
U .N . membership, for the trade embargo, and for the refusal to pay out the overdue aid money 
(Franklin 2002, 317-322; Isaacs 1997, 114, 129-130; Kwon 2008, 47; Martini 2004, 75ff, 111, 
362ff). For decades, Hanoi was pressured into “accounting for” all the U .S. soldiers missing from 
the war and told that the aid would come if Vietnam gave up the captured men or their remains. 
But o f course if there were no men and no bodies to give up, there was no proof to give and the 
accused party was left in an impossible position.16 Thus, while the U .S. government could never 
openly acknowledge its “knowledge” about the existence of U .S. prisoners in Indochina, it could, 
exploiting the fluid line between these spectral POW /M IAs and the American soldiers whose 
remains had not been recovered, continue to express vague doubts and issue demands for 
H anoi’s accounting for these men. In the early 1990s, the Vietnamese refusal to allow American 
researchers use their archives to seek answers became the primary issue. In the face of 
international pressure from the U .S., Hanoi soon relented, and the act was received in the States 
as “Vietnam ’s acknowledgement o f its sins” (Chomsky 1997, 169). The Vietnamese compliance 
could then be used in the campaign to lift the embargo, which was done finally in 1995 by 
President Clinton—not because o f a lessened opposition from the PO W /M IA  activists, but 
rather due to American big business’ newfound interest in Vietnam (Chomsky 1997, 169; 
Franklin 2002, 327; Martini 2004, 334ff; see also Martini 2004, 387ff on 1995 and the
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normalization process; the epilogue of M artini’s text discusses American-Vietnamese relations 
after 1995). The impact, by the mid-1990s, o f the prisoner issue on the American cultural 
narrative o f the war cannot be overstated, even if a summary is delivered in Chomsky’s less-than- 
subtle style:
[I]n one of the most stunning propaganda achievements of all of history, the doctrinal 
managers have succeeded in portraying Americans as the pathetic victims of the evil 
Vietnamese Communists, who, not satisfied with assaulting U.S. military forces defending 
Indochina from its people, now fail to open their country and archives totally to American 
investigators seeking remains of pilots maliciously shot down by Vietnamese aggressors. (...)
We can never forgive them for what they did to us, but we will magnanimously refrain from 
punishing them for their crimes and may even allow them to receive aid from abroad if only 
they confess their sins with proper humility and dedicate themselves to resolving the only 
moral issue that remains from a war that slaughtered millions of people and destroyed three 
countries [Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia]. (...)
Throughout, commentators in the press and elsewhere played their role with scarcely a 
slip. One can find an occasional word to the effect that the Vietnamese suffered too, but 
close to 100 percent of commentary keeps to the doctrine that the United States is entitled 
to set ground rules for Vietnam’s entry into the civilized world, maintaining an embargo 
and blocking funds from elsewhere until our tormentors cease their abuse (1997, 168- 
169).17
Elsewhere, Chomsky documents instances o f the rhetoric in the 1980s and early ‘90s that further 
emphasized American victimization at the hands o f the Vietnamese, and drove home the idea 
that the only lasting legacies to be resolved from the war were those concerning the U .S.: “at the 
left-liberal end of the spectrum,” for instance, reconciliation with Vietnam and resumption of 
diplomatic relations may be advocated, but always with the qualification that the Americans are 
ready to forgive the Vietnamese; the missing prisoners remain chief among “the humanitarian 
issues left over from the war” (1989, 62).
The notion o f American victimization in Vietnam was not limited to the dubious claim of 
mutual destruction and the phantom prisoners o f war, but rather it seeped into the very fabric 
o f the American cultural narrative o f the war, to render Vietnam decisively an “American 
tragedy”: something traumatic that had happened to the United States which now had to be 
treated and cured, and from which the extent o f Vietnamese suffering was largely excluded.
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By the early 1980s, several seemingly paradoxical trends had emerged in reference to the 
societal-cultural image of Vietnam veterans, concerning their psychological problems, economic 
and social welfare, public reception, and portrayal in media. Perhaps most importantly, veterans’ 
mental health was becoming a matter o f public interest. The edition of the Diagnostic and 
Statistical M anual of Mental Disorders (DSM) published in 1980 for the first time included an entry 
for posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), a condition “discovered” and described in the 1970s 
through therapy work and sessions with Vietnam vets (the crucial and direct impact o f Vietnam 
veterans groups and advocates in the process o f the official classification of PTSD  is described 
in MacPherson 1988, 214-230, and Bloom 2000, 27-38).
It is worth pointing out that both the methodology of the diagnosis o f PTSD and its impact 
on the Vietnam War discourse have been criticized. In the first instance, some have argued that 
the disorder was “discovered” and packaged from a pool o f symptoms that could be treated 
independently and without the need for branding a “new” condition.18 In the second instance, 
Lembcke and Patrick Hagopian independently argued that the media attention to PTSD, either 
fed by or feeding the Hollywood and television veteran portrayals, and legitimized by academics 
and journalists, worked to further “psychologize” the discourse on the war and its American 
combatants, and to effectively depoliticize them. Soldiers and veterans, as a group once most 
vocal and publicly visible in their antiwar, sometimes anti-imperialist stance and activism, were 
now being treated increasingly as psychologically troubled by their experience, even scarred, and 
in need of medical help. The radical politics and antiwar protests o f the 1960s, as well as the 
alleged hostility o f activists, were increasingly seen as a factor contributing to the veterans’ mental 
problems, a perspective which inadvertently aided in the neoconservative repudiation o f the 
decade. The sting o f their political arguments was thus blunted, as veterans’ politics and ideology 
became secondary to mental and emotional well-being, the specific political and ideological 
complaints now almost a symptom of trauma to be resolved and cured through psychological and 
psychiatric care:
The legitimation of PTSD was an enormously important development because it increased 
the availability of needed mental health resources for thousands of Vietnam veterans. (...)
But [it also] reached far beyond the boundaries of the mental health professions. In turn, 
the “discovery” of PTSD (...) had broad political implications. What had also been
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discovered was a mode of discourse that enabled authorities to turn the radical political 
behavior of veterans opposed to the war into a pathology, thereby discrediting them in the 
public mind. It was the media’s discovery as much as the psychiatric profession’s (Lembcke
1998, 110).
Once veterans were wrapped in society’s healing embrace as objects of public sympathy and 
acceptance, their role as bearers of a political critique quietly fell away. When the Vietnam 
veterans “problem” was redefined in psycho-sociological terms, an ameliorative vocabulary 
replaced the language of political critique (Hagopian 2009, 18).
In other words, the psychologization of the discourse removed much of the necessity of 
confronting the political and ethical problems of U .S. involvement in Vietnam and the country’s 
actions there by insisting on confronting instead the far narrower problem of combatants’ 
mental health, which itself now rendered veteran political engagement inconsequential 
(Hagopian 2009, 16-18, 49-78 ; Lembcke 1998, 101-125; see also Beattie 1998).
The image was replicated in popular culture, where the ex-soldier was frequently seen as a 
deeply traumatized “nutcase” and a possible menace to society. The epitome of the archetype 
arrived in 1982 in the muscly form of Sylvester Stallone’s John Rambo in First Blood, but 
Lembcke, who studied over a hundred films involving veteran homecomings as main and sub­
plots, traced the trope’s evolution back to as early as the 1960s. The upshot, he argued, was that 
by their sheer volume and persistence, these films promoted an image o f a politically uninvolved 
veteran. Incredibly, despite the high visibility o f antiwar veterans during the conflict, the bulk of 
these movies (with a couple o f notable but not unproblematic exceptions) never portrayed 
soldiers involved in the protest movement or even vocal about the political issues o f the war. 
Instead, the veteran’s mental wellbeing, and by extension the safety o f the American people 
threatened by the troubled madman, was made in these films the focal concern in the war’s 
aftermath (Lembcke 1998, 145-181; see also Katzman 1993, 7-24). Similarly, none o f the 
canonical films which take place in Vietnam, and involving soldiers on deployment there, 
portrays them as participating in organized, politically-motivated protest against the war.
But veterans’ psychological state was one among several specific grievances that their 
advocates voiced. The public attention which these grievances began to receive in the early 1980s 
testifies to the shifting relationship between ex-soldiers and the American society, and the
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veterans’ increasing rehabilitation and vindication. Myra MacPherson enumerated some of the 
adverse circumstances faced by veterans in the 1970s: “chronic unemployment” among unskilled 
veterans and those belonging to minorities, at 20 percent among the disabled; “inferior” G.I. 
Bill benefits as compared to W orld W ar II and Korea; lack of adequate help for the invalids; 
lack of psychiatric and readjustment help; lack of representation in political offices, which were 
overwhelmingly filled with men who had never entered military service or seen combat; and lack 
of interest in veteran stories in mass media (MacPherson 1988, 67-68). A  particularly notorious 
complaint concerned the so-called Agent Orange, a toxic defoliant used by the U .S. military in 
Vietnam, which by the late 1970s began to be linked to a host o f ailments among the veterans 
who had been exposed to it, including various forms of cancer and birth defects in offspring. 
Lawsuits started to be filed and a bitter struggle began with the Veterans Affairs Department, 
headed in the ‘80s by a Reagan appointee, in order to persuade the extremely reluctant 
institution to fund proper research into the herbicide’s effects. Eventually, in 1984, the president 
signed a bill that would issue disability payments to veterans reporting a limited range of health 
problems linked to their contact with defoliants during their tours o f duty (MacPherson 1988, 
699), and in 1991 Congress passed the so-called Agent Orange Act which pushed for 
classification of and continuing research into related diseases, although compensations remained 
rare due to restrictive conditions needed to be met to qualify for payments. Veterans fared 
slightly better in a notorious class-action lawsuit against the manufacturers o f Agent Orange, 
including Dow Chemical and Monsanto, which was settled in 1984 for 180 million dollars. 
Payouts to individual veterans and widows turned out to be minimal, the highest possible sum 
a completely disabled soldier would receive totaling only 12 thousand dollars, and the sums on 
the other end being significantly lower. Nevertheless, the Agent Orange issue became one of the 
defining problems of veterans’ affairs in the 1980s, and its high publicity is evidence of the 
increasing popular concern for Vietnam-era soldiers.
The same process was evident in literary and popular culture, too, where veterans—and other 
Americans directly affected by Vietnam—were similarly gaining more sympathetic recognition. 
Gloria Emerson’s Winners &  Losers, published in 1976 and awarded a National Book Award in 
1978, concerned as a major theme the effect o f the war on the U nited States and on veterans 
and their families, but the book’s ultimate condemnation was directed against the apathetic
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American public. Friendly Fire by C. D. B. Bryan, also published in 1976, enjoyed some initial 
critical attention, and in early journal articles scholars were quick to mention it in lists o f the 
emerging “best o f ’ Vietnam literature. That it has since almost completely dropped off the radar 
is perhaps due to the fact that its very precise political and social concerns have been outlived 
(the book may hold some residual general appeal because one of its central characters is then-Lt. 
Col. N orm an Schwarzkopf). Nevertheless, Bryan’s non-fictional account concerned not veteran 
affairs per se, but rather the death of draftee Michael Mullen in Vietnam, the conviction o f his 
parents that something in the official explanation o f his death was amiss, their dealings with the 
Pentagon and politicians in trying to understand their son ’s death, and their consequent activism 
in opposition to the war. Bryan concluded that there had been nothing mysterious in M ullen’s 
death, nor anything suspicious in the official record. But the book was ultimately a record of the 
small-town fringes o f the antiwar movement and a denunciation o f the way in which the Nixon 
administration had handled the war at home and the people affected by it. In its tone and 
sympathies, then, Friendly Fire fell in line with such veteran memoirs as VVAW ’s Ron Kovic’s 
bestselling Born on the Fourth of July (originally published 1976), which was similarly as much an 
account o f the suffering in result o f war injury and death as it was a poignant condemnation of 
official practices—be it by politicians, the military, or the V.A. hospitals—in response to them. 
(Kovic was shot in Vietnam and as a result became paralyzed from the waist down; after the time 
he spent convalescing in what he described as atrocious conditions, he later joined the antiwar 
movement.) Both books shared, moreover, in the accusation of the conformist American public 
indifferent to the war being waged, and then apathetic either to the voices o f the parents whose 
sons had died overseas, like the Mullens, or to the suffering, mistreated and ignored veterans, 
like Kovic. These types o f narratives had an impact that carried the Vietnam aftertaste over into 
the 1980s.
A  popular account concerning the war in Vietnam as it was being treated in the U .S. in the 
early 1980s comes in the form of Bobbie Ann M ason’s novel In Country (1985). The novel depicts 
a contemporary American landscape saturated with pop culture and pop consumerism, in which 
the book’s protagonist, a teenage girl named Sam  Hughes, begins to question her generation’s 
lack o f historical knowledge pertaining to Vietnam and the unwillingness o f adults to talk about 
the war: an echo of the previous books’ condemnation of the uninterested and apathetic public.
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M ason also explores the plights o f veterans, especially via the character o f Sam ’s uncle, Emmett, 
who exhibits antisocial and eccentric behaviors that effectively prohibit his living a normal life, 
and who, Sam worries obsessively, might “have Agent Orange.” But In Country signals change as 
well. Jim Neilson, who praised M ason’s concern for exposing the class exploitation of U .S. 
draftees, ongoing in the form of their current social and health problems, as well as for her acute 
attention to the 1980s Reaganite revival o f militarism, nevertheless found fault with the novel’s 
ending. Sam and Emmett arrive at the Vietnam Veterans Memorial— “the W all”—where Sam 
finds her own name etched onto the wall (i.e. a dead soldier with the same name as hers). In the 
book’s last scene, Emmett is “sitting there cross-legged in front o f the wall, and his face burst[s] 
into a smile like flames” (Mason 1986, 245). Neilson criticizes the finale, arguing that despite 
the socially engaged and critical nature o f the plot and Sam ’s subversive quest to learn about the 
war, the last scene suggests
reconciliation and regeneration (...). [The scene] is clearly intended to signal a process of 
healing. Sam’s sense that all the names in America have been used to decorate the Wall 
suggests that every American is a victim. This [is an] erasure of the Vietnamese and of the 
class-specific suffering caused by the war, [and a] repudiation of her own analysis for the sake 
of nationalist sentimentalism (...). The problem with the conclusion of In Country, this 
moment of personal and national healing, is that it is false and sentimental and at odds with 
almost all that Sam has learned about the war (Neilson 1998, 187 — 189; similar criticism of 
the book’s ending is offered in Beattie 1998, 2).
Both Friendly Fire and Born on the Fourth of July ended, or almost ended, with retrospections: 
having chronicled the Stateside events in the aftermath of the relevant tours o f duty, both 
authors return to Vietnam to tell us what had happened there, Bryan to describe the 
circumstances o f Michael M ullen’s death, Kovic o f his own wounding. Bryan finished the 
narrative o f the Mullen family with the parents crying and still seething in frustrated anger, 
followed by the Vietnam retrospection, and then ended with a brisk paragraph of statistics: by 
1973, this many U .S. dead were reported, and Michael M ullen’s death simply belonged among 
the numbers (Bryan 1991, 465). After the closing Vietnam scenes which describe his becoming 
paralyzed, Kovic ends with a lyrical page of reminiscence about his childhood backyard, as a 
finale to a nostalgic theme that runs throughout his memoir. He then adds a postscript in the
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form of a letter a Marine lieutenant general had sent to his parents following his injury, in which 
gratitude for Kovic’s “contribution” is offered and he himself is praised as “the type of young 
man of which Americans and free men everywhere can be proud” (Kovic 2012, postscript).
It is worth remembering that both books were published in 1976, and so were presumably 
written at a time when the war was winding down to a close for the Vietnamese and had only 
very freshly ended for the Americans. Both books, then, in their retrospections bring the combat 
o f Vietnam sharply back into focus, and in their endings convey the indignation at the 
unjustified and unredeemable loss o f young American life and potential. Friendly Fire, which has 
spent some time portraying Michael Mullen as an outstanding son of middle America (he had 
also been a promising Ph.D. student in animal nutrition), simultaneously scales down and 
multiplies the enormity of his death to his family by showcasing that he had been only one 
among thousands. Kovic, on the other hand, concludes with an emphatic sentimental image 
that, following the horrors o f his service and disability recorded in the memoir, wistfully 
underscores the loss o f innocence and magnifies the profound post-Vietnam bitterness. The 
letter from the lieutenant general is ironic in the light o f Kovic’s “contribution” to an ultimately 
meaningless war and the treatment he received in the States as a severely disabled, but also 
outspoken, veteran. It is probably not at all ironic as a device to drive home the point that Kovic 
was representative o f those among his generation whose youth and potential were misspent, and 
life and health sacrificed. Both books, in other words, end with anger and raw heartbreak; both 
throw the final accusation toward the military and politicians by putting the suffering they have 
recorded in the official context, by the means o f the statistics and the letter.
But In Country—a canonical Vietnam novel—while it concerns itself with the social injustices 
o f the draft and the postwar plight o f veterans, in the chasm between its critique and its 
sentimental ending reveals a change of attitude, a willingness toward reconciliation and healing 
that surpasses lingering grievances even if it costs the novel its critical consistency. W hat M ason’s 
book captures, even if inadvertently, is the moment that the vindication o f the veterans had 
started, and with it the new urgency toward restoring national unity, regardless o f what had 
previously been made of the war—its political and ideological motivations, or its crimes—itself. 
Cinem a gives further proof o f the spike in the interest in the war. All three books—Friendly Fire, 
Born on the Fourth of July, and In Country—were made into films in the 1980s. In 1979, another
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veteran narrative, Coming Home, had received three Oscar awards out o f eight nominations, the 
same year that The Deer Hunter went home with five, including Best Picture. (It was in 1979, too, 
that the seismic Apocalypse Now was released, the first film to deal with the actual war in Vietnam 
since its end.)
Alongside the newfound interest in the conflict and veteran narratives, in the 1980s a 
“discourse o f healing” became the pervasive way of speaking about the war. The group most 
clearly in need of healing were, o f course, the veterans, with their PTSD and Agent Orange, but 
on the list o f possible grievances was also mistreatment by American society, symbolized and 
visualized in several tropes. One concerned the image of allegedly hostile welcome given many 
veterans by (sometimes spitting) antiwar activists, discussed in the previous subchapter. In 
another example, in veteran accounts Vietnam continued to be compared with the W orld War 
II, and the soldiers and their advocates continuously referred to the “victory parades” which their 
fathers had been given and which they themselves had been refused—proof, it seemed, that 
whereas the troops o f the Greatest Generation got to kiss nurses on Times Square and were 
greeted home as heroes, the troops o f the Vietnam Generation came home alone and to, at best, 
indifference.19 In fact, the Vietnam homecoming practice had to do with the length of typical 
tours o f duty abroad (twelve months in the Army and thirteen in the Marines), which meant 
that individuals rotated in and out o f units separately—but what is not pointed out nearly often 
enough is the fact that as W orld W ar II was ending, the U .S. armed forces discharged their men 
individually, on the basis o f a complex point system, and not, as the myth would have it, in unit­
sized bulks that could be welcomed with floats and fanfare (Lembcke 1998, 119-120). That this 
myth is now ensconced not only as a painful counterpoint in the Vietnam W ar lore, but in the 
American cultural memory in general, supports as much the popular image of the Vietnam 
veteran as it does the nostalgic and mythologized status o f W orld W ar II.
But, as indicated above, changes were afoot: the veterans, reshaped into heroes-after-all in the 
Reaganite and conservative narratives, in the mainstream were instead being heard-at-last, and 
recognized as victims in need of attention and care. Indeed, M ason’s In Country finds an 
interesting nonfictional parallel in Myra M acPherson’s monumental Long Time Passing: Vietnam 
and the Haunted Generation, published in 1984. A  journalist, MacPherson conducted interviews 
with several hundred Americans affected by the war, including veterans and their families,
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members o f the antiwar movement, draft dodgers, representatives o f various government bodies 
and agencies, and so forth. The 800-page result testifies to the numerous complaints and 
ailments besetting ex-soldiers, ranging from specific charges against Agent Orange manufacturers 
to the sense o f betrayal at having been deprived o f the heroes’ status. MacPherson also gives 
much space to the problem of class and the inexcusable exploitation of the underprivileged by 
the Vietnam-era draft, a concern that carries over into the (book’s) present in the form of 
economic disadvantage of many veterans, often resulting from individual costs o f the war, such 
as disability or psychological trauma. She also openly denounces Ronald Reagan’s policies, 
militarism, and rhetorical use o f the Vietnam W ar and its soldiers. Unsurprisingly, then, 
throughout the book M acPherson’s sympathy remains squarely with the veterans, and her 
mission to let their voices be finally heard is clear.
But Long Time Passing is not without problems—it is, even more so than the ending of In 
Country, exemplary of what is wrong with the liberal take on Vietnam. O n  the face o f it, 
M acPherson’s enterprise is not at all different from what Gloria Emerson had done in Winners 
&  Losers, which also consisted of interviews and political and social commentary. But Emerson 
had been a correspondent in Vietnam, and one invested in the Vietnamese cause; her book 
covers the traumas of Vietnam in equal, if not greater, measure, and if she enumerates the 
various forms of American victimization (real and imagined), Winners &  Losers never loses focus 
o f the incomparable horrors suffered by the Vietnamese and the actual ruin of their country as 
opposed to the symbolic, psychological devastation in American society. Emerson also stays loyal 
to the antiwar movement. While she is adamant in her outrage at the loss o f American life in 
the war and remains sympathetic to the young soldiers she had met in Vietnam, she is not afraid 
o f presenting some of the veterans and their families with whom she spends time after the war 
in a critical, even negative light, which exhibits her broader critique of the American society. 
Above all, time and time again she recounts interviews with vets and parents o f wounded and 
dead soldiers, whom she quotes praising the war as a well-intentioned exercise in liberation and 
democracy, and insisting on American greatness. Emerson’s ultimate message is that nobody had 
learnt anything.
In contrast to Emerson’s experience, M acPherson’s interest in the “Vietnam Generation” had 
been sparked late, as she herself explains, after a decade of ignoring the war, and inspired only
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when she had watched the TV  film based on Bryan’s Friendly Fire. Long Time Passing, apart from 
providing a cross-section of the Vietnam Generation and charting the scope of veteran issues, is 
also a painting o f the American society in the aftermath of the conflict. But her diagnoses and 
prescriptions are not the same as Emerson’s, whose concern is to “learn to love her country 
again,” a piece o f advice given her by an N LF member she met in Paris during the peace 
negotiations. By shedding so much light on the Vietnamese suffering, Em erson is urging the 
need for profound change among the American people in the face o f what their country had 
done in Indochina. In M acPherson’s book, on the other hand, U .S. society is torn, divided, 
jittery, bruised; it is a society, in other words, in need of healing, not change. As indicated, the 
“discourse o f healing” has been recognized as an important mode of imaging and understanding 
Vietnam in the 1980s. It is obviously related to the psychologization discussed above, and the 
shifting of concern toward PTSD and veterans’ psyches. But in fact it encompasses U .S. society 
at large and thus becomes key to understanding its approach toward the war. Interestingly, just 
as veteran denouncement o f what had gone on in Vietnam as war crime became supplanted with 
individual trauma, so the way of talking about the war in the U .S. became not about the conflict 
per se—its history and the actual events o f the war—but rather about its aftermath in America 
and its meaning to the American people, as if the conflict had significance only in relation to the 
events and problems it had triggered between the two American coasts.
The advantage of the discourse o f healing is that it remains applicable whatever interpretation 
of the war one assumes: a noble cause spoiled by liberals; a mistake o f policy and a case o f good 
intentions gone bad; or even an immoral and destructive imperialist “project.” In the 1980s, the 
Vietnam W ar could continue to be considered wrong, but the understanding of its wrongness 
shifted, as if the conflict came to be seen through a different lens: its devastating effect was now 
not primarily the destruction of Vietnam and its people, but rather the rift it had apparently 
caused in the American society, divided by both the conflict’s politics and its aftermath as it 
related to U .S. veterans. As Lembcke shows, much of the blame of the discord and upheaval was 
put on the radical left and the antiwar movement, whose consistent demonization and 
uncoupling from the veterans’ cause first aided N ixon’s wartime propaganda and then helped 
repudiate the 1960s. A nd again, just as veteran activism was replaced with veteran mental health, 
so the way of “dealing” with the war became not about drawing conclusions from its ideological
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and political failures, but about societal healing, national reconciliation, and exorcising the 
suffering which the war had caused the American people.
Patrick Hagopian focused on the perceived need to heal in his study of the politics o f 
commemoration of the Vietnam W ar in the ‘80s. W ith particular regard to the Vietnam 
Veterans Memorial (VVM), he found that the overriding concerns o f the memorial’s initiators 
were to avoid flaring up the “old divisions” and to aid in fostering national unity, and so 
concessions were made toward conservative interests. In the end, Hagopian argued, the 
memorial, instead o f giving testament to the war in its most pertinent aspects, became a site of 
uncontentious, innocuous commemoration void of the war’s controversy and subversion—and 
also a site o f Reaganite and neoconservative nationalist and belligerent haranguing in the name 
of restoring national pride and patriotism. Criticism of the American policy and conduct in 
Vietnam was not welcome at the VVM since it could provoke discord and cause veterans and 
civilians further suffering (Hagopian 2009, 10-21, 79-110; see also Lembcke 1998, 80-81).20 
Moreover, it is not coincidence, Hagopian argues, that the W ashington monument is not a 
Vietnam War Memorial, but a Vietnam Veteran Memorial; it is an indication of what was 
occurring in the American narrative o f the war: the repudiation, determined forgetting, washing 
one’s hands o f the war itself while simultaneously recognizing and promoting identification with 
the Vietnam veteran (2009, 399; see also Haines 2000, 141-156; W agner-Pacifici and Schwartz 
1991, 376-420). The discourse o f healing was so pervasive that another scholar looking at this 
period of American rewriting of Vietnam, called it an “ideology of unity,” the primary and 
obsessive need of the people to restore the nation to its imagined pre-1960s harmony, central to 
their identity (Beattie 1998). Scholars have also commented on the dominance of the metaphor 
of a wound in regard to the American imagination about the war and their own experience in it, 
a discourse and imagery parallel, but obviously related to, notions o f healing (Beattie 1998, 11­
57; Hagopian 2009, 80; Sturken 1997, 72-74).
By the 1980s, then, healing was the priority, whether it was seen as symbolic, as papering over 
the cracks revealed in the U .S. society by Vietnam, or as metaphoric in relation to the image of 
the war as a wound. In fact, this—the loss o f unity, the national discord, the wound, the need to 
heal—is the other Vietnam syndrome, the postwar malady as it was understood in the liberal 
mainstream. Quoting from an article by Vietnam author Philip Caputo, MacPherson writes:
54 Vietnam Syndromes
America needs to cure itself of the post-Vietnam syndrome—so often attributed only to 
veterans. The way to do that is by ‘reconciling the schism created by the war,’ writes Caputo.
That schism he sees between ‘moral conviction, as represented by those who resisted the war— 
and service, as represented as those who fought it.’
That goal cannot be met by reopening the ‘tired old debate between right and left (...) 
President Reagan’s attempts to conceal the ugliness of the war under the cloak of a <noble 
cause> are as suspect as the left’s attempts to present it as a crime on a par with the Nazi 
invasion of Poland.’
His point is a good one. However, I have found in countless interviews that it is 
important for everyone to walk through his beliefs on that war—not for the sake of debate 
but for catharsis. Only then can they better understand one another (MacPherson 1988, 
70-71).
C aputo’s point is, o f course, not a very good one. It represents precisely the squandered 
subversive potential o f the war in Vietnam. The war’s “ugliness” is here understood as the 
gruesome experience of American GIs, but the view of the conflicts as a criminal and 
unjustifiable endeavor against the interests o f the Vietnamese people is occluded. A nd while it 
is true that the American policy in Vietnam cannot be considered “on a par with the Nazi 
invasion o f Poland,” the difference between radical criticism from the left and Reagan’s rewriting 
of the war is the difference between no more war and more war, a difference crucial for potential 
targets o f U .S. military operations which in Caputo’s centrist discourse is rendered less than 
subordinate to the problem of healing the American nation and restoring its sense o f unity. 
Moreover, Caputo’s perception of the rift as running along the protester-veteran line harks back 
to what Lembcke’s study has revealed to be an instance o f mythologization.
But where Caputo sees no need to pick at the old “wounds,” M acPherson’s comment is 
particularly interesting. The political divisions are not to be ignored, but “walked through”—that 
is all responses to the conflict, including the well-informed antiwar activism of the VVAW  or 
other anti-imperialist groups, should be considered a symptom o f sorts, a thing to be gotten through, 
and so cured, therapeutically. W hat is more, debate is made obsolete for the sake of catharsis. This 
is yet another striking instance of the substitution of the war’s political significance with the 
language of wellbeing and emotion, which MacPherson enforces when she continues by 
observing that “[i]deological and political arguments are more than just historical musing for
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most veterans. They go to the heart o f their sense o f alienation or, at least, separation from 
others” (1988, 70—71).
The depoliticization of the Vietnam W ar is a principal failure o f the liberal and centrist 
discourse, which, while disguising itself as non-ideological and benevolent toward the war’s 
victims—the American veterans—was in fact at work to reestablish dominant nationalistic 
American ideologies o f exceptionalism, liberal interventionism, and patriotism. The sense of 
unity, central to these ideologies, had been unsettled and threatened by Vietnam and the 1960s 
in general, hence the perception that it now needed mending. This urgency to restore American 
positive self-image and mental wellbeing by returning to the traditional modes o f thinking are 
evident in M acPherson’s book, when she writes, for example, that “confusion-free conclusions 
may be the reward for only the doctrinaire on the right or left. Vietnam was an ambiguous war 
that left us with ambiguous moral, political, and personal conclusions” (1988, 716; emphasis 
added). This watered-down view o f the war shows another facet o f liberal depoliticization, as if 
ten years after the destruction o f Indochina by U .S. armed forces—one might wonder what is 
ambiguous about it—the Americans could still be scratching their heads and pondering “what it 
all meant” or “where it went wrong,” while the answers were already clear in the 1960s. 
Elsewhere, she further mystifies the war while at the same time erasing its political significance 
and its consequences for the Vietnamese, giving voice to utmost American ethnocentrism: in 
line with the 1980s pluralist vogue to discuss the war as something ambiguous and tangled in 
the American hearts, she writes that “[i]deological and intellectual mind skirmishes o f historians, 
scholars, and critics o f Vietnam do not begin to touch the depth of searching for right answers 
these young men [U.S. veterans] went through. (...) There is no way to capsulize Vietnam. There 
were as many Vietnams as there are veterans” (MacPherson 1988, 16). A  particularly striking 
example o f this wish to turn the American war in Vietnam into a morally equivocal event o f 
diluted, depoliticized culpability, where responsibility for atrocity may be easily divorced from 
W ashington, is quoted by Chomsky from a 1995 Washington Post review of a book on the My 
Lai Massacre: “[a]ny book on this subject ultimately shirks its responsibility unless it clearly tracks 
the fault down to the complex light and dark of the individual human soul” (Chomsky 1999, 
10.5.11).
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The problems of this liberal and centrist narrative are seen in yet another point o f comparison 
between Emerson’s Winners &  Losers and M acPherson’s Long Time Passing, namely both in their 
treatment o f antiwar activism and in their approach to draft and draft avoidance. Both authors 
see yesteryear’s dodgers and deserters from the army among the conflict’s most affected victims: 
“most deserters today are among the last permanent victims of Vietnam ” (MacPherson 1988, 
397). As for draft resisters and deserters living in exile in Canada, “the war scarred and changed 
them permanently, too” (MacPherson 1988, 445). But where Emerson underscores the pride that 
should be felt in having moved to C anada or deserted as a deeply political and personally costly 
act o f opposition to the war (see also Hagopian 2009, 35-36), MacPherson is more inclined to 
see the issue in its broader context, for example by considering cowardice as another reason. She, 
too, notes that antiwar stance was the most prevalent cause o f this form of resistance (she is very 
careful to separate the worthy resisters from the condemnable ones, who had played the system 
to get out o f service rather than took the risk o f prison or exile), but she approaches it in a very 
1980s fashion. The exact antiwar and political reasons o f those exiles are not explored, but the 
phrase—“political reasons”—is used as a term sufficient to give the reader an idea o f the radical 
rationale that had once guided these people, and as a buzzword clear enough to signify the 
tumults o f the ‘60s. These reasons, however, are not important, obsolete, irrelevant, MacPherson 
seems to be suggesting. W riting about the “ex-Americans” she travelled to interview in Canada, 
she states that
[d]uring the sixties they often espoused hatred for corporate America and sympathy for the 
victims of its inequities (...). But past positions are seldom matched by any intelligent 
criticism of existing inequities today. What is more, Vietnam is often discussed in the same 
‘aggressor-imperialist’ versus ‘nationalistic peasant revolt’ sloganeering of yesteryear: ideas 
caught in the rhetoric of their time. It is as if, once they crossed the border, their thinking 
on American politics stopped, like a smashed watch forever telling the same time (1988,
418).
MacPherson does not explain here what an “intelligent criticism” of her day’s inequities would 
entail, nor does she provide an explicit alternative interpretation of Vietnam against the 
“sloganeering of yesterday.” Elsewhere, the “political reasons” o f deserters and resisters are 
summarized thusly, in a quote from a Ford-era clemency board report: “ [e]very deserter chose
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self and family over the cause for which he was asked to fight. Had the war made more sense to 
him, his decision might have been different” (MacPherson 1988, 393). Therefore, MacPherson 
presents the political and ideological motivation as either misguided and rhetorical, or as 
individualistic, a strange interpretation of the politics o f the left. Also, to abstractly claim political 
inspiration for as radical an act as desertion or exile, and then to explain it as the war “not 
making sense” is an act o f obscuring—the war had to make sense to a man in order for him to 
see it as wrong and to decide to resist it. But by the end of this part o f MacPherson’s book, the 
championed cause becomes again the need to “m end” the wounds and bridge the divisions 
between those in exile and veterans, as well as between those in exile and Americans in general.
But it is in the two authors’ respective treatments o f the antiwar movement and its postwar 
fate that the divergence in the narrative that occurred between the two books’ publication dates, 
1976 and 1984, is most evident. Again, Emerson’s attitude is more than sympathetic, and against 
the protesters—whom she portrays, in a series o f personal vignettes, as hailing from all strata of 
American society and variously motivated—she pits not the soldiers dying in Vietnam or the 
veterans returning to the U .S., but rather the patriotic and unquestioning majority who is 
ultimately bored with and deeply uninterested in the war.
For MacPherson, on the other hand, the antiwar movement had already become part o f the 
problem, a polarizing force that had contributed to the confusions and divisions o f the 1960s, 
and by the ‘80s had proved largely insubstantial in its progressive commitments. Like many 
American ideologues o f patriotism and centrist liberalism, so does MacPherson prescribe the 
limits o f acceptable political opposition and engagement: comparing them to “the most 
outrageous black militants o f the sixties,” she describes “biker” veterans—“arms ladened with 
tattoos, in camouflage fatigues, shouting in Senate hearing for their rights in 1981”—as 
“tragicomic” and an “embarrassment” to the good veterans “in the professional world,” “who 
had made constructive legislative change through years o f hard, quiet work” (1988, 73). Clearly, 
in M acPherson’s estimation, any hint o f ‘60s-like demand for change is by the early 1980s so 
passé that her objective o f recognizing veterans’ needs is obstructed by the ideal o f effecting 
change over long, but quiet, years. As for the Vietnam-era antiwar movement, the choice of 
interviewees, and the quotations MacPherson provides, all converge into a fairly unified—and 
deeply cynical—image: that the activism had in large part been a matter o f privilege, that it had
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been idealistic and ideological, that its protests were not only disruptive and divisive but also 
somehow targeted at and hated by veterans, and that the passage of time verified it as mostly 
futile, as yet another issue that was bad about Vietnam. The final appraisal o f the movement is 
not only cynical and disillusioned, but also already in line with political centrism, and the 
individualism and anti-socialism o f the 1980s.
Here are some examples o f how MacPherson rhetorically denounces the antiwar movement. 
A conversation with a wartime dove who went on to a career in the State Department gives 
MacPherson an opportunity to air the m an’s views on the movement’s more radical wings as 
having gone too far in their leftism. H e concludes that the ultimate lesson of Vietnam is that 
there are no “right or wrong” situations. But on this occasion MacPherson also writes that 
“[t]here remains one vast division in the generation”—the old activists are now not interested, 
she claims, in “push[ing] for veterans’ causes,” because the war experience is not theirs. She also 
cites C ohen saying that he personally benefited from his activism, which had given him lots of 
political experience, but that he did not pay “any real price for it” (1988, 151). Another ex-activist 
with a political career post-Vietnam, on the other hand, “feels he paid a price. ‘There are times 
(...) when I feel, God, if I hadn’t wasted those years on unfocused anger'" (MacPherson 1988, 195; 
emphasis added). Jim Fallows, a notorious draft dodger who went onto a successful career as a 
political commentator and an editor at The Atlantic, “ultimately (...) feels the brigade who 
opposed the war may not be judged as having been right or wrong but regarded as an historical 
fact—as simply ‘having been’” (MacPherson 1988, 181). The most striking conclusion to the 
1960s activism, however, comes in quotations from a man who upon receiving a draft notice in 
1970 had chopped off his finger—“as a protest statement, as well as to get out o f fighting in 
Vietnam ” (MacPherson 1988, 134). At the end o f the chapter devoted to him, he says,
“[i]dealism doesn’t have much substance. The force and power of idealism usually come 
from self-interest.” He sees as universals “a desire to be well-fed, secure, and love—and 
preserving something of value.”
We talk of those who railed against capitalism in yesteryear and are furiously competing 
in that same market today. “I think you’re taking the myth too seriously,” he says. “Those 
people are in the myth of idealism—but on the other side of it. A cynic is nothing more than 
a person who feels there still ought to be idealism. I don’t see the polarities. (...)
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“If something can be done to make things better for people, that’s nice, but it’s not the 
controlling value now” (MacPherson 1988, 140).
Finally, there is yet another dimension to the liberal and centrist narrative o f the war, one which 
precedes even the rewriting in the 1980s: the interpretation of the conflict’s roots and of the 
American failure as essentially a mistake, a case o f either arrogance and overblown national ego, 
or, more often, o f good traditional American intentions—to bring freedom, democracy, 
civilization—turning out to be insufficient to sustain free Vietnam: “an act o f imprudent 
idealism” (Bacevich 2005, 77) or the result o f “cultural myopia (...) blinding U .S. leaders to the 
subtleties o f the Vietnamese society” (Lawrence 2008, 176). This view was both conservative in 
nature—it called for no review of national myths or for a foreign policy o f restraint, only that 
future engagements (invasions) abroad are better considered in light o f American interest—as 
well as self-indulgent and self-forgiving, recasting the United States as the world’s good guy whose 
crime was that o f too much goodwill and optimism, not o f imperial ambition and 
neocolonialism. Consequently,
[a]t the outer limits of tolerable dissidence, the war came to be seen as an “error” based on 
misunderstanding and naivete, yet another example of “our excess of righteousness and 
disinterested benevolence” (...). U.S. intervention began with “blundering efforts to do 
good,” but “by 1969” (...) most people realized that it was “a disastrous mistake,” that the 
United States “could not impose a solution except at a price too costly to itself’ (Chomsky 
1997, 166; the inner quotations are from John King Fairbank, “a leading Asia scholar,” and 
Anthony Lewis, a “New York Times dove,” respectively; see also Hagopian 2009, 12; Isaacs 
1997, 67-68).
Polls indicate that until the mid-1980s, American people in vast majority tended to view the 
Vietnam W ar not merely as a mistake or a blunder, but rather as fundamentally “wrong and 
immoral,” which led Chomsky to proclaim that they had understood more about the nature of 
the conflict than the intellectual liberal elites had. Perhaps this is true; in any case, by the mid- 
‘80s, the popular opinion became split evenly, at around 35 percent each, between “wrong and 
immoral” and “a noble cause,” an impact no doubt o f Reagan’s tinkering with the historical 
memory, and a trend that has persisted until the 2000s (Hagopian 2009, 13-14 provides tables 
that demonstrate the changing attitudes among polled Americans between 1975 and 2000). But,
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as Hagopian observed, either despite or because of the commonly held understanding, the 
mainstream, most encompassing American cultural narrative o f the Vietnam W ar has been 
thoroughly liberal, influenced by the interpretations which these intellectual elites—journalists, 
commentators, editors, authors, scholars—had woven around the war’s history (2009, 16). And 
whatever the privately held beliefs o f the American people (the “wrongness and immorality” may, 
after all, refer only to the draft and the American deaths, and not the roots o f the intervention 
or the policy in Indochina), Chomsky also criticized the intellectual and liberal mainstream for 
favoring the view that the war in Vietnam had been a blunder, a mistake: that the well- 
intentioned U nited States, wishing to bring democracy and freedom to the country, stumbled 
into a war that turned out to be unwinnable against the evil forces o f communism (1989, 57). 
In this view, the war was not the ugliest reality check of U .S. imperialism, its attendant ideologies, 
and the dangers o f aggressive capitalism—as radical segments o f the antiwar movement had once 
argued—but a lesson in overreaching and the limits o f the effectiveness o f American goodwill.
This view of Vietnam as a mistake was safe: it called for no profound change in the nation 
and its image of itself, but only that entanglements—mistakes—such as the Indochina debacle be 
avoided. It was protective o f Americans and their wellbeing, because it assumed that they were a 
good and special people after all, only that their power to effect positive change in the world had 
found a limit. But as the other end of the interpretive spectrum continued to shift rightward, so 
did the other end move, stopping at this anodyne point as the edge of admissible criticism. 
Patriotism—nationalism, in other words—could be restored and remain at the center o f American 
identity and emotional life, enabling the restoration of other American -isms influential in post­
Reagan foreign policy. Here was one of the ways in which Vietnam ’s subversive potential had 
been squandered. Perhaps no event has been more revelatory as to the eventual shape o f the 
Vietnam W ar cultural memory and the limits o f admissible public discourse than the outcry at 
John Kerry’s 2004 presidential bid and the charges o f his supposedly unpatriotic, un-American 
activities in the 1970s: the radical antiwar and anti-imperial stance in the VVAW  (Hagopian 
2009, 406-407; Lawrence 2008, 183; Franklin, who documents the Kerry backlash at some 
length, is nevertheless tentatively optimistic: “the fact that a prominent activist against the 
Vietnam W ar came very close to being elected President o f the United States in 2004 suggests 
that the war in America over the Vietnam W ar has another side and has not yet been decided”
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[2007, 48]). The war’s “lessons,” meanwhile, so hotly debated throughout the 1970s and ‘80s 
and expected by the liberal side to be on the theme of “no more Vietnam s,” are evident in the 
U .S. foreign policy as it eventually developed. This subject will be picked up again the 
Conclusion.
A nd thus, in the United States the potential o f the lessons o f Vietnam, an imperialist 
endeavor, to safeguard in the future against similar abuses o f power, was squandered in the name 
of licking American wounds and the simultaneous rebuilding o f American nationalist ideologies 
and positive self-image.
* * *
Here, then, are the limits o f acceptable discourse: on the one hand, a Vietnam W ar in which the 
Americans were on the right side o f history poised against the unquestionable communist villain, 
but which they were not allowed to win decisively by yellowbellied liberals; on the other, a 
Vietnam W ar in which the two countries caused each other “mutual destruction” and suffered 
on a par. In the first version, the U .S. soldiers remained the largely gallant successors to W orld 
W ar II heroes, friends and saviors o f the civilian population of South Vietnam, but their 
reputation was tarnished by these very same liberals and “pinkos,” protesters and draft dodgers, 
who spread ugly rumors about massacres and drug use, and thus the troops were deprived of 
their heroic recognition and honor. In the second version, the war was a mistake, a misguided 
attempt at liberation, and the soldiers, many of them drafted in a profoundly unfair and 
exploitative system, continued to suffer after the war due to post-traumatic stress, the 
unwillingness o f the American “silent majority” to pay attention, and above all the deep division 
in the American society that left them on one side o f the painful split. The Americans suffered 
because o f Vietnam as much as the Vietnamese did: their self-image shattered, their nation 
divided and wounded, almost sixty thousand of their children dead, victims of a trauma as deep 
and as painful as that suffered in Indochina. In cinema, Americans continued to be tormented, 
in their personification as prisoners o f war, by the evil Vietnamese. These prisoners remained as 
the only important moral problem left over from the war. The American failure in Vietnam was 
spectacular; since there was no recourse to triumphalism that would sustain the notions of
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American greatness, other methods o f regaining balance had to be found. Recasting the 
Americans as the only victims worthy of attention proved the most successful: much like 
veterans, who were deprived of heroism so they were offered pity instead, so the Americans at 
large could persuade themselves that by healing and reunifying their battered nation they could 
restore its greatness and its guiding ideas o f exceptionality, benevolence, assertiveness, and 
universal love of liberty. A  nation healed from its Vietnam suffering could embark once again 
on its global mission, now recast in neoconservative terms. Eager to forget the traumatic 1960s 
and concerned with patriotic (nationalist) ideas o f unity, it aided the rise o f neoliberalism in the 
U .S., averse to the ideals—and eventually practice—of social solidarity, social change and 
organized opposition to oppressive and exploitative models o f the free market.
Both syndromes assumed there was something wrong about the war in Vietnam, and though 
they gave different diagnoses, both sought the symptoms as well as cures in the war’s impact on 
the United States only. But the manic attention given to the notion of American victimization 
had to be balanced by what a scholar termed “Vietnamnesia”—the erasure o f the Vietnamese 
from the picture o f the war and its aftermath (Beattie 1998, 28-34). The American cultural 
strategy of their own, almost exclusive victimization—and the effective depoliticization and 
dehistoricization o f the war that accompanied it—had the added benefit that it removed the 
problems of reckoning with American brutal and willful wrongdoing, and the responsibility for 
the devastation of Indochina and the suffering of its people: “[i]t is beyond the imagining in 
responsible circles that we might have some culpability for mass slaughter and destruction, or 
owe some debt to the millions o f maimed and orphaned” (Chomsky 1989, 59; see also: Lembcke 
1998, 123). A  small, but grating example is again provided by Myra MacPherson, who while on 
the subject o f Agent Orange and the birth defects it causes, laments that, “[t]he [affected] 
children o f America, Australia and Vietnam (...) may well be the most tragic and innocent victims 
of Vietnam ” (1988, 693). She makes sure to include even the Australians, whose exposure to the 
defoliant was comparatively negligible, before she mentions the Vietnamese (also apparently 
victims of Vietnam), and even then only the soldiers—not the millions o f South Vietnamese 
civilians who were sprayed with the herbicides by the Americans.21
While politicians continued to punish the victor on the international arena, the cultural 
narrative o f the war in the U .S. eventually pushed the Vietnamese beyond the scope of
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meaningful and traumatic suffering. W hile post-war Vietnam, in addition to the harmful policies 
and practices o f the communist government, went on to suffer the long-term consequences of 
the American war—the extensive destruction through bombing campaigns and air strikes, the 
millions o f people killed and maimed, the effects o f deforestation and common use o f highly 
toxic defoliants, the dismantling o f social structures and widespread displacement o f persons, 
the poverty and denial o f aid that for two decades translated into lack of basic supplies in 
hospitals and schools, and so on22—books and films in the U .S. kept on boring into the core of 
meaning the war had had for the Americans, relentlessly soul-searching and seeking the symbolic 
senses o f American mythology and self-image in “Vietnam ,” understood as an American place. 
The prevalence of this American ethnocentrism is perhaps best illustrated by James (Jim) Fallows 
of The Atlantic, who, having gone on a short group tour o f Vietnam, in a 1988 issue of the 
magazine, “concluded that the effects o f the war on Vietnam were negligible, adding that ‘the 
Vietnam W ar will be important in history only for what it did internally to the United States’” 
(quoted in Beattie 1998, 31).23 The effect has been the removal o f the war from history and so 
the squandering of its subversive potential. The rest o f this thesis will trace the particular 
strategies o f representation in American literature and cinema of the war which, though 
nominally critical o f the U .S. invasion of Indochina, contributed to these processes of 
dehistoricization and mythologization.

Chapter 2
“War is as Natural as the Rains”: 
Myth and Representations of 
the Vietnamese Landscape
It must have been a  beautiful area, Quang Ngai Province, before the war.
Seymour Hersh, My Lai 4
Gentlemen, I would like to tell you what we are going to do to that valley.
John M. Del Vecchio, The 13th Valley
2.1. History
The Vietnam W ar historian H. Bruce Franklin writes that next to the two “American stories of 
the Vietnam W ar”—the “Noble C ause” and the “Quagmire”—it is the third one, “Imperialism,” 
that is “the only one that adequately accounts for America’s half century of military, political, 
and economic warfare against Vietnam ” (2000, 42). Following this line o f reasoning, it might be 
added that the best explanations for the American engagement in Vietnam are both ideological 
and pragmatic. They are exemplary, in other words, o f how American mythology, closely bound 
to ideological constructs as it is, and the protection of U .S. political, economic, and business 
interests, have often intertwined, the two facets o f history-shaping decisions and actions which 
flicker alternately, depending on the optics by which one wishes to interpret events.
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A  brief history of the United States’ involvement in Indochina is as follows. In 1945, the 
Japanese were forced to leave the region following their wartime occupation, and the U.S.- 
supported, anti-Japanese resistance, the Viet Minh, proclaimed the establishment o f the 
Democratic Vietnamese Republic (DRV), with a Declaration of Independence that mirrored its 
American predecessor. (The Viet M inh had grown out o f independence movements active in 
Vietnam for decades, and was led now by Ho Chi M inh and Vo Nguyen Giap, nationalist and 
communist activists since late 1910s and late 1920s respectively.) The Potsdam Conference in 
1945 divided the country into its northern part, to be temporarily controlled by China, which 
recognized the Republic; and its southern part, temporarily controlled by the British, who soon 
handed the territory back to France, the colonial power in Indochina, now eager to move back 
in. The French were determined to keep their colonial holdings, and Ho was determined to 
reunite Vietnam under independent communist rule. Following a famine in northern Vietnam 
in 1944 and ’45 in which up to two million died, caused partially by French misadministration 
and blamed on it by the Viet Minh, the communists urged the people to rebel against the 
colonial power and raid stores o f food; the French bombarded Haiphong in the north in 1946, 
and finally the two countries went to war (the First Indochina War), which ended in 1954 with 
the total French defeat by Viet M inh under G iap’s military leadership.
As for the Americans, in 1945 and 1946, the U .S. President Harry Trum an left without reply 
a series o f letters sent to him personally by Ho, asking for assistance and reminding him that the 
Vietnamese struggle was one for self-determination against imperial claims of a foreign power. 
Instead, as early as October 1945, the United States provided the French with several o f their 
own troopships, as well as the money to finance them and the arms to fight with, which were 
then crewed, in addition to the French, with Germ an soldiers, including former members o f the 
SS, forced into the Foreign Legion. The ships were sent to Vietnam to end the country’s new 
freedom under Ho, achieved with the first declaration of independence by a previously colonized 
nation after W orld W ar II, at that time merely a month or so old. As Franklin reminds us,
[a]lthough this invasion army was under French command and its purpose was to restore 
French colonial rule, it was implementing part of Washington’s global strategy. We need to 
remember that all this took place prior to the so-called Cold War, a chronological fact with 
immense historical significance. (...) [W]e need to recognize that the U.S. war against the
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DRV was not a sequel to the French war but an essential component of it” (2007, 36; 
Franklin also notes that this moment marks the beginning of the American movement 
against war in Vietnam—all the American enlisted men on those troopships diverted to 
Vietnam in 1945 began a campaign of letters and petitions against “imperialist policies” in 
Indochina; opposition stemming from that first initial spark continued throughout the
1950s and early 60s).
But the American involvement in Indochina would, o f course, come to be linked inextricably to 
the developments o f “the so-called Cold W ar.” In 1949 and 1950, a string o f circumstances—the 
Com m unist takeover in China, the outbreak of the Korean War, the wish to secure French 
support in Europe against the Soviets—pushed Trum an to continue backing France, in the form 
of financial and military support. By the end of the war, the U nited States had financed “80 
percent o f the French war effort” (Zinn 2009, ch. 18).
The 1954 Geneva Accords, which followed the French defeat that same year, stipulated that 
the territory of Vietnam would remain divided, with the border at the 17th parallel (the area 
around which would become the American war’s notorious Demilitarized Zone, or the DMZ), 
that the French would temporarily remain in the South and the Viet M inh in charge in the 
North, and that the country would be reunited in 1956 following a free election of government. 
The United States never signed the agreement and nor did the American-backed South Vietnam. 
Instead, with the French withdrawn from Indochina, the United States had asserted its influence 
in the South. In Saigon, the Americans placed Ngo Dinh Diem as the prime minister, who, after 
the U .S. then helped steer a referendum that deposed the French-installed president and made 
him head of state instead, in 1955 established the Republic o f Vietnam (colloquially referred to 
as South Vietnam), which would remain the United States’ ally against the North for the 
duration of the upcoming war. As part o f the “[c]overt American subversion of the Geneva 
Agreements” (Young 2014, ch. 3), the Eisenhower administration, which had the intelligence 
that the popular support in Vietnam was overwhelmingly on the side o f Hanoi and that the Viet 
M inh would easily win the election with some 80 percent o f the votes, encouraged and fully 
supported Diem ’s decision to block the 1956 elections, which eventually never happened 
(FitzGerald 1972, 126; Franklin 2000, 30; Sheehan 1990, 138; Young 2014, ch. 3; Zinn 2009, 
ch. 18). Howard Zinn provides a quotation from the Pentagon Papers that states succinctly what
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that meant: “South Viet Nam  was essentially the creation of the United States” (Zinn 2009, ch. 
18).
American aid money and military materiel and personnel flowed to South Vietnam from that 
point on. Indeed, for the entirety o f its existence, between 1955 and 1975, “the economy of 
[South Vietnam] was sustained almost entirely through American aid” (Young 2014, ch. 3; see 
also Carter 2008, 93-94 ; FitzGerald 1972, 85ff). The numbers o f military advisors to the Army 
of the Republic o f Vietnam (ARVN) rose steadily to reach over 16,000 by the end o f 1963, and 
the Americans began engaging, covertly and illegally, in combat operations in Indochina. But 
the Diem government consistently failed to win popularity with its own people:
the effort [to create a viable anti-Communist state] was always undermined by the doubtful 
legitimacy of the South Vietnamese government from its very inception. The fatal weakness 
of [this government], which survived because of repression and U.S. support, not because 
of the freely expressed will of the people, was a problem for which the United States never 
found a solution (...). (Hagopian 2011, 48)
It is also worth pointing out that the American policy-makers since Eisenhower “had insisted in 
public that the South Vietnamese government was a genuinely national regime while recognizing 
privately that its legitimacy was only potential. The strategy of ‘nation-building’ was implicitly an 
acknowledgement that a South Vietnamese nationality was something that had to be 
constructed” (Slotkin 1998b, 542). In perhaps the most glaring example, Noam  Chomsky and 
Edward Herman quote from a 1965 memorandum by John Paul Vann, the star o f early 
pacification efforts in South Vietnam:
A popular political base for the Government of South Vietnam does not now exist. (...) The 
existing government is oriented toward the exploitation of the rural and lower class urban 
populations. It is, in fact, a continuation of the French colonial system of government with 
upper class Vietnamese replacing the French. (...) The dissatisfaction of the agrarian 
population (...) is expressed largely through alliance with the NLF (1979a, 5.1.2).
The National Liberation Front for South Vietnam (NLF), a guerilla revolutionary organization 
supported from Hanoi, was founded in the South in 1960, partly in response to the regime’s 
repressions (including torture and murder) and corruption, and the social and economic
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disruptiveness o f the American aid programs in the countryside. The organization’s better- 
known moniker, Viet Cong, is a derogatory term meaning “Vietnamese communists” and was 
apparently introduced by Diem. The N LF would come to be widely supported by the Vietnamese 
peasantry. As we have seen, declaring the United States’ invasion of Vietnam as a “mistake” 
carries dangerous ideological implications—but if any aspect o f that involvement should be seen 
as such with any validity, it is precisely this:
the struggle to represent those longings [of the Vietnamese people for independence] had 
almost certainly been won by first the Viet Minh and then the North Vietnamese 
Government and the National Liberation Front in the South long before the first American 
soldier ever appeared in Vietnam, indeed before the first French soldier appeared after the 
Second World War to reconquer the country. At the very least, the political story had 
reached its conclusion with French defeat at Dien Bien Phu in 1954—or maybe even earlier, 
with the expulsion of the Japanese in 1945. The American war was probably lost before it 
started (Schell 2007, 24).
This reading of the war’s history reveals its particular tragic dimension—tragic for the Americans 
who would die and be wounded in Vietnam, for sure, but, on a scale unimaginably greater, tragic 
especially for the Vietnamese people and landscape. The decade of the American war concluded, 
after all, with what could have happened in 1954: unification and communist takeover.
As for President Diem, his unpopularity (and his growing willingness to reach an agreement 
with Hanoi, against the bellicose directives from the U .S.) ultimately cost him his life: when a 
sixty-six-year-old Buddhist monk Thich Q uang Duc set himself on fire on a Saigon street in 1963 
to protest Diem’s repressions against the Buddhist majority—a seismic event which exposed 
starkly the extent o f the president’s unpopularity—his act was followed by similar suicides by 
other monks, mass demonstrations, and brutal reaction from the government forces. In light of 
the crisis o f Diem’s credibility—which was undermining the legitimacy of the American 
patronage in the South—a coup was carried out, with the knowledge o f the CIA, the American 
diplomats in South Vietnam, and President Kennedy. It ended with Diem and his brother dead, 
shortly before Kennedy’s own assassination.
There are several reasons to which the American intervention may be attributed. First o f all, 
war is, as always, good for business. As historian James M. Carter observes, what is often
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forgotten is that the American military intervention was preceded by a failed nation-building 
program in South Vietnam, initiated in 1954, which by 1960 had cost the U nited States $1.5 
billion. American organizations and companies profited from the program, from construction 
firms (Carter 2008, 88—91) to analysis and research teams hailing from institutions like R A N D  
or the Michigan State University, which between 1955 and 1962 “deployed over one hundred 
full-time staff and channeled approximately $25 million in U S funding to defend the 
government organized under Ngo Dinh Diem” (Latham 2002, 438), including a secret CIA 
contract for training police forces known to have been torturing South Vietnamese villagers 
(Young 2014, ch. 6, 7; for an exhaustive discussion, see: Carter 2008, 53-79; see also Emerson 
1992, 271—336, on the neocolonial aspects o f the Vietnamese studies research programs 
associated with U .S. Military Assistance Com m and, Vietnam [MACV]).
In the end the nation-building program failed. Am ong the reasons were the native 
population’s resistance to the U .S. program and the Americans’ failure to recognize the crucial 
importance of the people’s enduring sympathy for the revolutionaries. South Vietnam was never 
to become a viable state, even less so a nation. In the face o f growing opposition among ordinary 
citizens and organized cadres to their presence, the U .S. authorities, instead o f pulling out o f the 
country or fundamentally redesigning their policy and projects, decided to protect D iem ’s 
presidency, counter the opposition, and thus militarize the effort in Vietnam:
The United States had created South Vietnam and its leader [Ngo Dinh Diem]; it was now 
clear that any opposition to Diem would be understood as a hostile act, an attack on 
America’s baby. (...) But, in fact, what the United States had labored mightily to produce 
was not a democratic, independent new nation state but an autocratic ruling family held in 
place by foreign power (Young 2014, ch. 3).
Ultimately, and almost imperceptibly, U.S. officials glossed over the fact that the state- 
building project was deeply troubled and failing and instead began justifying greater military 
involvement and authorizing greater use of force by the regime in order to stamp out the 
Vietnamese resistance to that effort and as well as to mask its deficiencies. At the same time, 
nearly all American officials began referring to southern Vietnam exclusively as “South 
Vietnam,” as though the state had existed and now compelled defense from outside 
aggressors bent on conquest. The fiction perpetuated the powerful and politically successful 
idea that the effort in Vietnam was about combating aggression and that the problem 
stemmed from North Vietnamese aggression against a putatively independent South
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Vietnam. In reality, the war in Vietnam resulted not from outside aggression, but from the 
failure of the six-year effort to build a viable state infrastructure around the regime in Saigon 
(Carter 2008, 7, see also 117-129).
W ith Kennedy dead at the end of 1963, the newly-sworn Lyndon B. Johnson “inherited” South 
Vietnam. Despite its recent and American genesis, the conviction that the country was a 
legitimate state in need of protection from the North was already deeply ingrained as the 
rationale guiding the U .S. policy. In response to the perceived need, Johnson deliberated 
between military solutions to the “problem” and political ones that could lead to a “peaceful 
coexistence” between Hanoi and a neutral South, a proposition which had by then appeared 
among the new authorities in South Vietnam (the junta generals who had assassinated Diem, to 
be precise). Solutions guided by historical accuracy, that the South and North Vietnam were 
artificial and originally temporary creations o f the Geneva Convention and that the Vietnamese 
people were one nation with the right to reunification and independence, were now beyond the 
realm of consideration in W ashington. Instead, Johnson agreed with the advisers that the United 
States needed to persevere in Indochina and thus reassert its power and determination before 
the world, and that “abandoning” South Vietnam would seriously jeopardize American 
credibility: to honor the promises to stand by Saigon was the word. In the end, when Hanoi 
demanded that the U nited States withdraw from South Vietnam entirely, even in the face of 
American bombings o f the North that had already begun, Johnson let himself be persuaded by 
advisers left from the Kennedy administration (notably Dean Rusk, Robert McNamara, 
McGeorge and W illiam Bundy, W alt Rostow) to push toward military action against North 
Vietnam to force it—that is, the NLF, which the Americans insistently believed to be steered 
from Hanoi—out of the South (Young 2014, ch. 6). Eventually, when the bombs did not yield 
results, in early 1965 President Johnson sent the first American combat units to Indochina, 
having duped Congress into assenting and without legally declaring war.
In his work on American ideology and foreign policy, historian Michael Hunt argues that one 
of the constant components in American thinking about its foreign exploits during the country’s 
first two hundred years was the concept o f liberty, which through a convoluted intellectual and 
rhetorical process had by the end of the 19th century transformed into the idea o f a “dynamic 
republic” and “national greatness.” These were to be obtained through expansion, be it o f actual
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territory or decisive influence overseas (2009, 19-45, 125-159; H unt’s working definition of 
ideology is derived from Clifford Geertz’s broad cultural model, 12; see Geertz 1973). Coupled 
with the ideals o f capitalism and economic liberalism, this notion of liberty-by-expansion 
translated also into the deeply ingrained sense that American freedom and greatness depended, 
first, on the acquisition of land to supply the needs o f American agriculture and growing 
population, and then on the availability o f desirable free markets worldwide, open to American 
businesses and vital to the growing American economy. As historian Richard D u Boff argued in 
1972:
[The ideology that promotes the interests of the corporate business class, which has supplied 
most of the personnel to man the major foreign policy posts in Washington] constitutes the 
vital link between economic interests and political actions. The reason is that the key inputs 
into foreign policy ideology are derived from the general outlook of the American business 
community, which regards the external world in terms of actual and potential threats to free­
wheeling, open-ended profit maximization. (...) While not “each and every act of political and 
military policy” can be tied to economic motivations, the general thrust of American foreign 
policy over the past seven or eight decades comes from the “growth”-propelled search for 
control over major resource areas and the effort to keep an open door everywhere else for 
potential future expansion. The enlargement of capital values and market outlets is the first 
condition of capitalist production itself. The development of a worldwide market to assure 
the continuity of the expansion process is also part of the first condition of capitalist 
production—by no means can it be called extrinsic to the survival of the system (1972, 17; 
emphases in original; see also Hunt 2009, 29ff, 37, 43, 135-136; Neilson 1998, 207).24
In this context, the mid-20th-century domino theory—the reason behind the United States’ 
involvement in Indochina—is split open for deeper excavation. The domino theory straddles 
both pragmatic, ideological, and “popular” explanations behind American involvement. 
Crucially, the security experts, analysts, and policymakers in W ashington and Pentagon in the 
1950s and early 1960s did not question the basic, profoundly internalized assumption that, if 
left unharassed, communism would spread in the Third W orld and Asia, and wrangle such 
strategically critical states as Thailand and Japan away from U .S. influence. Moreover, in the 
national security circles in the late 1940s, 1950s and beyond, it was believed that the string of 
crucial U .S. military bases in East and Southeast Asia—and with it the United States dominance 
in the Pacific—could be jeopardized if indeed more countries in the region came under Soviet
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control or installed communist governments. Thus, the (potentially infectious) proximity of 
Southeast Asia to countries fundamental to U .S. security and geopolitical interests endowed the 
region, and Indochina particularly, with “cosmic significance” to Cold  W ar planners (Chomsky 
and Herman 1979a, 306). Additionally, its strategic importance was also in its natural resources 
and products such as rubber, tin, and petroleum, or, as a National Security Council document 
dubbed them in 1952, “strategically important commodities” (Zinn 2009, ch. 18; see also Du 
Boff 1972, 21-27; Kolko 1972, 3-5). A nd finally, the argument o f honoring the promise to 
South Vietnam so that American superpower credibility could be preserved was not without 
ideologically-legitimized import to national security and geopolitical strategy either:
Nonintervention and an NLF takeover [in South Vietnam] were unacceptable [to 
Americans] for reasons that had nothing to do with Vietnamese interests; they were based 
on an assumed adverse effect on our [American] material and strategic interests. It was 
assumed that an American failure would be harmful to our prestige and would reduce the 
confidence of our satellite governments that we would protect them from the winds of 
change (Chomsky and Herman 1979a, 304).
At stake in (...) various wars of suppression (...) is not just the investments in any one country 
but the security of the whole international system of finance capital. No country is allowed 
to pursue an independent course of self-development. None is permitted to go unpunished 
and undeterred. None should serve as an inspiration or source of material support to other 
nations that might want to pursue a politico-economic path other than the maldevelopment 
offered by global capitalism (Parenti 1995, 50).
O ne can attempt to account for the fervent anti-communism of Cold-War-era American 
decision-making elites by referring to more culturally entrenched notions associated with 
American history and thinking. Hunt, for example, attributes the anti-communist zeal to another 
ingredient o f the American foreign policy ideology which he considers fundamental, and namely 
a deep distrust o f revolutions; communist movements were seen as bad, he explains, precisely 
because they were communist movements. Hunt argues that this sentiment was the result o f the 
success o f the American Revolution, which was to remain an ideal o f peaceful and legalist 
change, and the failures and horrors o f subsequent ones, culminating with the events o f 1917 
in Russia, which horrified Americans (Hunt 2009, 92-124 ; see also Du Boff 1972, 16; Slotkin 
1998a, 35-36; see Spanos 2000, 128-144, on the “end-of-the-Cold-War discourse” throughout
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the 1990s and its conviction of “the universal illegitimacy of the founding principles of 
socialism” and “the universal legitimacy of the idea o f American [liberal capitalist] democracy” 
[emphases in original]). In the case o f Vietnam, the anti-socialist instinct which had led the 
United States on a counterrevolutionary crusade, was compounded by H unt’s third ingredient 
o f American foreign policy ideology, racism (Hunt 2009, 46-91), as well as orientalist notions 
(for a detailed history of American orientalism in relation to Vietnam, see Bradley 2000; see also 
Boyle 2015a, 1-4; Drinnon 1997, 447-451).
But the Cold W ar ideology of anti-communism also had behind it the protection of concrete 
American geopolitical interests—which were themselves informed by older ideas translated into 
policy, and namely the various tenets o f American political, economic, and social culture, or the 
American way of life in other words, whose promotion and cultivation globally ensured 
American prosperity and security o f its enterprise. Am ong these interests was, o f course, the 
protection of the free market and the liberal economic philosophy; the struggle against the Soviet 
U nion and communism was a struggle for a global economic vision, and the rewards it offered 
the U nited States, as much as anything else: “[i]t is impossible to divorce the economic and 
strategic components o f the so-called domino theory (...) involving raw materials, military bases, 
and the commitment o f the United States to protect its many spheres o f influence” (Kolko 1972, 
4-5 ; see also Adas 2003, who compares capital- and influence-oriented U .S. policies in 
Indochina to the conducts o f 19th c. European imperialism). In the words o f Marilyn Young, if 
there were misgivings among U .S. Indochina policymakers and strategists concerning the 
political nature o f the conflict, especially the lack of support for the Saigon government among 
the people, they were always trumped by “an overarching axiom: a world ordered by the 
principles and practices o f the liberal capitalist system that governed America was good for 
America and good for the world” (2014, ch. 7). The “communist threat,” in other words, far 
from simply posing risks to democracy and freedom—as the rallying cries o f American 
propagandists at the time would suggest—was understood by the decision-making elites as “the 
possibility o f social and economic progress outside the framework of U .S. control and imperial 
interests” (Chomsky and Herman 1979a, 305). As historian Gabriel Kolko observed,
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translated into concrete terms, the domino theory was a counterrevolutionary doctrine 
which defined modern history as a movement of Third World and dependent nations— 
those with economic and strategic value to the United States or its capitalist associates—away 
from capitalism or colonialism and toward national revolution and forms of socialism. (...) 
[Vietnam was part of the] effort to expand America’s power by saving vast areas of the world 
for its own forms of political and economic domination (1972, 2; see also Hunt 2009, 152­
153).
To allow these exploitable countries to topple into communist arms was not only to diminish 
the sphere o f Americanism as the ideal, but also to allow the world of business opportunity and 
profit to shrink. Here, too, the appeals o f Indochina are many, as listed in 1963 by a Kennedy 
administration bureaucrat in a semi-official address: “Why is [Southeast Asia] desirable, and why 
is it important? First, it provides a lush climate, fertile soil, rich natural resources, a relatively 
sparse population in most areas, and room to expand. The countries o f Southeast Asia produce 
rich exportable surpluses such as rice, rubber, teak, corn, tin, spices, oil, and many others” (Zinn 
2009, ch. 18; see also Du Boff 1972, who analyzes the national security documentation in the 
Pentagon Papers to give a clear picture o f all the factors that made Southeast Asia and Indochina 
vital to the geopolitical interests as perceived by U .S. Cold W ar planners).
But the ideology worked in shallower dimensions too, offering readily consumable rationale 
and slogans: “Stop Com m unism !” For Kennedy, as for Johnson (at least initially), Vietnam was 
a PR opportunity to advertise both the American benevolence as a patron helping a backward 
nation stand on its own and join civilization, and the determination of the United States to fight 
against the evils o f communism in the name of democracy and freedom.
2.2. Myth
The above considerations point toward three, closely related reflections. One, the period 
between W orld W ar II—and particularly beginning in 1954—and 1965 is crucial to understand 
the very nature o f American involvement in Vietnam, even more so than the period o f military 
intervention itself. Two, the events o f those years show more fully, and with a scope of 
consequence, what is meant when the American war in Vietnam is called an imperial endeavor. 
A nd three, both this crucial period and the historical (political, economic, cultural, military)
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particulars o f American imperialist policy regarding Vietnam are, with rare exceptions, absent 
from the American cultural narrative o f the war—and so from its literature and cinema.
The first two points are perhaps the cause o f the third one: to focus on the years o f American 
involvement directly preceding the war could too plausibly lead to som e very uncomfortable 
conclusions, at odds with the dominant discourse. There, the nature o f American imperialist 
war in Indochina cannot be seen in terms of invasion, political suppression and oppression, 
outright exploitation, hum an rights’ violation, or inhuman violence and war crime perpetrated 
in the name of precise political and material geopolitical and economic interests. Instead, the 
permissible cultural interpretation of the Vietnam war accommodates the watered-down notion 
of American imperialism in Vietnam rendered as mythology and mythological constructs. The 
canonical texts—novels, memoirs, films—express certain imperialistic aspects o f the American 
presence in Vietnam through a number of strategies that are meant to create the impression of 
confession, admission of one’s wrongdoing and, sometimes, repentance. Though lauded by the 
traditional scholarship for their supposed scathing criticism of the various political and cultural 
incarnations o f Americanism, these narratives turn out to be rather benign and compliant with 
the dominant American ideologies (Boyle 2016, 188; Kinney 2000, 5 —6; Neilson 1998, 7, 49 — 
54, 197—200 on O ’Brien specifically). Jim  Neilson elaborates:
under the sway of contemporary literary scholarship, Vietnam War literature has 
contributed to a conservative rewriting of the war (...). Consequently, the canon of Vietnam 
War narratives that has developed under the sway of prevailing 
postmodern/poststructuralist literary studies has depoliticized political dissent. (...) This is 
not to say that Vietnam War literature is uncritical of the war and U.S. policy. “Serious” 
literature about the war does not blame antiwar activists, and it does criticize aspects of 
American policy. Yet it does not challenge the fundamental morality of U.S. aims, nor does 
it document the large-scale killing of Vietnamese.
With its focus on the suffering of individual American soldiers and its refusal to consider 
the war as an extension of U.S. global interests, this literature does not counter and in many 
ways supports the Right’s ongoing historical reconstruction (1998, 53—54).
In other words, beyond language and form, in their content and commentary on the war these 
texts almost never stray beyond complaint over the plight o f the American soldier or the 
“pointlessness” o f the war, and they almost always remain loyal to either the ideal o f soldierly
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brotherhood, which morally and emotionally trumps all other concerns, or a sentimental 
attachment to a patriotic vision of America, or both. In fact, the past forty years have shown that 
the criticism of the war in Vietnam expressed by the left-most o f the antiwar movement has not 
been surpassed.
One crucial element o f the lukewarm nature o f the supposed criticism contained in these 
texts is their staggering uniformity (“the canon’s narrative homogeneity is troubling”; Boyle 
2016, 188; see also Jeffords 1989, 126; Gibson 2000, 467-469, and the Appendix in general for 
a discussion of the impact o f rank, profession, and “social stratification” on the production of 
different “knowledges” o f the war25). W ithin these narratives, there is no diverse chorus o f voices 
giving ample testament to the experiences o f the war’s different participants, despite what many 
scholars claim (see for example Holbling 2007, 114, who discusses only books authored by white 
male veterans published before 1990 and yet concludes: “[a]s this survey has tried to indicate, 
American discourses and stories o f Vietnam exist in dazzling variety and multitude (...). The 
prolonged and painful soul-searching has yielded a rich, if diversified, harvest” ; or Carpenter 
2003, 32: some of the Vietnam writers “exploded the conventions o f American war fiction to 
produce a diversity o f works that demonstrate the multi-perspectival, relativistic nature of 
America’s Vietnam experience”).
O n the contrary, the novels and memoirs most often encountered in discussions o f Vietnam 
literature are nearly exclusively authored by white men, veterans o f the war, serving in-country 
between 1965 and 1970, with military ranks no higher than a lieutenant, usually infantrymen 
(though in some cases, like Philip Caputo and Tim O ’Brien, at some points in their deployment 
relegated to administrative and other rear duties), and usually college-educated at the time of 
deployment or after the war. The protagonists are typically o f the same stock, relatively well- 
adjusted to the life in their platoons and companies, and well-liked by their comrades, although 
authors writing fiction sometimes undertake to create other types o f supporting characters. And 
so in Vietnam literature we fairly often encounter cocky adolescent privates and N C O s from 
working-class backgrounds, redneck killing machines exhibiting signs o f psychopathy (think 
Animal Mother), grizzled middle-aged sergeants who had fought in Korea, and the passionately 
and universally despised “lifers,” an assortment o f “chickenshit” career officers and N C O s (see 
Paul Fussell’s classic definition of chickenshit; 1990, 79-95). Found less often, though no less
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uniform as Vietnam literary archetypes, there are Vietnamese translators and scouts (male, 
defectors from the N LF or the North Vietnamese Army [NVA], narratively used as mouthpieces 
for opinions concerning Vietnamese-American relations); conciliatory blacks uncomfortable 
with the actions o f their politically involved and vocal “brothers” ; and, in post-war fast-forwards, 
high school friends nam ed M ark or Eric who had chosen to dodge the draft and thus become 
useful narrative devices to ruminate on duty and betrayal. W omen characters are rarely, if indeed 
ever, elevated above formulaic, symbolic, faintly Freudian functions: here we find the repulsive 
Vietnamese prostitute; the Japanese, European or Australian girl met on R & R  and seduced into 
serious girlfriendhood; the disloyal hometown sweetheart or even wife sending a “Dear John” 
letter from the States; the treacherous hippie encountered back in the States, always large­
breasted and free-loving, but sexually unavailable to the homecoming protagonist; and the pretty, 
petite teenage “Viet C ong” sniper prized as prey and object o f special violence. N ot every book 
or film includes every single one o f these figures, o f course, but they are common enough to be 
identified across the body of texts, regardless o f where on the (limited) ideological spectrum a 
given title is supposed to fall.
In addition to being populated by the same characters, the Vietnam narratives usually follow 
very similar plots. Even if some formal innovations are introduced into the texts, the stories o f 
the experience in Vietnam typically boil down to the same Ur-narrative o f the twelve to thirteen 
months the American infantry soldier, in the Army or the Marines, spent in Vietnam, or at least 
contain narrative blocks and tropes which are repeated over and over in different books and 
films, sometimes to the point o f replaceability. The fact that this meta-story is a story before it 
becomes anything else—a discourse, for example—it may very productively be considered as a 
myth (Scheurer 1981, 149: “even though these works [books and movies] do not adhere to a 
strict formula they are collectively contributing to a mythic vision o f the war”).
But this particular mythic story, powerful and enduring as it has proven, is only the end 
product o f the cultural narrative effected in literature and cinema of the 1970s and 80s. In a 
way, the American history in and of Vietnam has always been mythical, paradoxical as this noun­
adjective combination may sound. In 1982, in their article on the American notion of 
“innocence” in relation to ideological interpretations o f the war, Mary Bellhouse and Lawrence 
Litchfield wrote that “Americans especially tend to live in a timeless and mythical world in which
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reality is not allowed to intrude very much upon the W alt Disney epic which insists that we are 
heroes, the defenders o f freedom and justice, and the protectors o f the weak and oppressed” 
(1982, 158-159). They then claim that Vietnam dislodged something of the mythical thinking 
about American past, and brought new light upon issues such as imperialism and ruthless 
capitalism, slavery and systematic racism, and the Native American holocaust. While that is true, 
Bellhouse and Litchfield go on to endorse another form of mythologization, at the time of their 
writing only just beginning, and so not yet recognized, yet alone understood to be deeply 
problematic. Their article, like many published in the same decade, gives testament to the 
sentiment and ideological formulations o f the time (they have much scorn for protesters and 
“doves,” for example, whose input into the public discourse about the war they consider far less 
important than that o f the Vietnam soldiers, even insignificant). Proclaiming “the American 
dead” and the “surviving veterans” to be among the war’s “chief victims” (1982, 159), and 
gushing about Vietnam literature as “a more penetrating and powerful body of work than that 
o f any other American war” (1982, 160), they also reject political (and so historical) sources and 
instead give almost absolute prime to veteran accounts, on the basis o f their eyewitness 
experience. Even though they acknowledge the rampant and homebred racism of the Americans, 
as well as the determining social and educational backgrounds o f those infantrymen most often 
in direct contact with villagers, this pro-veteran-author stance leads the authors to unsurprising 
and familiar conclusions: American atrocities against the Vietnamese civilians are to blamed not 
on the offending soldiers, but rather on the war policy as much as on the nature of the war itself, 
the “attitudes” o f the population, and the people’s “indistinguishability.” The gravest pitfall of 
this critical position reveals itself when Bellhouse and Litchfield mention “the absolutely foreign 
characteristics o f the Vietnamese” (1982, 164)—an astounding statement o f profound 
ethnocentrism, considering that it was the Americans who were the invading foreigners in 
Vietnam.
To assess the mythological dimension of the Vietnam War, we need to take a long step back 
and disentangle ourselves from reliance on, and even admiration for, the canonical literature 
produced by American veterans. As for the pitfalls o f the canon, Nielson writes: “both reviewers 
and critics have emphasized textual strategies over historical and ideological content and have 
understood this literature almost exclusively through a liberal ideology that has found in
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American military policy in Vietnam error rather than intent, tragedy rather than calculation” 
(1998, 8; see also 217-221 for Neilson’s appeal to a re-historicization of the literary discourse on 
the war in Vietnam; it should be noted that Neilson clearly differentiates the materialist and 
ideologically-anchored critique, which he promotes, from analyses o f “cultural myth,” which he 
views as insufficient and “transhistorical”). The point about ignoring the history and politics of 
the war is important in light o f the well-known definition of myth pertinent to the current 
discussion—which itself will become useful when reading the canonical texts. Roland Barthes’ 
classic conceptualization of modern myth—not necessarily in its structure as “a mode of 
signification” (2008, 107), but rather in its far more interesting purposes and consequences—was 
that
it transforms history into nature. We now understand why, in the eyes of the myth-consumer, 
the intention, the adhomination of the concept can remain manifest without however 
appearing to have an interest in the matter: what causes mythical speech to be uttered is 
perfectly explicit, but it is immediately frozen into something natural; it is not read as a 
motive, but a reason (2008, 128; emphasis in original).
Myth, in other words, as a phenomenon or force in culture, strives to insinuate itself before 
history, to elbow it out o f the way, to throw its shadow over it. Or, as Richard Slotkin, elaborating 
on Barthes’ propositions, explains,
[m]yth is invoked as a means of deriving usable values from history, and of putting those 
values beyond the reach of critical demystification. (...) Myth does not argue its ideology, it 
exemplifies it. (...)
[M]yth has a paradoxical way of dealing with historical experience: although the materials 
of myth are historical, myth organizes these materials ahistorically. When historical memory 
is carried by mythological metaphors, it is falsified in the most fundamental way. (...) The 
past is made metaphorically equivalent to the present; and the present appears simply as a 
repetition of persistently recurring structures identified with the past. Both past and present 
are reduced to instances displaying a single “law” or principle of nature, which is seen as 
timeless in its relevance, and as transcending all historical contingencies.
(...) The most important consequence of [the myth’s dehistoricization] is the concealment 
of human authorship and intention in the creation of ideas and values and the shaping of 
material conditions (1998a, 19, 24; emphases added; Spindler 1991, 28, identifies the
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“Vietnam War” as a myth in the Barthesian sense; Kinney 2000, 112, considers Michael 
Herr as a “Roland Barthes’ mythologist”).
From this perspective, a historical event or condition—a village o f people’s homes burning from 
napalm bombs, say, or a young man considering self-imposed exile to escape a draft he deems 
unjust—ceases, once subjected to “mythical speech,” to be a contingent cluster o f tangible causes 
and culpabilities, subject to assessment and thus capable o f effecting consequence or change. It 
instead becomes locked inside a story that naturalizes it, or, in other words, gives it justification 
in the guise o f an explanation of the status quo. A nd at this point myths come in to support 
ideologies, by perpetuating their values and convictions in the highly effective form of stories. 
To quote Slotkin again,
most of the time the assumptions of value inherent in a culture’s ideology are tacitly 
expressed as ‘givens.’ Their meaning is expressed in the symbolic narratives of mythology 
and is transmitted to the society through various genres of mythic expression. (...) Myths are 
stories drawn from a society’s history that have acquired through persistent usage the power 
of symbolizing the society’s ideology and of dramatizing its moral consciousness (1998b, 5; 
“genres of mythic expression” are narrative and metaphoric).
And thus the young man considering moving to Canada now becomes an image in a discussion 
regarding concepts such as duty, his predicament an element in a mythic story of the war which 
supports the ideology of American patriotism by making it the natural state o f reality, where the 
condition the man finds himself in is a source of moral and emotional agony and shame, and 
not, for instance, a different sense o f duty or even pride.
The American war in Vietnam has eventually been transformed into a myth itself. This myth 
of “Vietnam” may be understood as a cultural narrative o f the war. If the cultural narrative o f 
Vietnam dictates that the war was fought for essentially positive reasons, that its primary victims 
were the American veterans, and that its only significance was in what it did to the United States 
internally, then the mythological dimension of this interpretation is its easy translatability into 
stories and its relationship to history. We find this mythical rendering of Vietnam (re)produced 
in American books and films; and we may not only observe the ways in which this myth rewrites
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and obscures the history—the “material conditions”—of the war, but also trace the process by 
which “Vietnam” has been removed from its own historicity.
The third factor which endows the cultural narrative o f Vietnam with the properties o f myth 
is its prolificacy of connotations (Slotkin 1998b, 6): the ugliest “memories” o f the 1960s; discord 
and riot; patriotic duty and betrayal; drugs and rock ‘n ’ roll and napalm; trauma; the 
disenfranchised veteran; the abandoned POW; the heartbreak of the Memorial. Viewed from 
this perspective, Vietnam becomes an interesting case study to observe not only how history is 
mythologized, but also how this new mythic structure interweaves itself into ideologies and 
political speech. A nd so, when in 1982 Philip Beidler, Vietnam vet and literary scholar, wrote 
that “the place became its own bizarre, hermetic mythology” (2007, 13), the statement was not a 
gateway to a study of the ways in which the war was being rewritten to recuperate American 
ideologies, but rather a proclamation of an imagined American reality o f Vietnam and a 
confirmation of the constructs found in American narratives o f the war. In the end, as we know, 
the war had a seismic effect on American foreign policy and military strategy and culture, but it 
was its mythic quality that enabled its absorption into the realms of American neoconservatism 
and patriotism, and the transformation o f the post-Vietnam sentiment into, for example, the 
G ulf W ar “Support the Troops” movement which has by now solidified in American culture 
and continues to exert powerful influence on the societal relationship to war.
“The sins o f the forest are alive in the jungle”
But first, older powerful myths operating at the time of the United States’ entry into Indochina 
must be briefly examined. One particularly important case to consider is the frontier, a central— 
and perhaps the oldest (Slotkin 1998a, 15; 1998b, 10)—construct o f American mythology, the 
constant dependence on which so permeates the Vietnam authors’ minds that in the literary 
renditions filtered through their memory it comes to saturate the very land they had once 
traversed with their government-issued rifles: the physical country(side) o f Vietnam. But, more 
than a literary theme, or a mode of representation, and eventually a problematic studied by 
Vietnam literature scholars, the frontier is also a specific strategy of apparent critique, in the 
narratives as much as some of the academic texts (Neilson 1998, 83). The cultural links between 
the American rendering of Vietnam and the mythical frontier are well-known and have been
“War is as Natural as the Rains” 83
described exhaustively. Although this chapter is not meant as a reiteration of these earlier studies, 
but rather an attempt to trace and deconstruct the ways in which the Vietnamese landscape is 
recreated in the American narratives in general, a consideration of this topic must necessarily 
begin at the frontier—before it can move away from it.
In American Myth and the Legacy of Vietnam, John Hellmann (1986) analyzes the deep 
connections between the myth of the frontier and the influence it exerted on the American 
relations with, and thinking of, Vietnam in the early years o f open “cooperation.” Hellmann 
explained that, beginning with the well-known genesis o f the frontier myth at the very 
foundations o f the United States, as the new settlers were eager to cut o ff all cultural links with 
Europe and instead turned west, such land-based continuity eventually embraced Asia and 
morphed it, in the American mind at least, into an extension of America itself. Consequently, 
the Asian—the inhabitant o f the land that was the ultimate, westernmost, final frontier to be 
won—was seen as a friendly Indian, a little brother to whom the American would bring progress 
and freedom, and in whose well-being the American destiny would be fulfilled (see also Beidler 
2007, 19—28; Drinnon 1997, 402—403; Melling 2007). The frontier myth would also become 
closely related to the idea o f American exceptionalism (1986, 4 —15; Slotkin 1998a, 33—34).
In a soon-to-be-related development, as Hellmann observes, towards the end of the 1950s 
there was in American society the feeling o f moral degeneration, o f resting on laurels, of 
consumerism-induced conformity and indulgence, and of the breakdown of the old American 
enterprise and spirit. To discuss this process, Hellmann chooses The Ugly American, a bestselling 
novel by Eugene Burdick and William Lederer published in 1959. The book’s action takes place 
in Indochina, and its scathing criticism concerns the conduct there o f the American CIA  agents 
and diplomats, who—according to the authors o f The Ugly American-are close to losing the Cold 
War for the United States due to precisely the vices and failings just enumerated. The heroes of 
the book, on the other hand, go out to the countryside, helping and working with indigenous 
populations, thus winning their hearts and minds, and ultimately the Cold  War, as modern 
reincarnations o f successful, all-American frontiersmen (Hellmann 1986, 19—30). Therefore, 
Hellmann goes on to argue, as the theme of Asia as the next frontier had already resurfaced, 
Vietnam then presented itself as an opportunity for the renewal o f traditional American values 
and virtues: “Americans entered Vietnam with certain expectations that a story, a distinctly
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American story, would unfold” (1986, x); “[w]hen they thought about Indochina, Americans 
generally saw themselves entering yet another frontier, once again 'western pilgrims' on a mission 
of protection and progress” (1986, 15); in effect [when it finally happened, the war in Vietnam 
turned out to be] a symbolic war in which the true terrain was the American character and the 
ultimate stakes world history” (1986, 4).
The Ugly American was extraordinarily influential at the time o f its publication. Am ong its 
millions o f enthusiasts was young Senator John F. Kennedy, who, in a gesture o f protest against 
the perceived political and societal stagnation, at one point mailed a copy of the book to every 
single member of the U.S. Senate (Hellmann 1986, 17; see also Carter 2008, 97-100).26 As 
president, Kennedy ran a policy program known precisely as the New Frontier, introduced upon 
his inauguration in 1961 and continued until his death two years later, that promised national 
regeneration and new hope. Hellmann argued that, although far from being the most important 
issue, Vietnam had for the Kennedy administration the function o f bolstering people's 
confidence in the United States' position as the champion of democracy and freedom, the 
protector o f the oppressed, and the world's all-around “good guy” (cf. Slotkin 1998b, 489, who 
argues that halting Com m unism  in the Third World was “Kennedy’s deepest concern and the 
one he regarded as the ultimate test o f his capacity as a leader”).
Moreover, Vietnam was attractive to Kennedy in a very pragmatic sense. By 1962 the 
competence of his administration and his own personal ability as the leader o f a Cold War party 
had been undermined by a string of international incidents, the most important o f which were 
the humiliating meeting with Nikita Khrushchev in Vienna in 1961, the failure o f the Bay of Pigs 
Invasion that same year, and the 1962 peaceful (ergo, in Cold  War logic, somewhat “surrender- 
ish”) settlement o f the crisis in Laos. Kennedy is indeed reported to have said to a reporter: “Now 
we have a problem in making our power credible, and Vietnam is the place” (Karnow 1983, 248; 
see also: Hellmann 1986, 50-1 ; MacLear 1982, 80-1).
According to Hellmann’s analysis, it is evident then that Vietnam's rather down-to-earth 
political role at home, preconceived by the president and his advisors, was to be played out on a 
symbolic, or at the very least rhetorical, plane. The country's status as the new frontier, in tangible 
connection to the policy program, was further enforced by the highly symbolic figure o f the 
Green Beret, to whom Hellmann devotes an entire chapter. The Greenie—Kennedy’s favorite
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and the militant brother to the member of the president's other flagship New Frontier 
organization, the Peace Corps—was a quintessential modern frontiersman, and he took the role 
to new heights, inserting himself firmly not only in the imaginary landscape of American 
mythology, but also in the material Indochinese country (Hellmann 1986, 44; MacLear 1982, 
61; Slotkin, 1998b, 503-504; for a discussion on Kennedy and the Special Forces in the context 
o f actual strategy, see Gibson, 76ff). As what a journalist once called “the Harvard Ph.D. of 
warfare” (quoted in Hellmann 1986, 46), but also as what Kennedy had envisaged as part-Peace- 
Corpsman, the Greenie, a gentleman killing machine, became the perfect man of the frontier, 
balancing the symbolic features o f city and country, civilization and wilderness, technology and 
nature (Hellmann 1986, 37-48; Drinnon 1997, 462-463). In the books and long features in 
magazines and newspapers, he eschewed the disgraced European colonialist even as he 
befriended the native; as a development o f the landscape theme, a frequent enough conclusion 
in these stories was that the Green Berets improve the lands o f the primitive people they visit, for 
example by showing them how to turn infertile fields into pastures (Hellmann 1986, 48-9 ; 
Slotkin 1998a, 34). Therefore, Asia-as-new-America is not only conquered by the sheer force of 
goodwill and brotherly sentiment, progress and democracy, but is in fact perfected, made into a 
useful, prosperous landscape. Hellmann saw in this, during the nation-building stage o f U .S. 
presence in South Vietnam, an expression of the wish for the history to repeat itself to a happy 
ending, where the American, instead of wrestling the land through bloody war away from a 
hateful Indian, whom he eventually kills with his diseases and guns, and whose buffalo (a 
creature o f the land, no less) he decimates, this time around finds a successful conclusion to his 
endeavor; this time, it all works out (1986, 30-8).
Hellmann’s study, an influential text in Vietnam scholarship and thus canon, for all its well- 
documented (and frankly interesting) analysis and interpretation, is in fact a benign take on the 
subject.27 While he essentially traces the ideological implications o f the frontier (though the word 
ideology is not applied in this context in the book) and obviously the relationship between the 
myth and the American presence in Indochina, Hellmann mostly ignores the rather clear context 
o f American imperialism, and particularly o f imperial practice that marries the psychology of 
“mythical speech,” political rhetoric, material interest, and foreign policy and its consequences. 
Reading American Myth, one might have the impression that the United States got involved in
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Indochina quite simply because o f a genuine desire to bring democracy and freedom to Vietnam, 
borne out o f the country’s deep cultural attachment to its mythological image of itself and sense 
o f mission. Indeed, Hellmann goes as far as to state that the American wish to reinvigorate its 
sense o f exceptionalism, bolstered by the mythical frontier, “was the force o f the American mythic 
heritage articulating itself in a specific policy” (1986, 53). Hellmann’s work thus supports not 
only the dehistoricized and Americanized “Vietnam” of the texts he discusses, but more 
significantly the very discourse o f the war in Vietnam as a tragic mistake resulting from good but 
miscalculated intentions.
Hellmann’s interpretation of the motivations behind American descent on Indochina is 
possible because his account o f the war begins with Kennedy and the New Frontier, and thus 
with the United States already deeply embedded in the region and South Vietnam ’s politics, 
largely disregarding not only the French history, but also the original imperial causes o f American 
involvement and backdoor meddling since the end of World War II (Ngo D inh Diem, for 
example, is mentioned only once, and in passing). If the story opens with Kennedy’s rhetoric in 
the context o f American society and culture—but not geopolitics or economy, for example—as 
determinant in involving the United States in Vietnam, it is fairly easy to be persuaded of the 
primacy of myth in steering U.S. actions abroad and so o f the country’s idealism (or innocence). 
W hat this perspective lacks, apart from some twenty years o f history, is a more nuanced view of 
myth implicated in ideology and politics. As discussed in the beginning of this chapter, the 
United States went to war in Vietnam for a number of security- and economy-related reasons, or 
rather a matrix o f interlocked interests informed on a profound level by the need to preserve a 
set o f American and capitalist ideologies, and so the country’s status as a superpower (and so, to 
close the circle o f this reasoning, the benefits this status brings; see also Kuberski 1986, 171, on 
the U.S. government’s supposed denial o f its own interests “encouraging” the country “to make 
its critical intervention in Vietnam in the service o f ideological, but ultimately metaphysical 
assumptions about its own identity and the identity o f its oriental, marxist other.”). Hellmann’s 
mythological interpretation is in this context not wrong or even parallel, but complementary: 
the frontier, like the other exceptionalist mythical concepts, is implicated in this matrix o f reasons 
both as a foundation of the rhetoric explaining and justifying foreign policy (the imperial 
practice), but also as a profound cultural foundation begetting American ideologies, like
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exceptionalism, and the political actions these ideologies in their turn influence and sometimes 
dictate.
The imperial dimension of the frontier myth was described by historian William Appleman 
W illiams (1955) in an essay on Turner’s “Frontier Thesis” and U .S. foreign policy, which, like 
The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, W illiams’ magnum opus, predates the war in Vietnam, but 
remains instructive. Particularly interesting is W illiams’ tracing of the history of an idea turning 
into an ideology, as well as his analysis o f the frontier ideology’s central role in U.S. foreign policy 
in the first half o f the 20th c., its tacit acceptance of European colonialism and promotion of 
American expansionism, and its inextricable links to the interests o f American capital.28
Richard Slotkin, in his seminal study of the frontier myth, similarly perceives it as residing at 
the core o f American ideology, its significance far exceeding the realm of popular culture and 
representation:
Although the Myth of the Frontier is only one of the operative myth/ideological systems 
that form American culture, it is an extremely important and persistent one. Its ideological 
underpinnings are those same “laws” of capitalist competition, of supply and demand, of 
Social Darwinian “survival of the fittest” as a rationale for social order, and of “Manifest 
Destiny” that have been the building blocks of our dominant historiographical tradition and 
political ideology (1998a, 15).
Slotkin sets out to deconstruct the frontier myth as a theory of development o f capitalism and 
of American society. Departing from the classic 19th c. formulations, which have been variously 
developed and polemicized with by economic historians since, Slotkin works his way through 
the thick sediment o f myth that had conventionally linked westward geographical expansion with 
the simultaneous rapid economic development. Having explored the internal contradictions of 
the frontier thesis, smoothed over by typical mythological mystification, Slotkin ultimately arrives 
at the conclusion that from the outset, based on the specific conditions o f the American frontier 
radically different from those o f European colonies (its physical proximity), America was a site 
o f internal imperialism. Moreover, the M etropolitan benefit from the frontier depended less on 
the values and pioneer virtues myth associates with it, and more on development in the 
Metropolis itself as well as on exploitation o f both the land, and so on the removal o f the natives, 
and on exploitation of labor, the imported African slaves and dispossessed European
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immigrants. In the end, Slotkin argues, the “Frontier Myth and its ideology are founded on the 
desire to avoid recognition of the perilous consequences o f capitalist development in the New 
W orld” and the class strife it inevitably brings, but which the American project was supposed to 
have eliminated (1998a, 47).
Beginning at around the turn of the century and the “closing of the frontier” in the United 
States, the theory was developed further and the frontier moved abroad, in formulations of 
Frederick Jackson Turner (the very famous version) as well as Brooke Adams and Theodore 
Roosevelt (less famous, but equally influential; Slotkin 1998b; Williams 1955). By the time of 
John Kennedy’s presidency and his flagship policy program, an “assertive” international frontier 
was back in vogue. Slotkin argues that, apart from the president’s particular care for U.S. activity 
in developing the Third W orld and protecting it from the Soviets, a particularly Turnerian vision 
of the frontier could be seen in the Peace Corps, and a particularly Rooseveltian one in the 
Green Berets and in Kennedy’s outlook and presidential style, and the Johnson administration 
inherited much of this dual ideology (1998b, 490ff; see also Drinnon 1997, 371). The beginning 
of the shooting war in Vietnam in 1965 ended the counterinsurgency phase and ushered in the 
“Big-Unit War,” which in terms of media representation, and to a considerable extent also the 
military self-presentation and explanation of strategy, continued to make use o f another element 
o f the frontier imagery and vocabulary known from the Westerns, and namely the Indian wars, 
with the NVA and N LF fighters filling the parts o f the bad Indians, South Vietnamese civilians— 
of the Indian women and children in need of protection. The critical years o f 1968 and 1969, 
however, quickly inversed or confused the roles—if American soldiers were capable o f shooting 
babies and old men at My Lai, in a vicious and destructive war that seemed to be nowhere near 
ending, then who could say for sure who the Cowboys were, and who the Indians, or if even the 
rules o f the game still applied? (Slotkin 1998b, 536ff; on Kennedy, the New Frontier, the Green 
Berets, counterinsurgency, etc., see also Drinnon 1997, 364-373) The rupturing of the 
confidence generated by the frontier myth and its application to Vietnam, which began in that 
tumultuous period, is next to the treatment o f veterans the most frequent and acute complaint 
in postwar American narratives.
Elements o f this myth are also found in Richard Drinnon’s study of American imperialism in 
relation to what he calls “Indian-hating,” where he argues that if Turner posited the closing of
“War is as Natural as the Rains” 89
the frontier in his time and thus initiated a second period of American history, then that second 
period ended with the failure in Vietnam—the first instance of the Anglo-American empire being 
turned back (1997, xiii; he also writes that “Turner added his monumental chapter to the 
national metaphysics o f Indian-hating”; 1997, 462-463). In contrast to Slotkin, Drinnon sees 
race, not class, as the core o f American experience and sociopolitics, and sets out to prove that 
racism, o f the variety directed against the Indian and later the Vietnamese, has been central to 
American nationalism and mythical/policy formulations like the Manifest Destiny or the New 
Frontier (1997, xxvi). In the part o f his volume devoted to Vietnam, he also discusses the ways 
in which U.S. policy contained traces o f early American colonialism and Indian wars (1997, 
355ff; for a polemic with the racial focus o f D rinnon’s thesis, see Neilson 1998, 98-99).
Slotkin finds specifically American violence to be at the root o f the American conception of 
the frontier and so the country’s progress. He thus also sees parallels between the Indian wars 
and the military strategy in Vietnam, which, as essentially a war o f attrition visualized as a “savage 
war” and aimed at rooting out the enemy entrenched among the civilian population, resulted in 
“deployment o f genocidal violence” (1998a, 6) and verged precipitously on becoming a “war o f 
extermination” (1998b, 545). Drinnon, who considers the entire concept o f counterinsurgency 
as well as the ideology of the New Frontier to be inherently imperial, in a similar strain writes 
that “ ‘Westernization,’ ‘Americanization,’ ‘modernization,’ ‘nation-building,’ or ‘progress’— 
under whatever name the process was always an assault on family structures and on the village. 
Natives who resisted these assaults on their persons and cultures provoked exterminatory attacks 
in a continuing tradition of Indian-hating (...)” (1997, 372; see also 461-464).
Hellmann, to be sure, also comments on some sinister aspects o f the frontier, but his 
observations, unlike the highly politicized and explicitly anti-imperial works o f Slotkin and 
Drinnon, offer instead an interesting insight into the early Vietnam literary and cultural 
scholarship’s complicity in the dominant discourse. Hellmann continues his discussion o f the 
Green Berets by pointing out that the Special Forces, in their second function in 
counterinsurgency and death by stealth, provided one more link to the land of Vietnam. O n the 
eve of the war and with Kennedy still alive, the Greenie was perceived as a master warrior who 
had taught himself the ways o f the jungle guerrillas and knew the land better than the natives 
did, like a frontiersman, a John Wayne, fighting the Indian the Indian way in order to protect
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the Indian (1986, 37, 49). In his analysis o f another bestseller set in Vietnam, Robin M oore’s 
1965 Green Berets, Hellmann explores the darker side o f the frontier mentality, which he places 
opposite the “liberalism” of The Ugly American and claims, based on M oore’s book’s spectacular 
sales, to have “mirror[ed] the fantasies o f a significant portion of the populace” (1986, 56). The 
book, he argues, is a masculinist celebration of symbolic and material exploitation o f the natives, 
complete with its anti-social tendency, its thinly veiled sense o f racial superiority, and its desire 
to “return” to Southeast Asia, to “the alluring landscape of primitive satisfactions, a dark frontier 
where the psyche may contemplate eternally having a communist to kill and a native woman to 
lose oneself in” (1986, 65). It seems that Hellmann cannot escape the entrapping of the very 
myth he analyzes. The darkness he finds in the frontier myth is again metaphysical, a reflection 
of a “fantasy,” and divorced from the imperial practice o f the United States as well as its material 
motivations, political acts, and consequences (as Neilson points out, missing from Hellmann’s 
mythological analysis o f American foreign policy in Indochina are “such figures as Ngo Dinh 
Diem, Ho Chi Minh, Allen Dulles, and Edward Lansdale. (...) Hellmann [also] ignores the people 
and politics o f Indochina” [1998, 101]).
But this is the same darkness that haunts most o f the war’s American texts, forming the core 
o f the dominant cultural narrative o f Vietnam. The frontier has been a useful image to convey 
a safe type o f imperialist confession: once its myth is out in the open, it exists as a well-established 
discourse by which to either motivate or explain, sometimes criticize, American attitudes, 
especially in encounters at various borders and margins, including in foreign policy. Because of 
its implications o f the Indian wars and “Indian country” (the moniker, like the mythically or 
culturally related figure o f John Wayne, is so often evoked in Vietnam books to refer to NLF- 
and NVA-held territories that it requires no reference), the frontier, when used by a Vietnam 
author, effects a semiosis o f well-known concepts and constructs. But the frontier, except in 
rigorous and securely politically- and ideologically anchored cases,29 is not a particularly useful 
discourse o f criticism: its failure is seen in the Vietnam literature, where it serves to mythologize 
rather than elucidate. A  Vietnam author reimagining the war as a frontier conflict, and especially 
when his story is bound by genre conventions as entrenched as those o f popular war literature, 
usually fails to become a truly progressive voice capable o f stepping beyond the predictable and 
the expected, and of delivering an acute, material and historical diagnosis o f the inequities of
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the war. The protagonists o f Vietnam narratives most often move in circles, their units stomping 
around the same areas o f operations, along the same little-known rivers and through the same 
paddies and villages, the knowledge of the land passed down from those ancient wise men, the 
“grunts” (infantry soldiers, especially in the Marine Corps) who had come and gone before them; 
often it seems that the Vietnam literature itself reproduces this repetitive movement through its 
own imaginary Vietnam, unable to transcend the limitations o f genre as much as o f myth. The 
frontier is an unreal space—whatever happens there has a conditional relation to historical reality, 
the significance of events and encounters arbitrary and malleable.
A nd so be it, we might say: it is not necessarily the role o f the writer to provide historical 
education and political critique, and he is free to write about his war however he wishes. The 
problem, however, comes from the other way round, so to speak: when the mass o f canonical 
representations, sanctioned, legitimized and thus perpetuated by the critics and scholars, remains 
so unitary and exclusive o f other discourses and perspectives as to shape and limit the popular 
imagination (memory, understanding) o f an event like a military invasion. Dom inant discourses 
are born this way. It becomes, in other words, a problem of ideology—perpetuated by reiterations 
o f the same mythic story.
This problem is related to two additional matters: the limitation of perspective in the 
canonical body of work, and the “friendly fire” discourse. First o f all, the most successful 
canonical Vietnam texts are not only told from the “grunts’” ground-level perspective, but rely 
with very few exceptions on veteran authorship (Boyle 2015a, 12-16; 2016, 176; Chattarji 2007, 
75; Kinney 2000, 8; see also Jeffords 1989, 135-138, on the veteran as a “spokesperson” for the 
whole o f American culture and society). Like Bellhouse and Litchfield in the article discussed 
above, so in many of the 1980s literary studies and reviews scholars and critics praise the “truth” 
o f the Vietnam literature, and give clear preference to veteran and correspondent accounts 
because o f their personal experience in the war, as if that experience legitimized an author’s 
version of Vietnam as definite and unquestionable, as if that experience were the only source of 
the authority to make interpretations o f the conflict and what was important about it. Other 
voices, those o f the antiwar movement for example, may be disqualified as ideological and biased 
because o f both their lack of personal experience in the war and the disparagement o f the 
protesters expressed in many canonical veteran-authored texts. This limitation is not without
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consequences for the political and ideological dimension of the canon and the dominant cultural 
narrative:
By promoting a literature that favors individual lives over social relations, universal truths 
over historical contingency, and textual sophistication over social analysis, [America’s 
intellectual class] has helped reproduce, not merely in the small audience of serious fiction 
writers but in general public as well, a simple and ideologically unthreatening view of the 
war. The conventional narrative of the war in film and TV—with its grunt’s eye view (and 
exclusion of senior officers, commanders, and policy makers), the alienness of the 
Vietnamese landscape and culture, the near invisibility of the Vietnamese, the focus on 
isolated atrocities (and the lack of focus on the destruction caused by U.S. aerial 
bombardments)—derives from novels and autobiographies written by American veterans, 
published in the 1970s and 1980s, and championed by American literary culture (Neilson 
1998, 6; see also Boyle 2016, 188; Kinney 2000, 6; Spanos 2000, 137-138).
Because the stories focus on the experience of low-ranking American soldiers in the field, not 
only are other points o f view, especially Vietnamese, omitted, but also the context o f high-level 
military strategists and W ashington policymakers is not considered. The U .S. destruction of both 
South and North Vietnam was multifaceted and involved various forms of warfare and violence. 
But let us take just one example: Operation Ranch Hand, the decade-long program of spraying 
vast amounts o f defoliants and herbicides like Agent Orange over the countryside o f South 
Vietnam in order to deprive the N LF of cover and crops. Even excluding the effects that the 
toxic chemicals would continue to have on the Vietnamese population and environment for 
generations, the wartime operation had immediate negative consequences for both the landscape 
(“Only you can prevent a forest” was the Ranch Hand staff s “jokey” slogan) and the people. As 
a form of chemical warfare, crop destruction and defoliation, especially because they were to be 
used on allied territory, were a particularly controversial element o f U .S. strategy, but once the 
operation started and the first reports o f its apparent efficiency came in, the initial strategic 
assessment was positive and the spraying would continue until 1971, despite frequent doubts 
expressed as to its effectiveness against the N LF and its impact on villagers. An early M A CV  
intelligence document noted that “in 1965 herbicides had destroyed enough food to feed about 
245,000 people for one year. In many instances (...) the local civilians suffered more than the 
Viet Cong” (quoted in Buckingham 1982, 120). A n N LF member interviewed in the report 
explained that
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[t]he farmers love their land, and the things they grow. All their lives, they did not own 
anything better than their own little plot of land, and the few trees. The spraying in one day 
killed the trees that had been planted 15 or 20 years before. You see how this affects their 
feelings and morale (quoted in Buckingham 1982, 121).
A  R A N D  study a year later found that “crop spraying struck at the very heart o f a farmer’s 
existence by destroying not only his food supply, but also the product o f his labors” (Buckingham 
1982, 134; this source is an official Air Force history of Operation Ranch Hand). James William 
Gibson in The Perfect War references an involved nutritionist who found that in Ranch Hand 
“children were the first to die when crops were destroyed. After them came old people. Babies 
were third in line—they died when the mother’s milk dried up. Adult women had a chance of 
survival if they were strong enough to leave the area” (2000, 231). Apart from causing starvation, 
crop herbicide also contributed to the massive wartime refugee crisis in South Vietnam, as 
populations moved from sprayed zones to government-controlled areas and camps, and 
compounded the process o f destruction of traditional Vietnamese society and way of life.
Ranch Hand, apart from very likely constituting a war crime, was one way in which the 
American presence made the life o f South Vietnamese civilians a nightmare, but a reader of 
American Vietnam literature and a viewer o f American films would not know it (the sprayings 
are mentioned briefly in James W ebb’s Fields of Fire). The operation does not feature in the 
American canon; that no Vietnamese (or Montagnard, who were also affected) civilians are given 
voice to provide their perspective on the spraying is one thing, but the exclusion of the entire 
world of U .S. strategists and policymakers results also in the exclusion at the level o f actual 
culpability o f those making decisions, signing documents, and giving orders—of those potential 
war criminals, in other words. This gaping hole at the center o f American Vietnam canon may 
be the largest and most effective strategy of depoliticizing and dehistoricizing the war.
Instead, as already suggested above, the war has been mythologized. A n integral aspect o f the 
myth of the Vietnam W ar is what Katherine Kinney has called a “trope of friendly fire”: 
Americans killing Americans being “virtually the only story that has been told by Americans 
about the Vietnam War. In novels, memoirs, oral histories, plays, and films the image of friendly 
fire, the death of one American at the hands o f another, structures the plotting of both realist 
gestures toward ‘what really happened’ in Vietnam and symbolic expressions o f what Vietnam
94 “War is as Natural as the Rains”
meant” (2000, 4). Moreover, Kinney links the friendly fire trope to, first o f all, the typical 
imperial tendency o f transferring the empire’s internal conflicts and tensions to the colonized 
territory, and, second of all, to the aforementioned mere semblance o f critique in the canonical 
texts. She observes that if the trope “testifies to the subversion of traditional American orders of 
meaning, the story it ultimately tells is not necessarily subversive” (2000, 5). In Platoon, for 
example, which Kinney discusses as exemplary of friendly fire, “the moral struggle at the heart 
o f the film trades on a racialized imperial memory without ever critically engaging its terms” 
(2000, 6). In the end, the omnipresence of the trope should be seen as a strategy of mystification 
and elision: friendly fire is “the violence Americans are doing to each other rather than to the 
Vietnamese” (Kinney 2000, 110; see also Holbling 2007, 105ff). Brenda Boyle, departing from 
Kinney’s work and focusing on the uniformity o f the Vietnam canon’s authorship, adds that by 
rendering the war into a site o f exclusively American internal struggle, the narratives evoke purely 
emotional response whereby all American characters, regardless o f what they do, must be viewed 
as victims o f the struggle and sympathized with. Meanwhile, the politics o f waging war, and of 
waging this war in particular, are rendered irrelevant. This, Boyle argues, has the effect o f 
naturalizing war as a matter o f “human nature, not human condition” (2016, 190; on the 
naturalization of Vietnam see also Schlegel 1995, 53-54 ; Spindler 1991, 28-29).30
A nd thus we arrive back at myth. If Slotkin is right when he contends that “the ‘internal’ 
location of the American colonizing enterprise made for a relationship between colony and 
Metropolis that was closer and more significant for domestic politics” (1998a, 47) than in the 
case o f European states and their imperial possessions, then the disrupted Vietnam frontier as a 
location where Americans are continuously inflicting friendly fire against one another becomes 
more understandable. The problem, as ever, is that while agonizing over the mythical and 
symbolic frontier, the canon and the dominant narrative leave out matters such as the actual 
destruction of the actual Vietnamese landscape and the lives o f the people who inhabited it. But, 
since in the decontextualized and dehistoricized war there is no concrete political causality, it 
also becomes clear how “Vietnam” can so unselfconsciously be considered a calamity that befell 
the American people—an American tragedy.
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2.3. “Vietnam, Vietnam, Vietnam”
The massacre at My Lai can be considered an American tragedy because My Lai was an American 
place. It was also a made-up place. It never existed.
My Lai, in the U .S. sources usually rendered as My Lai 4 or My Lai (4) to designate the specific 
sub-hamlet where the vast majority of the killings were perpetrated, was actually one of several 
settlements constituting the village o f Son My, in Quang Ngai Province.31 Another sub-hamlet 
o f Son  My where civilians were killed in large numbers by Americans (though by a different 
company) on March 16, 1968, was My Khe (4), and the entire incident conventionally referred 
to as My Lai in the U .S. is indeed known in Vietnam as the Son My massacre. Both names—My 
Lai (4) and My Khe (4)—were artificial U .S. military designations. The actual Vietnamese name 
for My Lai (4) was Xom Lang, and it belonged to the hamlet (administrative district within the 
village) o f Tu Cung; My Khe (4)’s actual name was My Hoi, in Co Luy hamlet. “Pinkville,” 
another name often associated with the massacre in American sources was applied in soldiers’ 
slang to the sub-hamlet o f My Khe in the My Lai hamlet—re-named My Lai (1) by the U .S. 
military—because o f the pink color used for the area on American maps to signify the alleged 
large Viet Cong presence there (Allison 2012, 23; Oliver 2006, viii, 192).32
I allowed myself to open this subchapter as I have, with a somewhat poetically paradoxical 
statement, in order to be playful with the way in which “Vietnam ” has been rendered in the 
American canon. In fact, the Vietnam-as-frontier discourse is only part o f larger strategies to 
claim the Vietnamese landscape for the American empire. “Vietnam, Vietnam, Vietnam—we’ve 
all been there”: so ends Michael Herr’s Dispatches (1978, 207), and indeed we may ask, what is 
“Vietnam ”? In American texts one often encounters the word used as an almost abstracted noun, 
a signifier so pregnant with connotations that on some planes it transcends the expected 
meanings, the name of a state in Asia or a war that took place in the 1960s. “Victims of 
Vietnam ,” “what Vietnam has done to us,” “no more Vietnams” and “another Vietnam,” “the 
lessons o f Vietnam ,” the “Vietnam syndrome”: the colocations are well-established and 
dependent on the fluid, sometimes amorphous, and spacious idea o f what “Vietnam ” means as 
an American myth—“Vietnam as a war, place, and time,” writes Kinney, the “categories barely 
distinguishable from one another” (2000, 10).
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The My Lai example is a particularly poignant illustration of two facts. The first is that 
whatever happens in this “Vietnam ,” has significance only in so far as it has relevance to 
American culture, society or “experience”; or, to put it differently, this reconstructed “Vietnam ” 
is a setting of an exclusively American story about America itself. Hence the recalibration of 
optics that transforms the slaughter o f several hundred Vietnamese people at the hands of 
Americans into an American tragedy. Hence, also, the soundness o f Kinney’s “friendly fire 
discourse” thesis. To use another example, the American odyssey through the war in Apocalypse 
Now encapsulates this point perfectly: each stop Captain W illard and the boat crew make, 
though nominally located in Vietnam, is a vignette o f America. For instance, if we agree with 
the interpretation of the Do Lung bridge scene as representative o f the black experience in the 
1960s and 70s U nited States society (as posited by Hellmann 2007), the reading comes to 
support a form of interpretive colonization of the Vietnamese landscape for the uses o f American 
culture—in addition, o f course, to the “basic” reading of the episode as representative o f the 
American black and “grunt” experience of the worst sites o f combat in Vietnam.33
The second fact is that whichever way one looks at it, the American concept o f “Vietnam ” 
always involves the construction of some kind of place or space. This should not be surprising, 
o f course; if “Vietnam ” is understood primarily as a myth, a specific story, it is only expected that 
it should have a setting, even if this setting changes—moving not from place to place, but between 
dimensions. In the imaginary realm, we find Vietnam visualized as a frontier so enticing to John 
Kennedy and his advisers, graspable as a desirable region of benevolent conquest to the 
American public; in the postwar literature, we find it reconstructed as a countryside and a terrain 
demarcated by conventional signifiers, rarely beautiful but always dangerous and hostile, as an 
abstracted space travelled through and across, and finally as the war itself.
But historically, too—in the physical dimension, so to speak—we see Vietnam redefined as an 
American place. It is there, firstly, as the imaginary but tragically consequential state o f South 
Vietnam, created by the United States for their own geopolitical interests. This creation was 
political and symbolic, as an attempt to launch a viable government and to force the population 
into forming a South Vietnamese nation, but through the processes o f aid and “nation building” 
it was also material. The United States moved in immediately following the Geneva Conference
in 1954:
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A staggering array of specialists and technicians, from civil police, public administration, 
public finance, military, counterespionage, propaganda, industry, agriculture, education and 
more immediately descended upon Saigon, the southern city made the capital of the whole 
project. These experts, along with the U.S. government and military installed Ngo Dinh 
Diem, removed all viable opponents, began a crackdown on dissidents killing tens of 
thousands and jailing as many or more, and began to physically transform southern 
Vietnam. United States government contractors, such as Michigan State University and the 
construction firm Johnson, Drake and Piper, went to work on the creation of a national 
communications, transportation and police network. This “mission” built or rebuilt 
hundreds of miles of roadways and dozens of bridges, dredged hundreds of miles of canals, 
built airfields and deep draft ports to receive a continuing and growing volume of economic 
and military aid. They built roads connecting all parts of Vietnam to Saigon, which they 
promised would result in greater access for both government officials and peasants to sell 
their crops to a larger market (Carter 2003).
From the moment when the engagement in Indochina became militarized in 1965, throughout 
the war, and for the first time in history, private U .S. companies received highly lucrative 
government contracts for construction projects during wartime. Vietnam ’s perhaps most 
notorious profiteer, the construction company Brown &  Root (“Burn &  Loot” to antiwar 
protesters), once a major benefactor o f Lyndon Johnson’s political career and by the early 1960s 
a subsidiary of Halliburton, was among a consortium of firms who received advantageous and 
highly profitable cost-plus contracts from the U .S. government—“a bonanza of contracts” for 
“billions o f dollars [sic] worth o f bases, airstrips, ports, and bridges” in the country. The 
consortium, known collectively as “RMK-BRJ,” in addition to Brown &  Root included “three 
other construction and project management behemoths,” Raymond International, Morris- 
Knudsen and J.A. Jones, “to form one of the largest civilian-based military construction 
conglomerates in history,” and in the end worked on construction projects worth over $2 billion 
(Briody 2004, 163 — 164; see also Carter 2003; 2008, 182—205; St. Clair 2005). In effect,
RMK-BRJ literally changed the face of Vietnam, clearing out wide swaths of jungle for 
airplane landing strips, dredging channels for ships, and building American bases from Da 
Nang to Saigon. (...) RMK-BRJ was building everything from roads to entire cities for the 
American military. (...) RMK-BRJ built two 10,000-foot jet runways and two deep-water piers 
in Da Nang; a permanent jet runway in Chulai; two jet runways in Phanrang; ammunition 
and fuel storage facilities; barracks; helicopter landing pads; pipelines; hospitals; 
communications facilities; and warehouses. In short, the construction conglomerate built
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everything the American military needed in Vietnam. They did 97 percent of the 
construction work in the country during the seven years they operated there. The remaining 
3 percent went to local Vietnamese contractors.
They were moving enough dirt to dig the Suez Canal and paving enough roads to 
surface the Jersey Turnpike every 30 days. They had a small army of their own in the country, 
51,000 at the height of operations in 1967, the largest employer in Vietnam (Briody 2004, 
164-165).
Halliburton employees were a common sight across South Vietnam—digging wells, building 
latrines, managing commissaries, excavating harbors and constructing barracks—from Da 
Nang to Cam Ranh Bay. The biggest project by far was its $220 million contract to build 
the mammoth Air Base at Phan Rang, which Halliburton constructed on top of some [of] 
the most beautiful Cham temple complexes in Vietnam (St. Clair 2005).
[RMK-BRJ] built six ports with 29 deep-draft berths, six naval bases, eight jet airstrips 10,000 
feet in length, twelve airfields, just under twenty hospitals, fourteen million square feet of 
covered storage, and twenty base camps including housing for 450,000 servicemen and 
family. In short, they put on the ground in southern Vietnam nearly $2 billion in 
construction of various kinds of facilities and infrastructure. Military commanders called it 
the “construction miracle of the decade” (Carter 2003; see also Carter 2008).
But despite the self-satisfaction of the New Frontier, the bulk of the American aid money did 
not go toward nation-building projects: until 1968, wrote Frances FitzGerald in Fire in the Lake, 
“many American liberals (...) believed the official claims that the U nited States was at least 
making an effort to develop South Vietnam and to improve the welfare o f the South Vietnamese 
people. But as a look at the aid budget would show, the claims were, and always had been, false” 
(1972, 120). FitzGerald pointed out that 90 percent o f aid money was spent on building the 
South Vietnamese armed forces and bureaucracy, and that the U .S. policy during the Diem years 
was “not an attempt to help the Vietnamese, but (...) an attempt to hold the line at the 17th 
parallel against the Com m unists” (1972, 121; see also Carter 2008, 95 -105).
Meanwhile, American counterinsurgency and later military strategy was also “changing the 
face” o f Vietnam and its social fabric. Pacification programs run under Diem proved disastrous 
to the lives o f the people in the countryside, and none more so than so-called Strategic Hamlet. 
The program, which consisted of fortifying villages against the N LF and thus giving the Diem 
government stricter military control o f the population, did not take into account that insurgents 
often hailed from and lived in those very communities, so it was practically impossible to root
“War is as Natural as the Rains” 99
them out. But in southern areas o f the country, where the people lived in scattered households 
rather than in the traditional villages o f the Central Highlands and the North, the program also 
involved relocation of whole groups o f farmers into new fortified villages, which cut them off 
from their land and sources o f food. Everywhere in South Vietnam, in order to destroy N LF 
infrastructure—but also to keep civilians in check in the government-controlled areas—swathes of 
land beyond fortifications were designated “free-fire zones” where people could be freely shot, 
for no other reason than being there, while artillery pounded nightly into the fortified villages 
to force people to stay in their beds. (Gustav Hasford includes an example, the scene of a type 
generally familiar from the canon, in his novel The Short-Timers: the narrator is aboard a 
helicopter, whose door gunner fires his machine gun on a farmer in a paddy: “[t]he hamlet 
beneath us is in a free fire zone—anybody can shoot at it at any time and for any reason. W e 
watch the farmer run in the shallow water. The farmer knows only that his family needs some 
rice to eat. The farmer knows only that the bullets are tearing him apart. He falls, and the door 
gunner giggles” ; 1988, 75.)
Unsurprisingly, the effect o f Strategic Hamlet was largely to push mass numbers o f South 
Vietnamese civilians toward supporting the N LF (FitzGerald 1972, 123-126; Young 2014, 
chapters 4 and 5). For two thousand years Vietnamese social and political life had been organized 
around the village, while at the heart o f the farmers’ spiritual life was their land, but the structure 
began to be undermined in the 19th century under the French; the enforced population 
movement o f the Diem regime exacerbated the process considerably, and the American war and 
the refugee crisis it generated finished it. W hile the Strategic Hamlet program ended, during the 
war’s search-and-destroy operations deportations o f villagers to government “relocation cam ps” 
(or, if a villager was particularly unlucky, to “interrogation camps”) continued, in addition to 
“incentives” to move willingly such as the herbicide sprayings; some of the operations, like the 
massive Cedar Falls o f 1967, ended up being among the largest forced relocations o f people 
during the war. Both the Strategic Hamlet villages and the relocation camps have been called 
concentration camps (on American euphemism: “[a] concentration camp (...) becomes a 
‘strategic hamlet’” [Roszak 1969, 143]; see also: FitzGerald 1972, 125; Gibson 2000, 232; 
Neilson 1998, 117; Griffiths 2001, 89: in one such “center” during Cedar Falls, where 800 
people were moved to live in 40 long tents surrounded by barbed wire, “at the entrance was a
100 “War is as Natural as the Rains”
sign saying ‘W elcome to Freedom’”). Free-fire zones continued in wartime, too, and remained 
inhabited by large numbers o f villagers unwilling to leave their paddies and homes and move to 
the government-controlled areas, where corruption and poverty were rampant; many of these 
farmers would be shot by Americans on sight while, for example, working their fields. Nightly 
artillery barrages into civilian areas also went on. The deficiencies and the dangers o f living in 
the countryside pushed many people to relocate to the cities, where refugee and homeless slums 
proliferated. In the end, the American war created between at least five to eleven million internal 
refugees (Appy 2015), and the effects o f this process o f societal destruction, together with the 
destruction of hamlets, cities, the environment, and human bodies—dead, wounded, maimed, 
diseased, and born with defects—should very much be considered a particular dimension of 
Americanized Vietnam.
Civilian relocation and camps, let alone the policies and strategies that authorized them, are 
rarely encountered in the American canon of the war (examples include a minor incident in 
W ebb’s novel Fields of Fire, and a chapter dedicated to a refugee camp in Tim O ’Brien’s memoir 
If I Die in a Combat Zone, Box Me Up and Ship Me Home (originally published 1973), accidently 
hit by American artillery which killed thirteen Vietnamese; O ’Brien notes that the families 
received solatium payments o f twenty dollars for a wounded person, thirty-three and ninety cents 
for a killed one [2006, 167]; on solatium payments, see Beidler 2004, 38-47). Search-and-destroy 
missions, burning villages and killing civilians are o f course integral to this canon and its imagery, 
but, as will be discussed further on, mainly as an element o f the U .S. soldiers’ experience and 
not as a dimension o f the war.
A  “Vietnam” very much present in the memoirs, novels and films, on the other hand, is the 
parallel physical American Vietnam of U .S. military infrastructure built by American engineers 
as a space to be occupied by American presence, a spatial layer superimposed over the actual 
Vietnamese Vietnam. An awareness that this alternative Vietnam is constituted by the American 
“phenomenology of presence” (James 1990, 85) can be glimpsed in H asford’s The Short-Timers, 
for example, where the narrator, Joker, at one point confesses: “[i]n the darkness, I am one with 
Khe Sanh—a living cell o f this place (...). In my guts I know that my body is one of the components 
o f gristle and muscle and bone of Khe Sanh, a small American community (...)” (1988, 146). 
The somewhat hypocritical nature o f American takeover o f Vietnam, on the other hand, is
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sometimes expressly acknowledged in ironic terms: “Ever been to Da Nang?” says a character in 
James W ebb’s novel Fields of Fire (originally published 1978), in a conversation about the 
Vietnamese. “The fuckers act like they own the place” (2001, ch. 29). In The Short-Timers, a 
masterpiece o f nonchalant irony, a vampiric “poge colonel” harasses Joker over his peace symbol 
button: “Do you believe that the United States should allow the Vietnamese to invade Viet Nam  
just because they live here?” (1988, 137).
This Vietnam of the American military can still be found in wartime maps o f the South, 
testifying to the reorganization of space, again both physical and symbolic. It is an alternative 
geography determined not by the terrain, history and prewar infrastructure o f Vietnam, but 
rather by the needs o f the American military (creating the new geography) and eventually the 
experiences o f soldiers on the ground (memorializing it in the texts). As Philip Beidler put it in 
his catalogue of the American spaces in Vietnam, “[b]ase-camp geography alone could be a 
history of the war” (strictly in the context o f the American experience, we should qualify, lest 
this point be allowed to further Americanize Vietnam; 2004, 17). Its landmarks are the place 
names known through frequent repetition in memoirs and novels: I Corps, the Central 
Highlands, the DMZ, the Laos border, Quang Ngai, Phu Bai, Hue, China Beach, Route 9, and 
so forth.
Som e of these places were not invented, but corresponded to real administrative and 
geographical entities, such as provinces or regions (the Central Highlands or the Mekong Delta, 
for example). Cities were of course not invented, but they are an interesting case illustrating the 
alternative geography. Saigon features in the canon far less than Danang and Hue, most likely 
because not many “grunts” would have a reason to visit it, their R & R ’s usually spent at China 
Beach, in Thailand, or in Sydney; the capital is prominent in Michael Herr’s Dispatches, but that 
is because as a correspondent Herr was actually living there. A  few books contain episodes taking 
place in Saigon (Philip Caputo’s A  Rumor of War, David Halberstam’s One Very Hot Day, Robert 
Stone’s Dog Soldiers), but Danang, with its massive military base and proximity to China Beach, 
and Hue, the site o f an iconic battle for the Marine Corps during the Tet Offensive, are featured 
more often.
Som e of the places were “semi-real,” or temporary, and not American-made but reendowed 
with meaning by the American presence there. The DMZ is a case in point, or the Ho Chi Minh
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Trail that ran along the Laos and Cam bodia borders and haunted the nightmares o f American 
officers. The division of South Vietnam into four tactical zones o f military operation—I Corps, 
II Corps etc.—had been made for the purposes o f the ARVN, but was later adopted by M ACV, 
which an almost Herresque act o f “artificial mapping that literally defined the Republic o f Viet 
Nam  as a war divided into four parts” (Heberle 2015, 30); the first o f the zones, sometimes 
rendered “Eye Corps,” made its way into the canon vernacular, perhaps because it overlay the 
ever-dreaded Central Highlands.
Sometimes these places flickered between existence and symbolic non-being, courtesy of the 
American redoing of Vietnam, such as My Lai 4.
In other instances yet, places normally insignificant rose to prominence because o f the 
American suffering endured there: the Ia Drang Valley, C on Thien, Khe Sanh. Dong Ap Bia, in 
the A  Shau Valley, was first renamed Hill 937, according to the dreary U .S. military designation 
logic that assigned hills and knolls new names derived from their heights in feet. In 1969, the 
American “grunts” fighting a battle there rechristened Hill 937 again, this time as Hamburger 
Hill. (For the terminology, and a comprehensive overview of U .S. military installations in 
Indochina during the war, see Kelley 2002; see also Beidler 2004, 16ff).
Hills bearing names corresponding to their heights, landing zones, observation posts, minor 
firebases and small camps—these were the smallest units o f the American military space. And 
then there were the American-made places, especially the logistical installations and massive air 
and combat bases housing divisions o f all the branches o f the U .S. armed forces—the realm of 
the “REM Fs,” or “rear echelon motherfuckers,” a space within the American Vietnam very much 
isolated from the “boonies,” where the “grunts” lived and died. “In the rear,” writes Tim O ’Brien 
about his reassignment to an administrative position at the battalion headquarters, “protected 
from the war by rows of bunkers and rolls o f barbed wire, I rejoined the real United States Army”
(2006, 177).
But above all, the American Vietnam was the Vietnamese landscape—the land with its climate, 
terrain, vegetation, waterways, and sparse infrastructure—reimagined as an American frontier 
but, as the narratives continued to be written and published, transformed into something else 
still, the mythical place known as Vietnam.
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Landing Zone Loon
The Vietnam landscape is recreated rather uniformly in American narratives o f the war, so that 
a coherent picture, based in reality and yet mythologized, emerges from the body of texts. But 
one narrative in particular deserves attention before others are considered, firstly because it 
remains a well-known and appreciated American book of the war, and secondly because it 
actually devotes so much creative energy to deconstruct the Vietnamese frontier and to explore 
the landscape and space of Vietnam.
Michael Herr’s Dispatches, published in 1977, was the result o f the year Herr had spent in 
South Vietnam as a correspondent a decade earlier. During the war, parts o f the book had 
appeared in several magazines, such as Esquire and Rolling Stone (on Herr’s biography and 
publishing history, see Gordon 2000, 16; Heberle 2015, 35-45 ; Hellmann 1986, 150-151; 
Spindler 1991, 25; a rare interview with Herr can be watched in the 2001 documentary, First 
Kill). Dispatches was published to critical acclaim that praised the book as “the first” accurate 
representation of Vietnam in literature; this view was then confirmed in much subsequent 
academic criticism that furthermore validated the text's significance by linking the novelty o f 
Herr's linguistic style and structure to the advent o f postmodernism (either as a cause or a 
symptom34). Patrick Hennessey, a British officer in Afghanistan and Iraq, in his own war memoir 
wrote:
the joke [among cadets] was that they gave you the Bible and Stalingrad to read and told you 
that only the latter was important. All they should have given anyone was Michael Herr’s 
Dispatches, which, quite apart from being the best writing on war, period, was probably as 
culturally influential as anything written in the second half of the twentieth century (2010,
238; on Dispatches being the best or the best-received Vietnam book, see Beidler 2007; Bonn 
1993, 29; Deusen 1983, 82; Hawkins 2012, 64; Hellmann 1986, 150; McInerney 1981, 191;
Myers 1988, 76; Rushdie 1991, 333; Harrison 1999, 89-90; Neilson 1998, 136; and many 
other sources; exceptional praise is heaped on Herr in the form of a personal essay in Smith 
2007; many of the obituaries and articles that appeared in newspapers, magazines, and 
online features following Herr’s death in June 2016 also praised Dispatches as war reporting 
at its best; see for example Shea 2016).
Dispatches consists o f six clearly differentiated, achronologically delivered parts. The opening 
section, “Breathing In,” provides the reader with initial impressions o f Vietnam, the people Herr
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met there, and the kinds o f things that went on. It is also an exposition of Herr’s gradual 
initiation into correspondent-ship, and particularly the specific Vietnam correspondent-ship, 
ending with his transformation into a “shooter” (1978, 60), when during the Tet Offensive he 
finds himself firing a gun and possibly killing one or more of the charging enemy. “Hell Sucks,” 
the shortest chapter and fairly conventional in terms of narrative and language style, is an 
account o f the Battle o f Hue during Tet. “Khe Sanh,” as the name suggests, concerns the 5- 
month-long “siege” o f several thousand U .S. marines stationed in the remote outpost near the 
DMZ in 1968, as well as the subsequent relief operation known as Operation Pegasus, and 
follows two “grunts” stranded at the base. “Illumination Rounds” is a collection of short 
unrelated “scenes,” especially encounters with unnamed soldiers and other personnel, each 
meant to convey a profound symbolic snippet o f the war. “Colleagues” is a somewhat 
romanticized panegyric to other correspondents Herr befriended in Vietnam, as well as a 
meditation on the profession’s nature, appeal, and inherent anxieties; it is also the section where 
Herr shares something of the traumatic memory that plagued him for some years after the war, 
and of the process o f healing. “Breathing O ut,” which closes the memoir, offers final glimpses 
o f the war, this time filtered through the traumatic and subsequently healed memory (on trauma 
as the essence of Dispatches, see Haberle 2015, 40-45). The themes surfacing throughout the 
book include the breakdown of the official language of propaganda and traditional journalism, 
the gruesome, embodied nature o f the conflict’s brutality, a fascination with the “grunts,” 
especially the marines and their superstitions, and the irony of war as well as the absurdities 
specific to Vietnam, expressed in the “illumination rounds” and the soldiers’ slang and stories 
which Herr recorded (Catch-22 was “a Nam  standard because it said that in a war everybody 
thinks that everybody else is crazy”; 1978, 169).
But one theme that is made to encompass all the others in Dispatches is “Vietnam ” itself, 
which Herr treats as a cluster o f entities and concepts, all o f which either begin or become 
entangled with the land. O ne context within which Vietnam is incarnated in the memoir is the 
Ur-myth of the frontier, explicitly acknowledged, and deconstructed, by Herr (Scheurer 1981, 
151-152). The memoir’s famous first image is an old French map hung in Herr’s apartment in 
Saigon, which shows the colonial division o f Vietnam into three parts (Tonkin, Annam, Cochin 
China), and which prompts the author to ponder:
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If dead ground could come back and haunt you the way dead people do, they’d have been 
able to mark my map CURRENT and burn the ones they’d been using since ’64, but count 
on it, nothing like that was going to happen. It was late ’67, even the most detailed maps 
didn’t reveal much any more; reading them was like trying to read the faces of the 
Vietnamese, and that was like trying to read the wind. We knew that the uses of most 
information were flexible, different pieces of ground told different stories to different 
people. We also knew that for years now there had been no country here but the war (1978,
1; original in italics).
This paragraph, second in the text, establishes a framework applicable to a reading of the rest of 
the memoir, whether by Herr’s design or through a critical lens. First o f all, o f all the canonical 
Vietnam authors, Herr is perhaps the most interested in drawing comparisons between the First 
Indochina W ar and the American war, an assessment that is later expanded on in relation to the 
Khe Sanh debacle, which Herr likens to Dien Bien Phu. Here, by contrasting French and 
American maps—traditional artefacts and instruments o f empire, after all—he suggests a 
continuity between one colonial occupation and the other, represented by the arbitrary and 
ultimately meaningless cartographic reorganization of the land by the invading powers (see also 
Bonn 1993, 30—31; Hawkins 2012, 70). Second o f all, the arbitrariness and meaninglessness of 
the American maps is not only symbolic o f the war’s chaos (the American ignorance of the very 
country they were waging the war in and against), but it represents also the multiplicity o f the 
“stories” pieces o f land tell: the map is one such story. The disturbance of the authority o f the 
map and all that may be associated with it, and the simultaneous disturbance of the certainty of 
meaning, not only heralds postmodernism, but speaks also to Herr’s preoccupation with the 
American mythical constructions in relation to Vietnam. A nd given that the map is in the 
quoted passage just one story told about the “ground,” this deconstructive act will be linked to 
the myth of the frontier, o f whose primacy Herr is perfectly aware. In other words, Herr draws 
attention to the fact that land may be endowed with connotations beyond its sheer physicality, 
and that the American attitudes toward the Vietnamese land, such as revising its representation 
in cartography for the uses o f warfare or reimagining it as a frontier, are examples o f this.
Importantly, Herr is also aware of the power mythical constructions exert on the physical 
landscape, and of the use that can be made of them in propaganda. He makes this triple
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connection by following the just-quoted passage with a story of an information officer 
responsible for telling VIP visitors to Vietnam about a defoliation mission:
[He] showed me on his map and then from his chopper what they’d done to the Ho Bo 
Woods, the vanished Ho Bo Woods, taken off by giant Rome ploughs and chemicals and 
long, slow fire, wasting hundreds of acres of cultivated plantation and wild forest alike (...).
And if in the months following that operation incidents of enemy activity in the larger area 
of War Zone C had increased “significantly,” and American losses had doubled again, none 
of it was happening in any damn Ho Bo Woods, you’d better believe i t .  (1978, 11-12; 
original in italics).
The frontier-like (technological and total) destruction of the woods proceeds from the map, with 
its arbitrary and meaningless “W ar Zone C ,” to the actual land, now viewed from the possessive 
(imperial) vantage point o f the helicopter. One story o f the Ho Bo W oods, told in the actual 
vanishing of the forest and the cultivated fields and apparent from Herr’s correspondent’s 
perspective, is that in the American map-generated “reality” the destruction is meaningless, 
because it fails in its strategic objectives; but its significance is arbitrary—the military information 
office is still, unfathomably, touting the operation, thus telling a very different story of the Ho 
Bo W oods.
The problems signaled in these opening pages o f Dispatches are undertaken further by Herr 
later in the text, where the Vietnamese landscape, as a dark frontier, becomes a literary tool to 
criticize aspects o f the American engagement (see also Hellmann 1986, 150-160; and Nielson 
1998, 136-164, who polemicizes with Hellmann and other like-minded critics, and who rejects 
the reading o f the map and of the Ho Bo W oods episode in purely literary, symbolic terms, and 
recommends instead that they be seen as Herr’s drawing the reader’s attention to the historical 
circumstances o f the war). Com m enting on the perceived difficulty of, or disagreement about, 
determining when “it began (...) for us” in Indochina, Herr acknowledges the influence of both 
American colonial origins and American mythology when he writes that, “might as well say that 
Vietnam was where the Trail o f Tears was headed all along (...); might as well lay it on the proto­
Gringos who found the New England woods too raw and empty for their peace and filled them 
up with their own imported devils” (1978, 46; “the Indian wars have yet to be concluded for a 
nation that refuses to publicly atone for the sins o f Vietnam. In Michael Herr’s Dispatches the
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sins o f the forest are alive in the jungle” [Melling 2007, 139]). Herr even envisions the Trail of 
Tears ending in Vietnam and doubling back “to form a containing perimeter” (1978, 46), 
echoing the idea o f the frontier extending ever westward, while simultaneously delivering the 
unavoidable conclusion that it would end up where it had started. In the same paragraph Herr 
also suggests that, “[m]aybe it was already over for us in Indochina when Aiden Pyle’s body 
washed up under the bridge in Dakao” (1978, 46).
Pyle is the protagonist o f Graham Greene’s 1955 novel set in Vietnam, The Quiet American, 
concerned with U .S. counterinsurgency and “nation-building” activity there, and widely 
considered to be a criticism of American exceptionalism and liberal progressivism in the Third 
W orld as destructively idealistic. Lederer and Burdock’s The Ugly American was o f course a pro- 
American response. The Quiet American was panned by American critics at publication, but has 
since been thoroughly rehabilitated in American Vietnam scholarship, laudatory of Greene’s 
prescience and acute insight. But, as Neilson observed, it is worth keeping in mind that Greene’s 
supposedly scathing criticism of American ideology still envisions it as a matter o f innocence, 
idealism, and good intentions, which perhaps helps explain the enthusiasm of the post-1975 
liberal scholarship to embrace it since it remained safely within the bounds o f the permissible 
discourse (Neilson 1998, 56-88). In a 1988 interview, Herr described the U .S. soldiers in 
Vietnam as “simultaneously so innocent and evil (...), like Alden Pyle” (Rushdie 1991, 335).
O ne way in which Herr explores the transformations o f American myth in Vietnam is 
through the figure o f John Wayne, a hero of American pop culture associated with his roles as a 
cowboy in Westerns, and as a perfect soldier in W W II films. The concept thus becomes 
entangled with “movies,” one of the book’s buzzwords, which are the contemporary vehicles o f 
myth. The breakdown of the frontier is then conveyed through Herr’s deconstruction of the 
films’ mythical charge—through exposing their deception in creating heroic American ideals— 
and through his ironic inversion of the medium to use it against itself, in order to underscore 
the mythical dimension of Vietnam.
A  passage in “Breathing In,” continuing from an earlier account o f the Battle o f Dak To, 
illustrates this. Herr begins the passage by describing a “jihad” between two gods, one of the 
Buddhists, standing here for all Vietnamese and representative o f their determination (the self­
immolations and protests o f 1963) and patience in waiting for independence, and the other the
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god of Americans, “who would hold the coonskin to the wall while we nailed it u p ” (1978, 43; 
the word “frontier” is also used in this paragraph to refer to the American line in the DMZ). 
Herr then writes that while the correspondents who actually witnessed Dak To knew how bloody 
it had been for U .S. soldiers, M A CV  categorized it as victory and sold this version to the 
compliant press. Next, he describes the plot o f Fort Apache, a 1948 John Wayne and Henry Fonda 
W estern in which the latter plays a colonel who disregards the knowledge that W ayne’s character 
possesses about the Indians (“If you saw them, sir, they weren’t Apache”), which results in a high 
number of casualties among the colonel’s men. Herr calls this plot a “mythopathic m om ent”— 
meaning that the myths in a movie like this become internalized—and further explains (in his 
signature broken syntax): “More a war movie than a Western, Nam  paradigm, Vietnam, not a 
movie, no jive cartoon either where the characters get smacked around and electrocuted and 
dropped from heights, flattened out and frizzled black and broken like a dish, then up again and 
whole and back in the game, ‘Nobody dies,’ as someone said in another war movie” (1978, 44).
As in the opening o f his memoir, Herr links myth to practice here. American myth, identified 
as something quasi-religious and lodged deep in culture, transfers via movies onto historical 
conditions like the Vietnam W ar and feeds the “paradigm”: American men dying due to their 
commanders’ bad decisions. But Herr splits the significance of this myth. O n the one hand, it 
underlines attitudes and thus finds historical parallels, such as the ignorance of the Americans’ 
enemy leading to disaster; Wayne is here the model frontiersman, the white man who has 
learned the ways o f the natives, but whose advice is not heeded. A n additional connection is 
made between the invisibility o f the Apache and the well-known trope of the invisibility of 
Vietnamese fighters.
O n  the other hand, Herr suggests, the movie/myth is also both deceitful and destructive. Its 
sanitized portrait o f combat35 skews expectations as to what fighting will actually entail, while its 
projections o f heroism might coax young men into enlisting or push them to behave irrationally 
on the battlefield (precisely the point whose deconstruction is the function of the John Wayne 
figure in the Vietnam canon). “I keep thinking,” Herr admits,
about all the kids who got wiped out by seventeen years of war movies before coming to 
Vietnam to get wiped out for good. You don’t know what a media freak is until you’ve seen
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the way a few of those grunts would run around during a fight when they knew that there 
was a television crew nearby; they were actually making war movies in their heads (1978,
169; see also O’Brien 2009, “The Ghost Soldiers,” for similar ideas).
Elsewhere, Herr recalls a commanding officer who, upon hearing that Herr and his colleagues 
were reporters, “wanted to throw a spontaneous operation for us, crank up his whole brigade 
and get some people killed. W e had to get out on the next chopper to keep him from going
ahead with it, amazing what some of them would do for a little ink” (1978, 15).
The movie/myth receives the harshest o f reality checks when these same young men die and 
the war turns out to be no movie after all, a realization which Herr says took some time to sink 
in because people, himself included, had been immunized to the reality o f warfare and combat 
death by television and cinema (1978, 169). The rhetorical strength of the John Wayne passage 
is realized at its end, where the cartoonishly grisly ways o f non-dying, the reader realizes, are 
actually some of the ways in which people did die in Vietnam: interrogated prisoners and 
suspects “smacked around,” hooked up to radio batteries and field telephones by their genitals, 
thrown out o f helicopters, and deliberately crushed by armored vehicles; U .S. soldiers torn apart 
by mines (and also, apparently, if we are to believe Tim O ’Brien’s memoir which describes just 
such an incident, sometimes ran over by their own armored vehicles and thus really “flattened 
out”: “most o f the blood was out o f him”; O ’Brien 2006, 153).
As Kinney points out, “[t]his obsession with John Wayne exemplifies the solipsism of
American narratives o f the Vietnam War, the self-referential quality that displaces the historical 
struggles within Vietnam with a spectacle o f American culture at war with itself’ (2000, 12; she 
is talking about her concept o f the friendly fire discourse, which she later claims to be “part of 
the texture o f the war” in Dispatches; 2000, 111-112; on John Wayne as a Vietnam discourse, 
see also Anderegg 1991a; Hallin 1986, 142-145; Herzog 1988; 2005, 17-24). But Herr goes 
further. Exposing and rejecting the “mythopathic” power o f movies and engaging instead in 
inversive mythography, Herr also uses the myth/movie parallel to describe the American 
experience—his own, o f the other correspondents, and of the soldiers—in Vietnam. Indeed, “the 
movie” is one of the ways o f conceptualizing that experience which forms Herr’s “Vietnam ” 
cluster; a marine Herr met during the fighting in Hue supposedly said to him, “I hate this movie,” 
and he thought “Why not?” (1978, 153; emphasis in original. In Hasford’s The Short-Timers, on
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the very first page, narrator Private Joker states, impersonating John Wayne: “I think I’m going 
to hate this movie” [1988, 4], an obvious reference to Dispatches, which also serves as the source 
for the motto o f the novel’s first part). In “Colleagues,” writing about the “glamour” o f being a 
war correspondent, Herr says that
in any other war, they would have made movies about us, too: Dateline: Hell!, Dispatch from 
Dong Ha, maybe even A Scrambler to the Front (...). But Vietnam is awkward, everybody knows 
how awkward, and if people don’t even want to hear about it, you know they’re not going 
to sit there in the dark and have it brought up. (...) So we have all been compelled to make 
our own movies, as many movies as there are correspondents, and this one is mine (1978,
153).
While traditional myths could apply themselves easily to earlier conflicts—“old and corny” (1978, 
153) to Herr and his posse o f correspondents—then the “awkwardness” o f Vietnam necessitated 
new “movies”: new myths. And thus, in Dispatches we can observe the early stages o f the process 
o f turning Vietnam into an American myth (note that both Phillip Knightley [1975], in the title 
o f his history of the profession, and Chris Hedges [2002, Introduction], call war correspondents 
“mythmakers”). In Herr’s Vietnam movie, as it turns out, both the setting and its spatiality play 
a major role. At one point, when Herr is considering the reasons someone would want to go to 
Vietnam, he concludes that “somewhere all the mythic tracks intersected, from the lowest John 
Wayne wetdream to the most aggravated soldier-poet fantasy” (1978, 24), and it is from this 
point o f initial inspiration that the reconstructed mythical land of Vietnam springs and rolls out.
Herr, as self-aware of his mythographic process as ever, proclaims the name of this mythical 
land toward the end o f the memoir, in a passage crucial to unlocking the meanings o f Dispatches:
LZ [Landing Zone] Loon, the mythical place where it got dark so fast that by the time you 
realized that there wouldn’t be another chopper in until morning, you’d already picked a 
place to sleep for the night. Loon was the ultimate Vietnam movie location, where all of the 
mad colonels and death-spaced grunts we’d [the correspondents] ever known showed up all 
at once, saying all the terrible, heartbreaking things they always said, so nonchalant about 
the horror and fear that you knew you’d never really be one of them no matter how long 
you stayed (1978, 188).
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The name LZ Loon, chosen by Herr and his correspondent friend Sean Flynn, was apparently 
inspired by a real place: “brand new no-name Marine lz in the heart o f Indian country (...). Just 
before I flew back to Danang they named it LZ Loon, and Flynn said, ‘That’s what they ought to 
call the whole country,’ a more particular name than Vietnam to describe the death space and 
the life you found inside it” (1978, 204).
As a “mythical place” and a “movie location,” LZ Loon is the plane on which various 
dimensions o f Vietnam merge: it is the Vietnamese landscape, overlaid with the conditions of 
the war and with the American presence the war has brought, as well as all the mythical ideas 
and images the Americans have brought with them, filtered through, revised and ultimately 
updated by the horrors and disillusions o f those very conditions o f the war (in the interview with 
Salman Rushdie, Vietnam is variously described by Rushdie and Herr as “madness,” “language 
as well as everything else,” “a drug-and-rock ‘n ’ roll extension,” “the ultimate trip,” “bad 
craziness,” “behaviour,” “archetypal behaviour beyond judgem ent”; Rushdie 1991). It is not a 
Vietnamese place, but a thoroughly American one (located in the Indian Country of American 
myth, after all), where the native inhabitants are the U .S. soldiers, whose experience and 
suffering generate its very existence. Like other correspondents, Herr is but a tourist there, but 
this status is precisely what grants him his meta-perspective from which to not only describe, but 
also deconstruct the place (Cobley 1986, 107; Hawkins 2012, 70-71; Herzog 1980, 687-688; 
even though Loon is, strictly speaking, Herr’s own reconstruction of “Vietnam ”; cf. Spindler 
1991, 28, who argues that when at the end of “Breathing In” Herr admits to having picked up 
the gun and shot the enemy, he signals his assimilation into the “grunts’” and the military’s 
culture; this is a convincing proposition, enforced by Herr’s clear infatuation with the soldiers, 
especially the marines, and his final admission by the end of the book that he enjoyed the war 
and found it beautiful; see also Hawkins 2012, 71-74).
Loon, appearing in the final pages o f the memoir, also brings the reader back to the all­
important beginning. Talking about the “souvenirs” he took with him from the war in 
“Breathing O ut,” Herr writes about
[a] National Geographic map of Indochina with about a hundred pencil marks, every place I
ever went there (...); attached to every mark and the complex of faces, voices and movement
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that gathered around each one. Real places, then real only in the distance behind me, faces 
and places sustaining serious dislocation, mind slip and memory play. When the map fell 
apart along the fold lines its spirit held together, it landed in safe but shaky hands and one 
mark was enough, the one at LZ Loon (1978, 203—204).
The French colonial and American military maps have been replaced by a map drawn by Herr’s 
personal experience (Heberle 2015, 28—29), but over time the map—and the detailed memory it 
once supported—deteriorated; Loon remained the only place still indicated on the map. Overall, 
Herr seems to be suggesting two slightly different interpretations o f Loon. One can be identified 
with the understanding of it as a “mythical place” moved through in Vietnam; this makes Loon 
the “spirit” o f what the map represented, the spirit o f the land of Vietnam: the atmosphere of 
the war, its sights and sounds, encounters with soldiers and officers, friendships with other 
journalists, its specificity. The second interpretation of Loon is similar, but differs in time and 
space: Loon is now not the place travelled around, but a memory, a certain “aftertaste,” a feel, 
o f that remembered place; the word “spirit” bridges the two interpretations, because it can be 
applied in this instance, too. To employ Herr’s own imagery, the first interpretation of Loon is 
the set where the movie is being made and the footage recorded, while the second one is the 
finished product. The difference between the two interpretations is nevertheless significant, 
because the first Loon will remain forever inaccessible to those who were not in Vietnam, and 
to an extent to all those, like Herr, who were, but whose memories have inevitably faded, while 
the second one is the version delivered to the readers and thus the one complicit in creating a 
(not yet the) cultural narrative o f the war. In fact, Dispatches as a whole can be read as a negotiation 
of the tension between the two Loons, as in his self-awareness and deconstructiveness, Herr is 
conscious above all o f the re-constructiveness o f his story, or o f his “Vietnam movie.” The memoir’s 
determined, almost total, lack o f chronology and the fragmentariness o f its narrative speak both 
to the phenomenology o f the war about which Herr tries to convince his readers and to the 
nature o f deteriorated memory he tries to convey, but they are also, even first o f all, a precise 
stylistic, rhetorically-oriented choice.
The “choice” in Dispatches has often been overlooked, and this is precisely what I mean when 
I write o f scholars validating Herr’s version of Vietnam with all its problems unchecked. The 
effect has been that “[i]n this context, Herr’s postmodern style is seen as oddly mimetic” (Kinney
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2000,112), or that the memoir’s “nonlinear structure and kinetic prose in some vital way [seem] 
to mirror the war itself’ (Neilson 1998, 136). To give just one example o f how Herr’s language 
(what Kinney calls “grunt speak,” “the vernacular”) could easily be translated into the very reality 
o f the war: “Herr’s style is particularly successful in evoking the nightmare world of Vietnam 
through a language that reproduces the sensibilities o f soldiers at the same time as it exhibits an 
obvious literary sophistication. (...) [T]he overall effect o f Herr’s stylistic display is an imaginative 
recreation of Vietnam ’s claustrophobic mental and physical landscape” (Cobley 1986, 109). 
Michael Spindler warns about divorcing from the historical context o f the book’s creation 
readings o f it that consider its formal qualities and self-reflexivity as o f greater significance. 
Rather, he argues that they should be viewed “as an aspect o f its limiting Americo-centrism”; 
referring to Herr’s famous proclamation that for the correspondents the experience in the war 
was “glorious” and “wonderful,” and that “Vietnam was what we had instead of happy 
childhoods” (1978, 195), Spindler further explains that in these words “the crippling limitations 
o f Americo-centric individualism become apparent, as the collective scale o f the war and the 
independent experience o f the Other, the Vietnamese, are denied, and the devastation of a small 
Asian country and the slaughter o f approximately two and a half million of its people are 
distastefully reduced to the warm glow of personal reminiscence” (1991, 27).
To ignore the book’s anchorage in a specific historical event is to overlook its ideological 
entrapping. Neilson also devotes much space to this problem with Herr’s writing and its 
reception, pointing out that the memoir’s representation of the war as madness and aberration, 
as well as its preoccupation with the states o f mind of individual soldiers and of Herr himself, 
“fit well with a nonthreatening view of the war” and “[shift] concern away from the Vietnamese” 
(1998, 142). A nd from a less benign perspective still, one that bridges the interior faults of 
Dispatches with its reception and absorption into cultural narrative (see also Spindler 1991, 28, 
who makes a similar point), in his materialist take on Vietnam and music, David James argues 
that the American failure in the war belongs to a class o f events momentous enough so that 
capitalist culture, for its own self-preserving needs unable to represent them but due to their 
impact equally unable to completely repress them, necessitates an updated vocabulary which, 
rather than speaking to the reality o f the suppressed history, enables the reintroduction o f these 
events into dom inant myths and markets. Dispatches, according to James, is just such a
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particularly successful vocabulary update, hence its star status in the dominant culture: it 
“rewrote genocide as rock and roll” (1990, 80).
In relation to its representation of Vietnamese landscape and reconstruction of the war, the 
book’s interior problems first appear, again, in the first page, where having considered the 
colonial map of Indochina and the inadequacy of contemporaneous American maps, Herr states 
definitively that “for years now there had been no country here but the war” (1978, 11; original 
in italics). This is not a mere statement o f the status quo, but rather, when considered in the 
context o f the rest o f the book, a forecast o f how “Vietnam” will be reconstructed and presented 
in Dispatches. That Loon is the dimension of Vietnam made up of American myth, presence, 
and experience has already been argued; a closely parallel dimension is the physical landscape 
rendered in symbolic terms for the benefit o f the American participants.
Because Vietnam is war, the land and the American war are one, becoming one 
environment—perhaps a conquered extension of the mythical “fatal environment” that, in 
Slotkin’s analysis, was felt among Americans to have “killed” General Custer. Indeed, writing 
about the 19th-century frontier imagery associated with “The Boy General,” Slotkin observes:
The Frontier in whose real geography Custer moved and acted was already in his own time 
a space defined less by maps and surveys than by myths and illusions, projective fantasies, 
wild anticipations, extravagant expectations. (...) The landscape of myth was no less 
important than battlefield terrain and Indian tactics in creating the “fatal environment” in 
which Custer was enmeshed (1998a, 11-12).
In Dispatches, the collapsing of land and war into one is achieved also by endowing this specific 
environment o f Vietnam with a sense o f spatiality transcending simple geography: “[s]ome o f us 
[correspondents] moved around the war like crazy people until we couldn’t see which way the 
run was even taking us anymore, only the war all over its surface with occasional, unexpected 
penetration” (1978, 15; see also Harrison 1999, 91-93). The war thus becomes a universe unto 
itself, and through continuous movement one could hope to find points o f entry into its deeper 
layers o f significance. Movement, in its freedom unprecedented in the history of warfare, was of 
course possible thanks to helicopters, and Herr is enthralled by helicopters. One of the memoir’s 
tropes is what he calls a “meta-chopper”; just like Loon was the place that all the other places
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Herr visited eventually merged into, so the “meta-chopper”—the “sexiest thing going” (1978, 15)— 
has been formed by all the helicopters he flew in in Vietnam. In the war, “choppers” enabled 
airmobility, and in Dispatches the “meta-chopper” enables Herr to travel through the space o f war 
(on the significance of the helicopter as a central image and symbol o f the war, see: Hall 1990; 
Sturken 2002). A  catalogue of the types o f places found in American Vietnam and accessible by 
“chopper” follows: jungle clearings and rooftops, massive bases “as big as cities with 30,000 
citizens” and one-man posts deep in the wilderness, “posh fat air-conditioned camps like 
comfortable middle-class scenes” distant from the fighting, “camps named for commanders’ 
wives, LZ Thelma, LZ Betty Lou,” “number-named hilltops in trouble” where it was unwise to 
alight for too long, “trail, paddy, swamp, deep hairy bush, scrub, swale, village, even city” (1978, 
16). This is the cartography around which Herr will move for the rest o f Dispatches: Vietnam, 
Loon itself.
Now, the problem here is twofold. One, identifying “Vietnam” with war, and especially by 
turning war into the entire environment, has the effect o f naturalization o f the conflict as the 
status quo (Spindler 1991, 28-29; on the naturalization of Vietnam see also Boyle 2016, 190; 
Schlegel 1995, 53-54). Two, Herr performs a total takeover o f the Vietnamese landscape for 
America, recreating it as a mythical land with significance only in terms of the American 
experience and suffering (Hunt 2010, xvii-xviii; Kinney 2000, 12, 188; Kuberski 1986, 181; 
Myers 1988, 146-169; Neilson 1998, 142-157). Indeed, in a passage in which he dubs Vietnam 
both an “ideological space” and a frontier, Herr also names it an “unnatural East-West interface, 
a California corridor” cut through the jungle, where “[t]here was such a dense concentration of 
American energy (...), American and essentially adolescent, if that energy could have been 
channeled into anything more than noise, waste and pain it would have lighted up Indochina 
for a thousand years” (1978, 42).
Because o f the success o f Dispatches and its early canonization, Herr’s version o f Vietnam 
became validated, and this helps to explain why someone could consider a vicious conflict in 
which hundreds o f thousands o f tons o f napalm were dropped on civilians and millions of 
people died a “symbolic war,” an “American ideograph” (Myers 1988, 141), a “mythic enterprise” 
(Myers 1988, 144), or a “postmodern phenom enon” (Carpenter 2003, 32). Philip Beidler, whose 
literary criticism occurs almost totally in the context o f Herr’s reconstruction of “Vietnam ,” even
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proclaimed that Vietnam was “the place that was the war, a complete structure o f physical and 
psychic actuality, a whole self-defining system” (2007, 7). He also made this statement o f 
unselfconscious and, as Neilson would put it, transhistorical ethnocentrism: considering the 
continuities detectable in Vietnam literature with the American writings o f previous wars, 
apparently “it seems almost as if our classic inheritance o f native expression has prophesized 
much of what we now know of Vietnam, made it by self-engendering symbolic fiat part o f our 
collective mythology long before it existed in fact” (2007, 19). Both processes—naturalization and 
Americanization—are of course one process o f mythologization, and so o f removal o f the war in 
Vietnam from history. A nd hence, Vietnam in Dispatches is essentially purged of the political 
state o f South Vietnam and of the Vietnamese people—who are actually largely absent from the 
memoir. In Herr’s Vietnam, there are no Vietnamese (the same is largely true for Tim O ’Brien’s 
The Things They Carried, a book clearly influenced by Dispatches). To turn again to James, Herr’s
phenomenology of presence allows him to elide the “realism” of the historical process as a 
whole. (...) Dispatches, after the mention of the old French map on the first page, not only 
contains no account of the place of the invasion in the history of colonialism—let alone as 
an event in Vietnamese history—it contains no narrative at all. Despite gestures toward 
geographic and chronological specificity (chapter titles like “Khe Sanh”), the invasion is 
everywhere and always the same. It exists only in the GIs' experience of it, and the GIs exist 
only in the perpetual present of combat (...) (1990, 85-86).
The dehistoricization of Vietnam in Dispatches might seem paradoxical given Herr’s criticism of 
U .S. policymakers and generals’ repeating of the French mistakes. But except for pointing out 
the failure, Herr does not provide an account o f the motivations that led the United States to 
Indochina beyond the brief references to Pilgrim New England, the Trail o f Tears, and The Quiet 
American, all three o f which are enmeshed in American mythological interpretations o f the 
country’s history (exceptionalism, the Indian wars) and, as we have seen in the case o f John 
Hellmann, a criticism of the mythology in relation to Vietnam tends to validate mythological 
readings over materialist and (geo)political ones. Indeed, Neilson criticizes the relevant passage 
in Dispatches, noting that “as a consequence of the postmodern epistemology and aesthetic (...) 
Herr cannot tell whether 1954 (...) [or] 1838 is a more likely date for the beginning of the 
Vietnam W ar” (1998, 206-207), an observation in line with N eilson’s general critique of what
“War is as Natural as the Rains” 117
he calls the transhistorical tendency of American Vietnam literature. The critique is persuasive 
given that Herr’s preferred subject is American myth, which history, as we have seen, can merely 
provide with imagery and a vocabulary. Similarly, Herr references the pre-1965 
counterinsurgency period of U .S. involvement—“spookwar,” as he calls it—but describes it in the 
terms of the frontier again: the “spooks” were “elevated crazies o f older adventurers who’d burst 
from their tents and bungalows to rub up hard against the natives, hot on the sex-and-death 
trail” (1978, 47). A  list o f different types o f spooks follows: “Ivy League spooks,” “ethnologue 
spooks,” “spook deities” like “Edward Lansdale himself,” “executive spooks,” “bureau spooks,” 
“Air America spooks,” “Special Forces spooks” (1978, 47); but the significance of these categories 
and their impact on the “spookwar” remain obscure unless one already knows what Herr is 
talking about.
In fact, Herr privileges what he terms “secret history” as worthy of excavation. W riting about 
the work o f correspondents under the pressure to comply with the official line from politicians 
and military information officers, he says: “[c]onventional journalism could no more reveal this 
war than conventional firepower could win it, all it could do was take the most profound event 
o f the American decade and turn it into a communications pudding, taking its most obvious, 
undeniable history and making it into a secret history” (1978, 175). By this he means, essentially, 
the experience of the “grunts” and the senselessness o f their suffering and, most importantly, o f 
their deaths: “in back of every column of print about Vietnam there was a dripping, laughing 
death-face; it hid there in the newspapers and magazines and held to your television screens for 
hours after the set was turned off for the night, an afterimage that simply wanted to tell you at 
last what somehow had not been told” (1978, 176; see also Harrison 1999, 90; the definition of 
“secret history” in Hawkins 2012 is somewhat similar, though given a different significance; cf. 
Hellmann 1986, 153; McInerney 1981).36
The phrase is used earlier in the book, where describing the American failure to account for 
what made the French lose Dien Bien Phu, their war, and ultimately their Indochinese colonies, 
Herr writes:
for all the books and articles and white papers, all the talk and the miles of film, something
wasn’t answered, it wasn’t even asked. We were backgrounded, deep, but when the
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background started sliding forwards, not a single life was saved by the information. The 
thing transmitted too much energy, it heated up too hot, hiding low under the fact-figure 
crossfire where was a secret history, and not a lot of people felt like running in there to bring
it out (1978, 46).
The smooth gliding from the French war history, through the counterinsurgency period of U.S. 
involvement (being “backgrounded, deep”), to the American war’s secret history is an interesting 
device. The ignorance, Herr suggests, was there despite all the reports, analyses, and so forth, 
which were supposed to lead to victory, but ultimately it all came down to the “secret” that most, 
including many journalists, were unwilling to admit: the death of American soldier in a war (in 
a place) like Vietnam. This is just another take on the “Nam  paradigm.” (It is o f course deeply 
ironic that the secret history, even once uncovered, cannot be told “straight,” that Herr feels the 
need to construct an elaborate mythic setting in order to tell it.)
O n the one hand, Herr could brand the plight o f the U .S. soldier in Vietnam as hidden and 
unreported because, despite the common belief about the “living-room war,” prior to the Tet 
Offensive (and so prior to Herr’s stunt in Vietnam), U .S. television channels actually showed 
the conflict in a highly sanitized way that avoided violence and graphic imagery completely 
(Hallin 1986, 129-134; Ham m ond 1990; Knightley 1975, 410-416; Pach 1994; Wyatt 1993, 
144-148). But from today’s perspective it testifies also to the shift that, as we have seen, took 
place in the Vietnam narrative in the 1980s, when the suffering o f the soldier and the veteran 
became the only valid story. But because this shift did occur—in some part thanks to Herr himself, 
perhaps—formulating the “grunts’” experience as secret, especially since Loon is constituted of 
that experience even as it rejects that o f the Vietnamese, actually serves to further mystify Vietnam 
and its history, and so to aid the process o f its mythologization. Herr also creates the impression 
that there was something mysterious and unknowable at the heart o f the war in Vietnam, that 
the senselessness o f American deaths was o f almost mystical origin.
One mark of Herr’s impact in this matter is that the notion has found its way into Gustav 
Hasford’s writing, who in The Short-Timers has Animal Mother in an altercation where his 
experienced “gruntness” is tensely contrasted with the comfortable life o f the “pogues” (rear, 
mainly administrative, personnel), at whom he smiles menacingly “like a man who knows a 
terrible secret” (1988, 39). Traces o f this Herresque secrecy are also found in Tim O ’Brien’s
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work, who writes about “all the ambiguities o f Vietnam, all the mysteries and unknowns” (2009, 
“The Things They Carried”; in fact, Neilson 1998, 192-209, appears to consider O ’Brien the 
most effective mystificator o f the war, particularly in this collection). As for the benefits o f this 
way of explaining the war, Gloria Emerson realized in the early 1970s already that, “it is easier 
to claim the war impossible to understand, therefore Americans need not feel pain or guilt or 
the necessity to see themselves differently” (1992, 112). But this is yet another strategy of 
mystifying and dehistoricizing the war—and a major one at that:
[a] more sophisticated and subtle denial of the actuality of the Vietnamese people and the 
Vietnam War comes in a package labeled “unreal,” “unknowable,” “incomprehensible,” 
“crazy,” or “alien.” (...) [T]his package also fits neatly into fashionable late twentieth-century 
theories that rejected coherent and consistent narratives as anachronistic in the epoch of 
“postmodernism.” (...) [T]he widespread intellectual perception of the Vietnam experience as 
too alien to be comprehended has helped to establish a canon of Vietnam War literature 
that enshrines indeterminacy, incoherence, ambiguities, strangeness, and unknowability, 
with critics exalting Michael Herr’s Dispatches as the quintessential truth about the war (...) 
(Franklin 2000, 32; Franklin is here elaborating on Neilson’s [1998] arguments).
Many scholars in the 1980s and 90s took their cue from Herr (and other Vietnam authors) and, 
validating this version of the war, put to paper such egregious statements as, “[the history of the 
Vietnam War] is interior and not available to scientific historiography” (McInerney 1981, 190). 
Or: “ ‘Vietnam ’ is a dom inant phantom whose historically complex presence still awaits 
demystified recognition” (Williams 1991, 117). Or: “[Vietnam authors convey] the futility o f any 
attempt to identify, much less communicate (especially via language), any fundamental meaning 
or truth attaching to or derived from the war” (Carpenter 2003, 32). These scholars would also 
acquiesce that the war produced “too much information,” that it “resisted” narrativization, that 
it lacked “objective” reality, that it revealed a “dichotomy of fact and truth,” that it led to a 
“disintegration of the traditional structure o f meaning,” that it “persistently call[ed] attention to 
its own abiding unreality,” that its “meanings” were “multiple,” that it was “secretive,” “elusive,” 
“insane,” “fragmented,” “a self-contained universe o f discourse,” an “irrational place,” “a place 
with no real points o f reference,” or that its essence was “the notorious ambiguity o f our 
[American] entire involvement in Vietnam ” etc. (see Beidler 2007, 5, 16, 140; Bonn 1993, 32;
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Carpenter 2003, 31ff; Cobley 1986; Hansen 1990, 135; Harrison 1999, 103-106; Hawkins 
2009, 131; Hellmann 1986, 151; Myers 1988, 142ff; Kuberski 1986, 176ff; Scheurer 1981, 
155ff; cf. the chapter on Dispatches in Nielson 1998, who repudiates much of the prior 
scholarship on Herr: “any assertion that there is a natural and direct connection between Herr’s 
aesthetic and the war, that there exists a correspondence between narrative strategy and historical 
period is itself shaped by historical and cultural imperatives” [1998, 138]; his polemics with 
Hellmann 1986 and Myers 1988 are particularly noteworthy; see also Neilson’s chapter on Tim 
O ’Brien’s The Things They Carried for somewhat similar problems).37 38
This interpretation and criticism of secret history is corroborated by the fact that the other 
context in which the word “secret” is used with significance in Dispatches is the marines’ attitude 
and knowledge. As we have seen, the war had a “surface” that could sometimes be “penetrated”; 
some correspondents could learn the war’s “dark revelations” and “hideous secrets” (1978, 175). 
But in Herr’s Vietnam it was the marines, Loon’s natives, who were the keepers o f the secrets. 
In Herr’s tales o f the marines, secretness mingles with jokes, and I would argue that it is precisely 
at the intersection of the two that he finds the “grunts’” seemingly innate understanding of the 
war’s irony. If Paul Fussell’s classic formulation of what makes all war experience and all 
traditional war narratives ironic (the tripartite structure: preparation/innocence,
combat/experience, reflection/disillusionment; 2013) stemmed from his work on the poetry of 
W orld War I, then in Vietnam Herr can observe the ironic process among the marines from his 
vantage position in the “meta-chopper.”
In Dispatches, marine jokes are dark because the marines are both tragic and enmeshed in 
their own particular superstition and mythology (“Eat the Apple, Fuck the Corps,” “W hat’s the 
difference between the Marine Corps and the Boy Scouts?” and so on; 1978, 86-87). In “Khe 
Sanh,” Herr writes o f a song some “grunts” composed, “a letter to the mother o f a dead Marine, 
that went something like, ‘Tough shit, tough shit, your kid got greased, but what the fuck, he 
was just a grunt’” (1978, 87). The lyrics are funny because they are true, because for the marines 
“[s]omething almost always went wrong somewhere, somehow. It was always something vague, 
unexplainable, tasting of bad fate, and the results were always brought down to their most basic 
element—the dead M arine” (1978, 86). This is the knowledge of the war’s secrets that the marines 
possess: “the madness, the bitterness, the horror and doom of it. (...) They got savaged a lot and
“War is as Natural as the Rains” 121
softened a lot, their secret brutalized them and darkened them and very often it made them 
beautiful,” because they knew “where true violence resided” (1978, 87). Among the marines in 
Vietnam the irony is deepened and made tragic by the war’s perceived lack of sense— when the 
marines “laugh silently and long” (1978, 87) at Herr for staying with them at Khe Sanh when he 
does not have to, they have no illusions as to the pointlessness o f what they are doing in Vietnam; 
a war with purpose, after all, would elicit a different kind of reaction. But this makes death itself 
into the joke, which is also on them: “[i]t was that joke at the deepest part o f the blackest kernel 
o f fear, and you could die laughing” (1978, 87). Interestingly, Kinney quotes from A  Dictionary 
of Soldier’s Talk the definition of a saying, “fuck ’em if they can’t take a joke”: “A  catchphrase 
often used when some dreadful military tragedy is revealed. During the Vietnam W ar it was most 
frequently used when friendly positions were accidentally bom bed or shelled by our own troops” 
(2000, 113). If this definition supports Kinney’s friendly fire trope, which is itself woven into 
Herr’s tale o f the marines, it also provides a further link between secrecy (“revealed”), fear 
(“dreadful”), joking, and tragedy.
As we have seen, one of Herr’s images associated with this subject is the “dripping, laughing 
death-face” (also “a laughing lucent skull” ; 1978, 203), and the trope is found elsewhere with 
surprising regularity. In Larry Heinemann’s novel, Paco’s Story (originally published 1986), for 
example, the eponymous hero is a veteran and the sole survivor o f a friendly fire incident that 
wiped out his entire company, and left him disabled. Frequently asked about his walking cane, 
Paco wonders about the responses he has given: among them, he “told it as an ugly fucking joke 
(the whole story dripping with ironic contradiction, and sarcastic and paradoxical bitterness)” 
(1987, 72). In his memoir, Philip Caputo, too, writes that “ [w]e were all victims of a great 
practical joke played on us by G od or Nature. Maybe that was why corpses always grinned. They 
saw the joke at the last moment” (1985, 231). But the trope is especially prominent in The Short- 
Timers. In the novel, a group of marines under fire realize that “Death is talking to us. Death 
wants to tell us a funny secret” (Hasford 1988, 98); later they find a mass grave of civilians killed 
by the NVA, and the narrator notes o f their appearance that they “are grinning that hideous, 
joyless grin of those who have heard the joke, o f those who have seen the terrible secrets o f the 
earth” (Hasford 1988, 126-127). A n enemy skull mounted on a spike near Khe Sanh, which the 
marines call Sorry Charlie, is similarly said to be smiling “as though he knows a funny secret”
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(Hasford 1988, 148). At the book’s conclusion, the protagonist, Joker, hears laughter in the 
jungle and sees Sorry Charlie in a tree; he claims that the rest o f his squad will soon laugh, too, 
disclosing at the same time the content o f the marines’ knowledge: “[w]e live by the law of the 
jungle, which is that more Marines go in than come out. There it is. Nobody asks us why we're 
smiling because nobody wants to know” (Hasford 1988, 175).
Both the secret war trope and the representation o f marines, in addition to foregrounding 
the death of American soldiers as the core issue of the war, help Herr mystify the war. 
Unsurprisingly, marines are also useful in redrawing the mythical cartography of Loon: “If the 
war in I Corps was a matter for specialization among correspondents, it was not because it was 
inherently different as war, but because it was fought almost exclusively by the Marines, whose 
idiosyncrasies most reporters found intolerable and even criminal” (1978, 86). This brings us 
back to the landscape. The mythical nature o f V ietnam /Loon is sometimes stated outright, but 
the reconstruction of the landscape as significant and the representation of the soldiers as usually 
nameless, sometimes deeply symbolic, often archetypical figures, also enforce this 
mythologization. The collapsing of the land and the war into one carries mythologizing 
undertones, which, when spelled out, make Vietnam sound downright mysterious: “the war 
made a place for you that was all yours. Finding it was like listening to esoteric music, you didn’t 
hear it in any essential way through all the repetitions until your own breath had entered it and 
become another instrument, and by then it wasn’t just music anymore, it was experience” (1978, 
58). That experience could be spiritual or existential (cf. Hawkins 2012, 69-74), Herr seems to 
claim, and immersion into it was possible: it was
a complete process if you got to complete it, a distinct path to travel, but dark and hard (...).
Some people took a few steps along it and turned back (...) A lot went further than they 
probably should have (...) And some kept going until they reached the place where an 
inversion of the expected order happened, a fabulous warp where you took the journey first 
and then you made your departure (1978, 58).
By “inversion,” Herr could mean the discovery o f the war’s secrets—for example, the mythical 
foundations o f the American war, and the darkness o f that myth—which is made at the end of 
the journey (the experience of the war), and then becomes a whole new point o f “departure.”
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But this perspective favors somewhat benign mythological readings o f the American motivations, 
which create a certain sense o f inevitability, strengthened by the view of Vietnam as a theater of 
exclusively American drama (Hunt 2010) and by naturalizing the war as the environment. It also 
circumnavigates, or even disqualifies, histories o f the conflict that take into account geopolitics, 
economy, political and economic ideology, power, racism, or international law. A  true 
understanding of “Vietnam ” cannot be obtained from outside o f this perspective, or from any 
perspective disregarding first-hand experience, because access to the war’s “secrets” turns out to 
be granted only to those who were there, and who were moreover willing to wade deep “into the 
war”: soldiers, and some of the correspondents. To others something inexplicable must remain 
at “the heart” o f the war. A nd because the Vietnamese are excluded from this Vietnam, not only 
is the American war all the more forcefully yanked out o f its own history—which was a 
development in a chain of events that had begun, lest it be forgotten, long before an average 
American could even point Indochina on a map—but also the ethical dimension of the American 
activity and culpability is obscured, from the top of the chain of command in the W hite House 
all the way down to the W illiam Calleys and the Paul Meadlos in the provinces. Dehistoricized, 
naturalized, mythologized, mystified—this is, ultimately, Loon, which is to say that all o f these 
participles really mean the same thing.
2.4. In-country
Many of the canonical narratives o f Vietnam are far more conventional in terms of style and 
structure than Dispatches, with a few engaging in other forms of postmodernist play. If they 
operate within the framework of American myth, with the exception of The Short-Timers and The 
Things They Carried, they usually do so less consciously or critically than Herr’s memoir. 
Nevertheless, as has been argued at the beginning of this thesis, the historical context within 
which they should be read is not primarily the one of the war itself, but rather o f their publication 
and canonization in the 1970s and 1980s, along with the transformations o f the cultural 
narrative. Partly because o f that, I would like to formulate another proposition, namely that 
these texts be read as if they are all set in Loon.
There is, I believe, more to that claim than just a methodology of reading the narratives. As 
mentioned, Herr’s memoir received widespread and relatively early endorsement o f critics and
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scholars, and because his mythologized version of Vietnam was both very well-written and 
aligned with the dominant discourse that was forming at the same time, it can, I think, be 
assumed that his re-creation of the war should have had at least some impact on how subsequent 
Vietnam narratives were read (on Herr’s influence on the cultural narrative, see Spindler 1991, 
25). Moreover, Herr co-authored the script o f Kubrick’s Full Metal Jacket (1987), another title in 
the war’s strict canon.39 He was also involved in the writing of Apocalypse Now (1979), “perhaps 
the major single ‘memory’ o f the Vietnam W ar” (Hellmann 2007, 51). Full Metal Jacket is based 
on the novel The Short-Timers by Gustav Hasford (originally published 1979), who worked on the 
script with Kubrick and Herr. In the case o f Apocalypse Now, John Milius conceived of the script 
years before Dispatches was published, while Herr got hired only in the very final stages o f the 
making of the film, and wrote Captain W illard’s (Martin Sheen) narration.
But even though Herr was not a decisive voice in creating these two texts, both Hasford’s 
novel and M ilius’ script are distinctly Herresque, sharing the memoir’s attitude, sensibility and 
imagery of “Vietnam ” : each narrative has more in common with Dispatches than they do with 
each other. For example, both Herr and Hasford are interested in the linguistic quality o f the 
soldiers’ subculture, finding in their vocabulary, quips, proverbs, and sarcastic slogans a key to 
unlocking the nature o f the m en’s experience and with it o f the war’s secret meanings; this 
tendency to shift attention away from the ethics o f the war toward language has in both cases 
also the effect o f creating an atmosphere of nihilism, cynicism, and moral ambivalence. The 
parallels with Apocalypse Now extend beyond outlook and are to be found in the mythical, 
symbolic slant o f the stories, as well as in certain characters and scenes.
Other canonical narratives have formally less in common with Dispatches—they are less 
Herresque, in other words. My argument is not that all these books and films are exactly the 
same—the differences in form and content between John Del Vecchio, Tim O ’Brien, and Larry 
Heinemann, for example, are obvious—but rather that to a large extent they share an ideological 
outlook, certain discursive practices, and strategies o f representing victimhood, related to 
strategies o f representing landscape. In order to trace how the literature and cinema of the 
Vietnam W ar have been incorporated into the cultural narrative that rewrote the conflict’s 
history and helped reinstate nationalist American ideologies, my purpose is not to consider the 
nuances o f literary difference between the narratives, but rather to search for discourse-forming
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patterns. Dispatches is helpful here as a framework to structure my analysis, since Herr’s strategies 
o f representation will constitute the core to which examples from other texts will be added. It is 
in this sense that I consider Loon to be a viable setting for the American cultural narrative of 
Vietnam in general.
The homicidal environment 
The elemental Otherness o f Vietnam is established in the texts via two strategies of 
representation: the soldiers’ vernacular and the reconstruction of the landscape. Americans in 
Vietnam spoke in a jargon particular to their historical circumstance, both time and place, and 
that jargon was not generally used outside o f the U .S. locations in Indochina. It consisted of 
vocabulary and phrases, a mix of the 1960s slang (“can you dig it?”), references to popular culture 
(“Puff the Magic Dragon”), military speak (“medevac”), slangs o f previous wars, especially W orld 
W ar II and Korea (“gung-ho,” “pogue,” “gooks,” “mama-san”), the new dialect specific to 
Vietnam (“to frag,” “to hum p,” “boonies,” “hooch,” “Charlie,” “grunt”), and a selection of 
bastardized French and Vietnamese words or English words apparently as used by the 
Vietnamese (“beaucoup,” “di di m au,” “V C  number 10”). It also included proverbs and sayings 
that expressed a particular nonchalant, cynical attitude stemming from the conditions o f the war 
(“there it is,” “it don ’t mean nothin’,” “what are they going to do, send us to Vietnam?”). In this 
sense, the language of the soldiers can be seen as inextricably woven into the setting of their 
experience; many Vietnam authors quite obviously revel in that language, but generally every 
narrative o f the war is required to record it in at least the dialogues. Philip Beidler devoted an 
entire lengthy essay to the “language of the N am ” as a dimension of the war in itself (2004, 10­
37). Glossaries can be found online, are often included in histories and other studies, and 
extensive ones are even provided at the ends o f some novels, like John Del Vecchio’s The 13th 
Valley or Larry Heinemann’s Close Quarters. In memoirs and novels “FN G s” (“fucking new 
guys”—rookies) often describe their first impressions o f Vietnam by describing the landscape and 
climate, but proper initiation into their units sometimes involves friendly, more experienced 
soldiers translating some fundamentals o f the dialect. Am ong the many things Tim O ’Brien 
learnt about the war in his first month in country was the vocabulary: FN G, REM F, to be “short,” 
to “waste,” a “frag,” “dinks and slopes” (2006, 84-85). In The 13th Valley (1982), the FNG,
126 “War is as Natural as the Rains”
“Cherry,” soon after arriving at his battalion headquarters meets his first friend, a short-timer 
named Silvers, who advises him not to ask people how long they have been in-country. Somewhat 
embarrassed, Cherry explains that he does it without thinking:
“Hey, I know,” Silvers laughed. “It don’t really mean nothin.”
“That’s another thing. Everybody I’ve met around here says that. ‘It don’t mean nothin.
It don’t mean nothin.’ Why does everybody say that?”
Silvers winked and shrugged. “I don’t know. You know. It don’t mean nothin.” He 
laughed. “That’s what happens when guys live together. Everybody says the same things” 
(Vecchio 1982, 51).
Another example comes from The Short-Timers:
“You listen to Joker, New Guy. He knows ti ti—very little. And if he ever does know anything, 
it’ll be because he learned it from me. You just know he’s never been in the shit. He ain’t 
got the stare.”
Rafter Man looks up. “The what?”
“The thousand-yard stare. A Marine gets it after he’s been in the shit for too long”
(Hasford 1988, 65).
In James W ebb’s Fields of Fire, a freshly arrived lieutenant’s first impression of his men also 
includes language: “ [t]hey were rough and wild and dirty, and they spoke a dialect that was 
geographically undiscernible, with minor variations o f tone and pitch, as if they had all been 
recruited out o f the same small town. Groovy. Wow. Num ber One. Num ber Ten. There it is, 
man. A  bust for your dust. W hat a bummer. But it don't mean nothing” (Webb 2001, ch. 6).
A n essential piece o f the Vietnam vernacular also captured the Otherness o f Vietnam felt by 
the men. At som e point, it became common among the Americans to refer to Vietnam by using 
the multi-functional “in country,” sometimes hyphenated when used as an adjectival compound. 
Philip Beidler, Vietnam veteran and literary scholar, in his essay on the language of the war, 
explained:
although you still hear 'the Nam' bandied about by people who affect to know something 
about the war, I do not remember using that piece of alleged GI shorthand, nor do I recall
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hearing anyone do so. I suspect that, for most of us, even to speak the name of the place was 
some kind of bad magic. Like most people I think I probably just used the phrase “in­
country”—as in, 'How long you been in-country?'” (2004, 14).
The full implication of the construct is revealed when set against its polar opposite: “the W orld,” 
the United States or home, with “W orld” usually capitalized in writing and always preceded by 
the definite article, which makes it the place in relation to which whatever it is that is “in-country” 
is totally outside. Beidler ascribed this linguistic construct to the perception that Vietnam was 
“a place too incomprehensible to exist. People did not go home. They went ‘back to the world’” 
(2007, 6). In The 13th Valley, for example, a character returning from R & R  in Sydney reminisces 
that when he had first arrived “in-country (...) [t]he contrast between N am  and the W orld did 
not seem immense. Now the contrast was num bing” (1982, 19). In the idiosyncratic vernacular 
o f the Vietnam soldier, a man would say, for example, when his in-country tour was almost up, 
that he was returning to the W orld; or the other way round, the FN G s or rookie reporters were 
“just in from the W orld,” “fresh in from the W orld.”
If the slang is the native tongue of Loon, the climate and terrain, as experienced by the 
soldiers, the land is the other component constituting the perceived elemental foreignness of 
Vietnam. Often the observations are fairly mundane, as the one from a veteran recorded by New 
Yorker journalist Daniel Lang: “ [j]ust seeing an Asian country, for instance, was an adventure (...), 
its landscape so different from the frozen plains o f his corner o f M innesota; he had never before 
splashed through paddy fields, he told me, or stood blinking in the sudden sunlessness o f lush, 
entangled jungle, or wandered uncertainly through imprisoning fields o f towering elephant 
grass” (Lang 1969, 12). In The Short-Timers, Cowboy admits to hating the country, because 
“there’s not one horse in all o f Viet N am ” (Hasford 1988, 41).
But the strangeness o f Vietnam can also be conceptualized as more profound and even 
metaphysical. Herr describes it in terms of the impossibility o f “getting used to the jungle or the 
blow-you-out climate or the saturating strangeness o f the place which didn't lessen with exposure 
so often as it fattened and darkened in accumulating alienation” (1978, 19). Beidler, the most 
Herresque of the Vietnam literary scholars, follows the mold: the war in Vietnam happened “in 
a strange, remote midworld where visitations o f the absurd and unreal nestled with sinister ease 
amidst a spectacle o f anguish, violence, and destruction almost too real to be comprehended”
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(2007, 3-4). In Tim O ’Brien’s story collection, The Things They Carried (originally published 
1990), Vietnam is turned into a darkly magical world outright. The underground tunnels and 
the over-ground terrains are haunted by ghosts (“The Things They Carried,” “Ghost Soldiers” ; 
see also the similar imagery for Quang Ngai in Going After Cacciato [O ’Brien 1980, 257]). The 
most remote wilderness can at night echo with strange, sourceless music, which reappears in 
several stories, and the sounds o f a cocktail party: “ [n]ot human voices, though. Because it’s the 
mountains. (...). The rock—it’s talking. A nd the fog, too, and the grass and the goddamn 
mongooses. Everything talks. The trees talk politics, the monkeys talk religion. The whole 
country. Vietnam. The place talks” (2009, “How to Tell a True War Story”; emphasis in original; 
see also “Sweetheart o f the Song Tra Bong”). A t the end of The Short-Timers, Joker and his squad 
experience something similar, when deep in the jungle they hear the sound of laughter coming 
“[f]rom nowhere and from everywhere. (...) [T]he source of the laughter is all around us. The 
laughter seems to radiate from the jungle floor, from the jade trees, from the monster plants, 
from within our own bodies” (Hasford 1988, 175). In his memoir A  Rumor of War, Philip Caputo 
also reimagines the landscape as a dark fantasyland, when he describes a valley in Quang Nam  
as “Shangri-La, that fictional land of eternal youth. But night always brought the sound of 
artillery, a practical reminder that this was Vietnam, where youth was merely expendable” (1985, 
68). Like O ’Brien, he too notes the strange sounds and even music in the jungle at night (drums, 
probably the Montagnards; 1985, 132).
The texts in the American canon do not usually dwell on the repercussions o f the obverse of 
this ethnocentric view of Vietnam as a strange Other space—the “in country” isolated from “the 
W orld”—except for glimpses in passing. In Seymour Hersh’s My Lai 4 (1970), one of the soldiers 
from Charlie Company admits, reflecting on the massacre, that he “knew it wasn’t right (...) but 
over there it makes no difference”; another says, as if referencing Loon, “W hen you come back, 
it’s just like there was some sort o f fantasy-land over there” (1970, 184-185). A nd Daniel Lang 
records an extension of this line o f thinking, in the words o f the lawyer o f a G.I. charged with 
premeditated murder o f a civilian in Vietnam: “ [t]here’s one thing that stands out about this 
particular offense. (...) It did not occur in the United States. Indeed, there are some that would 
say it did not even occur in civilization, when you are out on combat operations” (Lang 1969, 
102; “this isn’t civilization. This is N am ” [O’Brien 2009, “How to Tell a True W ar Story”]).40
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Instead, the perspective is uniformly American. Virtually all texts include comments on the 
difficulty o f the terrain and the harshness o f the climate—the impenetrable walls o f grass and 
jungle, the steep hills to climb, the murky paddies to slug through, the unbearable tropical heat 
and sunlight, the relentless monsoons, the leeches, the total darkness o f the night. These features 
o f the landscape, in themselves belonging in the realm of the N LF and the N V A  (the land and 
the night; see below), are labelled “the true enemy” of Americans in Vietnam with a frequency 
that requires no references. The difficulty o f the land morphs eventually from a metaphoric 
hostility into a metaphysical one. Herr’s words on the strangeness o f the Vietnamese landscape 
come in a passage where he writes about the falsity o f the sense o f security provided by 
airmobility, and his failure to fully adapt to the war and the land and their “surprises.” The 
underlying reason is that
[t]he ground was always in play, always being swept. Under the ground was his, above it was 
ours. We had the air, we could get up in it but not disappear in to it, we could run but we 
couldn't hide, and he could do each so well that sometimes it looked like he was doing them 
both at once (...). All the same, one place or another it was always going on, rock around 
the clock, we had the days and he had the nights. You could be in the most protected space 
in Vietnam and still know that your safety was provisional, that early death, blindness, loss 
of legs, arms, or balls, major and lasting disfigurement—the whole rotten deal—could come 
in on the freakyfluky as easily as in the so-called expected ways, you heard so many of those 
stories it was a wonder anyone was left alive to die in firefights and mortar-rocket attacks
(Herr 1978, 19-20).
The strangeness o f the landscape and the climate, then, is strictly connected with the lethal 
potential it carries. Herr draws a sharp line o f division, encountered everywhere in the Vietnam 
canon, between American technology, represented by helicopters and airmobility, and the 
guerilla tactics o f “Charlie”—the “he” o f the passage, the N LF and the NVA—who, by often 
operating at night and possessing native knowledge of the land, renders it actively hostile and 
dangerous. Philip Caputo, upon entering the jungle for the first time with his unit, notes that 
“[b]eing Americans, we were comfortable with machines, but (...) we were struck with the utter 
strangeness o f this rank and rotted wilderness” (1985, 83).41 Concerning the separateness o f the 
land belonging to the enemy, Caputo also notes that moving into NLF-controlled areas was “like
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sliding over the edge” (1985, 252). Webb describes these territories as “a wounded countryside 
swollen with anger” (2001, ch. 3), within which American bases and camps are oases.
The day-night division is particularly important. Caputo, stationed around Danang in 1965 
as a marine lieutenant, also writes in his memoir that his soldiers soon “learned that the Vietnam 
W ar was primarily a nocturnal event. (...) The landscape, so bucolic on daylight, gradually 
assumed a sinister aspect. (...) [T]he war and the Viet Cong were here all right, waiting for u s” 
(1985, 56-58). In Fields of Fire, “the black [of night] belonged to those others, the night god’s 
children, who frolicked, even murdered in the romance of starbright. Night for the platoon was 
hiding time, time to dig deep holes and wait in fear for the loneliest o f deaths (...)” (Webb 2001, 
ch. 27). W hen Tim O ’Brien and a couple o f other soldiers get their hands on a starlight scope 
and scan their surroundings after dark, on an occasion described in his memoir If I Die in a 
Combat Zone, one o f the “grunts” is obviously uneasy when the line between the Vietnamese and 
the American realms becomes disturbed by technology-gone-too-far. “Y ou aren’t supposed to see 
the night,” he tells the others. “It’s unnatural. I don ’t trust this thing.” Seen through the device, 
the Vietnamese countryside is exposed as a “fairytale land,” a “circus,” “on fire“ (2006, 38). 
O ’Brien returns to the subject o f nighttime in Vietnam, when he describes marching on patrols 
in total darkness, in the “haunted countryside,” and the terror at the thought o f being separated 
from the rest o f the squad; the line, closed off at both ends by the point man and the rear man, 
marks the limit o f “security and sanity”: “[t]he man to the front is civilization. He is the United 
States o f America and every friend you have ever known (...)” (2006, 92; the same theme is to be 
found in O ’Brien 2009, “Night Life”).
In effect, the entire environment becomes “fatal,” as in Slotkin; “it”—combat, death—is always 
happening somewhere, and it is to be expected at all times. It is worth noting that “expected” 
ways o f dying in combat are contrasted here with the “freaky” ones which are engendered by the 
very strangeness and danger o f the land, inundated with “it” to the point where, as we have seen, 
they are collapsed into one with war. And as with the “fatal environment” that ensnared and 
killed General Custer, so in Vietnam the mythic nature o f the land preordains the American 
death and suffering that will occur there.
The tension between Americanness and the hostility o f the landscape is also explored in John 
Del Vecchio’s novel The 13th Valley. In most respects, the book is as far from Dispatches as the
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canon can accommodate. W here Herr’s memoir is a mere 200 pages in the small trade paperback 
format, Del Vecchio’s novel is a gargantuan 600 in almost twice as large a size; where Herr 
eschews narrative coherence and traditional prose style in favor o f linguistic virtuosity and 
innovative form, Del Vecchio writes a meticulous and carefully chronologized epic; where Herr 
builds Vietnam out o f the language itself, Del Vecchio does so by describing places, events, and 
objects down to the minutest detail, often gratuitous from the perspective o f storytelling; where 
The 13th Valley is usually categorized as belonging to the conventional, “realist-naturalist,” Dos- 
Passos-Hemingway-Mailer school o f American war fiction (Holbling 2007, 107), Dispatches is 
unanimously branded as postmodernist. Del Vecchio served in Vietnam as a combat 
correspondent with the Airborne and came home with a Bronze Star; Herr, though in love with 
the soldiers, remained always aware of, and somewhat anxious about, the different quality o f his 
status and the animosity the men could feel toward him as an outside reporter (“Those fucking 
guys,” he once overheard a rifleman say about him and his colleagues, “I hope they die”; 1978, 
168). Del Vecchio is far more blatant in his outlook on the war as essentially noble and patriotic, 
and searches for the epic where he can find it, while Herr keeps up the screen of ambiguity in 
his assessment o f the U .S. involvement and his attitude toward the “grunts” is more hip than 
semper-fi.
A nd yet, like in all the canon, in both texts it all comes down to the same thing—the dead 
American soldier—however differently the process o f “coming down to” is conceptualized and 
represented. A nd then there is the landscape. Near its beginning, The 13th Valley, set in the 
Central Highlands in the northernmost Thua Thien and Quang Tri Provinces, contains a 
chapter in which Lieutenant Brooks and Sergeant Egan o f the novel’s protagonist company (in 
the 101st Airborne) attend a pre-combat operation briefing where officers o f various expertise 
prepare the unit commanders and N C O s for the upcoming mission. First comes a topography 
report, which gives Del Vecchio the chance to describe the map used in the meeting. Del Vecchio 
has clearly taken it upon himself to educate his readers: apart from a glossary, the novel also 
contains several topographic maps, a historical timeline spanning the years from “2879 to 258 
B C ” to 1975 (1982, 599-606), and a diagram outlining “the organization and personnel of 
Alpha Com pany” at the time of the action, containing the names, ranks, and occupations o f all 
92 men (1982, 127-129); and he is no less thorough in matters o f cartography. The reader is
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informed of the m ap’s size (“fourteen feet wide, eight feet high”), composition (“twenty-eight 
smaller topographic maps, each covering a grid o f 27.5x27.5 kilometers”), content (“northern I 
C orps,” the DMZ, the Laotian border), the exact coloring used for different types o f terrain 
(jungles, clear forests, lowlands, swamps, rice paddies, marshes), topographic lines and markings, 
and the scale o f the smaller maps (“ 1:50,000”; 1982, 57). One point o f describing, after Del 
Vecchio, the details o f the map here is to illustrate just what this chapter contains, considering 
that this is only the first speaker, followed by officers from the weather service, intelligence, 
operations, and so on, each giving similarly comprehensive briefings, ending with a long 
motivational speech from the brigade commander.
Reading this chapter through Herr leads to interesting interpretations. Del Vecchio’s lovingly 
reconstructed map is, o f course, one of the unrevealing American maps from the opening page 
of Dispatches. Interestingly, Del Vecchio also records that each smaller map has disclaimers 
printed on it, in English and Vietnamese: “D E L IN E A T IO N  O F  IN T E R N A L  A D M IN IS T R A T IV E  
B O U N D A R IE S  IS  A P P R O X IM A T E , and D E L IN E A T IO N  O F  IN T E R N A T IO N A L  B O U N D A R IE S  M U S T  
N O T  B E  C O N S ID E R E D  A U T H O R IT A T IV E ” (1982, 57). Del Vecchio leaves this without comment, 
but the statements correspond to Herr’s observations on not only the m aps’ arbitrariness but 
also the multiplicity o f “stories” they could tell. W hat does it mean, for example, and what for 
whom, that international borders are not set? W hat does it say about the context in which the 
map is used? The topography sergeant points out a tree on a knoll in a river valley that will be 
the operation’s central navigational reference (Del Vecchio 1982, 58); that same precise spot is 
described in the novel’s prologue which reads like a parable: it is about a spider living in the tree; 
it is a mythical introduction to the eponymous valley. Is this not a different story about this one 
spot o f land? (In W ebb’s Fields of Fire, a lieutenant character’s tour in Vietnam also begins with 
looking at a map, which tells a different story still, with dots representing spots where the U SM C  
has sustained casualties: the lieutenant’s A O  “was a large red smear” [2001, ch. 3].)
The descriptions o f the maps are a significant point o f contact between the two books, as they 
showcase how a relatively uncomplicated representation of a map in a text assuming an 
immediate relation to reality finds a hypermediated parallel in a text o f postmodernist 
commentary. But, more importantly for my discussion, this point o f contact also leads to another 
reading of Del Vecchio’s chapter via the Herresque optic. The 13th Valley concerns one particular
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combat assault operation in the war, against the Khe Ta Laou valley where the NV A is supposed 
to have a secret base, and the briefing with all its technical minutiae helps Del Vecchio reproduce 
precisely the environment in which the action will take place. However, we might well recall 
Herr’s ominous statement that, when it came to it, “not a single life was saved by the 
information” (1978, 46). The American probing into the environment reaches deep: after the 
topography and terrain are dissected, the weather service officer performs the same on the 
climate; next—completing the triad indispensably lumped together in American narratives—the 
enemy force is invigilated by an intelligence major, his knowledge obtained by marvels such as 
“remote area monitors,” “magnetic and acoustic detectors,” and the “XM-3 Airborne Personnel 
Detector Device or People Sniffer [which] indicates a massing of human beings in the Khe Ta 
Laou” (1982, 61—62). This is civilization tearing into the frontier at its most fearsome: “I would 
like to tell you,” says the operations officer to the gathered men, “what we are going to do to that 
valley” (1982, 63—64).
At the same time, however, all o f this awesome scientific knowledge the Americans have 
gained, this “fact-figure crossfire” (Herr 1978, 46), pales in the face o f the soldiers’ pain and fails 
to prevent American death. Egan, present at the briefing, belongs to the specific category of 
characters in Vietnam literature, super-soldier sergeants, tough guys from working-class and 
similar backgrounds. They fall on different spots on the spectrum of repulsiveness: Fields of Fire’s 
Snake is an embodiment o f marine perfection; The Short-Timers’ Animal M other is a rampant 
racist who exhibits pedophiliac tendencies. But they are ultimately excellent fighters and loyal 
comrades, which in the canon is always the final mark of sympathy. At the briefing, Egan has 
“nothing but contempt for the briefing officers,” and he is irritated by the “irrelevance of the 
[weather] forecast” because he knows the I Corps well enough to know what the climate there 
will mean for his physical wellbeing (“ [fjuckin rains in the mountains all the fuckin time”; 
Vecchio 1982, 62). He thinks instead about his feet, the most important matter for an 
infantryman, and about how damaged they get by the “fuckin rains” in the mountains; his 
disdain for the officers is compounded by the fact that their reports are abstracted from the pain 
in his feet, and that having to stand for so long in the briefing makes them hurt more. This is a 
case o f the experience of the war being embodied by the soldiers’ physical suffering and their 
intimacy with the environment, but also o f the discrepancy between that experience and the
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official languages o f the war. Significantly, after the battle results in the deaths o f almost 400 
paratroopers, The 13th Valley ends with a brief official report o f the operation—a throwback to 
the briefing and its deluge of details—followed by a roll call o f all the dead from the protagonist 
company. The information did, in fact, fail to save all these lives.
The upshot is that in Loon, the landscape ably resists U .S. military knowledge and attempts 
at a complete takeover. But because it is a mythical American construct in the first place, it 
actually generates the creative tension that kills American soldiers and enables the primacy of 
the friendly fire discourse. This quality o f the land is amplified by other strategies of 
representation. One, the landscape itself thus becomes the source of danger and terror. Two, the 
enemy soldiers are not a force ontologically on a par with the Americans, but rather they exist as 
a feature o f the landscape, part o f what makes it so dangerous. In Dispatches, Herr writes: “Forget 
the Cong, the trees would kill you, the elephant grass grew up homicidal, the ground you were 
walking over possessed malignant intelligence, your whole environment was a bath” (1978, 58). 
In Fields of Fire, “the whole black night was a killer, waiting for its moment” (Webb 2001, ch. 7). 
Philip Caputo in A  Rumor of War admits that sometimes he “could not think of [the climate] as 
heat—that is, as condition of weather; rather, it seemed to be a thing malevolent and alive” (1985, 
85) and adds that “ [i]t is as if the sun and the land itself were in league with the Viet Cong, 
wearing us down, driving us mad, killing us” (1985, 106). In general Caputo seems particularly 
preoccupied with the villainy of the environment.42 In “Speaking of Courage,” Tim O ’Brien 
famously has a character literally swallowed by a “shit field” (an actual field where local villagers 
go to defecate), symbolic no doubt o f the war/land, described as “[e]vil ground”; the swallowed 
man “was folded in with the war, he was part o f the waste” (2009, “Speaking of Courage” ; cf. 
Sean Flynn’s swallowing by the ground in Dispatches). O ’Brien, deployed to Quang Ngai during 
the war—he hated the province—in a 1994 piece for The New York Times also recalled that at some 
point his company, “began to regard Quang Ngai itself as the true enemy—the physical place, the 
soil and the paddies” (1994; this is not from a canonical text, o f course, but it is a further 
illustration of the attitude American soldiers could develop in Vietnam that infiltrates the 
canon).
Another strategy of representing the deadliness o f the landscape is the insertion of the enemy 
soldiers into it as an invisible though menacing presence. In a later part o f this chapter, I will
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briefly discuss the parallels between Loon and Patusan, the fictional Southeast Asian land in 
Joseph Conrad’s Lord Jim. Here, it is worth quoting Padmini M ongia’s reading of Patusan:
Patusan is overlaid with images engulfing forests and gloom that threaten the loss of the 
features and values which define the metropolitan region left behind. (...) As a fantasy land, 
Patusan enables the text to create a space for ghouls and terrors, a region both haunted and 
haunting, engulfed in green gloom and ‘circumscribed by lofty impassable mountains.’ Even 
Gentleman Brown describes the effect of Patusan on him as ‘weird’ so that ‘every individual 
man of them felt as though he were adrift alone in a boat, haunted by an almost 
imperceptible suspicion of sighing, muttering ghosts’ (1993, 6; the in-text quotations are 
from Conrad’s Lord Jim).
The resemblance to Loon, haunted by the spectral NV A and NLF, is uncanny. In “Khe Sanh,” 
describing the seemingly surreal buildup of both American and North Vietnamese forces in the 
hills around the remote outpost, Herr treated at length about the setting of the action, the 
Central Highlands, as a place o f magical, mysterious and menacing quality: “the Highlands of 
Vietnam are spooky, unbearably spooky, spooky beyond belief,” “it is a ghost-story country,” “the 
belief that Satan dwelt in Nature could have been born here” (1978, 79-80). O n occasion 
O ’Brien uses exactly the same imagery: “ it's spooky. This is mountains. You don't know spooky 
till you been there. Jungle, sort of, except it's way up in the clouds and there's always this fog— 
like rain, except it's not raining—everything's all wet and swirly and tangled up and you can't see 
jack, you can't find your own pecker to piss with. Like you don't even have a body. Serious 
spooky” (2009, “How to Tell a True W ar Story”; emphasis in original). In The Short-Timers, Khe 
Sanh is described as an “erupted pimple o f sandbags and barbed wire on a bleak plateau, 
surrounded by the end of the world” (Hasford 1988, 146). A  similar description is delivered by 
Caputo, aboard a helicopter looking down, about the mountain range stretching parallel to the 
Laos border along the full length of Vietnam:
There it was, the Annamese Cordillera, hostile and utterly alien. The Vietnamese themselves 
regarded it with dread. ‘Out there’ they called that humid wilderness where the Bengal tiger 
stalked and the cobra coiled beneath its rock and the Viet Cong lurked in ambush. Looking 
down, I wondered for a moment if the operation was somebody’s idea of a joke. (...) The 
whole North Vietnamese Army could have concealed itself in that jungle-sea, and we were 
going to look for a battalion (1985, 82).
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The mystical theme linking landscape to metaphysical evil is found also in Robert Stone’s Dog 
Soldiers (originally published 1974), where one of the characters, correspondent John Converse, 
talks to an American missionary, who tells him that she lives in the “Ngoc Linh Province,” a 
fictional place which, though it is never mentioned in the book again, serves as its heart of
darkness43:
Converse had never been to Ngoc Linh Province; he knew very few people who had. He had 
flown over it, and from the air it looked thoroughly frightening, a deep green maze of iron- 
spine mountains. The clouds were full of rocks. No one went there, not even to bomb it, 
since the Green Berets had left.
“We call it God’s country,” the lady said. “It’s sort of a joke” (1994, 5).
Converse remembers a story he has heard about the province, in which the local tribesmen killed 
a priest by putting a cage with a rat in it over his head, so that the animal, once hungry, ate into 
the m an’s brain. W hen he asks about the religion of the M ontagnard tribes in Ngoc Linh, the 
missionary replies that “they worship Satan”; she later tells Converse, meaning Vietnam, that 
“Satan is very powerful here” (Stone 1994, 8-9). Likewise, in Tim O ’Brien’s The Things They 
Carried, an American soldier calls Vietnam a “Garden of Evil” (2009, “How to Tell a True War 
Story”). The collection also has Azar, a character very clearly symbolic o f evil, or rather of 
boyhood innocence corrupted to the point that it becomes evil; the story “The Ghost Soldiers” 
involves a moment in which the fictional Tim O ’Brien performs an act o f psychological cruelty 
against another soldier with Azar’s assistance. At one point, the cruelty transcends O ’Brien’s 
capacity for it: “Azar was in command now”; Azar revels in the activity and proclaims his love of 
the “Vietnam experience” (2009, “The Ghost Soldiers”).
In this world o f myth, N LF guerrillas and the regular N V A  soldiers constitute the unseen 
danger, reduced to ghosts, specters and phantoms in their own land. To Herr, the by-far worst 
thing about the Central Highlands, at least in the weeks leading to the battle o f Khe Sanh, is 
that “Somewhere O ut There, within artillery range (...), within a twenty-mile radius, a day's 
march, (...) concealed and silent and ominous, lay five full divisions o f North Vietnamese 
Regulars” (1978, 82). The terror posed by this invisible force is then often evoked throughout 
the rest o f the chapter—the enemy is constantly expected to attack (but, as it turns out, will restrict
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his harassment to non-stop artillery barrage)—and when the siege is finally lifted and the spooky 
hills surrounding Khe Sanh thoroughly searched, none of the tens o f thousands o f the North 
Vietnamese regulars are to be found but for a few corpses and wounded.
Herr is, o f course, not the only Vietnam vet author, or scriptwriter, to exploit the trope of the 
enemy as invisible; Kinney argues, in fact, that the invisibility o f the enemy is prerequisite to 
making the friendly fire trope dominant in Vietnam narratives (2000, 4; on the subject o f the 
invisibility o f the Vietnamese enemy, see also Spanos 2000, 152-155, who provides long relevant 
quotations from several novels and memoirs). A nd so, in The 13th Valley, during a march one of 
the protagonists, Cherry, feels “uneasy,” as if “somebody [is] watching” him and “something [is] 
about to reach out and grab him ” (1982, 381). Caputo notes that on one occasion, following a 
firefight, his men “searched the tree line but found only a few spent cartridges. The phantoms 
had pulled off another vanishing act” (1985, 95). In another instance, Hasford calls the NVA 
and the N LF a race o f “strange, diminutive phantom s” (1988, 153). The American canon is also 
full o f “phantom ” enemy units, resembling the invisible five divisions around Khe Sanh in Herr. 
The most obvious case is Hasford’s “Phantom Blooper,” a unit o f “white Victor Charlies” (1988, 
58) mentioned in passing in The Short-Timers, but made a central subject o f the novel’s 1990 
sequel, indeed titled The Phantom Blooper (where it transforms into a single traitorous American). 
But more examples can be found. Caputo, looking at a map showing enemy strength in the area, 
realizes that “the Communists had the equivalent o f a division out there, but we had yet to see 
one enemy soldier. (...) [I]t was a whole division of phantom s” (1985, 63). O ’Brien in his memoir 
notes that “the phantom Forty-eighth Viet Cong Battalion walked with us” (O ’Brien 2006, 122). 
These enemy units seemingly had paranormal abilities; “ [t]he M ission was always telling us about 
V C  units being engaged and wiped out and then reappearing a month later in full strength,” 
writes Herr (1978, 11), and Caputo confirms that “we fought a formless war against a formless 
enemy who evaporated like the morning jungle mists, only to materialize in some unexpected 
place” (1985, 95). O n one occasion, the men in his company are shocked to discover they are 
going on an operation against a regiment they previously “wiped out at Chu Lai” (1985, 257). 
Hasford records a similar hearsay, in the words o f one character: “I know a guy in One-One [a 
marine battalion] that shot a gook and then tied a satchel charge to him and blew him into little 
invisible pieces because shooting gooks is a waste o f time—they come back to life” (1988, 87).
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In memoirs, ex-soldiers commonly admit to never having seen an NVA fighter, or having seen 
one once—or, alternatively, they describe the shadows they had seen moving in the mists in the 
jungle at night (e.g. O ’Brien 2006, 101-102: “[i]t was the first and only time I would ever see the 
living enemy,” upon spotting three silhouettes in the darkness; the same wording is used for Paul 
Berlin’s experience in O ’Brien’s Going After Cacciato [1980, 86]44; also in Caputo 1985, 93; 9 9 ­
101). We see the trope of the invisible enemy famously employed in Platoon. In Fields of Fire they 
are “shadowed apparitions” (Webb 2001, prologue; see also ch. 25 for an extended scene 
involving invisible enemy). In Going After Cacciato, the protagonist platoon spends weeks 
marching along the Song Tra Bong in an eerie, dreamlike atmosphere that turns into anxiety 
and a sense o f foreboding caused by the silence in the jungle, paradoxically taken to be a sign of 
the enemy’s unseen presence (mainly in the chapter “Pick-up Gam es”; see also Caputo, for a 
similar description of the jungle: it is eerily, worryingly quiet; the soldiers are “haunted by a 
presence intangible yet real, a sense o f being surrounded by something we could not see” [1985, 
83-85]; in the jungle, “guerillas were everywhere, which is another way of saying they were 
nowhere” [1985, 113]; Webb: “Snake put his finger to the dirt. ‘We are here.’ He then made a 
circle in the air. ‘They are everywhere else’” [2001, ch. 6]). Later, when contact is finally made, 
O ’Brien describes a firefight: “[t]here was no enemy. There were flashes, shreds o f foliage, a bright 
glare. (...) [The fire] ended like the end of rain” (1980, 264). In O ’Brien’s “The Ghost Soldiers,” 
it is difficult to distinguish the spookiness o f the land from the spectrality o f the enemy (note 
also the close resemblance to Herr):
We called the enemy ghosts. (...) The countryside itself seemed spooky—shadows and tunnels 
and incense burning in the dark. The land was haunted. We were fighting forces that did 
not obey the laws of twentieth-century science. Late at night, on guard, it seemed that all of 
Vietnam was alive and shimmering—odd shapes swaying in the paddies, boogiemen in 
sandals, spirits dancing in old pagodas. It was ghost country, and Charlie Cong was the main 
ghost. The way he came out at night. How you never really saw him, just thought you did. 
Almost magical—appearing, disappearing. He could blend with the land, changing form, 
becoming trees and grass. He could levitate. He could fly (2009, “The Ghost Soldiers”).
The irony is that, exacting revenge on a medic that almost failed to save his life, the fictional 
O ’Brien decides to frighten the man by constructing a ghost-like contraption, and in the process
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turns into an evil spirit o f the land himself; perhaps the story is meant precisely to draw attention 
to its own artificial reconstruction by an American o f the spectrality possessed by the Vietnamese.
In the aftermath o f the siege o f Khe Sanh, Herr describes U .S. soldiers pulling some left- 
behind NV A troops out o f shelters, and notes that finding these people made the Americans 
realize “what must have been suffered and endured that winter” (1978, 128) on the other side. 
This is all o f what Herr has to say on the subject. Reading the accounts o f N V A  troops and N LF 
insurgents reveals the full extent o f what indeed was “suffered and endured.” Despite the almost 
paranormal nature attributed to them by Herr and other American authors, they found living 
in the jungle as close to unbearable as anyone else would, especially as they were notoriously 
malnutritioned, even “semistarved,” and malaria was rampant; then there was also the almost 
constant American bombing of suspected enemy positions. “[F]or all the privations and 
hardships,” one N LF fighter recalled,
nothing the guerrillas had to endure could compare to the stark terrorization of the B-52 
bombardments.45 (...) From a kilometre away, the sonic roar of the B-52 explosions tore 
eardrums, leaving many of the jungle dwellers permanently deaf. From a kilometre, the 
shock waves knocked their victims senseless. (...) Hours [after a hit] we would return to find 
(...) that there was nothing left. It was as if an enormous scythe had swept through the jungle, 
felling the giant trees like grass in its way. (...) It was not just that things were destroyed, in 
some awesome way they had ceased to exist. (...) The first few times I experienced a B-52 
attack it seemed, as I strained to press myself into the bunker floor, that I had been caught 
in the Apocalypse. The terror was complete. One lost control of bodily functions as the 
mind screamed incomprehensible orders to get out (quoted in Young, Fitzgerald and 
Grunfeld 2003, 101-102).
Sorrow of War, the celebrated novel by N V A  veteran Bao N inh (originally published 1991), also 
conveys much of the adversity o f living in the wilderness. Interestingly enough, Bao also 
reimagines Vietnamese soldiers as phantoms in the jungle—they are the ghosts o f his comrades 
who died in battles and ambushes, haunting him across land and time.
St Vith, SV N
These strategies o f representing the landscape as a homicidal environment are obviously linked 
to the naturalization o f war as the environment o f Vietnam, but they relate also to the
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representation of victimhood. The “grunts” are perpetually stuck in cycles o f their tours o f duty, 
spent in the mythical Loon. In the European Theater o f World War II, the U.S. army advanced 
country by country, epic battlefield by epic battlefield, and retrospectively, in the cultural 
narrative(s) o f that conflict, the trajectory is easily construed as linear, moving forward towards 
victory. A nd although homecoming veterans o f that war were not met by widespread heroes’ 
parades, as is usually claimed in comparisons o f World War II with Vietnam (see Chapter 1), all 
members o f the armed forces could feel implicated in that victory because, save for serious injury 
or death, they remained in deployment until the end. In Vietnam, there was no victory to feel a 
part of.46 N ot only was communism not defeated in Indochina, but the U nited States failed in 
its most fundamental task of defending South Vietnam. The war did not even end until two years 
after the Americans had gone away. Moreover, unless he extended, an infantryman spent only 
twelve or thirteen months in-country, his experience torn from whatever linearity o f the war’s 
progress there was, which exacerbated the sense that the war was “fragmented,” composed of the 
thousands o f small wars each man fought during his own tour before going home.
In comparison to World War II then, service in Vietnam can be seen as corrupted, or in a 
way limited, in terms of both time and space, and the memoirs and novels indeed respond to 
that circumstance by making the use o f both. Som e—Herr’s Dispatches, the works o f O ’Brien— 
convey the “fragmentariness” by their lack of chronology and the scattering of events. Dispatches, 
as we have seen, constructs a realm in which the order o f events does not matter, because only 
the totality o f the text can express the mythical nature o f the war/land. O ’Brien’s Vietnam in 
The Things They Carried is somewhat similar, as the stories included in the collection return 
obsessively to the same events, and although O ’Brien’s metafictional concern is with storytelling 
rather than mythography, each incident comes to be endowed with symbolism not unlike in 
Herr—indeed, in its representations o f the landscape, The Things They Carried is, next to Apocalypse 
Now and The ShortTimers/Full M etal Jacket, a distinctly Herresque text in the canon. In O ’Brien’s 
novel Going After Cacciato (originally published 1978), parts o f the book concern protagonist Paul 
Berlin’s traumatic memories o f the first few months o f service. The events he reminisces about 
are scattered throughout the narrative and unchronological. But, more importantly, the logic of 
their recollection, in Berlin’s memory, also creates the impression that the company is constantly 
walking along the Song Tra Bong (a river in Q uang Ngai). The geographical limitation of soldiers’
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service in Vietnam is thus underscored. The nature o f that experience for most infantrymen 
reflects its rendering in the cultural narrative: instead o f marching on Hanoi, Berlin and his 
company are patrolling the same swathes o f jungle, searching-and-destroying the same hamlets.
The same imagery is evoked in O ’Brien’s memoir, If I Die in a Combat Zone, an 
unchronological account o f his time spent in the field in Quang Ngai: “Patent absurdity. The 
troops are going home, and the war has not been won, even with a quarter o f the United States 
Army fighting it. (...) [Because the war is absurd and cannot be won], a soldier can only do his 
walking laughing along the way” (2006, 129-130). Technically, the text is historically anchored 
by the My Lai investigation: O ’Brien, a draftee private in the Americal Division, was in a 
battalion whose A O  included Son My when the scandal broke, and he was working a rear job 
which let him witness some of the official and press inquiries taking place there at the time. Still, 
the events described in his memoir have no immediate relevance to the war’s history or progress, 
but rather their significance is contained simply in what happened to O ’Brien and the people 
around him. The sense o f fragmentariness is revealed in the memoir when during an operation 
some soldiers complain that they only get a five-minute break from marching, and their leader 
replies: “[s]ooner we get to the night position, sooner we get resupplied, sooner we get to sleep, 
sooner we get this day over with. Sooner everything” (2006, 35). The war is not history here, but 
a tour o f duty; time is strangely malleable. The sooner we get to the night position, the sooner 
our wars will be over. In Dispatches, Herr quotes a “grunt”: “Far’s I’m concerned, this one’s over 
the day I get hom e” (1978, 200). In W ebb’s Fields of Fire, this point is made repeatedly; for 
example, marines from the protagonist unit walk along “blackened dike that had been charred 
by a napalm drop in someone else's war a week ago” (2001, ch. 13); another time, looking at the 
light bursts o f battle, “they watched Som eone Else’s War a mile away” (2001, ch. 14); to one 
soldier coming home, the “Vietnam War was over. It happened only to individuals, and it had 
ceased happening to him” (2001, ch. 20). The in-country experience, composed of long stretches 
o f boredom and tediousness and bursts o f combat frenzy, is also described as “a timeless world. 
(...) Time was Vietnam. But it became so immeasurable in a m an’s emotions, some days so long 
and some so short, that it was irrelevant (...)” (Webb 2001, ch. 18). In Hasford’s The Short-Timers, 
a character complains that, “[t]his ain’t a war, it’s a series o f overlapping riots” (1988, 87). 
Similarly, Philip Beidler, whose scholarship seems influenced by the writing style o f Michael Herr
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and who is a proponent o f “Vietnam” as a hermetic and total world, writes that for the U.S. 
soldiers, “nothing in the war, it seemed, ever really began for any particular reason, and nothing 
in the war ever really ended, at least as it concerned those still living and unwounded. (...) In the 
large view or in the small, there was no real beginning and there was no real end to anything 
having to do with the war. It just went on” (2007, 3). Beidler returns to this subject in a later 
volume, this time expressly writing that, “somebody once described Vietnam as a one-year war 
we fought ten times”; he even singles out the marines, “poor bastards,” and the hermetic nature 
o f “their” war: “[t]hey had their own war, invariably lousier than anybody else’s ” (2004, 34; he 
here echoes the marine lore and Michael Herr in Dispatches, o f course).
Other books in the canon, which keep chronological order o f events, are nevertheless still 
limited in time by the length of tours o f their authors and protagonists, or are otherwise slices 
o f time cut out from the war’s duration with little relevance for its conduct. For example, 
memoirs like Philip Caputo’s A  Rumor of War and W.D. Ehrhart’s Vietnam-Perkasie cover more or 
less a year. The in-country part o f Fields of Fire spans the period from the arrival at A n Hoa of 
two main characters, Lieutenant Hodges and “Senator,” until a firefight in which the first is 
killed and the latter loses a leg about five months later. The 13th Valley takes place over a month 
in 1970, between the FN G ’s (Cherry’s) arrival and the roll call o f the dead after Khe Ta Laou; 
unlike the massive battles o f World War II, all o f which were stepping stones to the ultimate 
victory, this operation remains a self-contained event, in a relatively small spot within the I Corps, 
with little impact on this area and let alone on the war in general (Del Vecchio tries to build up 
the epic in the colonel’s speech during the briefing—“This is the last NVA stronghold in I Corps. 
We can kick the enemy out o f our AO, out o f this valley, out o f I Corps and out o f this country” 
[1982, 69]—but the attempt remains blatantly unconvincing).
If these limitations stem from the war’s conditions, their inevitable appearance and 
fundamental role in the texts have the effect o f removing the war from history entirely—yet 
another dehistoricizing process in the canon—and reducing it to, or perhaps more fittingly: 
fragmenting it into, those thousands o f small wars o f individual soldiers. Larry Heinemann’s 
novel Close Quarters (originally published 1974) is set around the village o f Trang Bang (known 
as the site o f the napalm bombing captured in Nick U t’s iconic photograph of the running 
children) and the base at Cu Chi, in Hau Nghia Province (III Corps), but the war’s status outside
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of history means that the narrative can get away with providing no chronological anchor points 
at all: the action can be taking place at any time during the war, and it does not matter. (It 
probably takes place before 1970, as this is when the 25th Infantry Division, to which the 
protagonists belong, left Cu Chi; Heinemann served with the 25th in 1968-1969.)
The dehistoricization of Vietnam is finalized in Heinemann’s second novel, Paco’s Story, which 
takes place in the United States, but includes frequent and crucial flashbacks to the war; it is not 
only unclear when Paco’s tour in Vietnam took place, but also his company operated in places 
Heinemann made up (Fire Base Harriette, LZ Skator-Gator, Ham Lom a.k.a. Gookville, Phuc 
Luc, the punny Scat M an Do [“whatever that is,” “absolutely and precisely where Scat M an Do 
is tongue cannot tell” ; Heinemann 1987, 5]), their non-existence again essentially without 
consequence for a war removed from history.
In this extra-historical setting, the suffering and death o f the American soldier is robbed of a 
palpable cause or historicized significance. The anonymity of hum an settlements in Vietnam is 
acknowledged perhaps most poignantly in O ’Brien’s If I Die in a Combat Zone. The memoir opens 
mid-operation, with the platoon approaching a cluster o f hamlets and about to move into a 
“ville.” Another soldier asks Private O ’Brien about the name of “this goddam n place”:
“I don’t know. I never thought of that. Nobody ever thinks of the names of these places.”
“I know. It’s funny, isn’t it? Somebody’s gonna ask me someday where the hell I was over 
here, where the bad fighting was, and, shit, what will I say?”
“Tell them St Vith,” I said.
“What? That’s the name of the fucking place?”
“Yes,” I said. “That’s the name of it. It’s here on the map. Do you want to look at it?”
He grinned. “What’s the difference, huh? You say St Vith, I guess that’s it. I’ll never 
remember. How long’s it gonna take me to forget your name?” (2006, 14).47
The conversation is emblematic o f the common American experience, also because it reveals the 
totality o f the Americentric perspective from which Vietnam is appraised; after all, the “ville” is 
nameless only to the G.I.s, certainly not to the people living in it. Moreover, O ’Brien’s q u ip -  
christening the hamlet “St V ith”—is an ironic remark, designed to draw attention to the contrast 
between the monumental historicity o f W orld W ar II versus the nebulous non-specificity of 
Vietnam. (St Vith was a Belgian town fought over during the Battle o f the Bulge in 1944; the
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skirmish at St Vith is mentioned elsewhere in the book, by an officer haranguing on the 
difference between “Chinese” wars, like Korea and Vietnam, and W orld W ar II [2006, 67]). 
Indeed, in his memoir O ’Brien devotes much space, especially in the chapters “Pro Patria” and 
“Beginning,” to exploring the extent to which the heroic mythologies o f previous conflicts 
contributed to the initial willingness o f many young American men to go to Vietnam, also 
because o f the pressure these youths experienced from their conservative, patriotic communities 
which included W orld W ar II veterans, something O ’Brien felt himself in his small M innesota 
prairie town; the subject returns in The Things They Carried, where it is said that the soldiers 
“killed, and died, because they were embarrassed not to” (2009, “The Things They Carried”), 
and especially in the story “O n The Rainy River.” This is the same sentiment expressed more 
obliquely in the canon’s continuous references to “John W ayne,” a discourse that links the 
pressure to go to war with the eventual disillusionment o f the soldiers and the denial o f a heroic 
status to them. “John W ayne,” as a synecdoche of the entire cluster o f concepts and complaints 
associated with this discourse, thus becomes a mark of a specific cultural, social, and identity 
victimization of homecoming veterans.48
The resultant lack of meaning and effect o f the American soldier’s anguish requires a tragic, 
rather than a heroic, framework; denied the status o f a hero, the soldier can only be a victim. 
Moreover, if Loon is predominantly a site o f Americans inflicting friendly fire on one another, 
it is also a war that has been naturalized into a landscape, and so the very lethality o f the 
environment contributes to the soldier’s victimization. In the bulk of the texts which are set in 
Vietnam, the culpability for what the soldiers endure rarely reaches further than the immediate 
chain of command. It is usually the “lifers” closest to the suffering protagonists who are 
responsible for sending the men to their deaths: the too-ambitious West-Point first lieutenants, 
the chickenshit sergeants, the captains, the majors, rarely the lieutenant colonels or higher. But, 
unless it is caused by actual friendly fire, such as miscalculated artillery coordinates, the death 
typically comes from the land: especially the ever-dreaded mines, trip-wired and booby-trapped 
all over the place (O ’Brien 2006, 125-130 contains a whole catalogue of landmines and 
descriptions o f what they do to human body; see also Caputo 1985, 288). But the danger is also 
in ambushes, sniper fire, and other attacks by the enemy, who by his invisibility and phantomlike 
presence in the shadows of the jungle and in the indistinguishable, unreadable faces o f villagers
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blends into the country’s landscape as an integral part o f its fatality. This enables the prevalence 
of the friendly fire discourse. Vietnam becomes a mythical American purgatory where each 
American death and severed limb is causeless, and so each is a crime, each enacted against, 
ultimately, a victim.
Fire Base Harriette to Ben Suc 
In Heinemann’s novel, Paco’s story is that he is the sole survivor o f a friendly fire artillery barrage 
that wiped out his entire company at FB Harriette, the incident branded throughout the text as 
a “massacre” or even, twice, as a “holocaust massacre.” That Heinemann could deploy the 
doomed company to invented places is because for Americans in the war’s aftermath any lesser 
known name from Vietnam could sound made-up, or conversely, because FB Harriette, LZ 
Skator-Gator and Phuc Luc could sound as plausible as any (indeed, Tim O ’Brien spent his tour 
around a real LZ Gator, a battalion headquarters). But in Paco’s Story, place names, made-up or 
not, become a marker o f veteran societal victimization, too. Crippled and scarred, Paco is back 
in the States, where one day he arrives in a small dusty town in an unknown state (perhaps 
Texas), his choice o f location dictated by nothing else but his running out o f bus fare money; 
there, he finds a job as a dishwasher and assumes a quiet life without friendship and with few 
conversations. A  young mechanic who gives Paco a ride asks questions about his tour and 
disability, and Paco answers out o f politeness, but avoids going into detail about the “massacre”; 
the owner of a shop where Paco inquires about employment also mentions his walking cane, 
and when Paco explains that he has been wounded in the war, the man asks what war: Paco is 
irritated, because, apparently, many people have asked him that, “as if not one word of the 
fucking thing had ever made the papers” (Heinemann 1987, 75; the same complaint is made, 
most emphatically, in W ebb’s Fields of Fire: “you'd hardly know there was a war on. It's in the 
papers, and college kids run around screaming about it (...) but that's it. It's like nothing really 
happened, except to other people. It isn't touching anybody except us. (...) We been abandoned” 
[2001, ch. 18]; the insistence that the Vietnam W ar was no big deal in the United States is a 
measure o f how determined W ebb is to victimize the soldiers and veterans). Later, Paco’s boss, 
Ernest, begins a conversation in a similar manner—“You wounded in Vietnam, eh?” (Heinemann 
1987, 125)—but when Paco replies that yes, in Vietnam, Ernest proceeds to tell him his own war
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stories from Guadalcanal and Iwo Jima. Ernest’s recollection of the two battles is graphic, racist, 
vulgar, even heretical in the light o f Iwo Jim a’s heroic national symbolism—“[s]ix guys breaking 
their balls, muscling that goddamn flag up” (Heinemann 1987, 128)—and it has a double effect. 
It establishes a link between U .S. soldiers’ experiences across history and demythologizes World 
War II, thus indirectly arguing for re-inscribing Vietnam into the nation’s military history and 
memory. But, at the same time, it forces a comparison between the two conflicts and their 
historical memories, underscoring the unfairness Vietnam veterans have been met with: where 
W orld War II is remembered in place names as monumental as Guadalcanal and especially Iwo 
Jima, Vietnam has unheard-of holocausts like Harriette.
Considering that many other residents o f the town approach Paco with something close to 
resentment, and no one ever talks about Vietnam, the novel should of course be categorized 
among texts about veteran trauma, reception, and mistreatment back home. But then another 
Vietnam vet, Jesse, visits Ernest’s diner and strikes up a conversation with the owner and Paco. 
Paco tells him that he was wounded in Vietnam, “at a place called Fire Base Harriette near Phuc 
Luc” :
“Heard about Harriette,” Jesse says (...). “Did myself a tour with the 173rd Airborneski! Iron 
fucking Triangle, Hobo Woods, the Bo Loi Woods. Lai Khe, An Loc, Cu Chi—back in the 
days when Ben Suc was still a ville. You heard of Ben Suc!”
Paco had; Ernest had not (Heinemann 1987, 152; emphases in original).
Later that night, Jesse helps Paco clean up the diner before closing; they are working alone, when 
Jesse suddenly turns to Paco and exclaims, “ ‘It was a shitty thing that happened at Harriette’—as 
if he’s been turning that event in his mind—the news of it and the impact—and has been trying 
to think of something to say about it, and Paco, since he walked into the place” (Heinemann 
1987, 162; emphasis in original). Allegiance and understanding between Jesse and Paco is thus 
established immediately and precisely via their shared familiarity with places and names which 
civilians back home have not heard of or remembered; such ignorance of these sites is symbolic 
o f the veterans’ alienation upon their returns.
But Heinemann’s use o f place names here underscores also the secret knowledge of the 
veterans. The Iron Triangle was an area in III Corps that since the times o f the Viet M inh had
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served as a communist stronghold, notorious particularly for its immense and ineradicable 
underground tunnel system extending to below the U .S. military base at Cu Chi (“C u Chi, Cu 
Chi, worst place I ever did see,” according to a song by the infantrymen stationed there; “Cu 
C hi” [1968?]). Ho Bo and Boi Loi W oods were described in 1968, in the 25th Division’s Vietnam 
newspaper, as “treacherous battlefields with funny nam es” (“ Proud Past” [1968?]), and were 
evidently still “ever treacherous” (Toulouse 1970) two years later. Both Ho Bo and Boi Loi were 
targets during the massive search-and-destroy operations conducted in the Iron Triangle, 
including Cedar Falls in 1967, when the several thousand inhabitants o f Ben Suc were forcibly 
relocated en masse to local villages and refugee camps in scandalous conditions, and the town 
itself was annihilated with aerial bombings (a contemporary report from Ben Suc is Schell 1967, 
a New Yorker article later published as a book). Ernest—the general public—has not heard about 
Ben Suc, and the reader o f Paco’s Story will not learn what had happened to the people there 
either, but the aim o f bringing up this name is not to inform, but rather to affect, to create the 
impression of the veterans’ sharing a secret knowledge of the war and of Vietnam. Such reading 
of this scene in the novel illustrates yet another way in which a representation of the otherness 
o f the Vietnamese geography—the exotic-sounding, generally unfamiliar place names in this 
instance—connects to the dehistoricization of the war, here in the form of literal forgetting of 
historical events from the war by the public.
The scene also draws attention to the dual status o f the veterans, as keepers o f the knowledge 
on the one hand, and on the other as victims o f trauma associated with these places as much as 
o f the indifference of the people back home to their experience and suffering. Philip Beidler 
captures this notion in his own reconstruction o f “Vietnam ”: “[t]he only people who remember 
much about the Ia Drang, the A  Shau, Hamburger Hill, the Ho Bo W oods, the Pineapple 
Plantation, Xuan Loc, Lai Khe, Quan Loi, Dau Tieng, the O ld French Fort, and all the other 
names and places were those who had actually gone there and spilled the blood and the anger 
and the youth” (2007, 16). As in Heinemann, the passage is not meant to be informative, but 
rather it uses the Vietnamese place names to convey the suffering of the soldiers and the 
alienation of the veterans.
The often painful intimacy between the American soldier and the Vietnamese land extends 
beyond knowledge of the place names and of the stories about them. One specific form of
148 “War is as Natural as the Rains”
bonding is “hum ping,” that is marching through the country’s terrains (on “humping the 
boonies,” see Beidler 2004, 27; Kinney 2000). Many veteran texts contain whole passages 
dedicated solely to the mechanics and tedium of walking, the activity fundamental to the 
Vietnam experience, and to the hard-earned familiarity with the landscape and its many 
difficulties and exertions. The descriptions are often accompanied by exhaustive lists o f the 
tremendous amounts o f heavy gear the men “hum p,” that is carry. Examples are to be found in 
O ’Brien’s works, in Caputo’s A  Rumor of War, in Del Vecchio’s The 13th Valley, in Hasford’s The 
Short-Timers and others, but an excerpt from the latter will suffice to illustrate how humping 
becomes interwoven with the intricacies o f the surroundings and the experience of it:
Humping in the rain forest is like climbing a stairway of shit in an enormous green room 
constructed by ogres for the confinement of monster plants. Birth and death are endless 
processes here, with new life feeding on the decaying remains of the old. The black earth is 
cool and damp and the oversized greenery is beaded with moisture, yet the air is thick and 
hot because the triple canopy holds in the humidity. The canopy of interwoven branches is 
so thick that sunlight filters through only in pale, infrequent shafts like those in Sunday- 
school pictures of Jesus talking to God.
Beneath mountains like the black teeth of dragons we hump. We hump on a 
woodcutter's trail, up slopes of peanut butter, over moss-blemished boulders, into God's 
green furnace, into the hostile terrain of Indian country.
Thorny underbrush claws our sweaty jungle utilities and our bandoliers and our sixty- 
pound field packs and our twelve-pound Durolon flak jackets and our three-pound 
camouflaged helmets and our six-and-a-half pound fiberglass and steel automatic rifles. Limp 
sabers of elephant grass slice into hands and cheeks. Creepers trip us and tear at our ankles.
Pack straps rub blisters on our shoulders and salty water wiggles in dirty worm trails down 
our necks and faces. Insects eat our skin, leeches drink our blood, snakes try to bite us, and 
even the monkeys throw rocks.
We hump, werewolves in the jungle, sweating 3.2 beer, ready, willing, and able to grab 
wily Uncle Ho by his inscrutable balls and never let go. But our real enemy is the jungle.
God made this jungle for Marines. (...).
Hours pass. Many, many of them. We don't know what time it is anymore. In the jungle 
there is no time. Black is green; green is black—we don't even know if it's night or day
(Hasford 1988, 149-150).
In this exemplary passage, the infantryman’s deep embedment in the jungle boils down to the 
exertion caused by the equipment and even more so by the conditions o f the setting. The 
discomfort is so extreme that the jungle seems to detach itself from reality, and comes to be
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endowed with spirituality and hostility instead. The application of this familiar imagery renders 
the relationship between the American marine and the Vietnamese wilderness more than 
intimate: the Vietnamese setting is in fact constituted by the American presence within it. It 
exists to make “grunts’” life harder.
It is worth pointing out, however, that a soldier’s intimacy with the physical land is not 
necessarily the effect o f an exclusively negative experience, but that the bond is more complex. 
Caputo writes that the “foot soldier has a special feeling for the ground” (1985, 288), meaning 
that he is in contact with it at all times, marching, fighting, and sleeping. In If I Die in a Combat 
Zone, Tim O ’Brien is taken aback by the sterile environment inside the plane that takes him 
home when his tour ends, and strains to see the land below in his window:
It’s earth you want to say good-bye to. The soldiers never knew you. You never knew the 
Vietnamese people. But the earth, you could turn a spadeful of it, see its dryness and the 
tint of red, and dig out enough of it so as to lie in the hole at night, and that much of 
Vietnam you would know. Certain whole pieces of the land you would know, something 
like a farmer knows his own earth and his neighbour’s. You know where the bad, dangerous 
parts are, and the sandy and safe places by the sea. You know where the mines are and will 
be for a century, until the earth swallows and disarms them. Whole patches of land. Around 
My Khe and My Lai. Like a friend’s face (2006, 201-202).
Precisely the same ideas return in Going After Cacciato, in the chapter “How the Land W as,” 
where Paul Berlin also emphatically does not hate the land (O ’Brien 1980, 239), and even has 
some special affection for the paddies, given the intimacy with them he has gained smelling and 
tasting them, and sleeping and urinating in them. The whole segment is, in fact, dedicated to 
features o f the Vietnamese landscape—maze-like hedgerows concealing villages, the red soil, 
country and jungle trails, the flora, the poverty of the hamlets—and their relationship to the 
American infantryman; Quang Ngai is also described in some detail. In the memoir, in contrast, 
O ’Brien is welcomed by the landscape, now evidently more distant to him, o f his snow-covered 
home state, Minnesota: “an empty, unknowing, uncaring, purified, permanent stillness. (...) In 
return for all o f your terror, the prairies stretch out, arrogantly unchanged” (2006, 203). In The 
Things They Carried, land is the second last thing on the list o f what the soldiers carry, before 
“their own lives,” the position indicating its visceral significance to the experience of Vietnam:
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“[t]hey carried the land itself—Vietnam, the place, the soil—a powdery orange-red dust that 
covered their boots and fatigues and faces. They carried the sky. The whole atmosphere, they 
carried it, the humidity, the monsoons, the stink of fungus and decay, all o f it, they carried 
gravity” (2009, “The Things They Carried”; note also the Herresque syntax). Ultimately, in Going 
After Cacciato, Paul Berlin’s greatest expression for his affection for the land of Vietnam is his 
drinking the filthy water from a rice paddy. The theme of intimacy with the physical Vietnamese 
land through its corporal implications—which M innesotan/Am erican land has no connection 
to whatsoever—is also expressed, though through a different imagery and with a different force, 
in Dispatches. Herr writes that when you made contact (“ Contact”) with the enemy, “it was you 
and the ground: kiss it, eat it, fuck it, plough it with your whole body, get as close to it as you 
can without being in it yet or o f it (...). Pucker and submit, it’s the ground” (1978, 56).49 The 
same comparison is made by Caputo, who, during a firefight, writes that, “lying in a shallow dip 
in the ground, I made love to the earth” (1985, 265).
Lurpism
The knowledge of a common infantryman like Jesse or Paco, or Tim O ’Brien, has its limits, 
however. In the texts, common “grunts” (usually o f color) sometimes have the intuition or get 
acquainted with the land enough to obtain almost mystical wisdom, in the manner of 
frontiersmen going native. In Fields of Fire, for example, there is Cat Man, a Hispanic man almost 
paranormally attuned to combat and the land, or Snake, who looking at the mountains “knew 
their secrets, understood their mysteries more completely than he had ever mastered anything 
before” (Webb 2001, ch. 31). In Dispatches, there is the Entertainer, a black soldier so in tune 
with the land that he can raise his arm and bring it down just as the rain starts coming down, 
and that he can see ghosts, including his own (1978, 201; O ’Brien also has a soldier who can see 
his own ghost in “Night Life” [2009]). In The Short-Timers there is Alice, the black-man who wears 
the skin of a Bengal tiger he himself killed, and who is said to truly understand the Vietnamese 
fighters, and who has the magical ability to detect mines, booby traps, punji holes, enemy 
presence, and mortar rounds coming from afar. The fictional O ’Brien in “The Ghost Soldiers,” 
when exacting revenge on the medic with the ghost contraption and witnessing the m an’s terror, 
has an out-of-body experience: “I was part o f the night. I was the land itself—everything,
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everywhere—the fireflies and paddies, the moon, the midnight rustlings, the cool phosphorescent 
shimmer of evil—I was atrocity—I was jungle fire, jungle drums (...) I was N am —the horror, the 
war” (2009, “The Ghost Soldiers”). Harnessing the power o f the spirit world to terrify, O ’Brien 
briefly gains the ability to enter it and “fade into” Vietnam.
But generally it takes a special type of soldier to possess a special type of knowledge. One more 
moment from Del Vecchio’s never-ending briefing in The 13th Valley: at one point, the map 
sergeant is about to say something, but is abruptly stopped. It is made clear that he is talking to 
the infantrymen standing at the back o f the room, “easily distinguishable from the staff and rear 
personnel by their worn rumpled uniforms. ‘I spoke personally’,” he begins, “ ’with several LRRPs 
(he pronounced it lurps) and they asked that I convey to y o u . ’” The brigade commander 
interrupts him right then, instructing him to “stick to the topography,” and Sergeant Egan 
wonders what the topography man was about to say and why the colonel stopped him (“Fucken 
typical,” Egan thinks to himself). Shortly after, discussing the terrain of the offending valley, the 
map sergeant says that “these are the highest mountains in I Corps. It will be rough out th e r e .” ; 
Egan is convinced this is what the sergeant wanted to say before (1982, 58-59). The Lurps seem 
to have had something to impart to the men going into the Khe Ta Laou, but the high-ranking 
officer blocked the message. Why? If we are to believe Egan’s intuition, it had to do with the 
difficulty o f the terrain, the tough going to be expected, and so this may be yet another instance 
of a clash between experience—the Lurps’ message—and the official burying of it, especially since 
in The 13th Valley, as in much of the canon, a sharp line o f division is drawn between the true 
hero-victims, the “grunts,” whom the map sergeant is addressing specifically, and the lifers, high- 
ranking officers, and “REM Fs” (“rear-echelon motherfuckers,” commonly despised for their 
supposedly cushy lives in Vietnam). But the exchange also draws the attention to the Lurps 
themselves.
After 1965, the newly formed elite Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP) units filled the 
Green-Beret-shaped hole left in the war’s symbolism at the end of the counterinsurgency phase. 
Formed in army and marine infantry and Air Cavalry divisions, they included leaders trained in 
the Special Forces, and in 1969 were grouped together into the new Ranger regiment. The so- 
called Tiger Force, known for its 1967 spree o f war crimes against the civilian population of 
Quang Ngai and Quang Tin provinces, which became exposed only in 2003, was a LRRP unit
152 “War is as Natural as the Rains”
in the 101st Airborne (if anyone had any doubts about the mythological symbolism, the Force’s 
long list o f offences, next to deliberate murder o f villagers, included scalping of their victims and 
carrying the skins as trophies; Michael Sallah is the journalist who brought the Tiger Force crimes 
to light and won a Pulitzer for it, see Sallah and Weiss 2006). In the canon, Lurps and the Green 
Berets tend to be standoffish and vaguely threatening, and to maintain an air o f secrecy and 
seriousness about them, and sometimes they are seen wearing human-ear necklaces, their real- 
life attribute (Sallah and Weiss 2006, passim; in the canon the accessory is not exclusive to them, 
as all Americans in Vietnam can collect ears and other body parts). If soldiers o f regular platoons 
are Loon’s natives, and the likes o f Michael Herr are tourists there, then Lurps should be 
considered a cross between its shamans and its cool kids. As the post-counterinsurgency 
Greenies, Lurps took over the frontiersman status, minus the pacification-and-nation-building- 
related benevolence of their predecessors, and became in the canon the wise men in possession 
of almost mystical knowledge of the land, gained by penetrating deep into the enemy territory, 
by using, like the Greenies did, the autochthonous M ontagnard tribesmen as scouts, and by 
amassing “impressive” body counts. Examples include O ’Brien’s platoon leader described in his 
memoir, a Green Beret for a reason named M ad Mark, an “insanely calm” man until they are 
out on patrol and he begins cutting off ears and bringing them back to show his men (2006, 86­
88).
Lurps are occasionally willing to impart something of their secret knowledge, and so the 
suppression of information in the briefing in The 13th Valley gains a new dimension since it comes 
from them and so presumably concerns particular dangers o f the land. In Dispatches, after the 
opening passage with the map and Ho Bo Woods, the very first encounter Herr records is with 
a Lurp whom he portrays in a typical Special-Forces, heart-of-darkness fashion: the man guzzles 
pills, uppers and downers, so that he can “see that old jungle at night like he was looking at it 
through a starlight scope”; he makes other soldiers uneasy—“he’s just too crazy for m e,” says one— 
and they claim “the whole fucking story” is “right there” in his eyes, but they advise Herr to look 
in quickly and not be caught by the man while doing it. Herr, scared of him, looks into his eyes 
once and writes that it “was like looking at the floor o f an ocean” (1978, 13). W hat depths lurk 
in the Lurp’s eyes and soul? W hat deep knowledge has he possessed?
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But what a story he told me, as one-pointed and resonant as any war story I ever heard, it 
took me a year to understand it:
“Patrol went up the mountain. One man came back. He died before he could tell us what 
happened.”
I waited for the rest, but it seemed not to be that kind of story; when I asked him what 
had happened he just looked like he felt sorry for me, fucked if he’d waste time telling stories 
to anyone dumb as I was (Herr 1978, 13-14).
One interpretation of the Lurp’s story, or rather o f Herr’s repeating it, is that it is exemplary of 
the general Vietnam theme of privileging firsthand experience; not only is the story profoundly 
meaningful (“resonant”), but also Herr needs to spend his year in-country in order to get to that 
meaning. Here the point seems to be that, whatever happens in Vietnam, whatever “freakyfluky” 
tales one hears, whatever tragedies befall marines and so on, in the end the story can be distilled 
to the death of Americans; it is a point that has been brought up often enough already (cf. Kinney 
2000, 116). But another reading might be that in its structure, the Lurp’s story is so skeletal that 
it can easily accommodate the entire mythology of Loon: there is a patrol (American “grunts”); 
a mountain (the land); mass death in mysterious circumstances and at the hands o f disembodied 
agents, so that only the dying and its mythical environment matters; a secret, a darkly ironic twist 
at the end, and a joke. Because it arrives at the beginning of the book, and is delivered by a Lurp, 
the story constitutes yet another mythical framework for Dispatches, and for Loon in general. The 
mystical/landscape-related interpretation o f the story, as a myth of what secret knowledge can be 
found in the wilderness, finds an intriguing reflection in O ’Brien’s The Things They Carried, where 
one of the characters begins a story with, “[a] six-man patrol goes up into the m ountains”—the 
wording is too similar to be coincidental. In the story, the men in the patrol set up a week-long 
listening post in the wilderness, a place so deep and secret that “[y]ou hear stuff nobody should 
overhear” there, and eventually begin hearing music and strange, impossible sounds which drive 
them insane, and they order annihilating air strikes over the patch of jungle. W hen they come 
back down, none of the men is able to speak, and they refuse to tell their commander what they 
heard: “they just look at him for a while, sort o f funny like, sort o f amazed, and the whole war is 
right there in that stare. (...) It says, poor bastard, you'll never know—wrong frequency—you don't 
even want to hear this. Then they salute the fucker and walk away, because certain stories you 
don't ever tell” (2009, “How to Tell a True War Story”).
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In the Vietnam canon, “Lurpism ” (Ringnalda 1990, 71) has a special connection to one o f its 
major themes, namely the “heart o f darkness,” well-established in Vietnam scholarship, mainly 
via A  Rumor of War and especially Apocalypse Now (“the trope has infiltrated so deeply into 
Western consciousness that the phrase ‘heart o f darkness’ resonates for people who have read no 
Conrad at all. The trope and phrase are also dangerously elastic, capable o f being stretched to 
cover any Western exploit in a non-Western country, as Francis Ford Coppola stretched it to 
cover Vietnam” [Clendinnen 2007, 1]; on Conrad, Apocalypse Now and other Vietnam texts, see 
Aubrey 1991; Cahir 2004; Hellmann 1986, 188 — 202; Herzog 1980; 1988; 2005, 25—31; Martin 
1993, 117 — 120). Unsurprisingly, the source of the darkness is the land itself, the strategy shifting 
the responsibility for whatever happens there onto “Vietnam ”:
To Conrad, the barbarism of Kurtz and of the Belgian enterprise in the Congo is the result 
of being stripped of one’s civilization and exposed to primitive Africa. Conrad argues that 
even the most civilized of us, when removed from civilization, will revert to the savagery of 
Africans. Reading the Vietnam War through Heart of Darkness can thus serve to excuse the 
excesses of U.S. militarism—which become not the results of a calculated policy but the 
product of a hostile and uncivilized landscape and people, a jungle fever in which Americans 
degenerate to the level of Vietnamese. This is a common understanding of the war, both in 
popular entertainments like Apocalypse Now and in Vietnam War novels and memoirs 
(Neilson 1998, 129—130).
In Dispatches, Joseph Conrad’s work is referenced twice. Soon after the Lurp’s story comes the 
list in which Herr enumerates the types o f places occupied by Americans in Vietnam, reachable 
by helicopter: “once we dropped in to feed supply to one man. G od knows what kind of Lord 
Jim  phoenix numbers he was doing in there, all he said to me was, ‘You didn’t see a thing, right 
Chief? You weren’t even here’” (1978, 16). The eponymous hero of Lord Jim  (1900) is an 
Englishman who lives among the Malay natives in the backward fictional Southeast Asian 
country of Patusan, so Herr’s reference seems clear enough—the Special Forces, their embedment 
in the jungle, their cooperation with M ontagnard tribesmen. It is perhaps worth pointing out 
that in Conradian scholarship Patusan has been described as a timeless “world of romance; its 
historical specificity is denied precisely because it is only a stage upon which Jim ’s heroism can 
be played out” (Mongia 1992, 182; in certain respects, Patusan bears symbolic resemblance to 
Africa in Heart of Darkness; see Mongia 1993, 5). The parallel to Loon, though not necessarily
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intentional on Herr’s part, is relevant in so far as Loon is a land extracted from historicity by the 
process o f mythologization of Vietnam, so that it can become a setting of solely American stories 
and conflicts.
“Phoenix num bers” probably refer to the Phoenix Program, ran throughout the American 
war against the N LF by a syndicate o f organizations, most notably the CIA, U.S. special forces 
units, M ACV intelligence, and South Vietnamese government. Phoenix was notorious for 
torture, assassination and murder o f tens o f thousands o f people, controversial intelligence 
gathered during interrogations leading to major military operations like search-and-destroy 
missions, rampant corruption among its Vietnamese elements, and abuse o f civilians resulting 
from all o f the above. This short passage then is another illustration of how the history of the 
war is obscured and mystified: the offhand reference to Conrad hints at an imperial confession, 
given the common perception of a relationship between the author’s oeuvre and late nineteenth- 
century British empire, and highlighted by the ironic reversal o f Jim ’s positive leadership of the 
tribesmen in Patusan into Phoenix’s campaign o f organized murder. The secrecy of the m an’s 
“num bers” in the wilderness, in itself indicative o f the mysteries at the war’s core, is transformed 
into a secrecy of history when Herr’s suggestion of “phoenix” stops at being a Vietnam -flavored” 
word used for a calculated effect, not for elucidation. (Herr could probably assume that the 
phrase would be commonly understood; Phoenix was a subject o f Congressional hearings in 
1971, and agents associated with the program were interviewed on T V  during the early years of 
the decade. That this passage might now be read as symptomatic o f the new secret history is 
rather an example o f how Vietnam narratives could become complicit in the dominant discourse 
regardless o f their authors.)
Herr’s second Conradian reference is to Heart of Darkness (1899), whose narrator, Marlow, is 
also the narrator o f Lord Jim; as mentioned, the internal monologue of the Marlow o f Apocalypse 
Now, Captain Willard, was also written by Herr, so there is an accumulation of connections 
whose hub is constituted by the figure o f the witness absorbed by the “heart o f darkness,” a 
narrator’s role reminiscent o f Herr’s perception of his own transformation from a tourist in Loon 
to a “shooter,” in possession o f experience and knowledge enabling his understanding of the 
Lurp’s story. The reference comes when Herr introduces his colleague and object o f homoerotic 
fascination, Sean Flynn: the son of Errol, a movie actor in his own right, a photojournalist in
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Vietnam, a trope of his own in Dispatches (Harrison 1999), and eventually something of a 
Vietnam legend given the circumstances o f his disappearance and death.50 Here is the very first 
description of Flynn by Herr:
Sean Flynn could look more incredibly beautiful than even his father, Errol, had thirty years 
before as Captain Blood, but sometimes he looked more like Artaud coming out of some 
heavy heart-of-darkness trip, overloaded on the information, the input! The input! He’d give 
off a bad sweat and sit for hours, combing his mustache through with the saw blade of his 
Swiss Army knife (1978, 15).
Antonin Artaud was a French theater director and playwright credited with conceptualizing the 
so-called “Theater o f Cruelty,” which is defined as “a primitive ceremonial experience intended 
to liberate the human subconscious and reveal man to him self’ (W ikipedia 2017), an anti­
Western and determinedly experience-, rather than language-, based concept, whose aim is to get 
beyond “false reality,” and which Herr equals with a “heart-of-darkness trip.” That these 
references occur in this description is significant, since Flynn, “the true connoisseur o f the war 
(...) literally embodies the knowledge Herr comes to Vietnam to claim” (Kinney 2000, 115). By 
the end of the book, in yet another arch that bridges the beginning o f the book with its end, 
Herr divulges that Flynn, as a photographer, “was in so deep he hardly bothered to take [pictures] 
after a while” (1978, 203). Flynn’s trip, it seems, has taken him “deep” into the “heart o f 
darkness” o f the war, where the knowledge is esoteric and experience cannot be mediated, such 
as through photography; Flynn’s transformation from a war photographer into a war 
photographer who takes no photos is really a transformation from a documentarian recording 
the experiences o f the war for the benefit o f the un-witnessing public, into the very embodiment 
o f that experience and the war, and so expressive o f the notion that the secret knowledge of the 
war can only be obtained personally, individually, and locally in Vietnam.
In the same passage in “Breathing O ut,” Herr writes that Dana Stone, the friend and 
photojournalist with whom Flynn was abducted and probably killed, “used to do a far-out thing, 
he’d take pictures o f us under fire and give them to us as presents” ; Herr’s gift photograph 
pictures him hiding from flying bullets in a helicopter with a (presumably) white soldier, a black 
soldier, and a corpse—“while Dana crouched down behind the camera, laughing. (...) [H]e said, 
‘I thought you ought to know what you look like’” (1978, 202). Stone thus becomes an assistant
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in the process o f “man revealing himself to him self’ in the context o f the heavy trip into the war; 
perhaps he is in a position to do that because “after three years he’d turned into the thing he 
came to photograph” (Herr 1978, 203). Like Flynn, then, Stone is in Dispatches an embodiment 
o f the experience of the war. It is therefore unsurprising that when Herr writes about the mystery 
of their disappearance, that “the ground swallowed [Flynn] up ,” “no one I ever knew could have 
dug it like you, Sean” (1978, 203). Herr’s grief for his friends is evident, but at the same time, in 
the dimension of Loon, the disappearance becomes total immersion, the “complete process,” 
the “distinct path to travel, but dark and hard” (discussed above).
Other texts occasionally make nods toward the heart-of-darkness theme, sometimes indirectly 
via similar concepts. Webb, for example, describes the ride o f one of his characters from Danang 
to An Hoa as “a journey into darkness and primitivity” (2001, ch. 3). The theme clearly seems 
to dominate the construction of “Vietnam ” as both war and land in The Things They Carried, not 
only in “Sweetheart,” but also in “The Ghost Soldiers” (“I was N am —the horror, the war” [see 
above]; O ’Brien also calls Vietnam “some kind of soft black protoplasm (...) the blood and the 
flesh” [2009, “Night Life”]; Hasford calls it “a narrow strip o f dried dragon shit” [1988, 49]). 
Caputo applies the heart-of-darkness imagery and vocabulary not as a symbolic mode of 
representation, but rather as a valid factor in determining the American brutality against the 
Vietnamese civilians, which, as a strategy, shifts the responsibility from the soldiers onto the very 
land they have invaded. Caputo makes Vietnam into a primordial realm beyond civilization to 
further his explanation of Americans’ behavior in Vietnam, by claiming that murderous urges 
are universal and natural, and that the environment in Indochina allowed them to surface:
[t]here was nothing familiar where we were, no churches, no police, no laws, no newspapers, 
or any of the restraining influences without which the earth’s population would be reduced 
by ninety-five percent. It was the dawn of creation in the Indochina bush, an ethical as well 
as a geographical wilderness. Out there, lacking restraints, sanctioned to kill, confronted by 
hostile country and relentless enemy, we sank into a brutish state (1985, xviii).
Later, Caputo discusses the ethics o f the war and—strangely, but not unsurprisingly considering 
all the self-absolutory strategies o f his memoir—complains about the imposition o f rules of 
engagement in Vietnam.51 O n that occasion he also claims that “[e]verything rotted and corroded
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quickly over there: bodies, boot leather, canvas, metal, morals. Scorched by the sun, wracked by 
the wind and rain of the monsoon, fighting in alien swamps and jungles, our humanity rubbed 
off o f us (...). [It was] a war for survival waged in wilderness without rules or laws” (1985, 229; in 
the same passage, he calls Vietnam “an inhuman war”—as opposed to human[e] wars?).
But the theme is employed most famously in Apocalypse Now, where Coppola’s Vietnam in 
many respects resembles Loon, his characters—Loon’s inhabitants. The opening of Apocalypse 
Now, for example, is wholly Herresque: like Dispatches, the film begins in a Saigon hotel room; 
while in the book the city is the correspondent’s base, from which the space of Loon can be 
travelled through in all directions, in Apocalypse Now, whose plot is linear rather than “spatial,” 
Saigon is the point o f departure. Herr’s considerations o f the map lead him to the memory of 
Ho Bo W oods, burned with napalm and viewed from a helicopter; in the film, the billowing 
flames engulf a jungle to the whirr o f helicopter rotors. But most importantly, the Vietnam in 
Apocalypse Now reflects Loon in that it is a reconstructed, entirely American, and finally mythical 
landscape; W illard’s river journey is essentially an odyssey through the war, the encounters along 
the way reminiscent o f both Herr’s list o f American places within Vietnam as well as his 
“illumination rounds.” The episodes in Apocalypse Now are more sustained than the short 
“rounds” in Dispatches, but their function, besides o f course propelling the film ’s story forward, 
is essentially similar: to offer meaningful, profound glimpses into the nature o f American 
experience in Vietnam. Sometimes the similarities are uncanny. Lieutenant Colonel Kilgore, for 
example, might have sprung up from the pages o f Dispatches, where Herr writes about the “mad 
colonels,” “saying all the terrible, heartbreaking things,” “so nonchalant about the horror and 
fear” (1978, 188). The black soldiers from the Do Lung Bridge episode in the film similarly bring 
to mind the “death-spaced grunts” from the same passage by Herr, which is, notably, the one in 
which Loon is defined. W here the memoir and the movie meet in the “heart o f darkness,” the 
film ’s Colonel Kurtz is basically a Lurp, symbolically if not nominally: he has trained in the 
Special Forces, he lives among Montagnards, the obscenity o f his outpost recalls the human-ear- 
necklace imagery.
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The purpose o f this chapter has been to show the significant contribution of the reconstructions 
o f the Vietnamese landscape in the American representations o f the war to the process o f the 
conflict’s mythologization. In the memoirs, novels, and films, little is left o f the history as it 
unfolded in Vietnam. Instead, Vietnam turns into “Vietnam”: an American landscape that is, at 
the same time, the war itself, backdrop to the American story as much as the individual stories 
o f American soldiers, those thousands o f small wars fought over the periods o f in-country tours. 
There are several consequences o f such rendering o f the setting. First, because “Vietnam” does 
not extend beyond either the chronology o f the American war, or indeed even beyond the 
chronologies o f the small individual wars, the actual historical and political Vietnamese Vietnam 
ceases to exist. This is as clear-cut an example o f myth obscuring, even obliterating, history as 
one can imagine. Two, because the land and the war become one and the conflict is thus 
naturalized as the status quo of the country, the plight o f the Vietnamese natives becomes 
secondary, since what matters is that the American soldier may survive his tour and escape from 
the throes o f this “homicidal” environment, or he may fall victim to it and die. This is an instance 
of myth naturalizing itself and excluding other stories (histories, interpretations etc.) which are 
outside the ideological propositions accommodated and supported within it. Three, beyond the 
dehistoricization and Americanization of the war that this landscape of “Vietnam” makes 
possible, it also prepares ground for further privileging of other stories which this particular 
American myth generates and upholds. In the following chapter, I look at just those stories, told 
by American veteran authors about themselves and the Vietnamese civilians, and at the strategies 
o f representation which they employ in the context o f the discourse on victimization.

Chapter 3
The Horrors in Quang Ngai: 
Representations of the Victims of “Vietnam”
W hat’s a civilian? 
An officer at Fort Benning, 196952
The North Vietnamese had dug in (...) and there was a battle for 
the town. We went in on the tanks next morning and the enemy 
had fled. Left in the marketplace were five bodies, a woman, 
looked like three kids, and a man, [who] had sort of been all fused
together by napalm. 
Peter Arnett, 197053
3.1. My Lai
O n December 5, 1969, three weeks after the story’s flare-up in U .S. media and almost twenty- 
one months after the actual event, Time published an article concerning the so-called My Lai 
massacre. In the event, several hundreds o f Vietnamese civilians—as is usually the case in wartime 
incidents labelled ‘massacres,’ mostly women, children, and the elderly—had been killed by U .S. 
Army soldiers. O n the cover o f the issue that carried the article was the face o f W illiam Calley, 
the Army lieutenant in charge of the platoon that committed most o f the killings, who had 
recently been charged with murder at My Lai, and who would ultimately be the only person
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found guilty and punished in the case. Above the photograph of Calley, the single cover line 
asked: “T H E M ASSACRE. W here Does the Guilt Lie?” The feature itself opened with a pre-My 
Lai quotation from Richard Nixon, in which the president stated that “North Viet Nam  cannot 
defeat or humiliate the United States. Only Americans can do that” (“American Tragedy” 1969; 
all quotations in this subchapter come from this source, unless otherwise noted). History, of 
course, would prove at least half o f that statement wrong—the Vietnamese would eventually force 
the U .S. out o f Indochina—but the Time article focused on the humiliation part, which the 
author now considered fulfilled:
Yet almost as chilling to the American mind is the character of the alleged perpetrators. The 
deed was not performed by patently demented men. Instead, according to the ample 
testimony of their friends and relatives, the men of C Company [of the 1st Battalion, 20th 
Infantry Regiment, 11th Brigade, Americal Infantry Division] who swept through My Lai 
were for the most part almost depressingly normal. They were Everymen, decent in their 
daily lives, who at home in Ohio or Vermont would regard it as unthinkable to maliciously 
strike a child, much less kill one. Yet men in American uniforms slaughtered the civilians 
of My Lai, and in so doing humiliated the U.S. and called in question the U.S. mission in 
Viet Nam in a way that all the anti-war protesters could never have done.
The article also quoted from a statement by the W hite House, in which the massacre was deemed 
“abhorrent to the conscience of all the American people” ; it cited various committee members, 
with one senator referring to the event as “one of the darkest days in American history,” and 
another responding to a television witness report by asking, “W hat kind of country do we have 
when that kind of garbage gets put on the air?” Senator William Fulbright was quoted as raising 
“a more pertinent question”: “This incident can cause grave concern all over the world as to 
what kind of country we are.” Finally, the author o f the feature concluded the response 
paragraph in their own words: “Countless U .S. citizens, whether foes or critics o f the 
Administration's Viet Nam  policy, were simply shocked and bewildered at the unfolding story, 
so alien did it seem to the America they thought they knew.”
Next, the article developed several paragraphs, each seemingly aimed at clarifying and 
contextualizing the deep-rooted causes of, or at least possible explanations for, what the U .S. 
soldiers had done. The reader learns that the “inexperienced” men of C  Company had only been
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in Vietnam for a month at the time, and had yet to engage in direct combat with large enemy 
forces. Quang Ngai, the province where “My Lai” was located and where C  Company was 
operating as part o f a larger search-and-destroy task force, was known as “the cradle o f revolution” 
in Vietnam because it had once “produced and harbored” Viet M inh’s best warriors in the First 
Indochina War, and now, in 1968, it was a “stronghold” o f the “Viet Cong,” especially o f its 
“48th Local Force Battalion—an outfit with an unnerving ability to disperse, then reappear to 
strike again.”
The soldiers o f C  Company “were also angry. Repeatedly lashed by booby traps and sniper 
fire from unseen “Viet Cong,” the company’s strength had already been cut from 190 to about 
105.” Effectively, the massacre was perpetrated by men of an “edgy company, expecting a firefight 
and anxious to at last even the score for their comrades picked off by an invisible enemy.”
A  horrifying description of the events at “My Lai (4)” (Xom Lang), consisting of recollections 
o f the U .S. soldiers involved or present at the scene, follows. One sergeant appears almost 
perplexed still: the men thought they were going against enemy troops; the Americans were not 
“aware of the fact that [they had] run into civilians.” Suddenly to the sergeant, the huts went up 
in flames, and children began to be shot and killed. Other troops describe in grisly detail some 
of the killings they performed or witnessed, including that o f babies and toddlers and of a group 
of villagers forced into a hut and destroyed with a hand grenade thrown in with them, the orders 
they received, an attempted rape of a 13-year-old girl, piles o f dead people. Sometime after the 
main phase o f the massacre, wounded and maimed people left among the dead bodies were 
“finished off.”
The question of motive returns, and a choice o f quotations from men in the perpetrating 
outfit is offered:
Everyone who went into the village had in mind to kill. (...) We had lost a lot of buddies 
and it was a V.C. [Viet Cong] stronghold. We considered them either V.C. or helping the 
V.C.
It just seemed like a natural thing to do at the time. My buddies had been getting killed or 
wounded. What it really was—it was just mostly revenge.
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You can’t just blame Calley’s platoon; you’ve got to blame everyone. It was a fire-free zone.
And you know, if you can shoot artillery and bombs in there every night, how can the people 
in there be worth so much?
The corporal cited last above, who was not among the perpetrators, is later quoted again: “I can’t 
figure out why everybody is so upset.”
In situ in Quang Ngai, a correspondent has interviewed a woman who was wounded but 
survived the massacre, but whose daughter and four-year-old nephew were killed by the 
Americans. Immediately following her words, a U .S. lance corporal is cited, described as 
“unim pressed”:
They’re all V.C., you can just tell. (...) You don't see many young men in there, do you? All 
women, children and old men. Where'd all those guys? Out with the V.C., that's where. We 
come in at night and sneak into one of their hootches and you know where they are? All in 
their bunkers. They gotta be V.C.
The article reported that there was some resistance among the soldiers, few of whom refused to 
participate in the killing. A  few lines are dedicated to Hugh Thompson, a warrant officer and 
helicopter pilot who arrived at the scene at some point and with his crew carried a number of 
civilians to safety in their craft, and who was later awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross for 
this—for “ ‘disregarding his own safety’ to rescue” the survivors, even though, as the Time feature 
observes drily, “[t]he only danger to him that day was from the free-firing U .S. infantrymen” 
(Thompson had made complaints about what happened at “My Lai,” but his reports were 
initially dismissed, and later only perfunctorily investigated). Som e space is devoted to Ronald 
Ridenhour, a Vietnam veteran who had heard about the massacre from other soldiers and 
eventually sent a letter disclosing the incident to a number of influential figures, including Nixon 
and several Congressmen, which finally led to larger-scale investigation and charges being 
brought against Calley.
Finally, “An American Tragedy” throws its subject into an ever wider, and more unsettling, 
context. Firstly, the readers—many of whom “are seeking comfort in the claim that the massacre 
at My Lai was an isolated incident, unexplainable, and wholly out o f character with U .S. military 
activities”—learn that indeed Americans seem to be killing Vietnamese civilians “often enough,”
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as evinced by surfacing recollections o f soldiers and correspondents, concerning sometimes 
extremely brutal forms o f torturing and murdering suspects and innocents.
Next, the author o f the feature, making a disclaimer that neither point is an excuse for the 
massacre, nonetheless observes that “the U .S. in Vietnam faces an unusually brutal enemy who 
uses terror deliberately.” The next point is even more perplexing: other “W estern nations have 
been guilty o f wartime atrocities,” including the French in Algeria, the British in India, and 
Germans in “Auschwitz, Buchenwald, and Dachau.”
The following two paragraphs are worth citing in full:
Yet a deliberate national policy of genocide is not the same as the unlawful actions of groups 
of soldiers running amuck. The U.S. as a nation bears no guilt equivalent to that of Nazi 
Germany, though perhaps the individual soldier in the American Army who commits an 
atrocity should be judged more harshly than a storm trooper. All the sanctions of his state, 
his education, his training were brought to bear on the Nazi soldier to obey an order, 
including the killing of civilians: it was more difficult for him to disobey. An American 
butchering noncombatants must act against all he has been taught.
Some of the men of Charlie Company say that their act was no different from bombings 
carried out by high-flying pilots—and for peasants the outcome is often deathly similar. This 
argument raises a troubling ethical question about the nature of war; yet it clearly takes 
greater savagery to kill a defenseless human being when one looks into his face than when 
one never sees him.
The racism of the American soldiers toward the Vietnamese is provided as another factor 
contributing to the events at My Lai, as well as “the frustration of guerrilla warfare in a hostile 
countryside, where the enemy wears no uniform, strikes from ambush, and where women do 
fire rifles,” and children may turn out to be “demolition experts” and planters o f landmines. 
Consequently,
[t]hose conditions breed fear and paranoia, in which the young soldier sees all Vietnamese 
as threatening. When he is also weary from hours of trudging through swamp and jungle 
and then sees a friend killed beside him—and friendships are highly emotional bonds in 
combat—a soldier can easily go wild.
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The parents o f one of the perpetrators were interviewed to express their shock and disbelief: 
“Why did they have to take my son and do that to him? (...) I raised him as a good boy, and they 
made a murdered out o f him.”
In the final paragraph of the story, the author mentions guilt, shame, and conscience, and 
concedes that they will have to be shared by the American nation and Army, which raised and 
trained the soldiers o f W illiam Calley’s platoon—but in some vague, undetermined future. At 
the moment,
Above all, the event weighed on the individual soldiers (...). When Private [Paul] Meadlo 
[one of the killers] stepped on a land mine shortly after the massacre and it ripped away his 
foot, he screamed: “God has punished me for what I did in the village.” Other men of the 
company have recurrent nightmares about My Lai. The scene itself is quiet now. All that 
remains today is a low pile of red-brick rubble, scorched black by fire and surrounded by 
fields filled with graves.
There is a good reason for summarizing the old Time article, even though it was, after all, only a 
single piece among countless news reports and editorials in the American press dedicated around 
that time to the freshly-exposed My Lai massacre; just in that particular December issue of the 
Time magazine, for example, “A n American Tragedy” was one o f seven articles about the 
incident. But, apart from a very interesting title, the article also used tropes and strategies that 
would come to characterize the specifically American narrative o f the Vietnam War—or, more 
properly, the narrative o f the Unites States’ conduct and experience in Vietnam. In other words, 
the feature and the arguments presented in it constituted almost a boilerplate o f what would be 
written (or told, or shown, or thought) about the Vietnam War in the U .S . cultural mainstream 
in the upcoming decades.
The resultant understanding o f the conflict is precisely that: o f Vietnam as an American 
tragedy.
The Time article shows that the prevalence of a certain frame of mind, and a certain 
imagination at work in the U .S. as to the country’s own role in the war and its status as one of 
the victimized parties in the conflict, were already manifesting themselves just as the war was still 
very much raging in Vietnam but already turning “bad” in the American press. That is, long 
before the end of the conflict’s American phase and even longer before its literary, cinematic
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and critical narratives and interpretations would start pouring out a decade later, often 
employing the very same strategies and tropes, offering similar interpretations, and ultimately 
reinforcing the view of the war as a tragedy for the United States.
Why did the editors at Time decide to go with this particular headline for the story? W hat— 
what myths, delusions and needs—would compel one to label an event like the massacre at Son 
My an American tragedy? Why were these myths and needs so powerful as to determine much of 
how the Vietnam W ar would come to be represented and interpreted in the U .S. mainstream? 
Or, in other words: “how (...) did a war once perceived as a nearly genocidal slaughter to 
perpetuate American neocolonialism come to be viewed as an American tragedy?” (Neilson 
1998, 5 - 6).
“A n American tragedy ”
Time, traditionally a Republican-leaning publication and pro-war well into Vietnam (Landers 
2004, 108), by 1969 was growing as critical o f the U .S. involvement in Indochina as the 
American press in general and the public opinion itself. But criticism could be directed at various 
objects. To oppose the war could mean, on a deeper level, opposing a number of things. Under 
a certain light, the American literary canon of the war, usually lauded by critics and scholars as 
subversive o f the “official” take on the war, turns out to be subservient to the ideologies 
surreptitiously performing a takeover o f the Vietnam narrative. Similarly (though much earlier), 
“A n American Tragedy,” while righteously outraged with the events at Son My, nevertheless 
applies interpretational suggestions and strategies, which steer the reader toward a particular 
reading of the event, its context, and the U .S. involvement in it, and thus shed light not only on 
the response to the massacre, but to the Vietnam W ar in general. To anticipate much of the 
discussion in the remaining part o f the chapter, here is a list:
1. Humiliation. The sense o f humiliation and shame open and close “An American Tragedy.” 
Neither feeling is, o f course, synonymous with guilt, and although the problem of guilt appears 
in the feature and the massacre is said to have “called in question the U .S. mission in Viet N am ,” 
highlighting the “pertinent question” (“American Tragedy 1969” ; all quotations in this 
subchapter come from this source, unless otherwise noted) o f Senator Fulbright—what the world 
will now think about the United States—suggests that the shame is externalized and bound to
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the concern for the country’s outlook and status as a benevolent superpower. Moreover, the 
emphasis on the emotional response among Americans serves to substitute sentiment for the 
problem of political accountability, and diverts attention away from the actual events occurring 
in Vietnam, the nature (and perhaps even the ideological foundations) o f the U .S. policy there, 
and the urgency of political action, toward less politically dangerous and less potentially 
subversive emotion, and toward the American people themselves, whose emotional wellbeing is 
now considered in a political vacuum alongside the experience of the Vietnamese victims.
2. Everymen and the war itself. Another emotion expressed several times in the story is shock: 
people in the U .S., the author says, are stunned because the perpetrators in Son My are “almost 
depressingly norm al” and “decent in their daily lives.” At several points, the article veers close to 
the banality-of-evil argument, for instance when the mother o f one of the killers is quoted 
bemoaning that “they” took her son, a “good boy,” and “made a murderer out o f him ”; we shall 
see this sentiment rehashed in postwar literature and cinema in the form o f the “what the war 
did to us/heart o f darkness” theme. The problem with this argument, however interesting a 
proposition it might be philosophically, is that it is universalizing. In this instance, it posits the 
importance of external conditions, or indeed agents, without actually naming and exploring 
these conditions and agents, which are, again, specific and rooted in power and politics. 
Consequently, the idea o f the war itself being the cause o f the mass killing at Son My, while not 
technically untrue in the most general sense possible, is advocated: “You can’t just blame Calley’s 
platoon; you’ve got to blame everyone.” But the issue here is that “they,” “everyone,” remain 
unnamed; instead o f zeroing in on specific underlying problems o f the U .S. involvement and 
policy in Vietnam, the article instead opts for the vaguely universal. Indeed, it explicitly denies 
any iniquity in the U .S. intentions and general policy when it does a tricky about-face: firstly, it 
contextualizes Son My by enumerating other war crimes perpetuated by W estern powers so as to 
universalize war atrocity and perhaps diffuse something of the American-focused guilt in this 
case; but then the article points out that that “a deliberate national policy of genocide [the 
Holocaust] is not the same as the unlawful actions o f groups o f soldiers running amuck.” The 
statement—while, again, not technically and generally untrue—nevertheless distracts from the 
possibility that U .S. policy in Vietnam may be flawed to the point o f criminality or entirely 
morally wrong, and simultaneously makes a second about-face in that the “everymen” are now
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an anomaly dissociated from the state as soon as the article gets too close to the notion of political 
culpability. By the end of the article, where the problem of collective American guilt returns, the 
killers are again embraced as having been raised by the nation and its military, both of which 
must somehow share in the responsibility. But this is yet another turn toward the 
universalization of Son  My, diffusion o f accountability, and diversion of attention toward the 
Americans and their soul-searching—perhaps the cause o f the eponymous tragedy.
Hints o f the same reasoning and practice may also be seen in the article’s use o f quotations 
from soldiers who claim the killings at Son My were not fundamentally different from 
Vietnamese deaths as a result o f artillery barrages and bombings—the latter essentially the core 
o f the U .S. military strategy in Indochina that resulted in the most destruction, death, and 
suffering, in South Vietnam, North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. The article acquiesces that 
“for peasants the outcome is often deathly similar,” but immediately it re-focuses the attention 
on Americans, the U .S., and the universalized problem of culpability. Firstly, it is stated that the 
soldiers’ argument “raises a troubling ethical question about the nature o f war”; it is worth 
pointing out that the moral disquietude suggested here refers to warfare in general, not, it seems, 
to the war in question and the U .S. conduct in Vietnam. Secondly, the article continues to 
counterpoint the soldiers’ argument by observing that “ it clearly takes greater savagery” to kill an 
unarmed person face-to-face than to do it from the distance of a bomber jet. But this is so beside 
the point—again, the article turns to a personal quality, savagery, which is a universal concept 
that may be attributed to any individual or group, but which here obscures the systemic 
perversions o f U .S. presence in Indochina. Death of noncombatants at the hands o f Americans 
in Son My is worse than death o f noncombatants from napalm burns caused by a pressing of a 
button only in so far as the first is less palatable for the American audience at home because it 
gets too close to dislodging the nation’s feeling good about itself, its comfort, its myths, and its 
power.
3. Un-American. Closely related to both points above is the staunch insistence that the 
massacre was un-American. Again, although the killers o f Son My are shocking because o f their 
outward “normality,” their actions were markedly uncharacteristic for the people o f the U .S. If 
Son My cannot be compared with a state policy o f genocide such as the Holocaust because it was 
the fault o f a group of savage soldiers and not the U .S. state, it follows that where a German
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soldier in the Nazi regime was indoctrinated to kill civilians, an American soldier partaking in 
such a crime “must act against all he has been taught.” The belief in the essential goodness of 
the U .S. armed forces, at least in their personification in the form of soldiers on the ground, 
stems from the myths o f W orld W ar II, which had not yet been dismantled by the experience of 
Vietnam; the image of a smiling G .I. handing out chocolate bars to European children in 1944 
or 1945 explains the shock in “A n American Tragedy” that his successor might be butchering 
Asian children in 1968, as well as the desperate conviction that the killing is wholly out of 
character. Still, dark clouds are beginning to gather over the G.I., as the article informs its readers 
that indiscriminate killings by American soldiers appear to be common in Vietnam, and 
somewhat meekly points to reports o f the U .S. soldiers’ racism toward the Vietnamese. Hence, 
Son My is turning out to be “abhorrent to the conscience of all American people” and “one of 
the darkest days in American history.” This, perhaps, is another dimension of Son My as an 
American tragedy, even if self-inflicted.
The allegorical G.I. would not come out unscathed from the Vietnamese jungle, o f course. 
In popular culture and memory, the hero of Normandy and Guadalcanal would soon be replaced 
by the psychopath and the paraplegic, the pathetic Vietnam veteran. The change of the image of 
the country’s soldier is one of the most profound cultural outcomes of the Vietnam W ar in the 
U .S., and a reflection o f the change of attitude towards wars and American involvement in them. 
Despite claiming that Calley and the rest had to overcome their American natures to kill the 
people at Son My, “An American tragedy” simultaneously marks the beginning of this shift: 
“many Americans are seeking comfort in the claim that the massacre at My Lai was an isolated 
incident, unexplainable, and wholly out o f character with U .S. military activities. (...) But 
inevitably, the My Lai revelation has started a flood of other horror stories.”
4. The “Viet Cong” and Vietnamese civilians. As in the many subsequent American veteran 
accounts o f the war, so in Time’s article the N LF guerrillas lurk in the background as a mostly 
unseen but passionately despised menace. In terms of enemy representation, the feature again 
foreshadows developments in the future dominant narrative and imagery. Several distinct but 
interconnected themes may be found in “An American Tragedy” with respect to the N LF and 
the U .S. adversity in Vietnam in general.
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First o f all, the article seems to wish to make clear that, apart from the Americal Division, it 
was not only the Germans, the French and the British who had been guilty o f war crimes. Closer 
to the matter at hand, “the U .S. in Vietnam faces an unusually brutal enemy who uses terror 
deliberately.” In fact, this is an “argument” used often in the U .S. press in response to Son My. 
In that very same December 5 issue of Time, another feature was dedicated entirely to the subject 
o f the “Viet Cong” and Com m unist “terror policy”: “For shocked Americans, what happened at 
My Lai seems an awful aberration. For the Communists in Viet Nam , the murder o f civilians is 
routine, purposeful policy” (“O n the Other Side” 1969). Time was not alone in this practice, as 
other U .S. newspapers and magazines also reported on crimes against civilians by the Vietnamese 
(Landers 2004, 107; Oliver 2006, 67-68). One purpose o f this strategy of guilt competition must 
be, o f course, dimming some of the negative spotlight on U .S. actions in Vietnam and at Son 
My in particular, demonstrating, however misguided the points o f comparison (the Nazis, for 
example), that atrocity is simply a part o f war. But Kendrick Oliver, in his book on the American 
response to the Son My Massacre, suggested another possibility as to why emphasis was put on 
the enemy’s practices o f terror, and namely that doing so further stressed the un-Americanness 
o f Calley’s platoon, which they proved by their Vietnamese-like behavior (Oliver 2006, 68-69).
Second of all, the massacre at Son My is contextualized by its location in an area with 
considerable and entrenched N LF presence, a circumstance brought up a number of times to 
reinforce the point, repeated in the soldiers’ quotations, that the perpetrators were “expecting a 
firefight,” not “aware of the fact that [they had] run into civilians,” sure that they were entering 
a “V .C . stronghold” and convinced that the villagers were “either V .C . or helping the V .C .”54 At 
the same time, the “invisibility” of—the inability to find, engage, identify—the insurgent force 
and its members in the countryside is explained as a major frustration for the U .S. troops, and 
indeed one of the reasons o f the perpetrating unit’s “edginess”—and so a partial reason for what 
the Americans did.
Finally, the cause o f the massacre repeated numerous times in “An American Tragedy” is 
perhaps the simplest one: revenge. The reader is frequently reminded that the men of C  
Company had suffered considerable losses (about 85 casualties, according to the figures in the 
article; it is important to remember, however, that this number was likely to include men killed 
as well as wounded). The soldiers were “anxious to (...) even the score for their comrades picked
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off by an invisible enemy”; the “lost buddies” are mentioned a few times in interviews with the 
soldiers. “Everyone who went into the village had in mind to kill,” admits one American. “It was 
just mostly revenge,” confesses another. The author o f the article confirms this particular strand 
of explanation, when they restate toward the conclusion that, given the demanding terrain and 
climate o f Vietnam, when a soldier “sees a friend killed beside him,” he “can easily go wild.”
Indeed, there are hints in the article that the entire surround of Vietnam—its natural 
landscape (Americans are “weary from hours o f trudging through swamp and jungle”) and the 
country itself—is partial justification, if not o f the massacre itself, then at least o f the soldiers’ 
state o f mind. W hen the author explains that “ [t]he strangeness o f Viet N am  to freshly arrived 
U .S. troops and the frustrations o f guerrilla warfare do not adequately explain My Lai,” this 
statement still implies that that to some extent they did.
The subject o f the perceived hostility o f the Vietnamese landscape and its identification with 
the native enemy has been explored in the previous chapter. But, as “A n American Tragedy” and 
the subsequent canon make clear, part o f that Vietnamese surround was the civilian population. 
Although the N LF is consistently referred to as invisible, the article nevertheless returns a 
number of times to the perception that “[t]hey’re all V .C .,” meaning all Vietnamese. The 
American soldiers’ inability to distinguish innocent noncombatants from guerrillas is thus 
presented not as a failure but as the status quo of Vietnam; again, the reality o f this situation is 
confirmed not only by using quotations from the U .S. soldiers who say so, but also by the 
authorial voice o f the article assuming impartiality and so factuality: because the civilians are 
indistinguishable from the “Viet C ong,” the article clarifies again, they contribute to “ [t]hose 
conditions [that] breed fear and paranoia, in which the young soldier sees all Vietnamese as 
threatening.” It would, o f course, be far too far to claim that the article suggested that the 
innocent victims at Son My were at any fault. But something more subtle is at work here: when 
the civilian indistinguishability is presented as a feature o f the Vietnam reality, not only is 
American perspective favored as unfiltered and natural, but the soldiers’ assertion of revenge is 
also rationalized—and rationalizing; a vector o f causality is drawn between the Vietnamese people 
and their relations with the soldiers, and the mindset o f the latter that contributed to the 
massacre. Instead of drawing attention to the indefensibility o f U .S. presence in Vietnam and 
the underlying ideological and political problems marring the country’s involvement in the war,
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the crime is made comprehensible and downsized to the level o f emotion and individual 
culpability. In other words, presenting the indistinguishability o f Vietnamese friend and foe as 
part o f the natural surround of Vietnam, and repeating the soldiers claims of revenge at face 
value and not as basis for critical insight, in fact disguises the U.S.-centrism of this perspective 
and dilutes the critique of the war’s immorality—immorality not in the universal, humanistic 
sense o f “war is hell,” but immorality in the sense o f som eone’s tangible interests, power, and 
political accountability. A nd because these are omitted from the equation, “An American 
Tragedy” proves to be a liberal voice, the chorus o f which would eventually come to dominate 
the Vietnam W ar’s historical memory and thus interpretation, that laments the innocent victims 
while at the same time implicitly accepting the crime as inevitable, part o f business-as-usual in 
war (see also Schlegel 1995, 53-54).
Moreover, within this depoliticized perspective, the notion of revenge exerted on civilians for 
military casualties among soldiers o f an invading force comes close to being legitimized; again, it 
is not that the article states that incidents like Son My should occur or that the “revenge” was 
justified, but it does necessitate the assumption that the brunt o f responsibility is on the civilians 
to make themselves distinguishable so they are not accidentally killed.
All o f the above strategies o f representation—the invisibility o f the enemy, the 
indistinguishability o f the Vietnamese civilians, the notion of retaliation—are all instances not 
only of contextualization, but o f what Amy Schlegel calls “naturalization of the massacre” (1995, 
54). In this final chapter, I move on from representations o f the landscape—of “Vietnam ”—onto 
the representations o f its victims, and the ways in which they come to support the notion of 
American victimization.
5. Redemption and the final scene. The Time’s article leaves its readers with a curious final image: 
a little too-good-to-be-true scene in which one of the killers from Son My loses his foot after 
having stepped on a mine and screams: “G od has punished me for what I did in the village.” 
Having just concluded that the guilt and responsibility for the massacre would have to at some 
point be shared by all Americans but that they are for the moment borne by the “individual 
soldiers,” the feature thus again removes the events at Son My from the political realm and moves 
them into the personal; the need for accountability is replaced by the need for redemption. This 
impression is reinforced stylistically by the closing of the story, where “[a]ll that remains (...) is a
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low pile o f red-brick rubble, scorched black by fire and surrounded by fields filled with graves.” 
The problem is, o f course, that this melancholy image is meant to not only suggest an ending 
where there is none, but also to nullify something of the legitimate political and activist outrage 
that might be occasioned by the Son My Massacre, by indulging in an aesthetic and emotional 
form of response—that moreover symbolically clears the Vietnamese countryside, leaving a quiet 
afterimage o f graves and ruins, suggesting the opportunity to move on.
3.2. A war between victims
That a mainstream magazine editorial from 1969, and a slew o f fictional and creative narratives 
publishes a decade and two later, would find the same strategies to expound on the misconduct 
o f American soldiers in Vietnam suggests a certain unanimity of thinking about the U.S. 
involvement, sustained over time. A nd if these rationalizations likely stemmed from pain and 
shock at what one, or one’s country, had done there, the reverberations o f this very sustainment 
would be ideological, or consequential for how the U .S. involvement and conduct in Indochina 
could be perceived and judged. In the remaining part o f this chapter, I discuss the ways in which 
the notion of victimization has been handled in the American Vietnam canon in the context of 
the relations between Vietnamese civilians and American soldiers, the two groups most readily 
defined as victims. As we shall see, the bulk of the works analyzed weave a complex tapestry of 
the infliction of suffering and o f death: while the villagers are victims o f Americans and of other 
Vietnamese, the Americans are victims of “Vietnam ” and all that it connotes, including its 
people as much as, as we have seen, its landscape. Again, as I have done thus far, I look for 
patterns and discursive similarities across the canon that can be classified as strategies of 
representation. A nd if among the effects o f the mythological reconstructions o f the Vietnamese 
landscape were the dehistoricization of the war and its total Americanization, the scope of the 
ideological renderings o f the war’s meanings made possible by the designation of victimhood is 
revealed at this point precisely: in the relationship of the American soldier and the Vietnamese 
civilian, a circumstance so intense, it would seem, that it excludes completely the upper echelons 
o f American power, and the extent and viciousness o f the American-wrought destruction.
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A necklace of tongues
The previous chapter ended with a discussion of the “Lurps,” or special-training troops serving 
in the Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP) units, and the roles they play in several 
American narratives o f Vietnam. Lurps, in the guise o f the Green Berets but fulfilling their 
symbolic function, make yet another significant appearance in the literary/cinematic canon in 
Tim O ’Brien’s short story “Sweetheart o f the Song Tra Bong,” from The Things They Carried (the 
story was made into a little-known 1998 film starring Kiefer Sutherland, titled A  Soldier’s 
Sweetheart). In the story, told to the book’s narrator by medic Rat Kiley who claims to have 
witnessed it, a soldier in a small, remote first-aid outpost by the Tra Bong village (Quang Ngai) 
manages to “ship” his Stateside girlfriend, Mary Anne, to Vietnam so she can stay with him. 
Mary Anne is seventeen years old, blond, blue-eyed, long-legged, “bubbly,” just the right amount 
o f flirtatious, “good for morale” (2009, “Sweetheart o f the Song Tra Bong”). She knows that she 
will get married to her boyfriend, that they will have three children, and that they will die together 
after a happy life. But, while she initially stays glued to her partner, Mary Anne is also smart and 
curious, so she begins to pick up phrases in Vietnamese from the ARVNs securing the outpost, 
to learn the traditional ways o f preparing rice, to help in the emergency first-aid surgeries the 
medics in the outpost provide, to handle weapons. Despite the danger (VC!), she persuades her 
boyfriend to go down to the village, through which she strolls like an enthusiastic tourist. As her 
knowledge o f living at the outpost and in Vietnam grows, so does her confidence; she becomes 
less talkative, she discards her cosmetics and jewelry, and the plans for a happily married future 
begin to get hazy. Finally, one night she disappears; it turns out she has spent the night out on 
ambush with the six Green Berets who have a base camp adjacent to the first-aid outpost. W hen 
her boyfriend wants to send her home, she leaves with the Greenies for three weeks. The 
boyfriend and another soldier confront her at the Greenies’ shack after she returns, but Mary 
Anne is “gone,” she talks to them briefly but it is clear she will not come with them; she is singing 
in an unknown language to some unearthly music, and she is wearing a necklace made of human 
tongues. In the end she disappears into the jungle completely. A n official search is conducted to 
find her, but it ends after a week with no results. According to the man telling the story, Mary 
Anne has become a shadowy, threatening presence moving through the landscape which the 
Greenies still operating in the area occasionally sense.
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M ost academic readings o f the story have unsurprisingly focused on the subject o f gender 
representations. Moreover, O ’Brien apparently deliberately strived to rework Heart of Darkness in 
“Sweetheart” (Bates 1996, 156), and additionally many critics have also observed the similarity 
o f the story to Apocalypse Now, both references evident especially in Mary A nne’s “inward 
journey” and eventual transformation, but also in the description of the Greenies’ shack where 
she is last seen resembling Colonel Kurtz’s compound in the film (“Sweetheart” has been called 
a “bizarre female heart o f darkness story” [Ringnalda 1994, 109]; see also Clarke 2013, 138-139 
[and bibliography there for additional sources on the subject]; Kinney 2000, 155-156; Smith 
1994, 32).
In a way, “Sweetheart” constitutes an ideal American Vietnam story. First o f all, the 
publication of The Things They Carried in 1990 closed the period o f canon-formation, at least in 
literature (in cinema, one still has to reckon with Forest Gump released four years later). Although 
some of the stories in the collection had been published earlier, “Sweetheart” was first printed 
in Esquire in 1989, which meant that O ’Brien could presumably write it with most o f the canon 
already in mind; the Apocalypse Now connection is one instance suggesting this awareness, and, 
as I have mentioned before, there is much of Michael Herr to be found in the book, too. His 
decision to grapple with the heart-of-darkness theme via important earlier Vietnam texts is 
therefore significant as a choice o f a specific Vietnam cultural narrative. Second of all, in 
“Sweetheart” the takeover o f Vietnam and its landscape, as in the rest o f The Things They Carried, 
is complete, constituting something o f a culmination of the trend in the canon.
The compound where the story is set, and where Mary Anne arrives, is not only remote, but 
also embedded deeply into the natural environment. It is no surprise that the Green Berets 
would find a home in this lush, complex landscape. The Lurp-like character o f the men is 
established early on:
The Greenies were not social animals. Animals, Rat said, but far from social. They had their 
own hootch at the edge of the perimeter, fortified with sandbags and a metal fence, and 
except for the bare essentials they avoided contact with the medical detachment. Secretive 
and suspicious, loners by nature, the six Greenies would sometimes vanish for days at a time, 
or even weeks, then late in the night they would just as magically reappear, moving like 
shadows through the moonlight, filing in silently from the dense rain forest off to the west
(2009, “Sweetheart”).
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The place has an otherworldly quality to it, however, because, despite its location, it remains 
remarkably safe and unharassed by the war. Also, apart from the typically standoffish and 
enigmatic Greenies, there are even no officers in the outpost, the highest rank among the medics 
being a mere staff sergeant. This setup gives the idea o f an enlisted man bringing his girlfriend 
to Vietnam more plausibility, but at the same time O ’Brien also clears the space to accommodate 
his symbolic story there, without distractions o f the conflict: as one o f the medics in the 
compound says, “no war here” (2009, “Sweetheart”). Extraction of Vietnam from history cannot 
be more precise, more total, than in this instance.
Mary A nne’s transformation begins with the fact that “[t]he war intrigued her. The land, too, 
and the mystery” (O ’Brien 2009, “Sweetheart”). The conflation of the three items is a spelling- 
out o f Herr’s project o f reconstructing Loon as much as a declaration of engaging the heart-of- 
darkness theme. Early on in her “journey,” where she begins to show disregard to the dangers of 
the Song Tra Bong, the medics remark among themselves, “ ‘She’ll learn.’ (...) ‘There’s the scary 
part. I promise you, this girl will most definitely learn’” (O ’Brien 2009, “Sweetheart“). The irony 
of the statement is o f course that she will, only not in the sense the men mean it—Mary Anne 
will gradually become, and eventually transcend, a Greenie, and possess a complete knowledge 
of the land. Rat Kiley witnesses the moment she and the Greenies return after their three-week 
absence:
off to the west a column of silhouettes appeared as if by magic at the edge of the jungle. At 
first he didn't recognize her—a small, soft shadow among six other shadows. There was no 
sound. No real substance either. The seven silhouettes seemed to float across the surface of 
the earth, like spirits, vaporous and unreal. (...) [H]e picked out Mary Anne's face. Her eyes 
seemed to shine in the dark—not blue, though, but a bright glowing jungle green (O’Brien 
2009, “Sweetheart”).
Spectrality is usually reserved for representations o f the enemy, NVA and N LF fighters, so by 
describing the Greenies and Mary Anne in such way O ’Brien signals their unity with the land 
and the secret threat they pose. W hen Rat and the boyfriend decide to enter the Greenies’ shack 
to confront Mary Anne, in the place—reminiscent o f Kurtz’s lair in Apocalypse Now—they find 
heaps o f bones, burning candles, a decaying head of a leopard, a revolting smell (“joss stick and
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incense (...) blood and scorched hair and excrement and the sweet-sour odor o f moldering 
flesh”), and “a weird deep-wilderness sound—tribal music—bamboo flutes and drums and 
chimes” (O ’Brien 2009, “Sweetheart”). There is also a poster saying, “A S S E M B L E  Y O U R  O W N  
G O O K !! F R E E  S A M P L E  K IT !!” (O ’Brien 2009, “Sweetheart”). Mary Anne, wearing the repulsive 
necklace o f dried, leathered human tongues, tells the visitors:
“You're in a place (...) where you don't belong."
She moved her hand in a gesture that encompassed not just the hootch but everything 
around it, the entire war, the mountains, the mean little villages, the trails and trees and 
rivers and deep misted-over valleys.
"You just don't know," she said. “You hide in this little fortress, behind wire and sandbags, 
and you don't know what it's all about. Sometimes I want to eat this place. Vietnam. I want 
to swallow the whole country—the dirt, the death—I just want to eat it and have it there 
inside me. (...) When I'm out there at night, I feel close to my own body (...). I know exactly 
who I am. You can't feel like that anywhere else" (O’Brien 2009, “Sweetheart”).
By understanding the nature o f the secret knowledge which Vietnam offers, and recognizing it 
as deeply personal, Mary Anne takes the Lurp/G reenie myth as far as it will stretch, to the point 
where it almost becomes parodic. But this monologue also signals that she is on the verge of 
transcending the Greenies, which she soon does: she starts going barefoot, she discards her 
weapons, she seems to be moving “in the dense terrain of a nightmare” (O ’Brien 2009, 
“Sweetheart”), she begins disappearing for periods o f time until she takes o ff into the mountains 
and becomes a phantom, a presence in the jungle. “She had crossed to the other side,” O ’Brien 
writes, “She was part o f the land” (2009, “Sweetheart”). In so doing, Mary Anne “completes the 
process” Herr described in Dispatches; like Sean Flynn, swallowed by the ground before her, she 
“joins the missing” (Kinney 2000, 154). In fact, the imagery toward the end o f the story becomes 
distinctly Herresque: Vietnam is likened to a drug; in Vietnam, “you go wherever the trip takes 
you” (O ’Brien 2009, “Sweetheart”). W hen O ’Brien writes that “[w]hat happened to her (...) was 
what happened to all o f them. You come over clean and you get dirty and then afterward it's 
never the sam e” (O ’Brien 2009, “Sweetheart”), the reader is reminded of the often quoted 
passage from Dispatches: “I went to cover the war and the war covered me; an old story, unless of 
course you’ve never heard it” (Herr 1978, 24). In the end, the elemental passage Mary Anne
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undergoes is inextricable from Loon, also as the extra-historical, total-environment war. W hen 
Rat Kiley is challenged by his listeners about the veracity o f Mary A nne’s tale, he says: “you don ’t 
know human nature. You don ’t know N am ” (O ’Brien 2009, “Sweetheart”), thus connecting, if 
not actually merging, the two. (The colloquial phrase that suggests itself here, “you don’t know 
shit,” is a further possible link to the knowledge that Vietnam offers.)
To reiterate, “Sweetheart” is an ideal American Vietnam story because it consciously engages 
with an interpretation of the war promoted in some of the most influential texts about the 
conflict, thus constructing an archetypal narrative o f what happened to Americans in “N am .” 
To accommodate the story, this “Vietnam ” is removed from history and emptied of the authentic 
Vietnamese Vietnam. As Milton Bates observes, this creates a typical heart-of-darkness problem, 
because “Sweetheart” completes the mystification of the war: “it suggests that the war is so alien, 
so unprecedented in ordinary human experience, that it can transform an innocent young 
woman into a remorseless killer almost overnight” (1996, 157). Rat Kiley finally admits that he 
fell in love with Mary Anne, because, unlike women back in “the W orld,” she experienced and 
understood Vietnam; others will never do, because they were not there. Lorrie Smith adds that 
this precious experience was still “conceived in masculine terms—fighting—rather than any of the 
other role women actually did play in Vietnam ” (1994, 32). But Mary A nne’s presence in 
Vietnam literature should not be considered simply along the lines o f two genders; rather, as 
Katherine Kinney suggests, ethnicity and Mary A nne’s imperial status need to be acknowledged: 
her “identification with the land displaces the Vietnamese even as it makes manifest the 
gendered construction of the imperial landscape. The Vietnamese are literally dismembered, 
figured only as pieces o f skin and the tongues Mary Ann [sic] has appropriated to voice her own 
experience” (2000, 156).
In a recent article, Michael Tavel Clarke (2013) polemicizes with the readings o f O ’Brien’s 
work in general which posit that his fiction fails to challenge American imperialism in relation 
to Vietnam due to its “solipsism,” its preoccupation with storytelling and its inwardness 
translating into an exclusively Americentric concern (for example: “it is precisely the postmodern 
elements o f The Things They Carried that contribute to its solipsism and ethnocentrism. (...) 
[O ’Brien] details the uncertain effects o f an unreal war upon an unknowable self but fails to 
examine its all too real effects upon the Vietnamese” [Neilson 1998, 204]). Instead, Clarke argues
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that “Sweetheart,” like the rest o f The Things They Carried, is a deliberate exposure o f such solipsism, 
that by employing such narrative strategies and imageries, O ’Brien intends to draw attention to 
and deconstruct American imperialism in Vietnam, through the character o f Mary Anne among 
others, whom Clarke sees as the most solipsistic in the short story collection, and also the most 
entangled, via her reference to Kurtz, in imperialism. The irony of the failure o f his argument is 
that his criticism is not inaccurate, for example when he writes that, “[a]n excessive focus on the 
national self is at the very least a component o f imperialism and arguably a central cause of 
imperialism. It is also significant that [“Sweetheart”] reenacts this process” (2013, 139). The 
failure lies rather in Clarke’s persuasion that the story itself is deconstructive o f the very problems 
it poses, simply because it “reenacts” them. The trouble is that the story nowhere reveals its 
deconstructive nature, or exposes its ideological constructedness. Clarke’s reading assumes that 
the reader coming to this text will be immediately, and with no help from the text itself, aware 
of its irony, even though it would require not an insubstantial awareness o f American 
imperialism and its practices, also narrative practices, in the first place. The absence of the 
Vietnamese in “Sweetheart” is either not meant to or unable to draw attention to itself, after all, 
unless the reader is conditioned to look for it; because the war is not “here,” the actions o f Mary 
Anne and the Greenies may appear to be victimless. Therefore, when Clarke writes that, like 
Mary A nne’s story which enacts “an imperial solipsism (...) as if to expose its own investment in 
that practice” (2013, 140), the whole collection in this context “explores the dangers o f an 
excessive inward focus” (2013, 141), it is like saying that Gone With the Wind “explores” the racial 
injustices o f the postbellum South. In other words, Clarke treats “Sweetheart” as a diagnosis, 
not as a symptom.
Given his stance, it is not surprising that Clarke can interpret Mary A nne’s tongue necklace 
as another self-reflexive device, symbolizing both the character’s unseen violence against the 
Vietnamese and the story’s own suppression of Vietnamese “voices” (2013, 138-139). But even 
if we agree, then this supposed “criticism” conveyed in the tale is impotent: the text remains a 
story of an American wearing hum an tongues as jewelry, not a story of the suffering of the 
humans whose tongues the American cuts out; there is nothing subversive in removing the act 
o f violence off-stage, especially if the people who are the objects o f this violence are still 
represented as leathered strips o f skin more symbolic o f Mary A nne’s transformation than of
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their own “silence.” Clarke’s own argument supports this privileging of Mary A nne’s experience 
when he writes that the necklace stands in for her violence against the Vietnamese “[o]n a surface 
level,” while it “also represents the dangers o f [her] journey into the se lf ’ (2013, 138-139), 
suggesting a reading in which what happens to the people is only superficially significant, while 
the violent ritual is what matters. Kinney makes a somewhat similar point as to interpretation, 
when she reads the necklace as testifying to Mary A nne’s “violently earned right to tell war 
stories” (2000, 155; see also Sm ith 1994, 35, who finds several “meanings” o f the necklace, most 
o f them sexual and gender-related). However, instead of crediting the story with using the 
gruesome accessory as a symbol o f the erasure o f Vietnamese voices, Kinney more convincingly 
connects it to Herr and the land of Loon, through a fragment in Dispatches from the same passage 
in which both Sean Flynn’s and Dana Stone’s heart-of-darkness trips are concluded, and death 
is identified as “pure essence of Vietnam” : “the moment of initiation where you get down and 
bite off the tongue of a corpse” (1978, 203).
American war crime literature 
In another possible reading of the necklace o f hum an tongues which Marry Anne wears in 
O ’Brien’s “Sweetheart o f the Song Tra Bong,” even the imperialistic dimension of the text is in 
the end less important than what is obscured and mystified in the story. The United States can 
get over being branded as an empire; symbolic readings like Clarke’s o f “Sweetheart” are in the 
end innocuous, since imperialism is so interwoven with American mythology that the dominant 
ideologies o f American nationalism can take it. It is more productive to treat the necklace of 
tongues not as a representation o f Mary A nne’s violence, but rather as strictly evidence o f it. Mary 
Anne is, after all, a war criminal.
Mutilation o f corpses, even of enemy soldiers, is a war crime, regardless o f how often the 
reader encounters this practice in American Vietnam literature as just one more thing the U.S. 
soldiers did. It should also not be viewed only in the context o f the battlefield, or as separate 
from other atrocities. N ick Turse, for example, in a chapter which documents the history of 
widespread American atrocity against villagers in Quang Nam, records an incident in 1967 when 
“a living woman (...) had an ear cut off while her baby was thrown to the ground and stomped 
on” (2013, ch. 4) by soldiers o f an infantry company. Viewed as an obscured war crime,
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“Sweetheart” is the story of a radical liberation of a white American woman, who takes symbolic 
possession of the Vietnamese landscape, at the cost o f the inhabitants o f this land against whom 
she perpetrates violence. W hen in American narratives the phrase “Indian Country” is used, it 
suggests a link to American mythology and pop culture, but a story like Mary Anne’s reveals the 
full implication of what Vietnam as Indian Country means: mass death of the natives. O ’Brien’s 
story is not a shrewd take on the violence perpetrated in the name of empire, but a mystified and 
symbolically-rendered reenactment o f war crime and murder committed to gain land for 
American use—not an exposure o f imperial practice or a commentary upon it, but an imperial act.
The poster in the Greenies’ shack, advertising “assembling your own gook,” referring to the 
fact that Americans removed various body parts from the Vietnamese (ears, noses, fingers, hands, 
feet, teeth, heads), also seems to have a connection to Dispatches, where Herr writes that “we’d 
all heard about the man in the Highland who was ‘building his own gook’” (1978, 35; it is a 
passage in which Herr interweaves marijuana consumption with atrocity, like ear-collecting, and 
composes a list o f smokers: “Lurps, seals, recondos, Green-Beret bushmasters, redundant 
mutilators, heavy rapers, eye-shooters, widow-makers, nametakers, classic essential American 
types”; it is interesting that Lurps, Green Berets, and the other SF  “types” are listed alongside 
the others, as if Herr is suggesting that all belong to the same category). U sed somewhat 
nonchalantly as a creepy-house decoration of sorts, the poster highlights the atmosphere inside 
the shack—inside the heart o f darkness—while at the same time again performing mystification. 
The word “gook” is an essential staple o f the vocabulary in American Vietnam texts, but it is also 
a racial slur which translates into a dehumanization of the Vietnamese that enabled the crimes 
against them to be perpetrated and ignored on all levels o f the American military, from the 
generals signing orders to spray the villages with Agent Orange to the privates and corporals 
shooting peasant children (infamously, William Calley was originally charged with murder of 
“Oriental human beings”; see Hersh 1970, 180).
W ar crime—the mutilations, shooting civilians, torture o f prisoners, rape, burning houses, 
killing livestock, destruction of property—is so common in American Vietnam literature and 
cinema that it becomes normal and expected. For example, in an early essay on the realism and 
mythology of Platoon, Thomas Prasch somewhat unselfconsciously observes that the film features 
disturbing episodes “which audiences simply expect a ‘true’ account o f Vietnam to take account
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of. These include such major events as the murder o f civilians, the torching of a village, and the 
near-rape of some Vietnamese girls” (1988, 199). In another example, in the documentary Hearts 
of Darkness (1991), about the making of Apocalypse Now, an actor playing one of the boat crew 
says that once the cast had internalized the “m adness” o f the narrative and began improvising 
scenes, “Francis [Coppola] had us write up lists o f things that we wanted our characters to do. I 
remember we all decided that we wanted to do sort o f a My Lai massacre.” Violence against 
civilians comes to define the Vietnam canon to such an extent it should not be considered war 
literature as much as war crime literature.55
This has the effect o f naturalizing mistreatment o f civilians, whose suffering at the hands of 
Americans becomes an essential part o f the Vietnam narrative. James W ebb’s Fields of Fire, which 
belongs to texts most firmly embedded in the canon (it has been on the Marine Com m andant’s 
Recommended Reading List for two decades), tells its story from the point o f view of a host of 
characters. One of them is Dan, a Vietnamese man, whose thoughts often return to this point, 
reminiscent o f Herr’s “no country here but the war”: “[w]ar is as natural as the rains. There are 
years when there is no war and there are seasons without rain. But always war and rain return. 
There is no difference. It is the nature o f things. Thunder booms and so does artillery. (...) One 
brother died from cholera. One brother died from Marine gunfire. There is no difference” (2001, 
ch.15; Dan thoughts are strangely Americanized, in that he uses the marines’ terms and names, 
for example “gook sores” for a skin disease blighting the peasant population). Watching a crowd 
of disfigured, napalm-burned children outside o f a hospital, Lieutenant Hodges thinks to himself 
that “the Marines in the convoy [passing the children] did not mangle them. Buddha merely 
turned his head. Som e days it rains rain (...). Som e days it rains other things” (2001, ch. 34). 
Sitting in a bunker with his wife and children, Dan listens as “rounds crashed in unexpectedly 
all through the village, slowly, one round at a time. (...) [The villagers] viewed the rounds as one 
would view a rainstorm. Som e nights there were artillery rounds. Som e nights there were no 
artillery rounds. It did no good to question it. Questions would not change it any more than 
they would change the pattern of rainstorms” (2001, ch. 15). Later, it is also said that villagers do 
not understand the connection between the Americans in the field, whom they view in awe as 
godlike, and artillery strikes that destroy their villages (2001, ch. 19). Vietnamese villagers were 
probably capable o f understanding where air strikes and artillery barrages came from, and that
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whatever their political views about Ho Chi Minh, the Americans were not viewed as equals to 
the NVA or the N LF in the countryside (Neilson 1998, 106-107). There is something 
presumptuous about Webb’s, a marine in Vietnam, ascribing this line o f thinking to a 
Vietnamese civilian, in this case a character who has lost his entire family in the war. By putting 
these words in D an’s mouth, a native, Webb reinforces the naturalization of the war in Vietnam 
and at the same time absolves the United States o f their sins in Indochina—after all, the locals 
have gotten used to it. It has become part o f the region’s climate. You can complain about the 
Americans as much as you can about the monsoons.
A  similar comparison is made by Philip Caputo in his memoir A  Rumor of War, who, walking 
through the ruins o f the village a platoon in his company burnt to the ground the day before, is 
struck by the indifference of the people still searching in the wreckage for their possessions: “ [i]t 
was as if they regarded the obliteration of their village a natural disaster and, accepting it as part 
o f their lot, felt no more toward us than they might feel toward a flood” (1985, 133). Caputo is 
at first angry at the people for behaving in this way (“Americans would have done something” 
[1985, 134]) and thinks o f them as inhuman, which cancels any pity he might have otherwise 
felt; he admits, however, that his attitude toward these people at that time stemmed from his 
ignorance of their daily ordeals. Realizing later that the villagers in South Vietnam had to adapt 
to the war in such way to survive and keep their sanity, he again makes a nature-based 
comparison: “ [l]ike the great Annamese Mountains, they endured” (1985, 134; see also Webb 
2001, ch. 19: the “pains” o f the war were “as inevitable as old age”).
But in Fields of Fire W ebb is not yet done with Dan. The character is milked for all the pro­
marine, pro-American uses that can be found. For example, Dan is a despicable opportunist. He 
is a peasant forced against his will into the NLF, from which he escapes and joins the book’s 
protagonist marine unit as a translator; later he fights with the South Vietnamese regular forces, 
from which he deserts to join the NVA. He is not a particularly sympathetic character: Webb 
used him not only to convey the notion of the “naturalness” o f the war, but also shows him as a 
rapist and a calloused man extraordinarily cruel towards other Vietnamese, abusing whatever 
power he has as a translator with the Americans, calloused because the N LF had killed his family 
and he turned against the other Vietnamese. His character is also used to mystify the Vietnamese 
cause. D an’s brother had joined the N LF and was killed: he “had left his family to starve so that
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he could die for his people” Dan thinks bitterly and with sarcasm; while the farmers toil and starve, 
“in the mountains the men live comfortably in caves and thatch shelters” (2001, ch. 15; emphasis 
added; the soldiers and guerillas living in the wilderness did not live comfortably, but rather in 
conditions far worse to those o f the Americans). Instead of resistance, Dan, the novel’s 
spokesperson for the Vietnamese, preaches waiting the U.S. marines and the NVA out, as if the 
two are equal calamities. Rather fascinatingly, toward the end of his story, Dan admits that the 
only time he felt good and happy in the war was when he was with the marines: he misses them! 
And so, not only is the American presence in Vietnam as natural as the monsoons, Webb 
persuades us through Dan, but the Vietnamese can find comfort in it, too.
Moreover, in Fields of Fire as in other American texts, because the U .S. soldiers are always 
meant to be the party in the stories with whom the reader identifies, the civilian suffering 
becomes instrumental, framed so that it is not primarily the consequence of American crime 
exerting high toll on Vietnamese communities, but rather as a factor in the American-on- 
American struggle, in American soul-searching, or in American victimization by the war and 
“Vietnam .” In American texts, the strategies o f representing victimhood, both Vietnamese and 
American, are in the end strategies o f handling war crime: they are strategies o f mystification, 
neutralization, justification, universalization, and above of all o f privileging American traumatic 
experience and victimization. For this reason, and because the authors are veterans or 
correspondents with firsthand experience, I argue that it is possible to read American Vietnam 
texts as perpetrator literature, in addition to just “war crime literature,” or as perpetrator narratives, 
if we include cinema.56
In Robert Stone’s Dog Soldiers, a novel that begins in Vietnam before moving on to the States, 
the two protagonists and old friends, Converse and Hicks—one a washed-out writer, now a 
correspondent in search of inspiration, the other an ex-marine and veteran, now a merchant 
marine—meet in a bar somewhere on the South Vietnamese coast and talk. Reflecting on his 
coming to Vietnam, Converse says,
“I feel like this is the first real thing I ever did in my life. I don’t know what the other stuff 
was about.”
“You mean you enjoy it?”
“No,” Converse said. “I don’t mean that at all.”
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“It’s a funny place,” Hicks said.
“Let smiles cease,” Converse said. “Let laughter flee. This is the place where everybody 
finds out who they are.”
Hicks shook his head.
“What a bummer for the gooks.” (...)
“You can’t blame us too much. We didn’t know who we were till we got here. We 
thought we were something else” (Stone 1994, 56-57).
Converse sounds quite like Mary Anne: she, too, felt like in Vietnam she knew exactly who she 
was, and claimed one could not feel the same way anywhere else. The sentiment o f Converse the 
correspondent also recalls Michael Herr’s ambivalence of not “enjoying” the war outright, and 
yet somehow appreciating the experience of it. A nd the price for the self-discovery—Mary A nne’s, 
the Americans’—is the “bummer for the gooks.”
Let us return to the story of Mary Anne. As noted, the setting of “Sweetheart” is, like Loon 
or the Vietnam in Apocalypse Now , a symbolically colonized land, so that war crime can become 
an issue beyond morality and culpability o f the soldiers, and turn into a setup for “friendly fire” 
or a matter o f an “inward journey” or a “heart o f darkness,” both universalized and 
individualized concepts o f “human nature.” W hen her boyfriend meets her in the Greenie shack, 
surrounded by the smell o f decay, singing unintelligibly, and wearing the tongue necklace, she 
tells him: “I know what you think, but it’s n o t .  it’s not bad” (O ’Brien 2009, “Sweetheart” ; 
emphasis in original), the italics suggesting the familiar ambivalence regarding violence as the 
road to Vietnam nirvana. In late 1980s, in the Rushdie interview, Herr formulated a somewhat 
similar interpretation o f the war:
[Herr:] “I was politicized by the war and then went to a stage beyond politics. It became 
critically nullified by the overwhelming experience of being there. The war was behaviour. 
Archetypal behaviour beyond judgement.” But is there such a thing? Isn't that a kind of 
exoneration? “I don't want to exonerate them. It’s just that from the outside the war was 
perceived as an exclusively political event. On the inside it was fundamentally and eternally 
a human event. And it’s going to be a human event much longer than a political one”
(Rushdie 1991, 335).
The war is here reimagined as both a “behavior,” a perspective in which, yet again, only the 
American presence and experience in Vietnam matters; and a depoliticized space insulated
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against the outside world, history, and politics, where that “behavior” cannot be judged: it just 
was, the way it was. (Beidler again: “whether at a certain point Vietnam simply started looking 
like a second-rate Catch-22 (...) is probably now something that is just not worth trying to figure 
out. Like most things connected with the war, it just happened” [2007, 12-13].) This is an 
extremely zoomed-in view. W hen Herr says that the “hum an” dimension of the war will far 
outlive its political dimension, his words align perfectly with the 1980s dominant discourse of 
almost hysterical attention given the veterans with the simultaneous erasure o f the history of the 
war and of American crimes.
It is worth returning briefly to the beginning of “Sweetheart” and the description of the area 
where the medical com pound was situated, in the vicinity o f Tra Bong: “[t]o the north and west 
the country rose up in thick walls o f wilderness, triple-canopied jungle, mountains unfolding 
into higher mountains, ravines and gorges and fast-moving rivers and waterfalls and exotic 
butterflies and steep cliffs and smoky little hamlets and great valleys o f bam boo and elephant 
grass” (O ’Brien 2009, “Sweetheart”). The inclusion of the human settlements in a list o f natural 
features is perhaps innocuous enough, but it also helps reconstruct the mythic Vietnam where 
Americans come to “find out who they are,” while the crimes they perpetrate, and the experience 
of their victims, fade into secondariness. Indeed, in much of the canon the peasants come to be 
viewed as fixtures o f the landscape that exist solely for their interactions with the Americans and 
vanish when removed from that context (“ [p]opular conceptions o f the war have little room for 
the Vietnamese, even though the war was fought on their soil, resulted in deaths and injuries in 
the millions, and imposed lasting societal costs. Vietnamese appear at best on the periphery, 
limited to cameo appearances” [Hunt 2010, xix]; “in practically all American novels about 
Vietnam, the Vietnamese characters, especially—if they appear at all—those of the ‘other side,’ 
remain abstract, and function as a supporting cast for American protagonists” [Holbling 2007, 
105]; “ in most American Vietnam W ar representations the Vietnamese are not even supporting 
characters as they disappear and the Americans take center stage” [Boyle 2015a, 7]). Indeed, it 
has been possible to write a praised and influential book about Vietnam without much recourse 
to the Vietnamese people at all, as we have seen with Herr (or, in cinema, with Apocalypse Now).
Another strategy of mystification occurs in regard to destruction of settlements. “You always 
know where the first platoon is, Hodges was fond of joking,” we read in Fields of Fire. “Just follow
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the smoke from the burning hootches” (2001, ch. 14). In A  Rumor of War, a hamlet is simply 
“burned out with white-phosphorus grenades” (1985, 72). In the memoir If I Die in a Combat 
Zone, the very first scene involves Tim O ’Brien’s platoon searching a village, and receiving and 
returning fire from a treeline beyond it, destroying some of the houses as a result. Although the 
village is occupied—the Americans knock over some jugs o f rice, for instance—it is not mentioned 
what the inhabitants do during the fight; in fact, their existence is not acknowledged at all. Later 
O ’Brien describes his first “bad” patrol, when—after a firefight that resulted in a trophy in the 
form of one ear cut off from a dead N LF—the squad orders an air strike and later burns the 
village o f “Tri Binh 4 ” (Kelley 2002 contains no place o f this name). The fate o f the villagers 
remains unknown, but O ’Brien recalls the sounds o f “cattle and chickens dying” (2006, 88) in 
the fire throughout the night. Other examples include villages in The Things They Carried (“ [a]nd 
then they burned Than Khe”; 2009, “The Things They Carried”) and in Going After Cacciato, 
where the destruction of Hoi An with white phosphorus is described in detail without recourse 
to its residents. In the same book, the platoon subsequently carries out an operation along the 
Song Tra Bong, where the soldiers “moved through the villages (...) and searched them, and 
sometimes burned them down” (1980, 100); they “destroyed twelve tunnels. They killed a water 
buffalo. They burned rice and shot chickens and scattered jugs o f grain. They trampled paddies. 
Tore up fences. Dum ped dirt into wells, diverted ditches, provoked m adness” (1980, 104). The 
people are invisible among this destruction. In general, in fiction, O ’Brien seems to prefer to 
avoid portraying the suffering of Vietnamese civilians altogether, and to transfer the brutality of 
American soldiers onto their killing of animals, especially water buffalo (1980, 56-58; 2009, 
“How to Tell a True War Story”).
As a side note, it is worth pointing out here that O ’Brien is sensitive to more subtle (relatively 
speaking) forms of abuse and humiliation, or their effects. In Going After Cacciato, Paul Berlin’s 
“only one truly shameful memory” was o f when he was ordered to frisk villagers along the Song 
Tra Bong, an activity that entailed touching their entire bodies (recalled later as a specific 
memory, not described together with the platoon’s journey through the hamlets along the river); 
part o f a chapter (“The Things They D idn’t Know”) is dedicated to the Americans’ inability to 
understand the Vietnamese villagers. In The Things They Carried, a half-page story is dedicated to 
a small girl the soldiers see dancing in the ruins o f her village, apparently gone insane from
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trauma (2009, “Style”). In If I Die in a Combat Zone, O ’Brien includes an apparently real-life 
episode involving a seventy-year-old blind farmer helping the G.I.s wash in the water from his 
well, watched by children; a “stupid” soldier hits the man in the face with a carton of milk, 
drawing blood, and after losing balance, the man, covered in milk, continues to shower the men 
(2006, 104-105). By describing the old m an’s humiliation, O ’Brien paradoxically bestows him 
with dignity (which the soldiers rob him of), a subject rarely undertaken when authors depict 
villagers, which makes the scene particularly resonant as an illustration of the relations between 
G.I.s and civilians—one can, as the canon convinces us, go berserk or get accustomed to killing 
people, but it is another thing entirely to be capable o f hitting a disabled elderly person in the 
face with a heavy milk carton.
At the same time, however, perhaps more so than in the case o f other authors, in O ’Brien’s 
fiction Vietnam is removed from history and politics to the realm of metaphysics, the war 
rendered into an abstracted site to ponder the subtleties o f difference between truth and fiction— 
a preoccupation in O ’Brien’s oeuvre that has received perhaps the most academic interest, but 
that has also formed the basis o f some criticism (see especially the chapter on The Things They 
Carried in Nielson 1998, as well as the criticism of Going After Cacciato there). W riting about this 
aspect o f O ’Brien’s work and articulating at the same time what is wrong with this particular way 
of re-visioning the war in Vietnam in general, Subarno Chattarji observes that O ’Brien’s “stories 
have greater integrity and truth than the ones told by Hollywood or W ashington, but [that] there 
is every danger that the privileging of story qua story will contribute to the further dehistoricizing 
of the Vietnam conflict. To perceive the Vietnam W ar purely or largely in terms of ambiguity, 
mystery, and endlessly multiplying narratives is to fall into a typically postmodernist trap” (2007, 
80). It is true: in his quest to be more than a war writer, O ’Brien creates sometimes needlessly 
convoluted plots, as in Going After Caccatio, for example, to convey a universal message of a 
higher order. In other words, writing about Vietnam, he tends to overlay it with new and, in the 
end quite insubstantial, issues, such as the mechanics o f imagination as opposed to the lived 
trauma of the warfront in Cacciato (encapsulated in Paul Berlin’s immaterial obsession with 
“what happened and what might have happened”). There it leads to the protracted race across 
Asian and European countries—a sort o f a less compelling odyssey than the one envisioned in 
Apocalypse Now, for example—in which each stop becomes an opportunity to alight at a particular
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quasi-philosophical point to be made about Vietnam and war, many of which can be tedious to 
read and indeed skipped completely if one wishes only to learn about the “grunt” experience of 
the conflict.57 As with the metafictional play in The Things They Carried, these techniques tend to 
create a sense o f withdrawal from the war’s visceral reality—not to mention its historical or 
political reality—to a degree considerably greater than anywhere else in the canon.
“Sweetheart o f the Song Tra Bong” not only self-consciously reworks the American Vietnam 
mythos, but also carefully obscures the Vietnamese natives from view. Mary Anne visits Tra 
Bong, but the trip is not described in depth, the occasion only a step in the process o f her 
learning and self-discovery, just as her first kill, obscured in the story, and the cutting out of 
tongues are subsequent steps. This is not dissimilar to the actors in Apocalypse Now feeling that 
“a My Lai massacre” is an appropriate step in their Vietnam story, realized in the film as the 
scene of shooting three innocent Vietnamese in a sampan, a literal stop in the characters’ odyssey 
through Vietnam and into the heart o f darkness. (Perhaps Mary Anne only kills and mutilates 
enemy soldiers, but the story leaves this issue not even so much as unanswered, but unquestioned; 
violence against the Vietnamese, and the relationship of the land to the ritual, is what matters.)
Elsewhere the suffering of civilians is made visible, but still instrumental to American 
victimization. In Dispatches, for example, Herr records one encounter—an “illumination round,” 
so it is a very brief passage—at the Can Tho province hospital, during Tet. A  deluge of wounded 
civilians descends on the hospital; people are dying in the corridors, the doctors work around 
the clock, and the place is being shelled by the NLF. Herr takes a can of beer, given to him by a 
nurse, to an American surgeon working in an operating room:
A little girl was lying on the table, looking with wide dry eyes at the wall. Her left leg was 
gone, and a sharp piece of bone about six inches long extended from the exposed stump.
The leg itself was on the floor, half wrapped in a piece of paper. The doctor was a major, 
and he’d been working alone. He could not have looked worse if he’d lain all night in a 
trough of blood. His hands were so slippery that I had to hold the can to his mouth for him 
and tip it up as his head went back. I couldn’t look at the girl.
“Is it all right?” he said quietly.
“It’s okay now. I expect I’ll be sick as hell later on.”
He placed his hand on the girl’s forehead and said, “Hello, little darling.” He thanked 
me for bringing the beer. He probably thought that he was smiling, but nothing changed 
anywhere in his face. He’d been working this way for nearly twenty hours (1978, 150).
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Clearly, Herr can barely watch the suffering of the little girl, which indicates its extent; in light 
o f Herr’s stunted ability to look at it and to represent it, the girl and her wound are signified by 
fragmentary images: the bone, the detached leg on the floor. Altogether this picture succeeds as 
a reconstruction of the act o f shocked witnessing. But in the context o f the entire scene, the girl’s 
suffering is only the background and the catalyst to the experience—exertion, dedication, 
humanity—of the main actor: the surgeon. This reading is supported by the fact that the 
Vietnamese are largely absent from the memoir, and this is in fact the only episode in which Herr 
records a specific instance of a specific Vietnamese person’s victimization; because o f this 
contextual insufficiency, this “round” illuminates not the plight o f the natives, but the plight of 
the American surgeons (see also Neilson 1998, 143).
Another example o f how Vietnamese victimization is made instrumental to the American 
experience is Platoon (1986). As Kinney observes, the film is emblematic o f the friendly fire 
discourse, since the story, told from the perspective o f newbie Chris Taylor, is essentially a 
profoundly symbolic battle between the equally symbolic figures o f Sergeant Barnes and Sergeant 
Elias; indeed, she expresses surprise that such an overtly allegorical film has been so often lauded 
as a particularly realistic view of the war in Vietnam (2000, 3; the same point is made, and 
elaborated on, in Prasch 1988 and Ringnalda 1990, 65-67; cf. Beidler 2004, 81-102, for a 
veteran take on the subject). Kinney also notes that the invisibility o f the NVA soldiers, for 
example in the iconic scene of night ambush turned firefight, is vital for making friendly fire 
viable, by removing the agency of the enemy and relegating him to the background. But Platoon 
is also essentially a symbolic reenactment o f My Lai, on a smaller scale. Because o f earlier 
casualties as well as the internal Barnes/Elias rift dividing the soldiers and putting a strain on 
them, the eponymous unit has already been on edge for some time when three men from the 
platoon are killed by mines and sniper fire while on patrol (“somewhere near the Cam bodian 
border”). U pon the unit’s discovery of traces o f enemy presence in a local village, Barnes snaps 
and kills the wife o f the village chief. For a while, the situation seems to be close to boiling over— 
several soldiers urging that they “do the whole village”—with the dramatic tension rising to its 
peak when Barnes, in an attempt to force the chief to divulge the enemy location, puts a gun to 
his small daughter’s head. Elias appears and stops Barnes, and the two sergeants fight, the 
violence thus playing out physically among the Americans. (By the time the end credits roll, two
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actual U .S. friendly fire artillery strikes will yet ensue, killing many in the platoon; Taylor will 
fight Barnes and plan to frag him; Barnes will wound Taylor and shoot Elias; and Taylor will kill 
Barnes. N o wonder Kinney picked Platoon as friendly fire incarnate). Afterwards, the spineless 
bad lieutenant Wolfe orders that the village be destroyed; the soldiers set the houses on fire with 
the iconic Zippo lighters, kick over stores o f food, and round up a few middle-aged and old men 
and take them away as suspects.
The film ’s village scene is successful because it is powerful and unambiguous; it is impossible 
not to sympathize with the villagers, or to have any sense o f identification with Barnes, who is 
represented as unequivocally evil. There can be no doubt—or at least there should be no doubt 
since the film does not seem to suggest otherwise—that what happens to the villagers is 
undeserved and wrong to the point o f criminality. The Vietnamese are certainly victims of 
gratuitous violence here. But the framing of the scene matters. The platoon is split between the 
followers o f Barnes, the brutal and demoralized soldiers, and the followers o f Elias, the 
marijuana-smoking, more empathetic (and sympathetic) ones. Taylor is an Elias man, but by the 
time they enter the village he is shaken up by the deaths o f his buddies; overtaken by the trauma, 
he shoots several times at (but does not hurt) a maimed young man the Americans have found 
hiding with, presumably, his grandmother in one of the huts. His status as a positive character 
enables an identification and empathy with his emotional distress represented in his attack on 
the boy in a way that the one-track brutality o f men like Barnes does not. In the end, Taylor stops 
his assault and breaks down in tears, brutalized by the vicious circle o f witnessing other 
Americans wounded and killed, and o f the violent, but emotional, retaliation against the 
Vietnamese; his behavior, and the way the film ’s narrative frames it, is representative o f what 
happened to even good men in Vietnam, and how it would come to haunt them. It is Bunny, 
one of the evil sergeant’s acolytes, who kills the boy without qualms (it seems that he kills the 
old woman offscreen, too). Taylor gets to redeem his bout o f violence by saving a young girl from 
being raped by a group of Americans; the exchange between him and the would-be perpetrators 
is the final drawing of a line between Barnes’ men and Elias’. Taylor, in a rage, screams calling 
them “fucking animals” and telling them that “she’s a human being”—a banal sentence that in 
the context o f the village scene, once uttered, rings significant. The almost-rapists sneer at him, 
telling him, “You don’t belong in ‘Nam, man. A in ’t your place at all.” Their verdict is interesting
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in light o f the earlier parts o f this chapter, as if the two groups within the platoon operated within 
different Vietnams.
This line o f fundamental difference of character is important as one strategy of defining 
victims in Vietnam. The likes o f Barnes and Bunny are abject characters. A  liberal audience is 
not expected to identify with them, and so they become symbols o f some unspecified group or 
groups o f Americans, or perhaps o f aspects o f American culture and society, whose evil came to 
the surface in Vietnam. Elias and Taylor are, o f course, the reverse o f this evil. But the attack 
and destruction of the village, and the deaths o f the Vietnamese, though in themselves horrific 
and eliciting compassion for the victims, are instrumentalized in the larger frameworks o f the 
two heroes’ individual narratives (Ringnalda 1990, 66). First o f all, the incident becomes an 
occasion to cement their goodness and heroism, by having them both (good Americans) save the 
Vietnamese from the crimes and the evil o f Barnes and his men (bad Americans). Second of all, 
the suffering of the villagers that Taylor witnesses becomes another way in which the war 
brutalizes, and ultimately teaches, him. In the case o f Elias, his behavior in the village becomes 
the final straw in his conflict with Barnes and determines his fate—saving the villagers will turn 
out to have been a sacrifice. Elias plans on reporting the unwarranted killings in the village, and 
so Barnes and his men plan on eliminating him. Elias’ symbolic stature means that the usual 
way o f disposing of undesirable officers and N C O s, “fragging,” is insufficient for the film’s plot. 
Instead, when the opportunity presents itself and the two men find themselves alone in the 
jungle, Barnes shoots Elias, and returns to the platoon with the news of his death at the hands 
o f the NVA; when the men, Taylor among them, are airlifted, they witness wounded Elias emerge 
from the forest only to be killed by pursuing enemy, falling to his knees in the iconic Christlike 
pose.58 By the end of the film, a friendly fire strike kills many of Barnes’ men, and he himself is 
shot dead by Taylor. Leaving the battlefield in a helicopter (again), in his retrospective voice over 
Taylor concludes that in Vietnam Americans fought themselves and not the enemy, that in his 
soul he was part Barnes and part Elias, and that “those o f us who did make it have an obligation 
to build again, to teach to others what we know, and to try with what's left o f our lives to find a 
goodness, and meaning, to this life.” The film ends to the iconic melancholy sound of “Adagio 
for Strings” and Taylor’s birds-eye view of the corpse-strewn battlefield. The ending is 
redemptive: the evil men are gone; Elias’ sacrifice has been in the name of morality, human
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decency, and heroism, suggesting that while some Americans in Vietnam were bad, their actions 
had destructive impact on the good Americans who were there, too, and whose suffering in the 
war was in the final tally a deliverance from that evil; and Taylor, though he admits he will carry 
the war with him forever—as the traumatic experience, no doubt—finds in the war a cathartic 
opportunity toward growth. A nd thus, due to its role in the narratives o f all the key American 
players in the film, the victimization of the inhabitants o f the anonymous village becomes a 
crucial tool o f that redemption and education. It was hard to watch, but in the end the suffering 
and death, enabling American soul-searching, contributes to the ultimate “lesson” o f the war 
(for the Americans) and the personal/national improvement (in America) which Stone preaches 
in the final lines o f his script. The killings o f the Vietnamese do not go to court martial in the 
end, pushed aside by the more pertinent dying of Americans, as either sacrifice or deserved and 
cleansing karmic retaliation; most importantly, while the Vietnamese deaths catalyze the 
subsequent developments o f the plot, there is no doubt that the death of Elias is the single most 
important and most meaningful event in the film. In terms of a narrative strategy of representing 
victimhood, it is instrumental death versus meaningful death (in a somewhat similar way, in the 
memoir Born on the Fourth of July, Ron Kovic’s accidental killing of the “corporal from Georgia” 
seems to be granted more significance as a source of traumatizing guilt than his involvement in 
a shooting o f an old Vietnamese man and a group of children).
The instrumentality o f the Vietnamese experience of violence at the hands o f the Americans 
is central to the plot o f Platoon, but the strategy is employed in other narratives, too, in close 
connection to representations o f victimhood. Philip C aputo’s Vietnam memoir, A  Rumor of War 
(originally published 1977), is the story of his tour o f duty around Danang as a lieutenant in the 
U SM C , beginning in 1965. By the end of the book, which is a fairly conventional realist war 
story, Caputo faces court martial as the officer in charge of a group of soldiers charged with the 
murder o f two Vietnamese men, one of them a teenager. Caputo describes how a patrol o f troops 
from his unit is approached by a young man, Le Dung, who claims that two other youths from 
his village, “Giao-Tri (2),” are NLF, and tells the Americans o f other guerillas and their caches 
o f weapons in the area. That night, overtaken by hatred for the land and the American deaths 
and wounds it has recently caused in his unit, for “what war was doing to them ,” and for the 
“V C ,” Caputo obsesses over retribution and decides to retaliate against the two suspects in the
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village. That night, Caputo’s platoon is to set up an ambush in the area, but Caputo, though as 
a lieutenant he lacks the authority to give such an order, instead decides to send his troops into 
the hamlet on a “revenge patrol” (Turse 2013, ch. 4) to capture or kill the men. He convinces 
himself that body count is what his superiors are after, and in any case, in a typical fashion of an 
American claiming Vietnam as his own hunting ground, he concludes that, “out there, I could 
do what I damn well pleased” (Caputo 1985, 316). Death is clearly on everyone’s mind, 
including, perhaps above all, Caputo’s; he tells the patrol that if they kill the suspects in the 
village, they will report that the men had fallen into the ambush, and as a narrator o f his memoir 
he admits that he “knew [the patrol leader, Allen] was going to kill those men on the slightest 
pretext (...). It was my secret and savage desire that the two men die. In my heart, I hoped Allen 
would find some excuse for killing them, and Allen read my heart. (...) [B]lood was to be shed” 
(1985, 317). After entering the village and the indicated house, the patrol beats a woman who 
wakes up, and kills two men, both, it will turn out, innocent civilians. One is shot in his bed, 
and the other, killed while the Americans are transporting him back to their base, turns out to 
be Le Dung himself, murdered by mistake. U pon finding out what has happened, Caputo 
instructs his men how to cover up the crime if anyone asks. Eventually the killings come out only 
when the villagers o f Giao-Tri make an official complaint. A  trial ensues, and the charges against 
Caputo and the patrol are in the end dropped, while the actual shooter is acquitted. A  few 
months later, Caputo receives honorable discharge from the U SM C .
A  Rumor of War is a rather mediocre book in most respects, and that it is popularly considered 
one of the particularly important texts in the Vietnam canon would seem inexplicable were it 
not for the fact that it aligns so perfectly with the dom inant discourses, and that its portrayal of 
U .S. soldiers in Vietnam is ultimately undeservedly generous. Caputo is particularly sly in the 
framing of the murder and of his own complicity. The overarching strategy in the book is the 
simultaneous universalization, naturalization, and depoliticization of the war in Vietnam. 
Caputo writes as much in the first paragraph of the prologue, where he announces his memoir 
as extracted from history and moral judgement, o f his own war crime, too, presumably, since 
this will turn out to be just a thing “men do in war”:
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[This book] has nothing to do with politics, power, strategy, influence, national interests, or 
foreign policy; nor is it an indictment of the great men who led us into Indochina and whose 
mistakes were paid for with the blood of some quite ordinary men. In a general sense, it is 
simply a story about war, about the things men do in war and the thing war does to men
(1985, xi).
That the “mistakes” were already “paid for” with American blood is a disguised ideological 
statement, because, like Carter’s rhetoric and the mainstream liberal discourses, it posits that the 
Vietnam W ar can be safely relegated to history as a closed chapter, and that the United States 
has no outstanding liabilities from the conflict.
A  familiar argument also makes appearance in the prologue. Caputo writes that the scale o f 
American atrocity in Vietnam has been exaggerated,59 and notes that the two most common 
explanations for American atrocities in Vietnam are racism and the dehumanization of the 
victims, and “the frontier-heritage theory” and the inherent “homicidal instincts” o f the soldiers. 
He acquiesces that both contain grains o f the truth, “yet both ignore the barbarous treatment 
the Viet Cong and ARVN often inflicted on their own people, and neither confront the crimes 
committed by the Korean divisions, probably the most bloody-minded in Vietnam, and by the 
French during the First Indochina W ar” (1985, xvi). But what is the connection between the 
reasons behind American atrocities and the others, except that they all happened in the same 
geographical locations? Does Caputo mean to say that since both Koreans, as Asians, and 
Vietnamese could slaughter other Vietnamese, then American racism is negated? Or, in other 
words, that if one atrocity in Vietnam cannot be attributed to racist motivations, none can? Also, 
how does taking the atrocities committed by other nationalities into account contribute to the 
understanding of why Americans committed war crimes? Should the acknowledgement o f the 
other atrocities lead to a somehow lesser condemnation of American atrocities? Is Caputo 
suggesting that the other atrocities were worse—and if he is, then how should one respond to that? 
Perhaps the purpose behind this argument is to show the reader that everyone commits atrocities, 
and that what happened to the Vietnamese people during the war was a natural condition o f an 
armed conflict—a point that would be in line with Caputo’s overarching universalizing 
tendencies.
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This kind of rationalization is extended. According to Caputo it is not only the American 
strategy and the universal horror o f combat that should be viewed as responsible for American 
atrocity, but also the conditions specific to Vietnam. In the prologue, he writes that the Vietnamese 
conflict, as a civil war and a revolution, was particularly vicious, and that
[t]wenty years of terrorism and fratricide has obliterated most reference points from the 
country’s map long before we arrived. Communists and government forces alike considered 
ruthlessness a necessity if not virtue. Whether committed in the name of principles or out 
of vengeance, atrocities were as common to the Vietnamese battlefields as shell craters and 
barbed wire. The marines in our brigade were not innately cruel, but on landing at Danang 
they learned rather quickly that Vietnam was not a place where a man could expect much 
mercy if, say, he was taken prisoner. And men who do not expect to receive mercy eventually 
lose their inclination to grant it (1985, xvii).
Moreover, Caputo begins each conceivable part o f the book with quotations. The memoir’s 
motto is from the New Testament, and then the prologue, each o f the three parts o f the book, 
each of the nineteen chapters, and the epilogue, all come with their own opening maxims, from 
Rom an authors, other Bible passages, Shakespeare, folk ballads, Hemingway, novels about the 
American Revolution, famous British W orld W ar I poets, classical military thinkers, and 
philosophers (and one from Rudyard Kipling). This practice is an attempt at locating the 
Vietnam W ar within human history and history of conflict, which is o f course not technically 
wrong, except that the proximity of the book’s publication date to the actual war turns this 
practice into a rhetorical device whose purpose is to universalize the war as an event o f human 
nature and another installment in the general history of war. Indeed, reflecting on his own 
ignorance and eagerness to go into battle, Caputo states explicitly that “every generation is 
doomed to fight its war, to endure the same old experiences, suffer the loss o f the same old 
illusions, and learn the same old lessons on its own” (1985, 81). There is an argument to be 
made against treating any armed conflict as a “norm al” war, but in this specific context it seems 
particularly inappropriate, given that at the time of the memoir’s release the United States was 
refusing to pay the much needed reparations to the country it so thoroughly destroyed, and 
whose catastrophic situation required humanitarian aid—which the U .S. was blocking 
internationally (cf. O ’Brien’s If 1 Die in a Combat Zone, where the verse “dulce et decorum est pro
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patria mori” is woven into the entire text, only to expose the fallacies o f patriotism and to subvert 
some ideas associated with it).
In fact, this urge to universalize war, and the Vietnam W ar specifically, is shared by a book 
which supposedly falls elsewhere on the ideological spectrum, namely James W ebb’s Fields of Fire. 
The difference is that where Caputo sees the universality o f soldiers’ suffering, W ebb sees the 
universality o f patriotic duty and masculine ritual. The novel is a treatise on the universality of 
war. One of the book’s unquestioned heroes, Lieutenant Robert E. Lee Hodges, embodies it: his 
entire male lineage had fought in America’s conflicts, and in the end, to Hodges the politics of 
the war do not matter. Being a soldier in the nation’s conflict matters: “I fight because we have 
always fought. It doesn’t matter who. (...) It was a continuum, a litany. Pride. Courage. Fear. An 
inherited right to violence. (...) If there had been no Vietnam, he would have had to invent one” 
(2001, ch. 2, part I; it goes without saying that this particular view of war not only universalizes 
it, but also mythologizes it as necessary—bummer for the “gooks”!). Even the novel’s token wishy- 
washy liberal, “Senator,” having lost a leg and inadvertently caused the deaths or wounding of 
all the heroic soldiers in his platoon, at the end of the book rejects the antiwar movement and 
comes to the conclusion that the marine camaraderie in the field, and the loyalty that it requires, 
trump all other issues related to Vietnam.
Caputo’s memoir is a standard narrative o f Fussellian irony—the naive preparation for war, 
the experience of combat, the disillusionment—only that the final element arrives in the form of 
a war crime in which Caputo himself is implicated. This way, the murders o f Le Dung and of 
the other man, Le Du, are not crimes requiring legal consequences, but rather the whole incident 
becomes a factor in C aputo’s disillusionment. W ith Caputo as the protagonist and narrator, and 
with the memoir written from his particular American perspective, the reader is supposed to 
root for him and be relieved by the end of the book when he is freed of charges. W hen he accepts 
the court’s conditions which allow him to get away with nothing more than a reprimand, Caputo 
makes sure to write that after the war he would travel back to Vietnam, find the families o f the 
victims and atone to them in some way he cannot yet himself specify. Perhaps he did that; in 
terms of the narrative o f the memoir, however, the statement is inserted there to costlessly assure 
the readers o f Caputo’s decency and free their consciences so they can feel the same relief at his 
walking free as he does.
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To be fair to Caputo, he does criticize the body count policy in Vietnam, seeing it as the 
determining factor in his and his men’s actions. But the concern of the book is entirely 
solipsistic, as Kinney or Clarke would put it, that is self-absorbed and Americentric. A nd when 
he explains why he and his men are not to be held accountable for what they did, Caputo 
performs an astounding rhetorical trick whereby perpetrators become victims, and thus 
contributes to the discourse o f American victimization—not to mention the instrumentality of 
the Vietnamese deaths. The criticism of body count is not there because Caputo sets out to 
criticize the war (in the prologue he states he is not interested in that), but it is in the book solely 
because Caputo is charged with murder and he judges the policy to justify the act. Importantly, 
this strategy also allows Caputo to portray himself and his troops as victims of the American 
policy—or as victims o f what the Americans were doing to the Vietnamese.
The memoir’s stated raison d ’être is to show “what war does to m en,” and the phrase returns 
again in time for the murders. Soon before they kill Le Dung and Le Du, Caputo’s platoon, 
again in an act o f vengeful rage—conveniently described as a fit o f a berserk frenzy, so that the 
soldiers have no idea what they are doing—burn another inhabited village to the ground. In the 
aftermath, Caputo feels “sick of war, sick of what the war was doing to us, sick of [himself]” 
(1985, 305). Shortly before he orders his men to kill in Giao-Tri, Caputo prepares the readers’ 
sympathy by enumerating briefly the bad things that have happened to his unit in the past several 
weeks. After listing the incidents o f American exertion and pain, he writes that “[o]ther episodes 
reflect what the war had done to us” (1985, 313)—which turn out to be episodes o f his men 
shooting a wounded “V C ” begging for mercy, and another one killing an old woman because 
she accidently spit some betel nut on him. It requires an extraordinary mental and moral leap to 
convince oneself, as Caputo evidently has and insists his readers do too, to view a heavily armed 
U .S. soldier shooting an unarmed elderly civilian woman as an example o f something bad 
happening to the American; yet it is not surprising, o f course. But Caputo’s determination to 
ascribe all the acts o f brutality and violence of his men to “what the war has done to them” 
reaches an apogee when he justifies the murders in Giao-Tri. First, waiting for his hearing, 
Caputo writes that his being charged with premeditated murder, like the actual shooter, is 
“absurd,” but more importantly, “the fact that we had been charged in the first place was absurd.
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They had taught us to kill and had told us to kill, and now they were going to court-martial us 
for killing” (1985, 322). Finally, Caputo comes to the following conclusion:
the explanatory or extenuating circumstance [for the murders in Giao-Tri] was the war. The 
killings had occurred in war. They had occurred, moreover, in a war whose sole aim was to 
kill Viet Cong, a war in which those ordered to do the killing often could not distinguish 
the Viet Cong from civilians, a war in which civilians in “free-fire zones” were killed every 
day by weapons far more horrible than pistols or shotguns. The deaths of Le Dung and Le 
Du could not be divorced from the nature and conduct of the war. They were an inevitable 
product of the war (1985, 323).
Caputo continues that he understood that in a war like this one, a people’s war, “killing some 
of the people” was unavoidable; but to treat what his men did, he goes on, as normal could lead 
to uncomfortable questions about the U .S. involvement, so, to keep a clear conscience, the 
military will court-martial him and his troops “as common criminals, much as if we had 
murdered two people in the course o f a bank robbery during peacetime” (1985, 323). Later 
Caputo even writes an “essay” on how the conditions o f the war should be considered 
extenuating circumstances. W hen his defense counsel tells him it is irrelevant, Caputo 
complains: “But why? W e didn’t kill those guys in Los Angeles, for Christ’s sake” (1985, 327).
All o f this argumentation comes across as self-serving and deceitful, since Caputo writes as if 
the two men were killed accidentally by stray bullets during a firefight, and not by U .S. marines 
sent to their house by Caputo, who in doing so was violating direct orders, specifically to be 
killed for no other reason than the Americans’ satisfaction. One, to maintain, as Caputo 
consistently does, that the reason the U SM C  charges him and his men with murder is to conceal 
the nature o f the war and so that other Americans do not have to face the possibility o f “evil” of 
other soldiers and of the conflict, is dismissive o f the actual criminality o f their actions; killing 
civilians is a war crime, as is killing prisoners, whom Le D ung and Le D u could at worst be 
considered had they been taken for interrogation as suspects. But this assertion also turns the 
two deaths into little more than a point in an argument about matters o f American soul- 
searching. It is dismissive o f the loss o f two lives, and of the grief and terror o f their loved ones, 
especially through the related point made that the Vietnamese are dying all over Vietnam 
anyway. In order to properly assess the ideological implications o f American Vietnam canon, the
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reader must resist the texts’ forced identification with their veteran authors and soldier 
protagonists; all o f us who are civilians, if we were to find ourselves in the midst o f an armed 
conflict raging in our homes, no matter how much death we would witness around us, we would 
still hope above all that our families and loved ones stay alive and safe, and grieve just as much 
if they did not.
Two, how convincing can the argument o f the “indistinguishability” o f Vietnamese friend 
and foe be, when the crime at hand involved premeditated killing o f two people accused of being 
NLF, but against whom there was no actual evidence? (At least one of the victims, o f course, 
turned out to be someone else entirely.) Caputo and his marines did not make sure, by 
investigation and interrogation, that the men were indeed insurgents before entering their 
house. Three, similarly, how can Caputo claim that premeditated murder is somehow justified 
by the existence of free fire zones and the American use o f weapons “far more horrible”? This is 
essentially the equivalent o f saying—since we’ve already invaded this country, and since we’re 
already killing these people by bombing and chemicals, and we acquiesce to killing them by 
indiscriminate fire in zones we decided to set up in their neighborhoods, we might as well enter 
their houses at night and shoot whoever we want to, insurgent or civilian, it doesn’t even matter 
if make the distinction. All in all, given the quality o f his argument, Caputo might as well have 
repeated again that “out there” he could do what he “damn well pleased.”
The extension of Caputo’s logic is o f course that any killing by American soldiers in Vietnam, 
legal or not, must be justified, because this is just the nature o f war, and of this war in particular. 
Caputo is unable to view the murders as much more than a tool of his own victimization, which is 
revealed by his lack of concern for those uncomfortable questions the killings may have raised. 
In his criticism of the U SM C , he does not go out o f his way to explore just what might be wrong 
with the U .S. war in Vietnam in general, but his complaint simply stops at the extent to which 
the military policy adversely affects him and his men. Even when he finds out that the victims 
had been innocent civilians, Caputo, though he admits to feeling guilty and considers the 
possibility that what transpired was a homicide, still settles on the conviction that the killings 
“had not been committed in a vacuum. It was a direct result o f the war. The thing we had done 
was a result o f what the war had done to u s” (1985, 326).
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It is, again, worth keeping in mind that Caputo’s goal is not to indict the those who led the 
U .S. to Indochina; “they” (as in, “they taught us how to kill,” etc.) is a purposefully nebulous 
concept. W hen he writes o f his m en’s actions that “if it was murder, then half the Vietnamese 
killed in this war have been murdered” (1985, 329), the purpose is not to seriously engage with 
the possible criminality o f the American war, but primarily to argue the “absurdity” o f charging 
the men. Caputo is not condemning the U .S. policies in Vietnam, but quite literally considers 
war, as a state o f affairs and a timeless condition, to be the victimizer o f soldiers like himself: his 
men might be killing civilians—civilians might be the victims of his men—but they themselves are 
the victims of (the) war. The war crimes Caputo’s platoon commits are the effect o f the troops’ 
victimization, but also a factor: the crimes traumatize the men further, and burden their souls 
with guilt.
It is not surprising the book proved so popular with American audiences. It provides a 
confession o f a wrongdoing and at the same a justification of it, an exoneration, on the most 
benign, the least precise grounds, o f the American boys who might have killed and raped and 
destroyed in Vietnam. A  Rumor of War provides its reader with the most comforting 
interpretation of the war, given the circumstances: in Vietnam, there were only victims. By the 
end of the trial, awaiting verdict, Caputo laments his own “serious” victimization and gives 
himself absolution for his war crime: “I already regarded myself a casualty o f the war, a moral 
casualty, and like all serious casualties I felt detached from everything. (...) I would endure and 
accept whatever happened with grace. For enduring seemed to me an act o f penance, an 
inadequate one to be sure, but I felt the need to atone in some way for the deaths I had caused” 
(1985, 332).
I wonder about those villagers who lodged the official complaint about the two deaths, Le 
D u’s and Le Dung’s families and neighbors. In the memoir, the reason Caputo mentions them 
at all is that the crime came to light only because they spoke out; then they fade from view 
forever. How Caputo’s actions that night affected these people is unimportant; the two killings 
matter in the story because o f how they affected Caputo.
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Casualties of war
As soon as he mentions the villagers’ complaint, Caputo writes that “meanwhile” his platoon, as 
well as the rest o f the company and the sister company, suffered heavy casualties at the hands of 
the “V C ” (1985, 325). W hen he awaits his verdict, he muses about a recent failed coup against 
the South Vietnamese government, which resulted in ARVNs fighting ARVNs. Meanwhile, “we,” 
Caputo thinks to himself, “were left to fight the Viet Cong” (1985, 333). He sounds a little bit 
like a captain in O ’Brien’s memoir, who refuses a Vietnamese scout in the officer’s company a 
three-day pass to see his terminally sick baby daughter: “this here’s your goddamn war. I’m here 
to fight it with you and to help you, and I’ll do it. But you’ve got to sacrifice too“ (2006, 185); 
the captain also tells the scout that when his child gets ill, he is thousands o f miles away and his 
wife has to go to the doctor or the drugstore herself. (The scout goes AWOL.) In Gustav Hasford’s 
novel The Short-Timers, Cowboy is outraged when, following a fight between the U.S. marines and 
the NVA in Hue, the Americans raise the old glory, in a gesture reminiscent o f the iconic Iwo 
Jim a scene, only to have it taken down and replaced by “the stinking Vietnamese flag” as if the 
ARVN scored the victory: “fuck the Vietnamese people” (1988, 109). Back in A  Rumor of War, 
Caputo’s inevitable complaint about his battalion’s casualties follows, punctuated in the middle 
by the observation that “Vietnamese civilians suffered too” (1985, 333)—Caputo saw smoke from 
villages bom bed and shelled by the Americans because o f their vicinity to enemy positions— 
before the paragraph quickly returns to American victims in a hospital Caputo visited at the 
time.
These examples are quoted here to illustrate a specific type of discourse, and namely the 
insistence, persistent whenever the United States invades another country, that mentioning the 
victims of the United States must necessarily be accompanied by the insistence that the 
Americans were victims and suffered, too. To illustrate the discourse by its inversion, Americans 
should not need the suffering of the American soldier, dead or disabled or traumatized, to 
convince them that George W. Bush’s war on Iraq was bad, because the dead Iraqis and the 
devastation of their country are more than enough. By the same token, Americans should not 
need to be told continuously, in all discussions o f Vietnam, about the 58,000 Americans who 
died there or about the vilified veterans in order to understand that the United States’ 
destruction of Indochina was a crime.
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But, perhaps in the case o f Vietnam especially, the above mentioned discourse dominates. 
The Vietnamese victims of Americans never stand alone, and images o f their suffering and 
deaths are permissible only when they are presented alongside the American casualty statistics 
or, in narratives, entangled in some way with the American experience. In Going After Cacciato, 
for example, in the chapter “The Things They D idn’t Know,” the narrator devotes some space 
to the total inability o f the American soldiers to understand the Vietnamese people: “[n]ot 
knowing the language, they did not know the people. They did not know what the people loved 
or respected or feared or hated” (1980, 248); included in the list o f incomprehensibilities are also 
Vietnamese emotional states and the villagers’ opinions about the war. The soldiers’ frequent 
failure to distinguish friend from foe is frequently attributed to this impossibility of 
communication. Paul Berlin is haunted by his wish to understand the people and to know if 
they “like him ”; assisting a medic attending to a little girl with sores, Berlin wonders what the 
girl thinks and feels, and is himself filled with compassion. But at the same time, the discourse 
o f American victimization creeps in. In his thoughts, Berlin wishes that the villagers “separate 
him from the war,” and realize that he hates it and is sympathetic to them. More importantly, 
however,
he was there, in Quang Ngai, for the same reasons they were: luck of the draw, bad fortune, 
forces beyond reckoning. (...) He was snared in a web as powerful and tangled as any that 
victimized the people of My Khe or Pinkville. Sure, they were trapped. Sure, they suffered, 
sure. But by God, he was just as trapped, just as inured (1980, 249-250).
Berlin then wishes he could tell the girl that he came to war because he had no idea who was 
right and whether the conflict was righteous; later, the narrator returns to the list o f things the 
“grunts” did not know, including victory and satisfaction, and describes their complete ignorance 
about the war and its workings, how to think and what to feel about it. Two things, apart from 
Berlin’s burning desire to connect with the girl and the Vietnamese in general, are worth 
pointing out about this passage. One, the overarching issue is the equalization of the two forms 
of victimhood in the war. It is expressed not only explicitly in Berlin’s thoughts, but is supported 
by the Americentric perspective in the structure o f the chapter, as well as and by the novel’s plot. 
Regarding perspective, the inability to understand the Vietnamese, and the complications it
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brings, is presented on a par with the soldiers’ deprivation of pride in victory, identity-forming 
knowledge, and so forth. As for plot, that Berlin is trapped inside the war is evinced most 
glaringly by the fact that half the story is his fantasy about following a deserter to Paris and thus 
escaping.
The second thing is the depoliticization of the war in Berlin’s monologue that simultaneously 
naturalizes, or mythologizes, the war, and within the context thus constructed establishes the 
American soldiers and the Vietnamese civilians as two groups ensnared and victimized by bad 
luck and force majeure—as in a tragedy.60 A  pair o f scholars indeed called O ’Brien’s soldiers in 
Cacciato as “victims of the ultimate innocence” (Bellhouse and Litchfield 1982, 166). The same 
point is made by Caputo: “[w]e were all the victims of a great practical joke played on us by G od 
or Nature” (1985, 231). Webb actually dedicates his Fields of Fire to “the 100,000 Marines who 
became casualties in Vietnam. A nd for the others who became casualties upon their return” 
(2001), emphasizing both types o f victimization of the soldiers and veterans present in American 
cultural memory of Vietnam. The same idea is found in Hasford’s The Short-Timers, where one of 
the characters complains: “We’re prisoners here. We’re prisoners o f the war. They’ve taken away 
our freedom and they’ve given it to the gooks, but the gooks don ’t want it” (1988, 67). Even 
more poignant is Joker’s recollection o f his first “confirmed kill” in the novel: Joker’s unit comes 
upon an “ancient farmer” who smiles at the marines, whom, Joker tells the reader, the man views 
as “frantic children with their fat burden of death” and for whom he feels sorry. Joker shoots 
him (for no reason): “[a]s he fell forward into the dark water his face was tranquil and I could see 
that he understood. After my first confirmed kill I began to understand that it was not necessary 
to understand” (Hasford 1988, 133). N ot only does the scene force some form of identification, 
or understanding, between the Vietnamese civilians and American soldiers, but at the same time 
it makes implicit ideological statements. The man’s smiling, “tranquil” acceptance of his own 
violent and undeserved death again relocates the war to the metaphysical realm beyond politics, 
the strategy reinforced by the familiar notion of the war’s senselessness (“not necessary to 
understand”).
In other instances still, the Americans are victimized by their own violence against the 
Vietnamese, as for example in the case o f Paco in Paco’s Story, whose severe trauma in large part 
stems from the gang rape, killing, and mutilation of a young Vietnamese girl, in which he
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participated. While his own wounding and the deaths o f his unit are described at the beginning 
of the book, the assault and murder o f the girl are revealed only at the very end, together with 
the full extent o f Paco’s trauma and alienation, which endows the act with special significance. 
That the placement o f the incident can lead to readings suggesting American victimization is 
evinced, for example, by Stacy Peebles, who finds Paco and his victim “subtly associated” as 
symbols o f the devastation of the war and laments Paco’s anguish over the rape, without 
considering the implications o f the victimization discourse that disclaims the possibility that Paco 
should be court-martialed rather than sympathized with (2015, 149).61 More examples o f this 
final strategy will be found below.
W hen Michael Herr writes that “those people who used to say they only wept for the 
Vietnamese never really wept for anyone at all if they couldn’t squeeze out at least one for these 
men and boys [“grunts”] when they died or had their lives cracked open for them” (1985, 60), he 
refers to the popular perception of the hostility to soldiers and veterans on the radical left and 
makes the uncontentious point that young Americans sent to Vietnam suffered because o f the 
war, too. Similarly, when in Winners &  Losers Gloria Emerson criticizes the women’s liberation 
movement for its, in her opinion, inadequate response to Vietnam,62 and writes that in the war, 
“among the most helpless and humiliated were the soldiers themselves” (1992, 7), she argues that 
compassion cannot be dictated by ideological motives and that the victimization of the troops 
must be recognized as part o f the war’s landscape. Both statements are not in themselves 
controversial, o f course, in physical as well as political sense, the latter in the context o f the now 
well-documented racism and classism of the draft system, and especially in regard to those who 
were drafted against their will and lacked the resources, personal or social, to resist it. But Herr’s 
and Emerson’s assertions now testify to how the Vietnam discourse has shifted. Winners &  Losers 
was published in 1976, Dispatches a year later, still during the period of the public blackout o f the 
war and general inattention to veteran issues, a national attitude that was, as we know, about to 
change diametrically in the upcoming decade. Vietnam literature and cinema, in their sheer 
mass, contributed to this shift. But kernels o f these same discourses are found even in the best 
American Vietnam journalism preoccupied with the worst behaviors o f American soldiers in 
Vietnam. This type of in-depth reporting could not always easily escape the throes o f the 
discourse o f American victimization. In the long run, and when fitted within the dominant
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cultural narrative o f Vietnam, these journalistic narratives sometimes also turn out to contain 
strategies significant from the perspective o f how victimhood can be framed.
In My Lai 4, a book published in 1970 that gathers his reporting on the massacre and the 
scandal up to that point, Seymour Hersh delivers a factual, unforgiving account o f what Charlie 
Company did in the village. The image of berserking soldiers, exacting revenge for their fallen 
comrades in an agonized fury, does not hold up particularly well when one reads about just how 
systematic the killing was. Som e people were shot on sight or in their homes, but the Americans 
also went house to house bringing people out to put them in groups in which they awaited 
execution, some groups taken to a drainage ditch to be shot there so their bodies would fall in. 
The Americans also went around gathering people and placing them in bunkers until they were 
full, and then threw grenades in. W hen most villagers were dead, the soldiers took a break, and 
afterward went about killing off the wounded and survivors, many of them children and babies 
previously protected by their mothers as they were themselves shot. To perpetrate such a 
deliberate and methodical massacre surely demanded a specific mindset from Charlie Company, 
but the details o f their crime and brutality, as described by Hersh, leave no room for sympathy 
with whatever trauma may have “provoked” them. Any non-psychopathic, standardly empathetic 
reader o f My Lai 4 is likely to be deeply affected by the fate o f the villagers, as it is described by 
Hersh. In the part o f the book dealing with the subsequent cover-up, coming-out, and the 
investigation, the injustice o f Captain M edina’s walking free, without so much as being charged, 
is clear. Hersh faced some abuse for his work on the story; in her own book, Emerson writes 
about a box of letters in her possession, all o f them hate mail Hersh received in relation to My 
Lai, some of them anti-Semitic, some accusing Hersh of communism and anti-Americanism, 
some expressing the conviction that Calley should be awarded the M edal o f Honor, and one 
from the mother o f the now footless Paul Meadlo, praying that “you [Hersh] will suffer for what 
you have done to us” (1992, 38).63
A nd yet even Hersh, seemingly, could not quite get away from conceptualizing at least some 
degree of victimization of the Americans, at least while working on the material in 1969 and 
1970. W hen he describes his meeting, prior to writing the first story on the massacre, with Calley 
at Fort Benning where the latter was awaiting his trial in 1969, Hersh makes a curious admission: 
having heard from Calley “a little about the operation,” Hersh writes that, as he began to work
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on his article, “I did it somewhat reluctantly, my thought being that Calley, perhaps, was as much 
a victim as those infants he and his men murdered at My Lai 4 ” (1970, 134). As nothing more 
than an illustration of Hersh’s state o f mind at the time, the statement is that o f an American 
trying to reconcile what he is learning with what his nation’s sense o f identity. But then the 
sentence is left without qualification; is it meant to suggest Calley presented himself as a victim 
in his testimony to Hersh? Is it meant to showcase the difference in Hersh’s assessment later on, 
once he has learned more details? Hersh never clarifies that thought, or follows up on it; it 
remains in the book as an unchecked and uncontradicted proposition.
The final chapter o f My Lai 4 cannot be viewed as anything else than a specific choice of 
framing the massacre—shifting the optic away from Vietnam and onto the impact of My Lai on 
Charlie Company. It begins with the observations that mothers were the first to notice that the 
men who killed at My Lai were suffering from traumatic memories. Interestingly enough, the 
first person to appear in this last chapter is Mrs. Meadlo—it is unclear whether she sent her hate 
letter before or after the interview with Hersh—who laments that she “gave them a good boy (...) 
and they made him a murderer” (1970, 181), the quotation familiar from the Time article. Hersh 
then cites other mothers who express anger and blame the press, the government, and the officers 
who gave orders. One of these women states: “So what if a few Vietnamese got shot? They’ve 
killed 40,000 of our boys over there” (1970, 182). Their reactions are one thing, but from the 
perspective o f what the book finally communicates, including their words is a rhetorical device 
that sets the tone for the rest o f the final chapter and essentially an emotional appeal for some 
degree of compassion with the Americans affected by My Lai. Hersh’s decision to finish his story 
of the massacre in this way can be seen as a matter o f journalistic fairness, or as a softening ploy 
necessary to successfully market the book in the U.S. But, in the end, is it really relevant, to the 
people o f My Lai or to outsiders judging the event, that Private So-and-So, as his mother swears, 
had never been in trouble with the police before? The brief life stories o f Charlie Company men 
recounted here align, essentially, with Fussell’s ironic nature o f war experience: my son was a 
good boy, he came back footless and traumatized and a killer; I thought the army would help get 
my head together, I ended up shooting a bunch o f civilians.
It goes without saying that this point, the progression from a “norm al” American boy to a 
killer is omnipresent and overarching in much of the Vietnam canon: it is the secrets o f the war
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brutalizing marines in Dispatches, the “what war does to m en” in A  Rumor of War, the 
transformation of Mary Anne in “Sweetheart o f the Song Tra Bong,” Chris Taylor shooting at 
the disabled man in Platoon, Rafter M an celebrating his first confirmed kill in The Short-Timers, 
the destination of all heart-of-darkness trips. The examples from texts are too numerous to be 
systematically reviewed here, but one particularly memorable instance comes from Going After 
Cacciato: in his backpack, Cacciato carries a family photo album labeled “V U E S  O F  V IE T A M ,” with 
a hundred pictures inside arranged chronologically, beginning with a shot o f Cacciato and his 
family in front o f a Christmas tree and ending with smiling Cacciato holding up by the hair the 
head of a “V C ” boy he has killed (O ’Brien 1980, 117).
The inclusion of the final chapter o f My Lai 4 eases its American readership out o f the horror 
o f the preceding narrative; it is not a strategy of justification, but o f rationalization. In the last 
three pages, some men from Charlie Company express their thoughts on the events o f March 
16. One insists that the massacre is being blown out o f proportion, since incidents like My Lai 
happen in Vietnam all the time. Another admits he has no “feelings toward it [the massacre] one 
way of another” (1970, 184). Others, in a somewhat stunted manner, admit that they know what 
happened at My Lai was not right. One man attempts to commit suicide after the scandal breaks 
out and he loses his job. “Only a few of them ,” Hersh writes, “seemed totally unmoved by the 
massacre, even in retrospect,” and he quotes them (“ I didn’t care nothing about the Vietnamese,” 
“[h]e had felt no remorse for the Vietnamese civilians while watching them get slaughtered,” etc.; 
1970, 185). Calley, heroically, insist that he take the full responsibility, despite the advice o f his 
lawyers; Hersh calls him “loyal” and describes the physical strain the whole affair is causing him, 
like weight loss and bouts o f vomiting (1970, 186). Finally, My Lai 4 ends with the words of 
Herbert Carter, a PFC in Charlie Company who did himself kill innocent civilians for no reason 
even before the massacre (these incidents are noted in the book), but on March 16, after a few 
hours, shot himself in the foot and was evacuated from the village. Carter says:
“The United States is supposed to be a peace-loving country; yet they tell them [soldiers, 
presumably] to do something and then they want to hang them for it.”
As far as he was concerned, Carter said, what happened at My Lai 4 was not a massacre, 
but a logical result of the war in Vietnam: “The people didn’t know what they were dying 
for and the guys didn’t know why they were shooting them” (1970, 187).
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I do not wish to argue that Hersh’s intention was to really make the men of Charlie Company 
into victims, or even necessarily to create a faint sense o f sympathy toward them. I suspect that 
the fault o f My Lai 4 in view of my criticism of its final chapter can be ascribed to its time of 
publication, almost immediately after the cover-up became exposed and before Calley’s trial even 
began (the book was published in June 1970, and the trial started in November). I can imagine 
that being an American with a capacity o f self-criticism in the aftermath of the My Lai scandal 
must have been a confusing experience, and the event itself a difficult thing to wrap one’s head 
around, and perhaps Hersh was similarly torn, in addition to his obligation as a journalist to 
maintain the veneer o f strict objectivism that defined the profession in the 1960s. But the fact 
remains that traces o f the eventual victimization discourse are detectable in My Lai 4 . Carter’s 
words, and the significance attributed to them by making them the concluding sentence of the 
book, are reminiscent o f Caputo’s conclusions as to the causes and context o f his own war crime. 
The pairing of the victims and the perpetrators in one seemingly logical sequence, hinging on 
the conviction that the war was bad for everyone involved, suggests that both the people o f Son 
My and the men of Charlie Company were victims of the same phenomenon, only that their 
victimization differed in degree and nature: the first because they died, the second because they 
killed.
Something both similar and different can be said to occur in Daniel Lang’s Casualties of War 
(1969), another in-depth journalistic account o f a crime perpetrated by U.S. soldiers: similar 
because the text inadvertently comes to support the dominant victimization discourse, different 
because its representation of American victimhood is more fundamental to the story and thus 
less rhetorical and more straightforward. Casualties of War was published as a longform 
investigative report in the New Yorker and simultaneously released as a book that same year. It is 
based on Lang’s interviews with “Sven Eriksson” (real name Robert M. Storeby), a former PFC 
in the Air Cavalry, and concerns the so-called Incident on Hill 192. In 1966, during his tour in 
Vietnam, Eriksson was part o f a five-man squad sent on a reconnaissance mission in the Binh 
Dinh Province in the Central Highlands. The patrol’s leader, Sergeant “Tony Meserve” (real 
name David E. Gervase), twenty at the time, informed his men in advance that he planned to 
enter a village and kidnap a Vietnamese girl, so they could take her with them on the five-day 
mission to repeatedly rape her, and that they would kill her afterwards. That is essentially what
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happened, except that Eriksson refused to participate in the rape, and the girl was killed after 
one day, not five (on Hill 192). The squad’s victim was Phan Thi Mao, around twenty years old, 
o f Cat Tuong village, tied with rope and taken from her house. Eriksson reported the crime, and 
although initially his superiors took no action and he himself was threatened with death by 
Meserve and others, his persistent effort to bring the men to justice eventually succeeded and 
they were court-martialed. The soldier who actually killed Phan, first by stabbing her and then 
by shooting her in the head, initially received a life sentence, but after a series o f commutations, 
he became eligible for parole after four years served (in the early 1990s, as a white supremacist, 
he would become implicated as accessory in the murder o f a black man by a fellow racist). 
Meserve’s initial ten-year sentence also ended with eligibility for parole after four years. O f the 
two others in the squad, one was incarcerated for just under two years, and the other was 
acquitted.
Casualties of War is an extraordinary Vietnam text, especially because its sympathies are 
completely divorced from the conventional expectations o f military loyalty, moral ambiguity 
protective o f the integrity o f the American presence in Indochina, or compassion with the U.S. 
soldiers just because they are in Vietnam. Its moral compass points unwaveringly toward the 
experiences o f Phan and of Eriksson, not because he is an American soldier, but because he 
behaved so unlike an American soldier. Indeed, Lang, who had studied the case files o f the four 
court martials, used the fact that Meserve was so highly regarded as a perfect soldier among his 
peers and superiors,64 even after Phan’s murder, to confer an implied criticism of the military 
culture as a pathology. Eriksson’s mission to bring his squad to justice is met with threats, 
condemnation, or disbelief (that he would care for a Vietnamese person) from virtually every 
person in the military he has come into contact with. W hat is perhaps the most unique about it 
is that we learn more, relatively speaking, about the victim and her world: not only her name— 
Eriksson always refers to her as Mao, her first name—and age, but also the name of her sister, 
who witnessed Phan’s kidnapping and later testified in the perpetrators’ trials. We learn that her 
father was away in a market the day she was taken, and that her mother chased after Meserve’s 
squad to give her daughter a scarf to take with her. The soldiers gagged her with it. Eriksson 
watched the girl’s suffering and terror for a day, and he relays to Lang her emotional state in as 
much detail as he can. We learn that Phan’s mother and sister went searching for her, and found
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her bloodied brassiere; because South Vietnamese soldiers helped them, the N LF abducted 
Phan’s mother, accusing her o f having guided the ARVN to the guerillas’ ammunition dump. 
Eriksson tells Lang that Phan’s sister was later also abducted by the NLF, and that only the father 
remained. “W ho says we don’t get along with Charlie?” he says. “Between us, we’ve taken care of 
that whole family” (1969, 102; O ’Brien makes a similar point when he records an incident in 
which three old villagers were tortured because the Americans had found an AK-47 in their 
hamlet, and yet they did not talk: “[t]hey talk to us, tell us where the rifle came from, and ol’ 
Charlie will get to them. They don’t talk and our interrogation teams rough them up” [2006, 
132]).
Still, Eriksson is necessarily at the center o f Lang’s text, whose second strand of narration 
becomes the veteran’s internal anguish: firstly during the time of Phan’s ordeal which he 
witnessed, all the while struggling with himself over whether he should kill Meserve and the 
others; later over the death threats against him and the frustration of the chain of com m and’s 
refusal to investigate his report; and finally, after his discharge from the Army, over his continued 
fear o f reprisals from those who viewed his actions as a betrayal, and over his deep feeling of 
guilt, traumatic memories o f Phan and spiritual disquietude. The text’s perspective and 
Eriksson’s role in exposing the crime explain why he can say that Phan “was the big thing that 
had happened in the war to me” (Lang 1969, 106; emphasis added). But discursively, the statement 
falls into the larger strategy of representation which insists that “Vietnam” was something that 
happened to Americans, implicit in many texts but exemplified starkly in A  Rumor of War, for 
example—or in My Lai envisaged as an American tragedy, for that matter. Hersh records one of 
the Charlie Company “grunts” saying that the massacre “was the worst thing that ever happened 
to me” (1970, 184). N orm an Schwarzkopf, still a lieutenant colonel, interviewed in the early 
1970s by C.D .B . Bryan, speaks o f the rift opened among the American people by the war: 
“Vietnam did that to us”; he adds that the American nation itself has become a casualty o f the 
war (Bryan 1991, 368).
In Casualties of War, Eriksson never foregrounds that argument, however. In the text’s last 
paragraph, a familiar theme returns briefly: Eriksson “would never cease to condemn the 
members o f the patrol personally for their crime (...) but that didn’t mean they were beyond pity. 
Other soldiers, he said, might just as easily have betrayed the weakness that the four men had
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betrayed on Hill 192” (1969, 120). He adds that Meserve’s squad behaved in an expected manner, 
perhaps suggesting, like others, that the war made American G.I.s into murderers. But these 
points are made perfunctorily. Eriksson’s final thoughts return to Vietnam, in his mind's eye 
freed of the American violence, when he recalls seeing an “Oriental” woman on a bus recently, 
whom he imagined as a Vietnamese peasant woman on her way with others to work in the 
paddies near the hamlet o f Cat Tuong, but in peacetime, so that they do not have to “ ‘smell the 
bodies that were always rotting for miles around, no one knew where, when I was in the Central 
Highlands. The only thing these women had to do on their way to the stream was breathe pure 
mountain air’” (1969, 121).
The cinematic adaptation of Casualties of War, Brian De Palma’s 1989 film of the same title 
starring Thuy Tu Le as “O anh” (Phan), Michael J. Fox as “M ax” Eriksson and Sean Penn as 
Sergeant Meserve, is, for a number of reasons, a particularly interesting Vietnam text.65 For one, 
among all the American Vietnam movies, it is the only antiwar picture. That no war film can 
truly be antiwar is an old adage, but in the case o f Casualties of War the story excludes some of 
the important elements that make the axiom true most o f the time, for example the 
sentimentality o f the bonds between soldiers or the ultimate value of going through war’s hell to 
gain experience and wisdom. Eriksson has no allegiance to his fellow soldiers, but rather, as 
already noted, his heroism is defined by his determined outsider status. The plot also avoids the 
allegoricality o f Platoon, for example, since there are no “good Americans” and “bad Americans” 
overtly construed as symbols o f the Manichean struggle between American values and evil; 
Eriksson’s morality is tied to his humanity, not to his Americanness, in the same way that 
Meserve’s and the others’ depravity is not made into a symbolical commentary on American 
culture. Instead of endorsing the spectacularism of combat, the film focuses as much on 
Eriksson’s attempts to help O anh as it does on her ordeal in the leadup to her death, which 
cancels out the possibility o f any appeal on the part o f Meserve and the others. The amount of 
time the viewer spends with her, as opposed to the typical representations o f Vietnamese victims 
usually shown onscreen long enough to be shot, also limits the viability o f viewing her suffering 
as symbolic o f the American experience. All in all, the film can be used to argue that only pictures 
concerned with the plight o f the civilian victims can truly be said to convey an antiwar message.
The film was well-received by critics in 1989, but it did considerably worse at the box office
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than the blockbuster Born on the Fourth of July, released a few months later (according to the 
details provided in the two films’ Box Office M ojo profiles as o f August 17, 2017). It was met, 
apparently, with some complaint, the controversy testifying today to the emerging limits of 
critical discourse on the war, including the question o f who was permitted to speak about it: 
“Vietnam veterans, who are now becoming an obnoxious lobby of their own, are protesting. 
They say Casualties of W ar paints too bloody a picture o f the American soldier. They even accuse 
DePalma [sic] o f trying to make the soldiers look bad because [he] himself didn’t serve in the 
war” (Fitzpatrick 1989). Thirty years later, Casualties of War remains on the peripheries o f canon 
awareness. In terms of gauging its cultural endurance, it is instructive to resolve to the internet 
and the number of popular ratings various movies have received as o f August 15, 2017. I have 
compiled the following list o f the top fifteen most watched Vietnam films, based on statistics 
pulled from the Internet Movie Database and Rotten Tomatoes user (but not critics’) scores66:
Title Year No. of ratings 
(IMDb)
No. of user ratings 
(Rotten Tomatoes)
Total
1. Full Metal Jacket 1987 532, 282 323,337 855,619
2. Apocalypse Now 1979 487,257 284,29667 771,553
3. Platoon 1986 314,950 239,172 554,122
4. The Deer Hunter 1978 252,076 102,727 354,803
5. First Blood 1982 184,020 138,460 322,480
6. Good Morning, Vietnam 1987 106,107 131,119 237,226
7. Rambo: First Blood Part II 1985 125,614 99,349 224,963
8. Born on the Fourth of July 1989 82,161 59,091 141,252
9. Jacob’s Ladder 1990 81,284 52,696 133,980
10. Casualties of War 1989 35,209 21,669 56,878
11. Hamburger Hill 1987 20,030 32,946 52,976
12. Missing in Action 1984 11,315 12,289 23,604
13. Heaven &  Earth 1994 11,345 5,484 16,829
14. Coming Home 1978 10,037 5,089 15,126
15. Uncommon Valor 1983 7,531 6,848 14,379
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I realize o f course that this is an imperfect methodology; for example, I am not in a position to 
explain why certain movies are relatively more popular on one website than on the other. Still, 
I do think this is a good way of getting at a representative approximation of the movies’ 
continuing relevance. Casualties of War, as we can see, has not fared too well, mirroring the fate 
o f the book it was based on. It is difficult to say whether Casualties of War the book sold well in 
1969. The article and the book were published in October, and my edition is a second printing, 
still from the same year, so perhaps this means it did. It certainly would have reached a sizeable 
audience in the New Yorker. It was met with “extraordinary reception from critics,” but twenty 
years later, it seems, it was already somewhat forgotten, except as the basis for its film adaptation, 
and difficult to find (Fitzpatrick 1989). It seems that it has fallen out o f cultural memory, if 
statistics from the popular book review social network Goodreads are anything to go by—not 
necessarily for the critical value of the ratings, but for the sheer number of readers as an indicator 
o f continued popularity and perceived importance. O n August 14, 2017, Lang’s Casualties of War 
has 36 ratings, although it was anthologized in Reporting Vietnam: American Journalism 1959-1975, 
whose single-volume edition has received 99 ratings, the two-volume one—around 60 for each 
part. Gloria Emerson’s Winners &  Losers seems to have become similarly overlooked, also with 
36 ratings (the decline in the popularity o f Emerson’s book, in contrast to Dispatches, was 
observed already in Bonn 1993, 28-29). In comparison, My Lai 4 currently has 313 ratings, still 
a measly number considering that Hersh’s place in history is pretty much assured—but maybe 
not surprising given the subject matter. Frances FitzGerald’s 500-page hardback history, Fire in 
the Lake, fares better with 1,600 ratings. A  Rumor of War has close to 9,500 ratings and 500 user 
reviews, Dispatches—around 11,500 and 750, respectively. The fictional The Things They Carried 
has almost 181,000 ratings and well over 10,000 reviews. Like in the case o f My Lai 4, I would 
argue that the subject matter, and the portrayal o f American soldiers (despite Eriksson’s 
heroism—or perhaps precisely because his heroism was essentially anti-military), proved 
unattractive to the audience in the United States in the long run.68
Still, the script o f Casualties of War, written by Vietnam veteran and playwright David Rabe 
(who disliked the film’s final cut and distanced himself from it), diverges from the facts and from 
Lang’s narrative. Those points o f difference are significant, not the least because while the abuse
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and murder o f O anh—the middle—stay true to the horrific facts, the changes are made at the 
beginning and the end of the film, quite literally framing the events on Hill 192, presumably so 
as to make them more palatable or understandable to 1980s mass cinema audiences.
At the outset o f Lang’s article, Eriksson explains, in the familiar vein known since the editorial 
response to My Lai, that “decent fellows, who wouldn’t dream of calling an Oriental a ‘gook’ or 
a ‘slopehead’ back hom e” (1969, 19), began to change in Vietnam, becoming capable o f abusing 
civilians. But Eriksson is cool about the value of this observation in the context o f American- 
perpetrated atrocity. He recalls a conversation with a friend in his platoon, in which he told him 
about Meserve’s plan to kidnap and rape. The friend, Eriksson claims, responded by saying that 
Meserve had always been “considerate and aggregable,” and that his “mean streak” had 
developed only recently, as a result o f the three years Meserve had spent in the infantry in 
Vietnam. Eriksson maintains a distance from the implication: “The way [he] talked about him, 
Meserve sounded as though he had become a kind of war casualty” (Lang 1969, 27). Another 
habitual point is also made, namely that the N LF also committed atrocity—but Eriksson refuses 
to engage with this line o f thinking or to even accept it as a legitimate argument, saying that 
other soldiers tried to justify their mistreatment o f the Vietnamese by claiming that “it was no 
worse than Charlie was doing. I heard that argument over and over again, and I could never buy 
it. It was like claiming that just because a drunken driver hit your friend, you had right to get in 
your car and aim it at some pedestrian” (1969, 20-21). Perhaps most significantly, in a reversal 
o f the strategy found in other veteran narratives, in his interview with Lang, Eriksson 
foregrounds the suffering of the Vietnamese over what happened to him and his fellow soldiers, 
something that Lang himself notices and points out:
An infantryman, Eriksson saw a fair amount of action, so, if he chose, he could reminisce 
about strong points he helped take and fire fights in which he was pinned down, and one 
ambush, in particular, in which half his unit was wounded. But, as Eriksson unhesitatingly 
acknowledges, the fact is that when he thinks of his tour of duty in Vietnam it is always a 
single image that comes to his mind. The image is that of a Vietnamese peasant girl (...)
(1969, 12).
But the film resonates differently. At the beginning, Eriksson’s platoon is ambushed by the N LF 
and he becomes lodged in a caved-in underground tunnel, a lethal predicament from which he
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is rescued by Meserve. The script thus reinforces the friendly fire trope, adds a new dynamic to 
the relationship between the sergeant and Eriksson—and encourages the sense o f moral 
ambiguity in the audience. Later, when the platoon is in the vicinity o f a village, an American 
soldier, Meserve’s close friend, is killed by the unseen NLF, and it is this event that brutalizes 
the sergeant, in both meanings o f the word (this interpretation is shared by Fitzpatrick, who in 
his contemporary review of the film argued that the film ’s preamble was added to “humanize” 
Meserve and convince the viewer that “he was really a decent sort who merely went off his rocker 
after too much combat” [1989]). W ishing to find some respite from the grief, Meserve and two 
other soldiers attempt to visit a brothel, but are denied entrance and told that it is for ARVN 
use only. The deep sense o f injustice—the fact that the Americans are losing lives and losing 
friends defending the Vietnamese, who refuse to show gratitude, and especially that the despised 
and useless A RV N  are given privileges that the Americans are deprived of—pushes Meserve over 
the edge. He decides to rape a girl as retribution for the frustrations and pain he and his fellow 
Americans experience. Now, this addition to the script does not exactly make Meserve a more 
sympathetic character (“De Palma tilts the deck in Meserve’s favor but the sergeant still comes 
off as a figure from your worst nightmare”; Fitzpatrick 1989). But it reveals to us what was 
expected, or acceptable, o f Vietnam narratives at the time of canon-formation. O anh’s death 
cannot be completely senseless, the result o f the actions o f depraved American men, Meserve’s 
scheme simply facilitated by the power he possessed over the Vietnamese in the conditions of 
the war, and the m en’s capacity to follow him in committing the crime enforced by the 
dehumanization of those people. Instead, in the film the girl’s death must be accommodated 
into the war—the war and the suffering it causes the “grunts,” as typically, must be made the 
cause for the squad’s crime, and by extension for what happens to Oanh. Every Vietnam 
narrative must, after all, be about the effect o f the war on Americans, about what it pushed them 
to do. Moreover, while Phan was in fact killed by one of the men, on Meserve’s orders, in the 
film the entire squad, except for Eriksson, shoot O anh with their rifles. In this light, the review 
Casualties of War received in Los Angeles Times exemplifies how the film could be construed in 
the context o f the discourse insisting on viewing the American soldier as a victim on a par with 
the Vietnamese. In De Palma’s film, the LA  Times critic argued,
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everyone is a casualty of war: not only the poor brutalized girl but the men themselves, 
turned by this hell into monsters or cowardly bystanders. (...) Meserve is more heroic and 
sympathetic in the movie than he was in Lang's book; he saves Eriksson's life and staunchly 
ministers to a dying black buddy (both fictitious episodes). We don't have the satisfaction of 
regarding Meserve as a coward, a hypocrite, a phony; he's a good soldier who's come to 
believe he has the right to rape and kill innocents (Wilmington 1989).
But the ending of the film is even more astounding as a rewriting. Like in real life, after Eriksson 
reports the crime, and is initially dismissed by his immediate commanders, he finally succeeds 
in having the four other squad members brought before court martial. Meserve and two of the 
men are sentenced to ten, fifteen, and eight years o f hard labor respectively; O anh’s killer is 
sentenced to life imprisonment. The story of the squad thus ends with the sense o f righteous 
punishment, in place o f the lax sentences, or lack of them, in real life: “De Palma spares us the 
real life ending, possibly because it would make the film much too depressing to survive as a 
commercial venture” (Fitzpatrick 1989). The very final scene is also tweaked. In the article, 
Eriksson’s seeing an Asian woman on the bus makes him think o f Vietnamese women walking 
through their country freely, without the war and the danger brought by Americans, which at 
the time of publication, in 1969, was a political message. In the film, the woman on the bus (also 
played by Thuy), a student in San Francisco, forgets her scarf, and Eriksson, waking up from a 
nightmare, jumps out to catch up and give it to her; he speaks to her in Vietnamese, and she 
suggests, smiling, that he has mistaken her for someone else and walks away. The two changes 
have a redemptive narrative purpose, which conceal an ideological proposition: the wrongdoers 
have been punished, and with justice served, the war itself, and the questions o f American 
culpability, move into the recesses o f history. The Vietnamese other, once the object o f American 
violence, has now been accepted and assimilated in the United States. The film thus follows the 
pattern of simultaneous historicization o f the war, in the sense o f pushing it back as an event 
whose immediate reverberations have passed, and dehistoricization, or mythologization, that serves 
the purposes o f American ideologies.
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They’re all V .C.
Let us return again to the beginning of Casualties of War the film, and the invention o f the attack- 
in-the-village scene. Eriksson, only a few weeks in-country, is a typical military naïf. But what 
matters to my discussion is the contextualization o f his ingenuousness. Eriksson’s platoon arrives 
in the unnamed village, greeted by waving friendly children, whom the soldiers gift with candy 
and other goods; Eriksson is so green he helps an old man plough his field, grinning. The idyllic 
scene of the soldiers’ respite is interrupted suddenly when an N LF sniper kills one of the men, 
the event, as we have seen, sending Meserve “over the edge.” Later the sergeant and some others, 
while showering, discuss the betrayal o f the Vietnamese and express their hatred for them. 
O anh’s abduction is subsequently framed as retaliation.
A  scene involving an American soldier ploughing Vietnamese fields is perhaps not to be 
found in any other Vietnam text, but the fact is that the setup described above is two things at 
once: a My Lai reenactment pattern (“we have suffered casualties, therefore we want revenge”), 
and a major strategy of representation in American Vietnam texts, one so omnipresent that it 
deserves its own trope name: “they’re all V C .” By this I mean the line o f reasoning that American 
soldiers mistreated Vietnamese civilians because they either could not distinguish between 
innocents and insurgents (the less malevolent version), or because they had come to learn that 
all Vietnamese could potentially belong to or sympathize with the N LF (the more malevolent 
version). At the root o f the issue is also the American frustration with the perceived impassion 
of the Vietnamese, and the impossibility o f reading their faces, a problem mentioned often, but 
perhaps most memorably by Herr: “trying to read the faces o f the Vietnamese, and that was like 
trying to read the wind” (1978, 1). Jim  Neilson points out the racism of this statement, noting 
that the simile is “strikingly reminiscent o f the stereotypical inscrutability o f Asians” (1998, 156). 
Both versions o f the “they’re all V C ” trope must, in the end, come down to the same conclusion: 
all Vietnamese should be viewed as hostiles, the view compounded by the racially-motivated 
dehumanization of the natives and the mythological constructs underlying the American 
perception.
The treacherousness o f the Vietnamese is represented with some uniformity across the canon, 
often relying on the inversion of the W orld W ar II model o f grateful European civilians 
welcoming G.I.s to their liberated towns: the image is precisely that o f seemingly friendly, waving
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children (or smiling farmers), used at an early point in some narratives only to underscore the 
betrayal o f the villagers later on. A n American wartime G.I. latrine in Saigon apparently once 
bore this piece o f graffiti on its wall:
This is a war of the unwilling 
Led by the unqualified 
Dying for the ungrateful 
(quoted in Pratt 1999, 153)
The same sentiment is found in a letter home from a sergeant in Vietnam, quoted by Susan 
Jeffords while she enumerates the many sources o f the perceived victimization among veterans:
[My platoon leader] died fighting for a people who have no concern for the war, people he 
did not understand, [who] knew where the enemy where, where the booby traps were 
hidden, yet gave no support. People that he would give portions of his food to yet would try 
to sell him a Coke for $1. (...) This country is no gain that I can see, Dad. We’re fighting, 
dying, for a people who resent our being over here (quoted in 1989, 123).
In fact, Jeffords suggests that “[p]erhaps the most distressing form of victimization came for
American soldiers in their sense that they were betrayed” (1989, 123) by the Vietnamese,
including their ostensible ally, the A R V N .69 In Winners &  Losers, Emerson describes a
conversation she had after the war with a veteran, at the time o f their talk a novelist and a
graduate at Harvard, who expressed the wish to go back to Vietnam:
I tried to listen, but the story was such an old one by then, the ending was never easy to 
take. He had asked a village girl—she wore earrings, he remembered that, perhaps they were 
gold—if there were any VC around, was it okay for the platoon to go down the road. No VC.
The girl was sure. The platoon moved on. But she deceived them. There were mines. Some 
of the Americans were wounded. The veteran wanted to go back and find the girl.
‘I wouldn’t hurt her, or do anything,’ the man said. ‘I just want to talk to her, to find out 
why she did it.’ The reasons seemed clear but the man could not understand them. Maybe 
he knows more now, but that day in Cambridge, it was already five years since he spoke to 
the girl with the earrings in Quang Ngai who had wanted the platoon to be blown apart
(1992, 16).
But an understanding like Emerson’s, that truly at the heart o f each perceived deception, o f each
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“no V C ,” were not the American soldiers about to step onto a mine or walk into ambush, but 
the Vietnamese themselves, is rare in American narratives. (It is also worthwhile going back to 
Emerson’s book to read her account o f why Vietnamese children would help the N LF [1992, 
92-96]).
Instead, the sense o f betrayal is omnipresent in Vietnam literature and film, conveyed directly 
in characters’ dialogues or implicitly in narrative arcs and strategies o f representation. In Going 
After Cacciato, O ’Brien, as he often does, acknowledges the trope by having it reconstructed, or 
performed: soon after Paul Berlin arrives in Vietnam, “they simulated search-and-destroy 
missions in a friendly little village just outside the Com bat Centre. The villagers played along. 
Always smiling, always indulgent, let themselves be captured and frisked and interrogated” 
(1980, 45); later, the playful exercise turns inevitably into an actual, unpleasant, and humiliating 
practice. Hasford’s reconstruction is more cynical: he has U .S. marines posing for hometown 
newspaper photographs with a Vietnamese orphan, who for the purposes o f the picture-taking 
is being handed the iconic Hershey bar, but made of rubber, which the child at one point 
snatches and tries to bite into, only to have it yanked out o f its hand by the photographer. “D on’t 
you guys want to be famous?” the photographer asks the marines, telling them to keep moving 
and be faster. “Some of you dudes probably wasted this kid’s family, but back in your hometown 
you gonna be the big strong Marine with a heart o f gold” (1988, 56).
Elsewhere in The Short-Timers, Joker learns from another marine the hard lesson of Vietnam, 
during an encounter with a small begging boy: “[t]hese gook orphans are hard-core. I think half 
o f them are Viet Cong Marines. (...) That kid runs an N V A  rifle company. Somebody blow him 
away” (Hasford 1988, 56-57). A nd later, when it turns out that the child with the rubber 
chocolate bar bit one of the Americans: “There it is, New Guy. You’ll know you’re salty when 
you stop throwing C-ration cans to the kids and start throwing the cans at them ” (Hasford 1988, 
66; emphases in original). The apparent impenetrability o f the Vietnamese faces is also 
traitorous. At one point Joker and others buy cans o f soda from a “m am asan,” whose “magpie 
chatter” is incomprehensible, but whose “frozen smile” conceals profound “hatred” for the 
Americans; Joker remembers the rumor that “old Victor Charlie mamasans sell Cokes with 
ground-up glass in them ” (Hasford 1988, 76). The story recalls others o f the same type, for 
example the cautionary tale O ’Brien heard about female communist agents, posing as prostitutes,
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“with razor blades in their vaginas” (2006, 107).
A  dialogue in Fields of Fire between a rookie and a seasoned soldier also captures this aspect 
o f the Vietnam education. The rookie is complaining (as U .S. soldiers in the canon often do) 
that the local children are unfriendly, but he still feels bad for them; the seasoned soldier tells 
him that they all work for “V C ”:
“Those little babysans are devils, man. No shit. Devils.”
“I still can't help it. I mean it. None of this is their fault.”
“Well, none of this is our fault, either” (Webb 2001, ch. 7).
The theme of women and children being treacherous, because their husbands and fathers are 
guerillas, returns time and time again in W ebb’s novel, as it does elsewhere. But Fields of Fire 
takes Vietnamese betrayal—and American victimization—to a different level. The novel follows a 
marine platoon over several months in the area around the An Hoa base, in Quang Nam  in 
Central Highlands in 1969. Chapters are told from the POVs of different characters, each a 
representative o f a different “type” encountered in Vietnam (the grizzled Korea-veteran sergeant, 
the conciliatory black, the Vietnamese translator, etc.), the main three being Lieutenant Robert 
E. Lee Hodges (who seems to be modelled on W ebb himself), a Southerner from a family with 
soldierly traditions spanning most o f American history; “Snake,” a white-trash kid from the bad 
part o f an unspecified city, now a short-timer sergeant and the platoon’s best soldier; and Will 
Goodrich, a.k.a. “Senator,” a philosophy student at Harvard who enlisted to play the French 
horn in a U SM C  band, and has been sent to Vietnam instead. All three men are volunteers. 
Hodges and Snake are positive characters, popular and loyal to other soldiers, while Senator— 
uncomfortable with the marines’ brutality, morally tortured over killing, never quite fitting in 
and openly disliked by the platoon—for the majority o f the book seems to be a device o f 
introducing a certain degree of ideological ambivalence counterbalancing the book’s otherwise 
clear conservative,70 pro-military slant.
In fact, Senator is the novel’s most interesting character, simply because o f how much he 
stands out from the others. Although he is something of a coward and he does not care much 
about the politics o f the war, his repulsion to mistreatment o f the Vietnamese serves to highlight 
it in a narrative that otherwise focuses on celebrating masculinity and warriorhood. At the
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beginning o f Chapter 17, for example, Senator ponders the “tragedies” o f the war: the 
destruction of the Vietnamese land, the abuse o f prisoners and suspects (including burning some 
surrendering troops alive with either napalm or white phosphorus), shooting of animals, burning 
villages in retaliation of ambushes, “accidental wounds and deaths o f civilians,“ and—the subject 
not raised elsewhere in the canon—the practices o f denying the villagers food, like spoiling or 
taking away their stores on the premise that the N LF will use them anyway, or deliberate 
destruction of the soldiers’ own leftover rations so the starving peasants will not dig them out 
from the trash. Senator cannot understand why the other marines are not bothered by the 
cruelty, and he even quietly admonishes them for only caring about the “experience” o f the war, 
and not the meaning of it or o f their behavior.
Unlike most other books and movies, Fields of Fire also briefly references the refugee problem 
in South Vietnam, in a scene where Lieutenant Hodges offers to evacuate a whole village in a 
free-fire zone to a resettlement village. The people, for whom the journey would otherwise be 
too distant, readily agree, but are turned away when it transpires that the refugee village is “full.” 
It is explained that the chief runs a scam, claiming he has a village-full o f people, to pocket all 
the food supplies (2001, ch. 19; it should be noted, however, that the scene is framed here in a 
way that blames the problem solely on Vietnamese corruption, not on the resettlement program 
itself or the conditions in the camps that discouraged people from relocating voluntarily). 
Moreover, the book, unusually, mentions herbicidal sprayings:
Far into one paddy a helicopter hovered in the rain, soaking a rice seedbed with aviation 
fuel that had been rigged to shower down in the rotorwash. In a few days the seedbed would 
be dead. The helicopter, remembered Hodges, was a part of Operation Rice Denial. If We 
Kill Off All The Rice, the logic ran, There Won't Be Any To Give To The Enemy. If The 
Enemy Doesn't Have Rice, It Will Have To Quit Fighting.
Hodges shook his head, watching the helicopter. Not a totally bad rationale. But, 
meanwhile, the villagers will starve. Ah, he remembered ironically. But they can always move 
to the resettlement villages if they really care. Ri-i-ight. Underneath the hovering monster a 
mamasan stood, squarely in the middle of her seedbed. She peered through the gasoline 
rain, reaching both hands toward the inanimate machine that soaked her and her life 
source. Hodges watched her chest heave. She was either crying or screaming. The helicopter 
did not hear her. Nor did it see (200, ch. 34).
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Generally, until part three, the novel reads as a flawed but diversified narrative that manages to 
achieve some degree of moral complexity, perhaps even surpassing the other canonical authors 
in this respect due to the extreme polarization between the idealization of the marines and the 
praise o f war on the one hand, and Senator’s undeniably valid position on the other. Although, 
alongside their heroism, the various forms of victimization of the soldiers and veterans are 
foregrounded, the novel, however imperfectly, at least discloses other issues that affected the 
civilian population. It could be said that all the major characters in Fields of Fire are sympathetic 
and potentially easy to identify with, which would translate into a determinedly centrist multi­
perspective from which none of the represented attitudes is “wrong.” For example, Senator’s 
disapproval o f the marines’ denial o f food to the people is countered by the scene in which the 
perfect Lieutenant Hodges is aghast when a group of villagers, who after an air strike on their 
hamlet bring severely wounded children to the marines for medical treatment, ask for food, 
evidently hoping they can wager their injuries for “goodies.”71 “How in the name of G od can she 
prostitute her grief, declare a clean slate, for twelve C-ration meals?” Hodges thinks, horrified. 
“Did the kid mean that little to her? (...) [W]hat the hell right do they have to bitch, anyway?” 
(2001, ch. 19). The people are refused food. (This scene, and its tone of condemnation, finds a 
parallel in Hasford’s The Short-Timers, where a little girl is crushed to death by an American tank, 
together with the water buffalo she was riding. The observing Vietnamese civilians are said to 
“accept” the fact that “another child is dead,” while the girl’s grandfather shouts at the soldiers 
with tears in his eyes; one FN G ’s anxiety at the m an’s apparent grief is quelled by another soldier: 
“The little girl’s grandfather? He was yelling about how he needs his water bo. He wants a 
condolence award. He wants us to pay him for the water b o ”; 1988, 78-79.)
But the ending o f the novel reveals its larger strategy. To understand it, it is necessary to 
recount the convoluted story. At one point in the book, the platoon is sent on a mission to a 
dangerous territory known as G o Noi. The marines walk past many villages, local children waving 
to them from the first ones they pass, but as the men enter further into the land, the hamlets 
become either abandoned and eerie, or their populations are impassive and quietly hostile. Some 
of the men are wounded and killed moving into the area, but the true crisis comes after about a 
month in the field, when two of the platoon’s most beloved troops, “Ogre” and the super-soldier 
“Baby Cakes,” disappear when detonating a booby-trapped bomb found in the ground near a
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village. The platoon looks for the two, or for their bodies, but when they cannot find them, 
Snake decides to take a “little killer team” (Webb 2001, ch. 27), including the reluctant Senator, 
to search the village once again. They finally capture a man and a woman; they hit the woman 
repeatedly in her face, pull her lips apart to look at her teeth (no betel nut stains), grope her 
breasts (too much milk for G o Noi), and so on, and decide she cannot be local and must 
therefore be “V .C .” The Americans then find Baby Cakes and Ogre buried next to the couple’s 
house, obviously executed and mutilated. Despite Senator’s feeble protests, the man and the 
woman are shot on the spot and buried. Snake tells Senator to keep quiet about the incident.
After some internal turmoil and discussion with a superior, Senator decides not to keep quiet, 
but to report what he witnessed in the Go N oi village. Before an investigation can get underway, 
however, another tragedy strikes. The platoon takes part in a large operation in the Arizona 
Valley, a territory near An Hoa known to be a major NLF-held area. One night they are 
positioned in a field near a village. In the dark and rain, Senator and three other men are sent 
to investigate for enemy presence nearby. Suddenly, one of the other men brings his rifle up to 
shoot at a moving figure, which Senator immediately sees to be a seven-year-old girl, waving and 
smiling at them—he knocks the weapon out from the m an’s hands to save the girl, and all hell 
breaks loose. The girl jumps into a ditch as heavy fire opens on the Americans. The man with 
the rifle is killed, and Senator loses a leg; Snake comes to Senator’s rescue, saves his life, and is 
himself killed in the process. In the continuing firefight, Hodges is killed trying to retrieve them 
both. M ost o f the other soldiers in the platoon are wounded.
Back in the U .S., Snake’s simple-minded mother, in a scene saturated with an astonishing 
mix of irony and sentimentality, waits for her son ’s Medal o f Honor to arrive—she knows he has 
been recommended by his company commander two years before for saving a friend’s life. Tough 
luck, though; the medal will never come, because Senator’s report from G o N oi prompted an 
investigation that was soon closed, since all the men involved were either dead or wounded now, 
but it means no medal for Snake. Unaware, the sergeant’s mother basks in the pride that he died 
for his country and for his friend (“must have been a hell o f a friend,” the mother thinks; Webb 
2001, ch. 40), not knowing, o f course, that the friend was the treacherous Senator.
In case we miss the point, we also follow Senator, now an amputee, back home. A nd then the 
purpose o f the entire narrative unspools, revealing just how carefully the novel has been
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constructed so that it reflects exactly certain ideological stances. Senator leafs through his 
Vietnam scrapbook, thinking nostalgically about the men in the platoon, “lamenting their loss 
and so lamenting him self’; the others’ sometimes viciously expressed hatred for him is forgiven— 
“that was all a part o f it” (Webb 2001, ch. 42, part I). Soon, his draft-dodging friend Mark, now 
a resident o f Toronto, sneaks back into the States and visits Senator, who has become ambivalent 
about Vietnam, uninterested in M ark’s antiwar arguments; later, Senator’s father has Mark 
arrested and delivers a self-righteous speech about why it was the right thing to do. Back at 
college, Senator is disgusted with antiwar students and professors, whom he calls “vaporous 
intellectuals” (Webb 2001, ch. 42 part II) and impractical idealists, and he comes to view himself 
as suspended between the university crowd and his old platoon. He approves o f N ixon’s 
campaign against Cam bodia (it “seemed rational”). In the end, two fellow students ask him to 
speak at an antiwar Cambodia-themed rally, obnoxiously insisting that he talks about atrocities. 
Senator tells them it is not true:
“(...) it’s a bunch of shit to say it’s regular or even condoned. (...) What you guys are missing 
is the confrontation. It loses its simplicity when you have to deal with it. (...) You drop 
someone in hell and give him a gun and tell him to kill for some goddamned amorphous 
reason he can't even articulate. Then suddenly he feels an emotion that makes utter sense 
and he has a gun in his hand and he's seen dead people for months and the reasons are 
irrelevant anyway, so pow. And it's utterly logical, because the emotion was right. That isn't 
murder. It isn't even atrocious. It's just a sad fact of life. (...) You know why I'm all fucked 
up?” He waved his stump, forcing them to look at it. “Because of a little girl. That's right. A 
little babysan sucked me right out into the open so the NVA could start an ambush. (...)
And I'll tell you what. If I hadn't had the shit blown out of me, it would have given me great 
pleasure to hunt that little girl down and blow her away” (Webb 2001, ch. 42, part II).
Senator attends the rally. Standing on the stage he becomes enraged because the crowd shouts 
pro-NLF and pro-Ho slogans (and, no doubt, because a pair o f “huge” breasts, “lovelies” the size 
o f which he has not yet “experienced,” is “merrily” bouncing in front o f him, attached to a girl 
betrayingly sitting on som eone’s shoulders; Webb 2001, ch. 42, part II; see Jeffords 1989 and 
Lembcke 1998 on the theme of female betrayal in Vietnam narratives). Senator thinks o f all his 
platoon buddies, imaging that they are imploring him to “Set the Bastards Straight” (Webb 2001, 
ch. 42, part II). He begins his speech, scolding the protesters for their antiwar activities, until
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one of the organizers “stripped the mike from his nerve-damaged hand without effort” (Webb 
2001, ch. 42, part II) and told him to scram. Senator finds his car vandalized, sprayed with the 
words “FASCIST PIG,” but he gets in and drives away. The book ends.
There is a lot to unpack here, but it should be clear that Fields of Fire endorses certain opinions 
on the war, while it strives to refute others. Senator’s story is not the only example, but it is 
particularly important given the prominence it has as the conclusion of the book. Senator is 
essentially a Sven Eriksson in reverse. His ultimate transformation not only supports the notion 
of military brotherhood, veteran victimization, anti-protester narration, and a right-wing-liberal 
position from which the war is a noble, if possibly misguided, event, but also throws a shadow 
over anything subversive Senator thought or said earlier in the book, making it seem as if the 
war experience and loyalty to his platoon endowed him with a wisdom that now cancels out his 
previous positions. To Senator and his platoon, the war, it turns out, was fought for Baby Cakes. 
Com m enting on Senator’s character and its function in W ebb’s reconstruction of the war, 
Jacqueline Smetak rightly observes that, it “is as if for Webb the mere fact o f war justified all 
actions because the war itself simply stopped making sense except on the most basic level where 
anyone and everyone who was not part o f the primary group was ipso facto the enemy” (1991, 
149).
At the root o f Senator’s transformation is Vietnamese betrayal. The steadfastness o f Senator’s 
final conviction is as unwavering as it is unforgiving (to the Vietnamese). W ebb’s Vietnam is so 
Americanized that there exist no extenuating circumstances for the locals, responsible for the 
marines’ suffering. The couple in G o N oi could be killed regardless o f whether they were actually 
“V .C .” or responsible for Baby Cakes’ and Ogre’s deaths—Snake and the others had the right to 
exert their revenge, and what happened was not a murder or an atrocity; Senator was thus wrong 
to report the men, also because he ironically deprived Snake of his deserved Medal o f Honor. 
The little girl in Arizona Valley can be seen as responsible for what happened to Senator and his 
platoon, regardless o f the fact that she was described as seven years old, and so her role could be 
nothing else but coerced; she embodies the treachery of the Vietnamese, since Senator foolishly 
protected her only to learn his painful lesson and be yanked out o f his dovey naivete. “They’re 
all V C ,” “even the women and children were hostile”—these are remarks found frequently in 
American texts about Vietnam, not least significantly in the My Lai editorials like “An American
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Tragedy”; but Webb essentially concretizes the trope, spinning it out into full narrative. In 
another example from the novel, two men are killed and one loses an arm from a booby-trap; in 
the next paragraph, the Americans are walking away from a nearby village in a column: “[b]ehind 
it, like random torches, the hootches (...) spent themselves in orange rages. The flames rose 
anonymously, but it was the platoon's collective act o f passion, a substitute for not being able to 
fight the enemy that had ravaged them. The hootches burned like funeral pyres.” Senator, ever 
the dissenting voice, decides not to protest against the destruction of the village, understanding 
that a “vote against burning a hootch would have been a vote against the memory of those who 
had been hit” (Webb 2001, ch. 23).
N ot that the trope o f betrayal is absent from other texts. Betrayal is followed by revenge. In 
Friendly Fire, a veteran is quoted recounting: “We were mortared every night by local villagers. (...) 
One night we went out and did our own My Lai. (...) W e had to, see? Because night after night 
we kept losing” (Bryan 1991, 230; emphasis added). In The Short-Timers, an entire street of 
beautiful colonial mansions in Hue is utterly destroyed by a tank in pursuit o f a single sniper 
who shot some Americans dead. Villages are always being burnt in retaliation for American 
casualties sustained in their vicinity. As we have seen, both Platoon and Casualties of War the 
movie employ this trope. (Paradoxically, Apocalypse Now, whose actors actually expressed the wish 
to do a “sort o f a My Lai massacre,” ends up not following the pattern at all; in the “sam pan 
massacre” scene the killing of the three Vietnamese is truly senseless and not framed as 
retaliatory.) “Than Khe” is burnt in The Things They Carried (2009, “The Things They Carried”).
In If I Die in a Combat Zone, O ’Brien’s characterization of villagers along the lines o f betrayal 
is limited to the inhabitants o f “Pinkville,” but is otherwise as typical as any: among Americans 
being blown apart by mines in the area during O ’Brien’s own stint there, “[frustration and anger 
built with each explosion and betrayal, one Oriental face began to look like any other, hostile 
and black (...). ‘Where are the V C ?’ Captain Johansen would ask, nicely enough? ‘W here are all 
the men? W here is Poppa-san?’ N o answers, not from the villagers. N ot until we ducked Poppa’s 
bullet or exploded his fine mine” (2006, 120-121). O ’Brien’s company grows to hate the people 
o f Pinkville, and finds much satisfaction in burning the villages; soon, prisoners and civilians, 
including women, are getting beaten up, and farmers are getting shot while working in their 
fields. After two soldiers are killed by a mine, O ’Brien’s unit orders a napalm strike on a nearby
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village. O ’Brien writes that he heard screams in the wreckage of the hamlet, and knew that there 
were babies, children, and innocent people in there, but that given his friends’ deaths “it was 
hard to be filled with pity” (2006, 123). Caputo confesses to a similar thought process. His unit 
burns down the village renamed Giao-Tri (3) with white phosphorus grenades and shoots the 
inhabitants’ animals after an N LF ambush leaves one American casualty: a lance corporal “hit 
superficially in the hand.” W hen the Americans are finished, the hamlet “no longer exists.” 
W atching a woman wailing in despair over the ruin of her house, Caputo, realizing that the 
annihilation has been not merely a bout o f insanity but “an act o f retribution,” says: “I harden 
my heart against her cries. You let the V C  use your village for an ambush site, I think, and now 
you’re paying the price. (...) These villagers aided the V C , and we taught them a lesson. W e are 
learning to hate” (1985, 109-110).
W hen Caputo’s platoon destroys the village o f Ha Na, he admits that they “needlessly” (1986, 
306) burnt the houses o f around two hundred people, and that he feels unredeemable guilt. On 
the other hand, once they finish, the soldiers—channeling both the heart-of-darkness and 
“normal kid to killer” themes—cannot believe their transformation “from disciplined soldiers to 
unrestrained savages and back to soldiers” (1985, 305). Caputo, echoing W ebb, finds yet another 
way to explain the destruction and to contextualize it within the experience of the G.I.s: with 
the soldiers now calm, “[t]here was a sweetness in that inner quietude, but the feeling would not 
have been possible if the village had not been destroyed. It was as though the burning of Ha N a 
had arisen out o f some emotional necessity. It had been a catharsis, a purging of months o f fear, 
frustration, and tension. W e had relieved our own pain by inflicting it on others” (1985, 305).
This is not to say that either Caputo or O ’Brien mean to say that they approve of these 
retaliatory destructions; their aim is to reproduce the leadup and the emotional state at the time 
they participated in them—or to attempt an explanation. M ore importantly, the historical 
accuracy of this trope is also irrelevant—whether the mistreatment o f the Vietnamese by the 
Americans was in fact retributory in a majority of cases (however much sense the “revenge” might 
have actually made), or whether it has come to dominate veteran memories as something of a 
“postmeditated” motivation, or whether it is nothing more than a strategy of representing 
victimhood in Vietnam narratives, born from a psychological need and latent ideological drive. 
In fact, only the last point really matters, because it is the one that remains. This “My Lai
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reenactment pattern” is, in its essence, as archetypal as Herr’s “patrol went up the mountain 
story”: patrol was ambushed, so patrol went up to a village and burned it. As a crucial ingredient 
o f the “Vietnam W ar” myth, this pattern mythologizes war crime, calcifies it as part o f the 
narrative so that individual events lose significance except as part of the narrative, the circularity 
characteristic o f myth. In other words, the prevalence of this pattern has established a dynamic 
between American soldiers and Vietnamese civilians whereby the latter must become subject to 
mistreatment and war crime in order to fulfil their narrative function; this is yet again a point 
about the instrumental nature o f the Vietnamese characters in American narratives. This 
slippery-slope narration, delivered as if the escalation of hostilities was inevitable, as if the 
Americans and the villagers were joint in a preordained helix o f spiraling hatred, thus comes to 
support the specific and common revenge discourse whereby the civilians’ unfriendliness toward 
Americans, and their covert support for the N LF against the South Vietnamese government, 
trigger the abuse and crimes perpetrated against them.
Moreover, this narrative function is to represent the brutalization of the American soldier, 
and so the emphasis is on his experience and on the negative effect o f the war on him. The 
soldiers are represented as victims of their own crimes, in other words. But this way of reading 
this particular condition of the war is also merely discursive. There is another argument to be 
made here, namely that the U .S. policy, together with the way it shaped the U .S. soldiers’ 
conduct toward the Vietnamese, must be seen as what liberal political scientist R.J. Rummel 
termed democide. Rummel defined democide as encompassing other forms of mass murder, such 
as genocide and politicide, and referring to “intentional government killing of an unarmed 
person or people” (1994). The concept includes also “practical intentionality,” as when “a 
government causes deaths through a reckless and depraved indifference to hum an life” (Rummel 
1994), for example by implementing policy. Bom bing of civilian areas and practices such as food 
denial are, according to Rummel, also forms of democide, as are all instances o f soldiers carrying 
out extra-judicial killings o f non-combatants, and so unsurprisingly he concludes that “American 
forces (...) clearly committed democide during the Vietnam W ar,” in South Vietnam, Cambodia, 
and Laos (1997).72
W hether one considers the “remote” methods o f targeting civilians—artillery strikes against 
villages, napalm and white phosphorus bombings, defoliation, and so forth—or the quick and
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well-documented progression of the violence of infantry units from enemy soldiers and suspects 
toward villagers (Turse 2013), what is fundamental to both is the indifference to civilian casualty 
as well as the indiscrimination of the killings. It is important to keep in mind that half o f the 
reason that napalm—perhaps the most potent symbol o f indiscriminate U .S. violence—was even 
developed by the U .S. military in the first place was so that it could be used against large civilian 
populations, as part o f strategic bombing campaigns against Japanese cities in W orld W ar II. 
The idea o f strategic bom bing itself, as a type of air warfare, came from the Italian Fascists, who 
saw its advantages in sowing terror among civilians and who even recommended the use of 
incendiary materials over high explosives. The Americans, FD R  among them, were at first 
appalled by the idea, but by 1942 had scientists building paper-and-wood models o f Japanese 
cities for the specific purpose o f developing incendiary material that could be dropped on their 
real-life originals and cause inextinguishable fires (Franklin 2000, 72-75; for a full “biography” 
of napalm, see Neer 2013). American napalm would remain a weapon of choice “reserved for 
people o f color” (Franklin 2000, 73), specifically Asians. The first people against whom 
Americans used napalm were the Chinese and especially the Japanese in W orld W ar II. Franklin 
writes that “the March 9, 1945, raid on Tokyo was as devastating as the Hiroshima atomic 
bom b,” and that “[b]y early August 1945, every Japanese city with a population over fifty 
thousand had been burned out—except for four reserved for an experimental secret weapon” 
(2000, 73-74). The “[d]amage was apocalyptic” : over 1 million people in Tokyo became homeless 
as a result, and between some 88,000 and almost 125,000 died (Neer 2013, 81). Napalm was 
then used against Koreans, both North and South, in the 1950s, and a decade later, in the 
“perfected,” more devastating form of Napalm-B, against the Vietnamese. (It was last used by the 
United States against Iraqis in 2003; Neer 2013, 208-222.) One of the flagship horror weapons 
used in Vietnam by the Americans was therefore one historically employed against Asian civilian 
populations.
In the case o f Vietnam, the point o f the indiscriminating nature o f killing that encompassed 
civilians is, o f course, glaringly underscored further by the body count and kill ratio policies, 
which inevitably deteriorated to the point where any Vietnamese body could be tallied as a small 
statistical victory for the United States. In the aftermath of the Tet Offensive alone, for example,
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[t]he United States counterattack in the countryside was a systematic campaign of mass 
killing aimed at large segments of the rural population. It took three main forms: (1) massive 
assaults from the air, including saturation bombing by B-52s and concentrated napalm 
strikes by fighter bombers; (2) systematic destruction of villages by ground troops; (3) the 
Phoenix program of mass arrests, torture, and assassination coordinated by the CIA. (...)
Intelligence gathered during interrogation [as part of Phoenix] was often used to direct 
“search and destroy” missions aimed at wiping out whole villages or groups of villages. In 
some areas where the population was believed to support the NLF strongly, entire provinces 
were subjected to campaigns of destruction and mass killing. Thus by late 1967, even before 
the Tet Offensive, 70 percent of the villages in Quang Ngai province had already been 
destroyed.
In response to Tet, this slaughter was intensified literally with a vengeance (Gettleman
et al. 1995, 410-411).
This, precisely, is the argument: when the implication of the strategy is indiscriminate violence 
against the population, and it results in mass death, it constitutes democide. Similarly, claiming 
the “indistinguishability” o f civilian from insurgent is not an extenuating circumstance that gives 
pardon to soldiers killing innocent people, but rather the very factor o f reality that makes 
American conduct democidal. Noam  Chomsky and Edward Herman give some argumentation 
in this regard:
The decision to employ technologically advanced conventional weaponry against the 
southern countryside made a certain amount of sense on two assumptions: first, that the 
revolutionary forces were predominant in the rural areas, so that the war had to be a true 
anti-population war to force submission (...). The first assumption was true in fact and must 
be assumed to have contributed to the gradual emergence of a full-fledged policy of search- 
and-destroy and unrestrained firepower, whatever the human consequences. (...) The 
character of U.S. policy was also influenced by the gradual recognition of two additional 
facts: first, that the South Vietnamese victims of “pacification” were essentially voiceless, 
unable to reach U.S. or world opinion even as effectively as the North Vietnamese, with the 
result that the population being “saved” could be treated with virtually unrestrained 
violence. The second fact was that relevant U.S. sensitivities (i.e., those of politically 
significant numbers of people) were almost exclusively related to U.S. casualties and costs.
Both of these considerations encouraged the development of an indiscriminate war of 
firepower, a war of shooting first and making inquiries later (1979a, 5.1.2).
Moreover, Chomsky and Herman present evidence which shows that artillery strikes and other 
forms of attack against villages were often okayed on flimsy intelligence and unverified
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information, since there was the willingness up the chain of command to, in the words o f an 
Army Chief o f Staff, to “ ‘act with ruthlessness, like a steamroller, bombing extensive areas and 
not selected targets (...).” “This,” Chomsky and Herman continue, “is an expression of 
indiscriminateness as a principle—deliberate, calculated and discriminate indiscriminateness— 
and it is a perfect complement to the other facets o f a policy which was from the beginning semi- 
genocidal in purpose and method, resting in large part on the fact that the civilian population 
has been regarded as enemy or, at best, o f no account” (1979a, 5.1.2; see also Gettleman et al. 
1995, 411). In this view, then, the indiscriminate nature o f the “air war” made way for strategies 
that involved the infantry, above all search and destroy, now a hackneyed phrase concealing 
atrocity such as My Lai, “a codification o f the indiscriminate violence mandated by the reactive 
military strategy” (Spanos 2000, 159; emphasis in original). If all, or almost all, locals come to be 
seen as the enemy by an occupying military power, the conflict transforms into a war against the 
population. Michael Walzer makes this point: “what if the guerillas cannot be isolated from the 
people? (...) [T]he anti-guerilla war can then no longer be fought (...) because it is no longer an 
anti-guerilla but an anti-social war, a war against an entire people, in which no distinctions would 
be possible in the actual fighting” (2006, 187). N o less crucially, once troops on one side in such 
a war, like the Americans in Vietnam, “become convinced that old men and women and children 
are their enemies,” the only way to win is to “systematically kill civilians or to destroy their society 
and culture” (Walzer 2006, 196; see also Hagopian 2009, 420).
The W elsh photographer Philip Jones Griffiths, who spent years documenting the 
Vietnamese experience in the war, writes that his “view of American’s involvement in Vietnam 
is, admittedly, at variance with the commonly held one that sees the whole venture as a simple 
case o f the American military-industrial complex practicing genocide” (2001, 4) in Indochina for 
the sole purpose o f deterring would-be revolutionaries in other countries. Nevertheless, he goes 
on to make a point that underlies the indiscrimination of killing in Vietnam: because the 
Americans were single-mindedly bent on forcing the Vietnamese to adopt their “total ideology,” 
eventually, when all else failed, “it became permissible to kill off anyone sick enough to prefer 
the other brand—communism” (2001, 4; Griffiths is o f the opinion that what led the United 
States to Indochina is its “stupidity rather than evil, an observation accentuated by comparison 
with the Vietnamese”).73
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But if “they’re all V .C .”—they are all potential targets. Hence, once the killing of civilians, 
even if not specifically ordered, becomes norm, the war turns into democide. The actual 
sympathy and support o f the Vietnamese peasantry for the N LF and H o—and so, according to 
the tenets o f U .S. ideology, reason enough to get killed—are well-documented (for example in 
FitzGerald 1972 and Young 2014). It is worth quoting Griffiths again: “anything America is 
trying to achieve is being done against the will o f the people. I have never met any Vietnamese 
who could relate to America’s claim to be liberating him from his traditional past. [...] [Any 
outward signs o f allegiance to the Saigon regime and the American invaders result from] 
expedience: [the Vietnamese] would hang out ten foot handwoven tapestries o f the face o f Spiro 
Agnew if it ensured freedom from bom bing” (2001, 13). The discourses that shift the attention 
away from the Vietnamese experience as a result o f these policies, and recalibrate it so that it 
centers on the American perpetrator, are in fact strategies o f mystification of the nature o f the 
American conduct in Vietnam—or of the fact that the American soldiers in Vietnam were, often 
willingly, participants.
In Fields of Fire, the strategy of mystification, specifically through portraying American violence 
against the Vietnamese as a result o f the latter’s wrongdoing and treachery against the marines, 
is perhaps the most complete. The entire village o f “Nam  An (2)” is burned and bombed because 
marines on patrol saw lights flickering in one of the houses past lights-out. Three more hamlets 
are destroyed in the same night. In the morning the marines are woken up by a rooster, 
wondering how it has lived through the barrage, and call in another strike on the village to make 
sure that the rooster, and whatever else might have survived, is properly taken care o f (Webb 
2001, ch. 7; the rooster lives). A  wounded woman is found in one of the houses, and while the 
naïve Senator feels sorry for her and tries to bandage her arm, the more experienced Snake tells 
him she has herself to blame for leaving her bunker, and that she is probably “V C ,” anyway 
(Webb 2001, ch. 7; the woman explains, through a translator, that she went out to relieve herself, 
and is told to “shit in [the] bunker” from now on). In the end, the village miraculously sustains 
very little damage, despite being bombed twice in the span of a few hours, and the wounded 
woman is the only Vietnamese casualty. It is difficult to say, o f course, whether this is a likely 
scenario or not, but perhaps in his novel Webb wishes to simultaneously display the American 
firepower, show that “they’re all V C ,” and spare the reader’s, and his characters’, conscience. In
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any case, most men suspected of being N LF or NVA in the novel turn out to be; Senator stands 
corrected when he attempts to refuse to shoot at people he claims are women and children, but 
who then shoot back (ch. 13). That the N LF is victimizing the civilian population is carefully and 
conscientiously inserted throughout the book. The novel’s Vietnamese character, Dan, when he 
defects from the N LF to the marines, is greeted warmly with pats on the back and cigarettes, not 
bound or harshly interrogated. Later, as a translator with the marines, he is the person most 
cruel toward civilians, and he brutalizes them most often. (Race is treated in a similar manner in 
Fields of Fire: the only racists are black.)
Another major Vietnam narrative whose dramatic release hinges on betrayal is the popular 
Robin Williams film, Good Morning, Vietnam (1987), set in Saigon in 1965. Williams plays an 
(almost completely) fictionalized version of Adrian Cronauer, a DJ at the American Forces 
Vietnam Network radio station. In the film, Cronauer falls in love with a Vietnamese girl, Trinh, 
and gradually befriends her brother Tuan, who initially opposes the relationship, but at one 
point ends up stealing a van to save Cronauer’s life. It eventually transpires that Tuan belongs 
to the N LF and has used Cronauer at the very beginning of their acquaintance to gain access to 
a G.I.-only bar, where he planted a bomb that killed two American soldiers. Cronauer is 
devastated; he finds Tuan in a Saigon street, where the most unusual exchange between the two 
men happens—unusual only because in the entire Vietnam canon no similar conversation occurs 
between an American soldier and an N LF operative, and no Vietnamese is given voice to say 
what Tuan does, obvious though it is. While Cronauer babbles on about betrayal, broken trust 
and the heartbreak at being told “that my best friend is the goddam n enemy,” Tuan’s icy 
response is what makes the scene remarkable in the context o f the American Vietnam narratives:
TUAN: Enemy? What is enemy? You killing my own people, so many miles from your home.
We not the enemy. You the enemy!
CRONAUER: You used me to kill two people. Two people died in that fucking bar.
TUAN: Big fucking deal! My mother is dead. And my older brother, who be 29 years old, he 
dead. Shot by American. My neighbor, dead. His wife, dead. Why? Because we not human 
to them. We only little Vietnamese.
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Ultimately, the scene is ambiguous: at no point is the viewer led to assume that Cronauer is an 
unsympathetic figure, and so perhaps it is possible that his outrage and complete disregard of 
T uan ’s words, are the kind of sentiments the audience is expected to share, as if Cronauer’s hurt 
feelings really equal the tragedy of Vietnam embodied by Tuan and his family and neighbors. 
Maybe the confrontation is meant to be a genuine take on Jimmy Carter’s “mutual destruction” 
thesis, or symbolic o f the American sense o f having been betrayed by their supposed South Asian 
allies, as expressed in Fields of Fire and elsewhere. Whatever the case, against other texts in the 
canon, Good Morning, Vietnam is quite extraordinary in that when a Vietnamese is treated as an 
equal and given voice, his words are so scathing and accusatory, so bitter, and yet so 
fundamentally true.
Feasibly, the reason that Good Morning, Vietnam turns out to contain this subversive element 
in contrast to other texts, is its genre. As a (non-satirical) comedy, the movie lays no claim to be 
a reconstruction o f the war or an elucidation o f what it meant, which liberates it from the tension 
and reliance on Manichean symbolism or tortured exploration into hearts o f darkness, as is the 
case with the dramas. Although the brunt o f the American destruction was born by the 
Vietnamese countryside, the film ’s setting in Saigon is also not without consequence. The story, 
simply put, is not set in Loon. W hen Cronauer visits a village, it is not as a rifle-bearing 
patrolman with revenge on his mind or a Mary Anne figure on her way to learn the secrets of 
the war, but as a guest o f Trinh and T uan ’s family. W hen he is seen eating and talking with the 
villagers, learning a little about their way of life, it is not to prepare narrative ground for an 
inevitable attack on the Americans and their innocence, but to show an American man getting 
to know something of the culture o f the woman he loves. If anything, the village scenes serve to 
strengthen Tuan’s harsh words at the end and to reinforce his anti-American position by 
highlighting retroactively that normal human lives are at stake—those dead mothers and 
neighbors’ wives not different to the people Cronauer met in the village. But T uan ’s eventual 
“betrayal” is divorced from civilians, inscribed rather into the political context o f the war. The 
disappointment in the relationship between Tuan and Cronauer is ultimately not mythological, 
not a tool in a strategy of American victimization; Tuan is neither an invisible enemy setting up 
ambush to propel the archetypal Vietnam narrative forward, nor a civilian abused to underscore 
the war’s effect on the G.I.s. He is Cronauer’s equal, a person the American is capable of
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befriending intimately, a person with a complex morality illustrated in his saving Cronauer’s life 
despite his deadly anti-Americanism, and a person with political agency. A nd finally, perhaps 
the most significant point made during the exchange is the permission to utter the opinion that, 
at least in a non-American context, in terms of sheer numbers and also the circumstances, the 
American deaths do not matter as much as the Vietnamese deaths do. Or at least are not more 
meaningful in the tragedy of Vietnam.
It is a resonant “big fucking deal.”

Conclusion
Don’t Support The Troops
In the American Vietnam W ar canon, the status o f victims is at the heart o f the narratives’ 
explicit or hidden concerns. Virtually all concentrate their sympathies on the U .S. soldiers: dying 
and getting wounded, witnessing those deaths and wounds, suffering through the bad war, 
experiencing evil, and returning to unwelcoming homes. But most American texts o f the war at 
least contain, and sometimes indeed hinge on, cases o f mistreatment and atrocity against 
Vietnamese civilians by American soldiers. Several interpretations o f the prevalence of this trope 
are possible. One is that the violence remains a particularly painful American sin committed in 
Vietnam, and the canon strives to purge it. Another is that instances o f violence against villagers 
have become an indelible part o f the war’s imagery, to the point that they are a required element 
o f the Vietnamese setting. But this view, while certainly true, is also perhaps too cynical; it is, 
however, not exclusory of other interpretations. The perspective I have assumed in considering 
the ubiquity o f abuse and atrocity—and a conclusion I arrived at toward the end of the thesis—is 
that the American canon employs strategies o f handling war crime. This issue is, I believe, crucial 
to the problem of victimization in Vietnam.
For all the insistence that the Vietnam War had caused an upheaval in the ways the Americans 
thought about themselves and their country, and a reversal o f the mythology/ideology which 
had guided their sense o f their role in the world, encompassing U .S. foreign policy, that
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subversive potential appears to have been wasted. While all these propositions are to an extent 
true—although, as William Applem an W illiam’s work on American international relations prior 
to Vietnam attests, it had been possible to reach these conclusions before the debacle—it is also 
true that subsequent changes in the American culture and society, as well as in the military and 
in foreign policy, indicate that the lasting “lessons o f Vietnam ” had been different. The literary 
and cinematic canon, with its obsession with establishing victimhood, is a microscopic case in 
point. Although the narratives, as much as the literary criticism and scholarship they had been 
the subject of, make claims of iconoclasm, true American villainy is impossible, even as a device 
o f political stance. Even if the soldiers are perpetrators o f crimes against civilians, or at least 
guilty o f mistreatment, more important is their implication in the war as its most significant 
victims. Hence the determinedly apolitical moral ambiguity prevalent in the canonized texts. 
Hence, also, the strategies o f representing victimhood—strategies o f handling war crime, atrocity, 
and mistreatment—which allow these problems to be woven into the complex tapestry of 
victimization in which the various forms of suffering tug at one another, so that, in the end, 
everyone becomes a victim of the war.
But because in the American canon the attention is steadfastly with the soldiers, and because 
among the corelated strands o f the “tapestry” one form of victimization triggers another, the 
suffering o f the Vietnamese civilians is instrumentalized so that it serves to occasion the more 
significant, more profound suffering o f the Americans. This is the kernel o f the discourse which 
insists that talking about the victims of the U nited States and its military must necessarily be 
accompanied by talking about the American soldiers and what they go through.
In the aftermath of Vietnam, from the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s, this discourse 
seems to have overtaken the memory of the war as the attention shifted to the veteran. From 
Carter’s “mutual destruction” to Reagan’s “noble cause,” the dominant American ideologies of 
American patriotism were regaining momentum which, with other simultaneous 
transformations, meant that the center o f the political spectrum moved away from the left, and 
toward the right instead. The “lesson” o f Vietnam turned out to be not the destructive power of 
American capitalism and imperialism, but the danger o f radicalism, the value o f national “unity,” 
and the importance of “healing” the post-Vietnam “wounds.” In addition, the erasure o f the 
history of the war in Vietnam, and both the expurgation and vilification of the Vietnamese were
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necessary to enable full, unchecked concentration on the American veteran and, via him, on the 
American people. The transference of the war’s memory and significance onto the symbolic 
figure o f the veteran meant not only the sense that the United States was a victim o f the war—of 
“Vietnam ,” that the war happened to it—but also its inevitable obverse, namely the inability to see 
Americans as oppressors. The myth of “Vietnam ,” or the ultimate purpose o f mythologizing the 
historical conflict and its political basis, should thus be understood as the myth of American 
victimization.
As it turns out, this process o f “dealing” with Vietnam has not proven innocuous. The 
“Vietnam syndrome” that guided the Weinberger Doctrine of the Reagan era seemed at first a 
relatively positive outcome of the conflict, imposing a restraint on the Pentagon which, even if 
it did not stop the covert operations and support for regimes in Latin America and Africa, at 
least did not see U .S. forces deployed to combat or dispatched to carry out bombings, even 
despite the squirming of the bellicose president and the influential neoconservatives in the 
administration. The syndrome was not to last, o f course. By the end of the decade, the lessons 
were turned around on their head: now the point was not that Vietnam had proven that 
unpopular wars are unwinnable, and therefore should not be waged at all; now the idea was that 
wars need popular support, and therefore popular support should be garnered if wars are to be 
waged and invasions accomplished. In the case o f the G ulf W ar of 1990-1991, the rationale 
went both ways. The intervention was seen by President Bush and his advisors as an opportunity 
to raise the patriotic (nationalistic) spirit among the people by declaring the Vietnam syndrome 
kicked, and thus divert attention away from the concurrent economic recession in the U .S. and 
help his dropping ratings. At the same time, to ensure the success o f the endeavor—in accordance 
with the updated version of the military engagement doctrine, known informally as the Powell 
Doctrine after General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs o f Staff at the time—the war 
needed the public’s approval. The approval came: the operation “evoked a burst o f nationalist 
religiosity that (...) seemed both spontaneous and deeply felt. Flags appeared everywhere, along 
with bumper stickers, T-shirts, and buttons urging Americans to S U P P O R T  O U R  T R O O P S  (. . .) 
joined by yellow ribbons, which had been originally displayed in solidarity with the U .S. hostages 
held by Iran from 1979 to 1981 and seemed to indicate that America was once again the wronged 
party or victims”; Bush’s ratings shot up to “over 90 percent” (Ehrenreich 1997, 223; see also
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Isaacs 1997, 75-86; Lembcke 1998, 11-26; for a history of military policy regarding Desert 
Storm, see Bacevich 2005, 35-56).
“Support the Troops” was a self-inflicted ploy: by pledging their unwavering allegiance to 
American soldiers, people tricked themselves into approving an American intervention whose 
basis was at the very least shaky. According to Arnold Isaacs, because “opposing the policy in 
Vietnam had been interpreted (particularly after the fact) as dishonoring the soldiers who fought 
there, this time support for the soldiers would have to be expressed as support for the policy as 
well” (1997, 77; emphasis in original; the same happened during the Afghanistan and Iraq wars 
[Carruthers 2014, 181]). But the widespread enthusiasm for the campaign and the celebration 
of the conflict by the public suggest that the sentiment was also genuine, as if Americans were 
relieved to feel that they could indulge in patriotic activity and emotion, and feel good again 
about their country and its role as the purveyor o f freedom and democracy on the global scale. 
From this perspective, the effect o f the Vietnam W ar can be understood as the sense o f guilt 
among the people, o f having failed the veterans—the war’s primary victims—which could now be 
atoned for and expunged. Never again would the American soldier be vilified or abandoned. 
Ultimately, during Operation Desert Storm, the blurring of lines between the intense public 
feeling toward soldiers and the actual war being waged in Iraq reached such an extent that it 
seemed “as if Saddam  Hussein had kidnapped four hundred thousand Americans and the 
United States had to go to war to get them back” (Isaacs 1997, 78; the choice o f words 
reminiscent of N ixon’s use o f the POWs in North Vietnam is, no doubt, intentional).
But the “Support the Troops” campaign and its ideological implications prove deeply 
problematic, o f course. At the time of Desert Storm, for instance, the almost hysterical emotion 
that attached itself to U .S. soldiers also rendered invisible and insignificant the Iraqi wounded 
and killed in the American war: “I have absolutely no idea what the Iraqi casualties are,” said 
U .S. Commander-in-chief General N orm an Schwarzkopf in 1991, “we’re never going to get into 
the body-count business” (quoted in Beattie 1998, 11). A nd even if the “support-the-troops” 
ideology allows for a disapproval o f foreign U .S. interventions and invasions, it still primarily 
enforces an emotional attachment o f the public to the soldiers. Whatever the motivations o f its 
proponents, it still bolsters patriotism (nationalism), impedes criticism of the military’s conduct, 
and dilutes antiwar politics, which in the American context is usually analogous to anti-imperial
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politics. Perhaps most significantly, it encourages the discourse which puts the American soldier 
before any other concern.
Here the victimization of the American soldier finds its extension. Am ong the most palpable 
results o f Vietnam was the suspension o f the draft by President N ixon in 1973. In Long Time 
Passing, Myra MacPherson—who in Chapter 1 served as exemplary of the mainstream liberal 
discourse o f the 1980s—advocated hotly against the draft, engaging with the arguments presented 
by its supporters, who pointed out that a fair draft, which would avoid the kind of system abuse 
and resultant class and minority exploitation as happened in the case o f Vietnam, would be a 
democratic measure to keep Reagan’s militancy in check. MacPherson presented this standpoint 
as occupied solely by the privileged draft dodgers like Jim Fallows, whose actions she condemned 
passionately and considered relevant to dismissing their argument: “[t]here is seldom a moment 
of chagrin at asking another generation to do what they were unwilling to do” (1988, 198).
Surprisingly, for all her concern for class issues, MacPherson argued that an all-volunteer 
army, the model she approved of, is “an achievement center for men who might not have made 
it elsewhere,” meaning, o f course, the working class and impoverished and marginalized groups, 
“[m]en who most certainly would be back at the bottom of the ladder if the middle and upper 
middle class were added to the mix” (1988, 198). The first problem in this argument is the happy 
acceptance of the military rank and file as a natural domain for the underprivileged, and 
MacPherson’s rather bizarre approach to the problem of inequality in class distribution in army 
recruitment.74 O n the other hand, Vietnam era draft evasion by the middle and upper classes 
did translate into disproportionate representation of the working class and racial minorities on 
the Indochinese battlefields. Therefore, following M acPherson’s trail o f thought, one must 
assume that the underprivileged must always end up actually fighting in wars: either because 
enlisting is a viable career option for them, while it is so far less often for the more privileged, or 
because in case o f draft they are going to have far fewer opportunities to evade service, as 
happened with the Vietnam War.
But this particular issue is illustration of more profound failures o f liberal argumentation in 
response to Vietnam. Dismissing draft as inherently unfair is in reality arguing that American 
citizens are not forced to fight and die in wars waged by the state—which is problematic on a 
number of levels (on the unwillingness o f the American public opinion to accept any U .S.
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casualties throughout the 1990s, see Isaacs 1997, 68). I am tempted to argue that a democratic 
superpower like the United States, with its imperial history, should all the more invest its demos 
in its war-making plans abroad, and that fair and equal draft is a natural tool for that purpose. 
But even dismissing this line o f thought as unfair, one has to accept that an all-volunteer force 
removes the business o f war away from the people, and with it the interests and fate o f the 
potential targets o f attack and invasion. Even in the Vietnam era, when the protest movement 
and the demonstrations were combustive, the greater tide o f public opinion began turning 
decisively against the war not because o f the napalm dropped on Vietnamese villages but because 
U .S. costs and deaths mounted and reached a tipping point as the war began to look ever more 
pointless and endless, with the disastrous years 1968 and ’69 the true turning point that 
progressively revealed that the costs and casualties were unjustifiable.75 Ultimately, urging no 
draft after Vietnam was not to urge that immoral and illegal wars in the name of American 
ideologies and interests do not happen again, but that if they do, only those Americans who 
volunteer fight and die, while the rest is left alone.
The 1980s liberal dismissal o f draft in reaction to Vietnam in fact opened the way for an all­
volunteer army, which is a neoliberal force par excellence, surpassed as a neoliberal model o f a 
military perhaps only by a mercenary army. Neoliberalism as an ideology o f war does not need 
citizen armies any more than neoliberalism as an economy model needs societal solidarity or 
strong labor unions. If neoliberalism needed the repudiation of the 1960s to thrive, it would 
also be far better off without the disruptive danger o f mass protest and unrest, such as those in 
opposition to the war in Vietnam, and the threat they posed to capitalist interest. The truth of 
the matter is that Reagan understood well that draft was unnecessary, even obstructive, to 
attaining the kind of national greatness military intervention could ensure and promote. W hat 
he cared for was a patriotic nation supportive o f the troops, not a nation of citizen soldiers. 
Indeed, the plan could work so well because it “was not going to entail sacrifice on the part of 
the average American. (...) [Reagan] categorically rejected any suggestion of reviving the draft,” 
while he raised military spending to the eye-watering total o f $2.7 trillion over his two terms 
(Bacevich 2005, 107-109).
Today the progression of the American way of waging war, a process that began with the 
reaction against the Vietnam-era draft and along the way gave birth to the AVF and the “Support
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the Troops” ideology, continues in the transformations towards post-heroic warfare. Post­
heroism has been used to refer to the notion that at the end of the twentieth-century and into 
the twenty-first, the ideal o f sacrificing one’s life for one’s country on a battlefield eroded, while 
simultaneously the value of combat death decreased and devolved into a sense o f “waste”: heroes, 
in other words, have become victims. Vietnam is, unsurprisingly, singled-out as the most glaring 
example (Scheipers 2014a). In her summary of the current debates concerning “post-heroic 
tactics” such as the “use o f PSCs [private security contractors], reliance on air power as an 
independent tool in military operations, the use o f drones and robotics and the introduction of 
new technologies such as nanotechnology and biotechnology” (2014a, 11), Sybille Scheipers 
observes that some studies point toward the conclusion that “casualty aversion” is not the reason 
why some wars are unpopular, but rather that those ongoing wars that become unpopular breed 
casualty aversion (e.g. Carruthers 2014). She also argues that since some post-heroic tactics, such 
as drone warfare, are currently subject o f much controversy, and the PSCs sometimes become 
objects o f public scrutiny and scandal (such as happened with Blackwater in 2009), post-heroism 
in itself does not automatically translate into unanimous public support for military 
interventions.
But while the long-term effects o f post-heroic tactics on warfare in general and on the status 
o f soldiers remain to be seen, within the current system the processes are underway. There are 
inherent dangers to the inhabitants o f zones o f military operations, which are made ever more 
remote by application of weapons that are remote-controlled and risk-free for their users, not the 
least because the potential victims are rendered all the more invisible to the scrutiny of the public 
opinion in the country that has the power. Susan Carruthers, who points out the resurgence of 
the hero status o f the U .S. soldier after 9 /1 1  and during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (which, 
she adds, did not extend into a popular concern for the returning veterans’ health or welfare), 
also notes that civilian casualties o f Afghanistan conflict
have become a profound irritant to the AfPak [Afghanistan and Pakistan] campaign. Being 
American no longer means never having to say sorry for killing civilians in wartime. But US 
media generally have treated intention as everything in this regard. In short, if NATO troops 
did not set out to kill civilians then these deaths are unfortunate but not atrocious. Tellingly, 
CNN’s senior manager insisted in the early days of “Operation Enduring Freedom” that
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mention of Afghan civilian deaths always be “balanced” by a reference to those killed on 
9/11, with the unmissable implication that these fatalities were acceptable losses of 
questionably innocent life. As is often the case, “their” deaths barely register. That the vast 
discrepancy between “our” losses and “theirs” in every war America has fought should rarely 
be commented upon constitutes its own form of casualty avoidance (2014, 182-182; 
emphases in original).
While drawing a straight line o f causality between the war in Vietnam and the conduct o f more 
recent U .S. military engagement is impossible given the convoluted history of the past several 
decades, it is still reasonable to argue, as I have done, that the aftermath of that conflict had set 
in motion processes, which at the very least, redefined the relationship between American society 
and its soldiers. But by recasting the war as an American tragedy, the American cultural narrative 
o f Vietnam has also allowed other, more profound and more progressive “lessons” to slip away 
and remain unlearnt. Permitting the war to turn into a distinctly American myth enabled it to 
endure as an essentially hermetic experience. The story of how victimhood in Vietnam has been 
represented and perceived also reveals the ways in which it can be used for ideological and 
political ends. In the case o f the U nited States and the war in Vietnam, the subsurface dispute 
that had taken place in the American culture and politics over the questions o f who were the 
war’s victims and what meanings their victimizations carried, proved so profound that it actually 
reworked the historical memory of a momentous, potentially pivotal event. Looking back, and 
working our way through the history of this problem, exposes not only the danger o f a situation 
in which the powerful claim for themselves the status o f victims, but also the failure o f the 
conviction that everyone is a victim of war.
Notes
1 Articles and volumes critical, sometimes radically so, of American books and films of the Vietnam War had 
been published before and contemporaneously to his Warring Fictions, e.g. James 1990; Martin 1993; Spindler 
1991; also elements in Bates 1996; Bibby 1999; Herzog 2005; Searle 1988; Ringnalda 1994. Gender, for 
example, has been one particular approach applied to this literature frequently (e.g. Jeffords 1991; chapters 
in Hixson 2000; Smith 1994; Kinney 2000). Since 1998, scholars like Katherine Kinney (2000), William 
Spanos (2000, 2008) and Brenda Boyle (2015b, 2016) have delivered extensive critiques of the ethnocentric 
and ideologically-influenced perspectives in American narratives of the war.
2 For sources on the “right turn” as a response to the 1960s, see the next subchapter. “[‘New conservatism’] 
has become hegemonic in the public discourse, has displaced a waning postwar liberalism as a public 
philosophy, and has succeeded in attaining political and ideological power in many branches of government 
and within many of the organs of the public sphere” (Thompson 2007a, 2). See also Ferguson and Rogers 
1986.
3 “[Neoconservatives] became beneficiaries of economic and political elites: funded by big business, influential 
within corporate-backed think tanks, and appointed to government agencies under the Reagan-Bush (and 
Clinton) administrations. (...) [They] operated primarily in the realm of ideology, through conferences, books, 
magazines, and newspaper columns, in efforts to influence political opinion” (Diamond 1995, 179).
4 Lyndon Johnson deployed the first regular U.S. forces to Vietnam early in 1965, so technically he waged the 
war for three years until the end of his term in 1968; despite his campaign promises, under Nixon the war 
would be prolonged for over four more years, until March 1973. According to the National Archives website, 
between 1965 and 1968, 36,540 U.S. troops died in the Vietnam War, between 1969 and 1973—21,194; the 
total number of U.S. fatalities in the war since 1956 is 58,220 (“Statistical Information” 2013).
5 Lembcke located the origins of the “inside threat” version of why the United States had lost in the 
“ultraright” John Birch Society, and described Nixon’s approach as “Birchesque” (1998, 91-93). The notion 
of the defeat being due to the antiwar movement and liberals in Washington would weave its way into the 
neoconservative and Reaganite interpretations.
6 In his research, Lembcke found that the only confirmed incidents in which anyone was spat on concerned 
war supporters spitting on antiwar activists. He also pointed out that there had been instances of confrontation
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(but not spitting) between individual members of the public, not representatives of the peace movement, and 
antiwar Vietnam vets, and that much reported hostility was directed at the latter from pro-war groups, 
including the conservative veteran organizations, the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) and the American 
Legion (1998, 77-78). For example, in 1970 the Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW) organized a 90- 
mile march from New Jersey to Pennsylvania, conducting guerrilla theater performances and an educational 
campaign of speeches and leafleting on the way, the whole event recorded on tape which Lembcke watched 
and summarized. Upon reaching their destination, the men were greeted with “the menacing hostility of 
older, pro-war veterans of previous wars,” with VFW members taunting them: “Why don’t you go to Hanoi?,” 
“I don’t blame those fellows for not being proud, because we won our war and they didn’t; from the looks of 
them, they couldn’t”; “as a maimed [Vietnam] veteran on two crutches move[d] slowly by, a voice wonder[ed] 
if the wounded ‘[had] been shot with marijuana or shot in battle’” (1998, 57-58).
Lembcke also argued that the image of spitting on soldiers and veterans had been used in other modern 
Western nations in the wakes of lost wars as an element of scapegoating various parties for the defeat: as in 
the case of the American right blaming the antiwar movement, so in these instances did other right-wing and 
nationalistic forces pin the blame on “traitors” from within who, the scapegoating logic went, had sold out 
the armed forces or lost the war on the home front; this tactic and the attendant image of abused veterans 
could also serve to foster “ultrapatriotism” and belligerent fervent. Lembcke’s examples include the American 
South following the Civil War; Jews blamed for the French defeat in the Franco-Prussian War in 1870; 
Germans opposed to the war accused of helping the country lose World War I; and French considered by the 
country’s right wing to have “sold out the military” at home which led to the defeat in Indochina in 1954 and 
in Algeria in 1962 (1998, 7-8, 84-87).
7 Lembcke also points out that “[o]ne of the little-known dimensions of the anti-war movement is that 
veterans of previous wars, World War II in particular, were early participants in the opposition to the war in 
Vietnam and instrumental in initiating outreach to Vietnam-era soldiers and veterans” (1998, 4). In fact, 
veterans of World War II, organized as Veterans for Peace, had been the first to burn their discharge papers 
and mail their medals back to President Lyndon Johnson in protest over the Vietnam War, their practices 
later copied and adapted by draft resisters and the VVAW (Lembcke 1998, 30-31). See also Hagopian 2009, 
18.
8 Lembcke also cites a 1975 study which had found “that 75 percent of [Vietnam veterans] were opposed to the 
war”; he also noted “the affinity of these veterans for anti-imperialist politics and the cultural critique of
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capitalism” (1998, 106; emphasis in original). On the other hand, although he acquiesced that during the war 
“antiwar veterans denounced [it] as imperialism necessitated by the interests of a capitalist system” and that 
they “were in the forefront of denunciations of the war, bearing witness to what they claimed was a pattern of 
indiscriminate violence and criminal conduct by U.S. forces,” Patrick Hagopian suggested that many other 
veterans were not interested in these matters, that those involved in commemoration activities and memorial 
projects in the 1980s were actively involved in the process of ignoring the problems of morality and U.S. 
culpability in Vietnam, and that their interests were “self-serving” (2009, 12, 18, 76-77, 407; emphasis 
added). A still harsher assessment of veterans was delivered by Kendrick Oliver, who argued that “[m]any 
American soldiers (...) had never been much concerned by what they were called to do in south-east Asia, and 
following the US withdrawal, even those who were seemed to rechannel the flow of their pity away from the 
Vietnamese back to themselves, invoking an image of the veteran as victim rather than agent of war. (...) For 
the most part, Vietnam veterans have not functioned as custodians of the conflict’s moral memory; they have 
tended to seek redemption only of the moral debts that were owed to themselves” (2006, 255, 264).
9 It should also be pointed out that the socialist and Marxist elements in the antiwar organizations opposed 
draft evasion on the grounds of the class- and race-based exploitation and privilege inherent to the practice, 
and, they believed, its ultimate futility as a means to end the war; instead, soldiers’ rights were to be promoted, 
protected, and expanded (Lembcke 1998, 40-41; MacPherson 1988, 203).
10 For the record, Bacevich considers the designation neoconservatism to be a misnomer, as the ideology had, 
in his opinion, more to do with the transformative ambitions of the left, rather than the preservative urges of 
the right. The movements allegiance to the right wing was due to its origins in the opposition to the New Left. 
Sara Diamond agreed: among various post-World War II American movements on the right, 
“neoconservatives fit least comfortably into a ‘right-wing’ category” (1995, 179).
11 It should be pointed out that for all his ultrapatriotic rhetoric exulting the Vietnam vets, Reagan did very 
little to actually ease their various social and health ailments: “[b]ehind the ceremonial flag waving (...) it is 
hard to find anything constructive that either Reagan or Congress has done for Vietnam veterans,” wrote 
Myra MacPherson in 1984, following with a list of failures, including Reagan’s budget cuts that had adversely 
affected the veterans, his plans to roll back the funding for the so-called vet centers, and the Vietnam 
Administration’s (VA’s) continued refusal to carry out research into the effects of Agent Orange under its 
Reagan-appointed director.
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12 Beth Osborne Daponte found that 56,000 Iraqi soldiers and more than 3,500 Iraqi civilians died as a direct 
result of the war. Daponte found that in addition 146,000 Iraqi people died in the war’s aftermath due to its 
impact, some due to postwar violence, but a vast majority (111,000) due to what she called “adverse health 
results,” a result of the destruction of infrastructure, loss of electrical power, the vulnerability of the “weakened 
population” to infection, etc. (Daponte 1993). A Greenpeace International 1991 report stated that “100,000­
120,000 Iraqi soldiers lost their lives in the war (...). From 49,000-76,000 Iraqi civilians have died, about 10­
20 percent directly from allied bombardment and attacks, and the remaining 80-90 percent since the 
ceasefire” (Arkin, Durrant and Cherni 1991, 41).
13 The reluctance to report on the Vietnamese side of the war has been discussed by scholars working on 
various aspects of the Vietnam-era U.S. media. In U.S. press photography in the 1960s, for example, 
“[p]ictures of the Vietnamese (...) did not call up the same level of inspired concern [as pictures of the 
American soldiers]; the American press consistently emphasized coverage of the American GIs over the 
Vietnamese allies, civilians, and enemy” (Moeller 1989, 399; see also 373-374, 399ff on the representations 
of various groups of Vietnamese in American war photography). Moeller also describes the circumstances 
faced in Vietnam by Welsh photographer Philip Jones Griffiths, whose work was uniquely focused on the 
plight of the Vietnamese people: on assignment from Magnum, he actually struggled to find buyers for his 
photos among American magazines and newspapers, because demand for work such as his was so low. In turn, 
the U.S. military agency responsible for issuing accreditation to reporters in Vietnam became suspicious of 
Griffiths, as one of the conditions stipulated that accreditation be given to journalists but not authors, which 
required regular publication in the press. Griffiths, while documenting the Vietnamese perspective remained 
his focus and resulted in the publication of a photo book in 1971, had to ask Magnum for more typical 
assignments that would ensure the security of his job in Vietnam (Moeller 1989, 360). In his seminal book 
on the history of war correspondence, Phillip Knightley discusses at length the unwillingness of the U.S. media 
to cover American-perpetrated atrocities in Vietnam prior to My Lai: “In short, until the My Lai massacre 
story, American coverage was weak on the racist and brutalising nature of the war and on the way Americans 
treated the Vietnamese” (Knightley 1975, 388; see also 386-400). Knightley, too, tells the story of Philip Jones 
Griffiths’ difficulties in finding anywhere to publish his pictures, and he also discusses the case of the famous 
war correspondent Martha Gellhorn, who reported on the systematic abuses of the civilian population as 
result of the U.S. strategy, but found no publishers at all in the American media. Daniel Hallin, writing about 
American television networks’ insistence to always portray American soldiers in Vietnam before 1968 as “good 
boys” and heroes, shows that not only did this tactic obscure the racism and sometimes violent hostility of the
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GI toward the Vietnamese civilian, but also that it translated into a virtually exclusive interest in the U.S. 
soldier to the detriment of reporting the Vietnamese side of the war (Hallin 1986, 134-140). Hallin also 
points out that the U.S. ally and central cause of the war—South Vietnam—with its “government, politics, and 
economy took up something under 10% of television coverage during the war (...). But this figure exaggerates 
the attention television paid to the South Vietnamese: most of this coverage was in its own way very American 
centered. (...) Most coverage focused on the South Vietnamese government and its urban political opposition; 
the peasant figured in the news mainly as a victim and prize of the conflict” (1986, 201). A similar statistic is 
provided by Clarence Wyatt, who cites a report which “found that, of 187 film reports from Vietnam 
appearing on the evening news shows from September 1967 through January 1968, 159 dealt exclusively or 
primarily with American troops” (Wyatt 1993, 147; see also 139-142 generally on the lack of interest in the 
Vietnamese side in American media). An exhaustive study of the (mis)representation of the Vietnamese people 
in three major American magazines is provided in Landers 2004, 225-270.
14 A detailed account of the U.S. Vietnam policy during Ford’s and Carter’s terms is given in Martini 2004. 
In her study, Young (2014) emphasizes not only the lengths the Vietnamese government was ready to go—and 
went—to meet the U.S. demands that were issued as conditions to normalization (which came only in 1994) 
and to fulfil all requirements to qualify for international aid and credit (which it could not receive due to U.S. 
pressure), but also the dire need for international help in which the country had found itself after the war; it 
should also be pointed out that the United Nations, the World Bank, and other international development 
organizations were ready to provide Vietnam with funds. See also Chomsky 1999, 10.5.9.
15 The “MIA/POW issue” gained prominence with Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, who used the subject 
of U.S. prisoners of war and of the missing in Vietnam to promote their various propaganda schemes, to 
divert people’s attention away from the situation in Vietnam and the political problems the war presented, 
and to exert pressure on the North Vietnamese during peace negotiations; it was the Nixon administration 
which first encouraged and promoted the organizations that would later become the MIA/POW movement 
and lobby. See Franklin 2002, 319ff; Isaacs 1997, 117ff; Lembcke 1998, 94.
16 To begin with, the MIA/POW “truthers” never explained sufficiently why the Vietnamese—who always 
denied the charges—would hold on to the captured men for decades after the war, without ever using them as 
leverage; the reasons why the U.S. government would have known and kept the existence of these prisoners 
secret are even less clear. In an example of the logical conundrum posed by the lobby’s impossible demands, 
Isaacs quotes a position paper, published by the National League of Families of American Prisoners and
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Missing in Southeast Asia in 1992, which states: “Americans are known to have been left behind, in captivity, 
in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, it can only be assumed that these 
Americans remain alive in captivity today” (1997, 121). Furthermore, in his study, Martini points to the 
extensions of this absurdity: some U.S. citizens claim that the Vietnamese withheld the American remains 
because they are not getting the aid, thus locking the circular logic of this particular catch-22 (2004, 124). See 
also Franklin 2002, 318-322.
17 See also Chomsky 1989, 60-62, where he records the sobering statistics, always brought up in criticisms of 
the Vietnam POW/MIA issue: the original U.S. Vietnam MIAs lists contained just over 2,500 names (of 
whom about a half was known to have died, but whose bodies had not been recovered), which constitutes 
around 4 percent of the total confirmed deaths of U.S. servicemen in Indochina. The number of American 
MIAs from World War II is c. 80,000, from Korea—c. 8,000, 20 and 15 percent of total deaths respectively 
from these conflicts. The Vietnamese still list around 300,000 (the figure in other sources in this footnote; 
Chomsky gives 200,000) missing from the American war. See also Franklin 2002, 318; Isaacs 1997, 111-115, 
191; Martini 2004, 112, 120-122; Kwon 2008, 48. A comparison with the case of the American POWs 
repatriated after the Korean War—who were treated as traitors rather than heroes, as was the case in Vietnam, 
and largely ignored—illustrates just how much the reception of POWs is a matter of propaganda and political 
interest (see Young 1998).
18 Both Lembcke and Hagopian include in their bibliographies entries concerned with this discussion and 
criticism as it relates to post-Vietnam PTSD; see Hagopian 2009, 76-77, and Lembcke 1998, 121. The 
“psychiatrization” and medicalization of the American society in the past four decades, fed by a host of 
disorders “discovered” or renamed in the 1970s and 1980s, is the subject of Robert Whitaker’s popular- 
science bestseller, Anatomy of an Epidemic (2010); it is also transcribed into the core of various political and 
cultural processes occurring over the past half-century, examined in Adam Curtis’ documentary film, The 
Trap: What Happened to Our Dream of Freedom (2007). In this and his other films, Curtis also links the 
medicalization and psychiatrization to the dominant cultural norm of individualism, emerging since the 
1970s; see also Beattie 1998, 26-27. The anti-psychiatry movement—or at least criticism of the psychiatric 
profession and practice—itself reaches back to the 1960s and the work of influential practitioners such as R.D. 
Laing and Thomas Szasz (The Myth of Mental Illness, 1961; The Manufacture of Madness, 1970), or the French 
philosopher Michel Foucault (Madness and Civilization, first English edition 1964).
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19 Jerry Lembcke, who argues that the veterans were not welcomed in as hostile a manner as it would be 
“remembered” by the late 1970s, also pointed out a historical pattern of veterans of lost and humiliating wars 
returning to their countries with feelings of alienation and rejection; moreover, in these instances, as in 
Vietnam, hostile agents at home are often blamed for aiding the enemy and their own nation’s defeat. As 
examples, Lembcke discusses Confederate soldiers after the American Civil War, German soldiers after World 
War I, and French soldiers after both Indochina and Algeria. “The fact,” he writes, “that we seldom, if ever, 
hear stories about soldiers in winning armies returning home to abuse suggests that these tales function 
specifically as alibis for why a war was lost” (1998, 75-89).
20 Marita Sturken is far less critical of the VVM’s ideological implications, arguing that the right-wings 
“attempts” to appropriate it are in opposition to the “textured and complex remembrance that allows the 
Americans affected by this war (...) to speak of loss, pain, and futility” (Sturken 1997, 84). The VVM is also 
positively appraised as a “dove” triumph over “hawks” in Marling and Silberman 1987, 10; doves are 
understood as those who wish to see the VVM as a monument to the tragic loss of American life.
21 Chomsky also observes that while the $180 million settlement with manufacturers was lauded as a victory 
for the “victims of Agent Orange,” the Vietnamese victims never seemed to cross anyone’s mind (1989, 64­
65). While the United States never gave aid for Vietnamese Agent Orange victims, in 2000 President Clinton 
did okay funding for research on its health effects; the funding was stopped by President Bush in 2005, the 
same year that a class-action lawsuit by 3 million Vietnamese victims filed in the U.S. against Agent Orange 
manufactures was dismissed by a federal court. The reader is encouraged to look up Philip Jones Griffith’s 
photographic book Agent Orange, which documents the effects of the toxin in Vietnam years after the war.
22 Many books and studies have provided ample accounts of the difficulties, sometimes dire, faced by people 
in Vietnam between 1975 and the normalization of relations with the U.S., from the problems of Vietnamese 
internal affairs and the communist government, to studies of societal and cultural change, to journalistic 
accounts and stories of individuals. Examples are to be found in Chomsky 1989, 63-65; Chomsky 1999, 
10.5.9; Isaacs 1997, 163-195; Lawrence 2008, 168-169; Young 2014, ch. 15. Kolko 2007 is an economic, 
political, and sociological history of postwar Vietnam. Heonik Kwon has devoted much of his career to 
documenting the long term effects of the American war on the Vietnamese society and culture; see, for 
example, Kwon 2008. A recent edited volume also considers the legacies of the war in Vietnam and in the 
Vietnamese diaspora; see Boyle and Lim 2016.
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23 Beattie follows with another quotation, Chomsky’s response to Fallows’ conclusion, which the latter 
thought similar to a “German liberal saying that it is now clear that the Holocaust will be important in history 
mostly for what it did, internally, to Germany, not what difference it made to the Jews” (1998, 31).
24 Hunt, who in his study devotes far less attention to economic details and whose writing betrays lesser 
allegiance to a leftist discourse, even within his Geertzian framework notes the crucial importance of social 
class: “The sponsoring ‘ideologues’ in the case of U.S. foreign policy [in the late 19th and 20th c.] were usually 
white males possessed of at least a modicum of wealth from birth. Privilege not only smoothed their way to 
positions of political prominence but also left its stamp in some significant ways on their views of the world” 
(2009, 12-13, see also 137, 150), and in his conclusion acquiesces that from the end of the 19th c., “the greater 
power of corporations and the rise of a strong U.S. state had implications for policy ideology” (2009, 213).
25 Gibson’s overall argument in the Appendix of The Perfect War (2000) is that “the warrior’s knowledge,” i.e. 
the “truths” of the war contained in fiction and non-fiction written by veterans, should have a claim to 
legitimacy as valid source material alongside the assessments and histories written by high-level officers and 
military analysts. This is in response to what Gibson, originally writing in 1986, sees as the omission of veteran 
accounts in “official,” “scientific,” “socially accepted” knowledge about the war produced within the upper 
echelons of the U.S. military itself, which supposedly rendered the war in Vietnam ultimately as “Technowar”: 
a conflict fought according to rational, logical, and efficient rules of good management. Gibson argues that 
“the warrior’s knowledge,” located in the category of first-hand experience rather than calculated abstraction 
together with the “knowledges” of the Vietnamese peasantry or the Vietnamese enemy, contradicts 
“Technowar” and exposes its absurdities, cruelties, personal dilemmas, and so forth, but that it has not been 
integrated into the “official” version of the war. I would argue that over time the opposite has happened, and 
“warrior’s knowledge,” at least in the realm of cultural narrative and memory and of mainstream discourses, 
has come to eclipse other forms of knowledge about the war; this is, after all, what this thesis is largely about. 
But my own argumentation is not entirely in opposition to Gibson’s, whose historical study concerns the 
formulations and theories as to what happened in Vietnam within military and foreign policy circles and 
historians, not culture. The “lessons” of Vietnam that the Pentagon had learned—as seen in the 1970s and 
80s, the Gulf War, and into the 21st century—have been traced and described by many scholars (including 
Gibson in the 2000 Introduction to The Perfect War), and elements of this history are reproduced in Chapter 
1 of this thesis.
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26 Drinnon calls Burdick and Lederer’s novel “the bad book” due to, as he claims, its racism, its unchecked 
sense of American superiority, and its agenda of imperialistic handling of the natives; it probably does not 
help that one of the book’s heroic and positive characters is one “Colonel Edwin Hillandale,” a rather thinly 
veiled laudatory version of real-life Edward Lansdale, whom Drinnon perceives as a colonialist frontiersman 
par excellence and as an agent of empire, and whom he singles out as a figure as influential in Diem’s South 
Vietnam as he was exemplary of the vices of New Frontier counterinsurgency (Drinnon 1997, 374ff). For 
another in-depth criticism of the book and particularly its reception, including a polemic with Drinnon, see
Neilson 1998, 90-134.
27 Hellmann’s study, as pertaining to Kennedy and the New Frontier, is evoked here in favor of the fuller and 
more historically-anchored Slotkin 1998b, because it is representative of the discourse under scrutiny. The 
reader is encouraged to read Slotkin’s chapters.
28 Williams was a leading figure among revisionist historians associated with the New Left, and his work, 
although highly influential, has also been an object of much criticism and polemic. In recent years, his theses 
have been revisited by Andrew Bacevich in his studies of American imperialism (2002, 23-31; 2009).
29 Slotkin, for example, notes that in Fire in the Lake, Frances FitzGerald saw the frontier myth “as an 
ideological cause in American war policy” in Vietnam, but that she also “use[d] it herself as a way of defining 
a critical position against that policy” (1998a, 17-18). He also argues that one method of “escaping” myth, 
and of immunizing ourselves to its potentially destructive power in rhetoric, and in so politics and political 
action, “is through the demystifying of specific myths and of the mythmaking process itself. The center of any 
such effort necessarily involves the rehistoricizing of the mythic subject, and a historical account of its making”
(1998a, 20).
30 See also the chapters in Neilson 1998 on The Quiet American and In Country, where the literary criticism’s 
insistence of forcefully ascribing a preoccupation with human nature and metaphysical evil to the two novels, 
against their politicized content, is discussed. In a similar vein, Chomsky summarizes the gist of several reviews 
in mainstream American newspapers in the 1990s of a book on My Lai, concerning the understanding of the 
massacre itself: “[i]t was all some natural disaster, inexplicable, except by musing on the darkness of the 
individual human soul, perhaps” (1999, 10.5.11).
31 The administrative organization of what was once South Vietnam has changed: some provinces have shifted 
borders or disappeared, while new ones were constituted; the changes sometimes occurred during the
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American war. I use the names of provinces as they were at the time the given event took place. Kelley 2002 
provides an exhaustive account of the administrative and military geography of South Vietnam as it pertained 
to the American war.
32 Pinkville is also the title of Oliver Stone’s film project that seems to be perpetually stuck in a cycle of being 
cancelled due to lack of funding, and being announced to be back in the making. Stone’s February 13, 2014, 
tweet stated that the film is “still on the agenda” but “not in the climate of the time.”
33 This is not to say that these types of readings, postulating Vietnam exclusively as symbolically rendered 
America, are not in themselves unproblematic: they are. The text mentioned here, Hellmann 2007, which 
interprets Apocalypse Now solely as a reconstruction of the 1960s and 70s in the U.S., performs something of 
a magic trick—how to talk about “Vietnam” without actually mentioning Vietnam. This is, of course, the 
problem with depoliticized and non-materialist interpretations of the war’s narratives; if the books and films 
themselves may be said to Americanize Vietnam, as evinced in Kinney’s discussion of friendly fire, then critical 
texts which discard of the war completely take the practice to a higher level. To make another polemic loop, 
this is not to disregard Hellmann’s particular reading outright, either, as that would involve denying a text’s 
like Apocalypse Now incapacity to contain meanings and inspirations drawn from various sets of ideologically- 
and historically-informed factors. Either way, the point remains that these narratives are virtually invariably 
about American problems and tensions.
34 This interpretation of Dispatches in the postmodern context was launched by Fredric Jameson's famous 
remark about Vietnam being “the first terrible postmodern war,” a comment prompted precisely by Jameson's 
reading of Herr (1991, 44-45; see a polemic in Neilson 1998, 151-152). For subsequent discussions of 
Vietnam as a “postmodern” or “postmodernist” war, see Bibby 1999, Carpenter 2000.
35 As something of a commentary of this sanitized portrait of World War II in Hollywood, in The Short-Timers 
Hasford includes an ironic scene where a group of “bearded, dirtied” (1988, 38) marines, muddied survivors 
of months in the jungle, watch Wayne’s Vietnam vehicle, The Green Berets (1968), laughing at the movie- 
soldiers’ cleanliness, their clean-shaved faces and shiny boots.
36 Death in itself is among the largest themes and tropes in the memoir’s first four parts. Elsewhere, Herr 
comments on the perhaps most iconic phrase of the Vietnam vernacular, “there it is,” used as a response to 
encounters with corpses of American KIAs: “pure essence of Vietnam” (1978, 203). In his memoir If I Die in 
a Combat Zone, Tim O’Brien identifies the “buried, irretrievable history” (2006, 27) of the conflict as a factor
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in the American ignorance about what was going on in Vietnam, referring to the other type of “secrecy” during 
the war.
37 In the clearest instance of such validation, in his early study, American Literature and the Experience of Vietnam 
(originally published 1982), Philip Beidler, himself a veteran, claims that Dispatches is “the truest book” he 
knows about the war, but that it is also “first and last, the work of an observer, enclosed in its own stoned 
objectivism like an insect in amber” (2007, xii). Branding Herr’s memoir as an instance of “stoned objectivism” 
might seem bizarre were it not for the realization that what Beidler praises is not only the vision of the 
postmodern Loon as a faithful rendering of the war, but also the book’s political “objectivism,” that is its 
determined depoliticization. In the next sentence, Beidler claims that Gloria Emerson’s Winners &  Losers, the 
subjective, “experiential” opposite to Dispatches, “often gets most thoroughly lost in its own anger and 
polemicism” (2007, xii)—i.e., its clear political stance, continuing allegiance to antiwar activism, sympathy with 
the Vietnamese suffering, and adamant refusal to view the American people as victims, is in Beilder’s view, by 
the early 1980s, flawed and undesirable. The capacity to see Dispatches as admirably objective and to fault 
Winners &  Losers for its politics and perceived emotionality betrays an unspoken ideological position, as 
evinced by Beidler’s own take on the war: “whether at a certain point Vietnam simply started looking like a 
second-rate Catch-22 (...) is probably now something that is just not worth trying to figure out. Like most things 
connected with the war, it just happened” (2007, 12-13). The book’s index does not contain a single 
Vietnamese name, no U.S. president except for one mention of Johnson, no entry for Lansdale or any 
American politician, advisor, or diplomat—which is understandable in a book of literary criticism, but one 
would think proclaiming the war to have “just happened” would have warranted at least a footnote to account 
for all those missing names.
38 In his relatively recent reading of Dispatches, Ty Hawkins argues that in writing his memoir Herr set out on 
a “two-fronted quest, one both deconstructive and profoundly essentialist” (2012, 74), or, in other words, that 
Dispatches is primarily an excavation of the war’s “essence”—namely the “secret history,” which Hawkins 
identifies as “the war’s Truth (...) the destructive horror and reconciliatory allure of violent death” (2012, 66). 
But Hawkins also positions himself explicitly in opposition to (among others) radical critiques of the book, 
exemplified, according to him, by Jim Neilson (1998) and Katherine Kinney (2000), which, accusing Dispatches 
of postmodernist language play and self-conscious constructivism, point out and ultimately focus on the 
absence of the Vietnamese; instead, Hawkins proposes a methodology that rejects “skipping from text to text 
and dismissing an organic conception of artistic development” (2012, 65). What Hawkins seems to be
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overlooking, however, is that where his methodology considers Dispatches hermetically as a unique work of 
art—which, in literary studies, is more than valid, of course—Neilson and Kinney consider it from the outside, 
by tracing the ways in which a text like Herr’s becomes complicit in a discourse, something the present thesis 
is preoccupied with, too. Hawkins reads Dispatches against Chris Hedges’ admission of the attractiveness of 
combat, and promises that an analysis of how Herr dealt with this problem “constitutes a critical facet of our 
larger thesis as to how combat proved sufficiently alluring to American policy makers, military personnel, and 
the general public as to engender two guerrilla conflicts just a generation removed from the war in Vietnam” 
(2012, 66).
39 Full Metal Jacket was voted “the BEST Marine movie of all-time” in a poll by the Marine Corps Association 
(“Which is the BEST Marine Movie” 2013), and second-best in a list compiled by an author at Breitbart, of 
all places (Schlichter 2009). Number one on the list is Wayne’s Sands of Iwo Jima, which came second in the 
MCA poll; maybe the meaning of the “John Wayne” figure in Vietnam has become part of the new secret 
history.
40 O’Brien offers another, more strictly literary and representational, type of change of perspective. In 
“Ambush,” a story in The Things They Carried (where the Vietnamese are virtually always victims of the 
Americans; Americans die, but the culprits remain unseen and of secondary importance), the narrator 
describes the night when he killed a man in a surprise attack. There is a reversal in the description of the act, 
since, first of all, the man walks out of the night and fog, like the Vietnamese enemy usually do, but instead 
of being a killer of Americans, he will soon himself be the victim. Second of all, O’Brien is thus now the 
danger lurking in the jungle and darkness; moreover, he later tries to imagine the man’s identity and life (“The 
Man I Killed”), and in his projections his victim is very similar to himself, which fuels the inversion, with the 
man in the role (through his manner of death) traditionally reserved for American casualties, further.
41 Richard L. Stevens’ virtually unknown memoir, Mission on the Ho Chi Minh Trail: Nature, Myth, and War in 
Vietnam (1995) also departs from the comparison between the war in Indochina and Leo Marx’s 
conceptualization of “ the machine in the garden.” The main reason I do not consider Stevens’ book here is 
that it appears to have made no dent on the canon; it has four ratings on Goodreads, and two on Amazon.
42 Caputo also includes “the conditions imposed by the climate and country” as a factor in determining 
Americans’ behavior in Vietnam, especially their brutality: “[f]or weeks we had to live like primitive men on 
remote outposts rimmed by alien seas of rice paddies and rain forests”; next on the list are diseases like malaria, 
the sun, monsoons, dense jungle, leeches, and so forth (1985, xvii). Later he notes, “we fought the climate,
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the snipers, and monotony, of which the climate was the worst” (1985, 59), and attributes the “spiritual 
disease” blighting his men, apparently named “la cafard” by the French who fought the First Indochina War, 
to the “alien landscape” (1985, 68-69). Elsewhere, “it was the enemy that resisted us, the land, the jungle, 
and the sun” (1985, 87). Caputo also suggests that part of the reason why the Americans lost the war was that 
the soldiers were so often hindered by the difficulties posed by the terrain and climate (1985, 147). In fact, it 
is impossible to quote all instances where the landscape and climate are the villain in A Rumor of War, since 
they are so frequent; ultra-realistic and meticulously chronological, Caputo’s memoir is also quite repetitive.
43 Ngoc Linh Province is fictional. Ngoc Linh is the name of South Vietnam’s highest mountain, in Kontum 
Province in the Central Highlands.
44 On the other hand, O’Brien is the canonical author most interested in the humanity of the enemy. In his 
memoir, he describes the opportunity he claims to have had to converse with a North Vietnamese student 
while himself studying in Prague, Czechoslovakia, during the summer of 1967, before going to war; the man 
good-naturedly counters everything that O’Brien says, voicing some rational anti-American arguments, and 
the two part cordially (2006, 99-100). In the same book, O’Brien recalls some soldiers’ tales he has heard 
about prostitutes in Bangkok and Manila who are really communist agents with razor blades in their vaginas, 
and admits he believed the stories, “imagining the skill and fright and commitment of those women” (2006, 
107). While an earlier chapter in the memoir, titled “Pro Patria,” deals with the cultural pressure on young 
Americans to go to war to fulfil heroic ideals, ultimately deemed by O’Brien to be harmful and meaningless 
in the case of Vietnam, a subsequent part titled “Mori” actually regards a shot NVA nurse whom O’Brien and 
his platoon watch die. Going After Cacciato contains the entire chapter dedicated to Cacciato’s pursuers’ 
political and philosophical, not unfriendly, discussion with an NVA officer whom they find imprisoned in a 
tunnel system they have fallen into. In The Things They Carried, the story titled “The Man I Killed” has the 
collection’s narrator examine the body of an NLF fighter he has shot, imagining his entire life and 
circumstances on the basis of his features and the contents of his pockets.
45 U.S psyops officers were aware of the terror brought about by the American B-52 Stratofortresses, the 
flagship bomber of the war and a considerable innovation in the business of raining death from the sky. Like 
other aircraft, it was routinely portrayed on leaflets and pamphlets dropped in their hundreds of thousands 
over North Vietnam and the Ho Chi Minh trail. One such leaflet, reproduced in Friedman 2007, reads: “This 
is the B-52 evil genius, a constant threat to you.” And on the other side, “Dear North Vietnamese Communist 
Cadre: On your supply routes into the south, you have surely heard a lot about the terrible death and
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destruction of the B-52 evil genius. The B-52 evil genius is capable of carrying many different kinds of bombs. 
It usually flies at an altitude of more than 10 kilometers, so that you can neither see it nor hear it. Unmarked 
graves on both sides of the road are the consequences of bombing by the B-52 evil genius. Therefore, whenever 
the North Vietnamese Communists make you move supplies to the South, you will be bombed. Do you still 
hope to escape the Angel of Death and return to your families? You had better find a way to escape and save 
your lives. The Government of Vietnam will welcome you with open arms.”
46 Going After Cacciato: “[The infantrymen] did not know even the simple things: a sense of victory, or 
satisfaction, or necessary sacrifice. They did not know the feeling of taking a place and keeping it, securing a 
villager and then raising the flag and calling it a victory. No sense of order or momentum. No front, no rear, 
no trenches laid out in neat parallels” (1980, 256). And so the passage continues. Like the entire notion of 
the “inadequacy” of Vietnam in comparison to World War II, this excerpt belongs, of course, to the “different 
war” discourse.
47 Strangely, my printed copy of If I Die in a Combat Zone, a 2006 Harper Perennial Modern Classic reprint of 
a 1995 Flamingo edition, released in Britain, appears to be quite different from the e-book I also have. The e­
book is the 1999 Broadway Books edition, and it comes with the following information: “A hardcover edition 
of this book was originally published in 1975 by Delacorte Press. It is here reprinted by arrangement with 
Delacorte.” The online previews of the book, on Amazon and on Google Books, are both the Broadway 
edition and unsurprisingly correspond to my e-book. I use the printed Harper Perennial for quotations in this 
thesis; the dialogue referenced in this footnote is different in the e-book—not to the point that it changes the 
meaning of what is said, but nevertheless the choice of words and people speaking differ. This kind of 
difference appears to be consistent across the two editions.
48 O’Brien later also makes a generally rare, if quick, reference to the other type of comparison to World War 
II, when he likens the U.S. tactic of helicopter combat assault in Vietnam to “the dropping of the bomb on a 
sleeping Hiroshima, (...) the Nazis’ rush through Belgium and Poland and Czechoslovakia”; as he boards the 
chopper to be CA’d with his company into Pinkville, he thinks of the fact that “[fourteen miles to the south, 
the villagers of My Khe were sleeping”; “My Khe” will be soon destroyed by Americans (2006, 113-114).
49 In his own scene of departure, Herr leaves Vietnam on a plane while high on opium, still thinking of 
Vietnam in spatial and geographic terms, the memory a way of cementing his construction of Vietnam as both 
a fantasyland and a phantasmagoric extension of America: the journey home is “time outside of time, a trip 
that happened in seconds and over years; Asian time, American space, not clear whether Vietnam was east of
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west of centre, behind me or somehow still ahead. (...) There’d been nothing happening there that hadn’t 
already existed here, coiled up and waiting, back in the World. I hadn’t been anywhere” (1978, 200; the final 
part of the quotation may refer to Herr’s personal issues, too).
50 Sean Flynn and fellow photojournalist Dana Stone were abducted by guerillas in Cambodia in 1970, and 
were never seen again. Flynn’s Vietnam story is recounted in a 1982 song by The Clash, titled “Sean Flynn,” 
in the British-Australian miniseries Frankie’s House (1992), and in the independent film The Road to Freedom 
(2011).
51 Caputo’s complaint is that in Vietnam, “[e]thics seemed to be a matter of distance and technology,” meaning 
that Vietnamese people could be shot from a distance or bombed, but it was “wrong” to kill them at close 
range or to burn villages with white phosphorus grenades; or that in free-fire zones people could be shot if 
they ran, but not if they stood or walked. The reason for Caputo’s complaint about rules of engagement is 
that, to the U.S. soldier on the ground, the war was one for survival and that he did not care whom he had 
kill in the process; the rules of engagement were an attempt “to impose on his savage struggle the mincing 
distinctions of civilized warfare” (1985, 229). In other words, Caputo’s American self-absorption and self-pity 
are relentless.
52 Quoted anonymously from a private interview about William Calley and the charges against him, in Hersh
1970, 155.
53 Peter Arnett talking about the invasion of Cambodia, which he witnessed, in an interview on CBS Evening 
News with Walter Cronkite, July 7, 1970; quoted in Wyatt 1993, 190.
54 Some of the same strategies enumerated in this list are discussed in a very interesting paper by Amy Schlegel 
on the naturalization of Son My in the U.S., and the significance of documentary photographs of the massacre 
in relation to empowering the Vietnamese voice largely silenced in public response to the incident in the
States (1995, 53-54).
55 Another war crime is looting, instances of which, though rarely, are nevertheless also recorded. For example, 
in The Short-Timers Joker’s unit steals a large amount of Vietnamese piasters from civilian houses, and other 
marines are said to have taken a loaf of golden bars from the imperial palace, in the aftermath of the fighting 
at Hue (Hasford 1988, 86-87, 108). In My Lai 4, Seymour Hersh writes about an incident when, prior to the 
massacre, the men of Charlie Company stole a radio from some villagers, as retribution for a booby trap
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detonated in the vicinity of their hamlet: “We stole it because we wanted it. (...) They had it and we wanted 
it—we figured, ‘What the hell, they’re gooks (...).’ Everybody was just taking things” (1970, 35-36).
Cronin 1991 writes on the subject of atrocity, specifically killing of POWs, in Vietnam War literature vis- 
à-vis World War II literature, although his interest is exclusively in the issue of the veteran-author’s awareness 
of committing crime.
56 I partially borrow the idea of connecting the “perpetrator” status of some narratives to their strategies of 
representation and narration whose purpose is to influence interpretations of the oppression from Holocaust 
scholar Robert Eaglestone’s (2013) article on “swerves,” or the ways authors of Holocaust perpetrator fiction 
find to avoid engaging with the problem of evil. Beyond inspiration, the comparison between Eaglestone’s 
work and my project ends
57 This is not to make an aesthetic statement and claim that it is impossible to enjoy reading Going After 
Cacciato. Other readers may very well do so. However, my brief discussion of the novel is predicated on its 
status as a Vietnam narrative, the limitation made defensible by the minor significance the book seems to have 
outside of the Vietnam canon on the one hand, and the significance afforded O’Brien within that canon. If 
Going After Cacciato is usually read as a successful representation of the war, criticizing its formal and aesthetic 
aspects in this specific context is fair.
58 A pose which was actually inspired by a 1968 Vietnam War photograph, taken by Art Greenspon, of a 
paratrooper signaling for a medevac helicopter. The picture appeared on the cover of the New York Times.
59 Here the inherent weakness of the privilege of the veteran voice is most starkly revealed. Caputo, as an ex­
soldier who fought in Vietnam, appears to have the authority to make proclamations about the war, and his 
judgement of it is deemed as particularly valuable, authentic, and so on. But then—would his personal 
perspective on the war not be limited to his own experience, to what he witnessed and did? (Not to mention 
the potential interest in insisting on a given image of the war vis-à-vis his own involvement in a war crime.) A 
more distant perspective affords a broader view; a historian, for example, is in the position to take into account 
the evidence from the whole war, not only a sliver of it, limited in both space and time. Caputo’s authorial 
pronouncement that American atrocity in Vietnam has been exaggerated flies in the face of collective veteran 
efforts like the Winter Soldier Investigation, whose participants wished to prove that it had, in fact, been 
seriously downplayed. (In the prologue to A Rumor of War, Caputo writes that after his tour he became 
involvement in the antiwar movement; but his long-term contribution to the memory of Vietnam, unlike that 
of the WSI veterans, has been to produce his book, a self-absolutory account of one crime which he justifies,
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and from the sales of which he profited.) Nick Turse’s 2013 Kill Anything That Moves is a historical, evidence- 
based and well-received study that also completely contradicts Caputo’s “exaggeration” thesis, and indirectly 
weakens the authority which the veteran literary voice is often afforded as “authentic.”
60 I would argue that there is no reason to discount Berlin’s position as simply a fictional character’s opinion, 
and thus not discourse-forming. For one thing, he is the character to identify with in the novel, and his 
perspective is shared by the narrator. In the context of literary criticism, and especially of O’Brien’s Vietnam 
oeuvre, it is rather obvious that Berlin stands in for O’Brien himself. Finally, O ’Brien, at least in his Vietnam 
works, is not particularly good at creating characters, who are quite undistinguished and, unless they are 
allegoric, like Mary Anne or Azar, usually serve to convey what O’Brien wishes to say about the Vietnam War 
or storytelling.
61 The extent to which Peebles sees the veteran as a victim is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that in 
comparing Paco’s Story with Toni Morrison’s Beloved, she claims that Paco and Sethe belong to the same 
category of characters, “both perpetrators and victims” (2015, 145), with gender as apparently the main line 
of difference between the two. In Peebles’ analysis, what slavery is to Beloved and Sethe, the Vietnam War is 
to Paco’s Story and Paco, and it is the latter that “emerges as the bleaker portrait, one in which any kind of 
community proves to be a fragmenting rather than a sustaining force” (2015, 138).
62 “Perhaps [my] interest in the women’s movement, the early excitement over its huge importance, ended that 
night in Saigon in 1971 when Germaine Greer was there on a brief visit. One evening there were half a dozen 
of us in the same room. She was witty, wonderfully bright, very talkative. She looked nice. Her manners were 
charming and she made the men in the room light up. What really provoked her, she said, was seeing a group 
of Vietnamese women filling sandbags near Long Binh, the biggest U.S. Army base in Vietnam, the ugliest of 
places. What she resented was a sign in English, near the Vietnamese women, that said MEN AT WORK” 
(Emerson 1992, 2).
63 The public reactions to Calley’s guilty verdict, among which open protest against his sentence was common 
and vocal, is one indication of the state of mind of a sizeable portion of the American society, concerning the 
country’s involvement in Vietnam and atrocity against the Vietnamese. As an example to illustrate the scope 
of pro-Calley hysteria, an astonishing voice in the matter came from a Georgia reverend, speaker at a pro- 
Calley rally: “There was a crucifixion 2,000 years ago of a man named Jesus Christ. I don’t think we need 
another crucifixion of a man named Rusty Calley” (quoted in Linenthal 1980, 86). “Rusty” is Calley’s 
nickname. Eqbal Ahmad, as quoted in Friendly Fire, gives an interpretation of the outcry: “Aren’t you shocked
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the American people are now trying to make a hero out of [Calley]? Why do you suppose they are doing this? 
Why are these Americans protesting Calley’s sentence? (...) Because they sense that Calley’s trial is their trial 
as well. They are crying to the President, ‘Get us off the hook, too!’” (Bryan 1991, 239).
64 The case of Phan’s death has eerie connections to two American “Vietnam presidents.” Before his 
deployment to Vietnam, Meserve, the model soldier, was actually chosen for Johnson’s inaugural parade 
march in 1965. The other connection is stranger: a month after Phan’s murder, Eriksson took military 
investigators to Hill 192 to look for her body, which they found in a badly decomposed state. She was taken 
to Saigon, where autopsy was performed by one Colonel Pierre Finck—one of the three pathologists who had 
examined John Kennedy’s body in November 1963.
65 Phan’s death was also the subject of a 1970 West German film, o.k., directed by Michael Verhoeven.
66 I exclude films made after 1994, the year I consider to be a working caesura in Vietnam canon formation. 
Forest Gump (1994), though crucial in the canon—in fact, its release date dictates my choice of the cutoff date— 
also transcends it in terms of subject matter and concerns, and so is excluded, too; it would be the most 
popular film on the list by far, anyway, with the numbers of its ratings exceeding one million on each website.
67 Excluding the 3,561 separate ratings of Redux.
68 I am, again, aware of another major potential drawback in the simple method I have applied in the 
compilation of my list, and namely the fact that an unknown, potentially substantial, number of ratings had 
come from movie viewers outside of the United States. In the United Kingdom, for example, the opposition 
to the American invasion of Vietnam was staunch in the 1960s and 70s, and a certain attitude of 
condemnation in academia and criticism, harsher than in the U.S., has persisted there. The reception of these 
Vietnam films in countries like the U.K., potentially different than in the States, could find reflection in the 
number of ratings. Nevertheless, I would still argue that my list is valid, for four reasons. One, irrespective of 
how a given film might have been received anywhere (and my list is not meant to reflect opinion), its status as 
a noteworthy film, or a noteworthy Vietnam film, leads to greater number of viewings in general. Two, all these 
films are American Vietnam films, and since the “Vietnam War” was also an American event, Americans 
(both directors and audiences) determine what the canon is, or which films are, in other words, noteworthy. 
Three, the ratings were given already in the internet era, which means that the majority of the people 
dispensing their stars were most likely not the people who saw Platoon in the cinema in the 1980s, but rather 
the younger generation who has learnt, from the existing canon, which Vietnam films are noteworthy—or,
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conversely but with no impact on the validity of my list, that these particular films were in themselves 
noteworthy; but it also means that the ratings were given at a time when the reach of cultural globalism (or of 
American cultural hegemony) is in many respects unprecedented. In these conditions the national boundaries 
of canons naturally dissolve, and so perhaps my list should be branded as reflective of a general Vietnam movie 
canon. And four, we have to consider channels of distribution, too. For example, has a film like Casualties of 
War had the same chance over the past three decades of being broadcast on television, where large numbers 
of people would have watched it regardless of whether they had specifically sought it out or not, as often as 
one of the Rambos? How many young people today will stream or download something corny like Coming 
Home, versus something awesome like Full Metal Jacket, one the coolest films ever made? All of these points 
are made to argue that the preexistence of the canons, popular and critical, is crucial to viewership, and thus 
making my list, I guess, into an illustration of the cultural echo chamber.
69 Jeffords, whose well-known thesis is that the aftermath of the Vietnam War served as a vehicle of cultural 
remasculinization in the United States, links the betrayal of the Vietnamese civilians to the need to restore 
American masculinity, and simultaneously offers another interpretation of the importance of “Vietnam” to 
Americans: “because American manhood itself seemed to be on trial, with soldiers fighting and frequently 
being killed by women, children, and an often poorly equipped and nutritionally depressed enemy, it is 
important to revive the image of American strength through Vietnam, the place where it was apparently ‘lost’” 
(1989, 135). See Neilson 1998, 159-161, for a polemic with aspects of Jeffords’ thesis.
70 James—now Jim—Webb was a highly decorated marine lieutenant in Vietnam, and later became a journalist 
and author. He served as Assistant Secretary of Defense and Secretary of the Navy in the Reagan 
administration, and was U.S. Senator from Virginia (Democrat) until 2013. Webb considered running for 
the Democratic nomination for the 2016 presidential election, but pulled out of the race. Patrick Hagopian, 
in his study of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial, of whose Fund Webb was a member, includes some 
interesting biographical information: by the beginning of the 1980s, “Webb [had] made his political mark by 
opposing [Jimmy] Carter’s plan to extend a pardon to some deserters and to upgrade the discharges of veterans 
who had received less than honorable discharges. In contrast, he pleaded for clemency and an honorable 
discharge on behalf of a marine veteran convicted of point-blank shooting of a group of unarmed women and 
children in Vietnam. Webb argued that they were not ‘innocent civilians’ because of his supposition that they 
supported the Viet Cong” (2009, 85).
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71 At least this is what I think the villagers are asking for; even with the slang glossaries at hand, the rendition 
of Dan’s pidgin translation is difficult to decipher: “She say babysan get boo-coo bac-bac bomb, same-same 
K.I.A. Say honcho mebbe souvenir chop-chop. (...) She say mebbe one case C-rats same-same one babysan”
(2001, ch. 19).
72 Rummel (1997) calculated that the U.S. forces committed 5,500 democidal killings in South Vietnam; 
between 3,000 and as many as 200,000 in Cambodia; and 3,000 in Laos. For other and more recent, statistics 
concerning civilian deaths, I turn to the figures compiled by Nick Turse: at least 65,000 were killed by 
American bombing in North Vietnam; as for the South, while earlier estimates hovered above 1 million 
civilian casualties in general, the “most sophisticated analysis yet of wartime mortality in Vietnam, a 2008 
study by researchers from Harvard Medical School and the Institute of Health Metrics and Evaluation at the 
University of Washington, suggested that a reasonable estimate might be 3.8 million violent war deaths, 
combatant and civilian [in both North and South],” of which perhaps 2 million were civilians, the figure 
provided by the Vietnamese government in 1995 (2013, introduction). If we discount Rummel’s figure of 
5,500 as too low, it is still impossible to extricate the number of civilian deaths or even casualties caused 
directly by the Americans from the totals; the figures provided by the sources quoted by Turse include all 
casualties of the American war, also those caused by the Diem and other South Vietnamese regimes, the 
ARVN, other U.S. allies (especially South Koreans), the NLF, and the NVA.
73 Similarly, in the case of the Phoenix program, Frances FitzGerald writes outright that it “in effect eliminated 
the cumbersome category of ‘civilian’” (1972, 412).
74 A 2008 article that looked at the history of demographics in military enlistment, found that “significant 
disparities exist only by socioeconomic status,” and not by race, ethnicity, or immigrant status: since the end 
of conscription in 1973, “[t]hose with lower family income are more likely to join the military than those with 
higher family income. (...) Class differences in military enlistment likely reflect differences in the non-military 
occupational opportunity, structured along class lines” (Lutz 2008, 184-185). The political and cultural forces 
behind this trend are examined in Michael Moore’s film, Fahrenheit 9/11 (2004). Lutz’s study contradicted 
the 2006 report by the conservative think tank Heritage Foundation, which found that enlistees were in fact 
more likely to be well-off and better-educated (Kane 2007). The report’s educational claims were in turn 
contradicted by the findings of a study conducted in 2007 by the National Priorities Project (NPP), which 
found that the number of recruits with high school diploma were dropping and educational standards were 
being lowered in the U.S. Armed Forces recruitment; in response to the study, an army recruitment
Notes 267
spokesman said that the trend was “an indication of the difficult recruiting environment we’re in, both with 
the impact of the ongoing wars [in Iraq and Afghanistan], an economy competing for high school graduates, 
and a decline in the percentage of students who graduate from high school” (White 2008).
As Lutz herself writes, not enough research has been done into class in the military, and so it is difficult to 
say with certainty what the demographics were exactly at the time of MacPherson’s Long Time Passing, or in 
other words what the likelihood of a person’s enlistment was in relation to his class, educational background, 
or family income; the Heritage Foundation report certainly aims to refute the “conventional wisdom” that 
volunteer enlistment stems from fewer opportunities and poverty, and sets out to show that it stems from 
patriotism instead. The studies cited above, and Lutz’s article in particular, nevertheless provide an analysis of 
demographic processes in armed forces enlistment that began with the end of conscription and result from 
the institution of all-volunteer force instead—they are directly linked, in other words, to the no-draft 
discussion in the early 1980s.
It should also be pointed out, that in theory military draft remains a possibility in the United States, as 
since 1980 men are required to register for Selective Service System when they turn 18, and a bill that would 
require women to do the same is in works in Congress as of 2016. In practice, draft has not been enforced 
since 1973; it also appears that registration is patchy and failure to register has never been prosecuted 
(Wikipedia 2016a).
75 By 1967 and the siege of U.S. Marines at Con Thien, “[increasingly costly warfare, which saw the deaths of 
two hundred to three hundred Americans a week, had produced congressional debate challenging the 
Johnson administration’s policy and had caused some measure of public dissent”; after 1968 and the Tet 
Offensive, coverage of the war in leading American magazines decreased as the public “wrote Vietnam off” as 
impossible to win and too costly (Landers 2004, 99-103). By the time of the Tet Offensive in 1968, 
“Americans came to realize that the cost in lives and treasure was simply too great to sustain without some 
successful end in sight” (Wyatt 1993, 188). One scholar saw an analogy with the response to the Korean War: 
“It should not be forgotten that public support for the shorter and less costly limited war in Korea also dropped 
as its costs rose, despite the fact that television was in its infancy, censorship was tight, and the World War II 
ethic of the journalist serving the war effort remained strong” (Hallin 1986, 213). (A wholly different 
perspective on those critical years is offered by Noam Chomsky, who argues that 1968 was the year in which 
big American corporations turned against the war and “called for the enterprise to be liquidated” [Chomsky
1997, 166].)
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Summary
The aim of the dissertation is to examine canonical American narratives of the war in Vietnam from the 
perspective of victimhood. I argue that these texts should primarily be read in the context of the late 1970s 
and early 1980s, the period when they were published and received, and when the American cultural 
narrative of the conflict was simultaneously developing. The status of the victim of “Vietnam” turns out 
to be a key fact in the eventual cultural narrative, and one bestowed primarily on the American veteran. 
Having discussed the discourses of the time, as well as their ideological motivations, as they pertained to 
the conflict itself as much as to the figure of the vet, I formulate the proposition that mythologization of 
the war was necessary in order to obscure its historicity and to turn into an exclusively American affair. In 
this way, the country of Vietnam becomes a symbolic landscape of American myth, in which the American 
tragedy of the war is set. I set out to deconstruct the various strategies of representations employed in 
canonical narratives in order to perform this type of mythologization. In the final chapter I turn to the 
representations of the U.S. soldiers and Vietnamese civilians in the canonical films and books, so that I 
can trace the strategies used to establish and explain the various forms of victimhood. I come to the 
conclusion that the American Vietnam canon to a large degree hinges on the problem of handling war 
crime. The thesis approaches the problem of victimhood in the contexts of myth and ideology.
Streszczenie
Celem rozprawy jest zbadanie kanonicznych narracji amerykańskich dotyczących wojny w Wietnamie pod 
kątem problemu wiktymizacji. Wychodzę od założenia, iż teksty te powinny być odczytywane głównie w 
kontekście późnych lat 70. i 80., czyli okresu, kiedy zostały one wydane oraz kiedy rozwijała się 
amerykańska narracja kulturowa dotycząca konfliktu. Status ofiary „Wietnamu” okazuje się być kluczowym 
aspektem tej kulturowej narracji, przyznanym przede wszystkim amerykańskim weteranom. 
Przedyskutowawszy kwestię ówczesnych dyskursów odnoszących się do wojny w Wietnamie oraz postaci 
weterana, a także ich ideologicznych pobudek, formułuję propozycję wedle której mitologizacja wojny 
wietnamskiej była niezbędna by przesłonić jej historyczność i uczynić z niej wyłącznie amerykańską 
sprawę. W ten sposób państwo Wietnam staje się symbolicznym krajobrazem amerykańskiego mitu, w 
którym rozgrywa się amerykańska tragedia. Moim celem jest dekonstrukcja różnych strategii 
przedstawiania Wietnamu oraz jego mieszkańców w kanonicznych narracjach, które dopuszczają się owej 
mitologizacji. W ostatnim rozdziale rozprawy zajmuję się przedstawieniami żołnierzy USA oraz 
wietnamskich cywilów, aby prześledzić strategie użyte to ustanawiania oraz wyjaśniania różnych „typów” 
ofiar wojny. W konkluzji zauważam, iż amerykański kanon wojny wietnamskiej w dużej mierze polega na 
„radzeniu sobie” z problemem zbrodni wojennej. Rozprawa odnosi się do kwestii statusu ofiary w 
kontekście mitu i ideologii.

